Written evidence submitted by Professor
Michael Hutt, School of Oriental and African Studies
NEPAL: A SUBMISSION TO THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS
COMMITTEE'S ENQUIRY
INTO SOUTH ASIA
Nepal is now passing through what may or may
not turn out to be the final phase of a long struggle between
two conceptions of how the people of Nepal should be governed:
as subjects or as citizens. If one takes the formation of Nepal's
first political parties as the starting point, this struggle dates
back some 60 years.
There are a number of parallel themes in this
process:
1. THE MAINTENANCE
OF A
POLITICALLY ACTIVE
MONARCHY
For the king the very existence of Nepal depends
upon the relationship between the monarchy and the people. The
people are simple, humble and loyal; the king knows what is best
for them, and he ensures that conditions in his realm are conducive
to the maintenance of dharma (religion, righteousness)
and the proper social order of things. The people acknowledge
and honour the role of the king, and do not question or oppose
it. King Drabya Shah seized the throne of the tiny hill kingdom
of Gorkha in the mid-16 century, and his successors are generally
credited with having created the modern nation-state now known
as Nepal. Prithvi Narayan Shah overran most of the other petty
states of the central and eastern Himalaya in a campaign of military
conquest during the second half of the 18 century, and incorporated
them into his own territory. The Gorkhali expansion ended in 1816
after a series of battles with the armed forces of the British
East India Company, and 30 years later the Shah kings' power was
eclipsed by a courtly family which adopted the title of "Rana".
Between 1846 and 1951, when it was displaced, the Rana regime
achieved an accommodation with the British that suited both sides,
but which strengthened the traditional order in Nepal against
the forces of change unleashed by British rule in India. The extractive
nature of the Nepali state thus remained very deeply ingrained,
and the ruling elite continued to regard the mass of the population
as revenue-producing subjects rather than citizens with rights.
Over the course of these 105 years, the Shahs and Ranas intermarried
on a regular basis, and their genealogies became closely intertwined.
A disdainful view of commoner politicians and a belief in the
natural authority of the Shah-Rana elite is still endemic to this
often very wealthy class of Nepali society, which also predominates
in the upper echelons of the Royal Nepalese Army (now the Nepal
Army). However, the monarchy emerged from the trauma of 1 June
2001 palace massacre with its legitimacy severely damaged. Although
there is no hard evidence to support their view, many ordinary
Nepalis still believe that Gyanendra had some hand in the murder
of Birendra and his family—and the Maoists' bulletins and
press releases regularly refer to him as a "fratricide"
and "regicide".
2. THE DEVELOPMENT
OF A
POLITICALLY SOPHISTICATED
POPULATION
By 1990, half a million students were enrolled
in higher secondary or tertiary education, compared with a mere
2000 in 1950. The national literacy rate increased from 5% to
40% over the same period. Nepalis are more exposed to the outside
world, and events beyond Nepal's borders have provoked and inspired
political movements in the recent past: eg the death of Bhutto
in Pakistan, the release of Mandela, the fall of Ceaucescu. Since
1990 Nepal has had a free and flourishing media (newspapers, FM
radio etc).
The educated non-elite sector of Nepali society
sees democracy and the political and human rights and civic freedoms
of the individual as the only means by which Nepal can achieve
real development in the interests of all its citizens. This view
is often sharply critical of the commoner politicians, for what
it sees as their duplicity, egotism and venality, but it sees
no alternative to democratic politics. The Maoist ideologue Baburam
Bhattarai says that the master narrative of Nepal's political
history since 1950 has been the struggle between democrats and
monarchists. However, the majority of democratic forces, including
even the larger, more moderate communist parties, have historically
accepted the need for a constitutional monarchy, and in fact have
often turned to the palace for support and patronage as they compete
with one another.
Recent years have also seen the emergence of
an apolitical consumerist culture, mainly in Kathmandu, which
is anxious to protect its new prosperity and will act politically
when it is threatened, eg in 1990, after the trade and transit
dispute with India.
3. THE DEVELOPMENT
OF DEMOCRATIC
POLITICAL PARTIES
The contest for political power in Nepal was
largely confined to elite and aristocratic circles for the whole
of the 19th century and the early decades of the 20th. However,
during the 1930s a new educated urban class began to emerge. Its
most visible members were male, and in terms of their caste and
ethnicity predominantly Brahmin or Newar. By the 1940s this class
had begun to organise itself into a political opposition to the
Rana government. In party terms, the main groupings were the Nepali
Congress Party, a moderate left of centre party modelled on the
Indian Nationalist Congress, and the Communist Party of Nepal.
Although endemic factionalism has marred the electoral achievements
of the communist movement in Nepal, the total number of votes
cast for communist parties in the first two of the three post-1990
elections roughly equalled those cast for the Congress, while
in 1999 the Left as a whole was 4% ahead of Congress. Many politicians
have used their positions since 1990 to enrich themselves and
their families, leading to the emergence of a new propertied elite
that is viewed with contempt by those who obtained their membership
of the elite through birth, and with serious distrust by most
others. There is undoubtedly a gap between the politicians and
the urban civil society constituency from which most political
noise emanates. This gap is as much linguistic, generational and
cultural as it is political.
4. THE DEVELOPMENT
OF AN
EXTREME LEFTIST
STRAND IN
THE POLITICAL
CULTURE
This is now one of the more over-explained but
still least understood features of Nepal. Since the 1960s the
urban literate classes have burgeoned in size, but the severe
material poverty of the majority of Nepal's people has not been
tangibly ameliorated, nor has the profound inequality of Nepali
society begun to be redressed. This is in spite of Nepal receiving
the highest level of development aid per capita of any South Asian
state (US$ 5.2 billion per annum by 2000). Rapid population growth
has been an important contributory factor: a population of 8.4
million in 1954 had grown to over 20 million by 2001. Nepal has
now produced two whole generations in which relatively educated
people form a significant and geographically concentrated minority,
but has failed to provide many of them with opportunities for
social, material or professional advancement. Many Nepalis see
emigration as the only means of bettering their lot; the rest
(especially those who have developed a strong sense of being disadvantaged
by their ethnicity, place of birth, caste or gender) are easily
persuaded that Nepal needs radical change. This is the wellspring
upon which the Maoists have successfully drawn. Most Maoist cadres
are under 30.
5. RECENT EVENTS
IN NEPAL
The "People's War" waged under the
leadership of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) from February
1996 until late 2005 claimed approximately 12,000 lives, and as
it continued the middle ground occupied by parliamentary democracy
and constitutional monarchy was progressively squeezed. The House
of Representatives was dissolved in May 2002. Elections to local
government bodies were cancelled in August 2002. In the semi-coup
of October 2002 the king dismissed the prime minister, ostensibly
for his inability to conduct general elections. During the next
28 months he appointed three different governments, while most
of the major parties took to the streets in protest at this "regression".
Finally, on 1 February 2005, King Gyanendra took all executive
power to himself. The middle ground had all but disappeared, so
that all that remained were the two extreme positions. King Gyanendra
then embarked upon a comprehensive squandering of the opportunity
he had created, appointing corrupt men to his Council of Ministers,
oppressing the media and civil society with the crudest of measures,
and making little real effort to go after the Maoists.
King Gyanendra's actions, and especially his
announcement that municipal elections would be held in February
2006, eventually forced the seven agitating parliamentary parties
and the Maoists into each other's arms. The Maoists seemed to
have realised that a change of tactic was called for, an adjustment
to changing world realities.
A 12 point agreement was concluded by the SPA
and the Maoists in Delhi in November 2005. This stated that
an understanding had been reached to establish absolute democracy
by ending autocratic monarchy. It was also agreed that all parties
would boycott the municipal elections the king had announced for
February 2006. These were the dampest of squibs. Even the
US State Dept said on 8 February: "The United States believes
Nepal's municipal elections called by the King today represented
a hollow attempt to legitimize his power." There was a clear
lack of public support for the elections. The government detained
large numbers of political activists before the elections, restricted
media and refused to allow independent outside monitors. Maoist
intimidation and killing of candidates during the campaign also
marred the vote.
There followed an extraordinary uprising against
the king in April 2006. Tens of thousands marched in Kathmandu
and other cities, with many of the demonstrators brought in by
the Maoists from surrounding villages. When the king offered a
return to the system of government he had maintained between his
"semi-coup" of October 2002 and the full coup of February
2006, heads of foreign missions in Ktm called upon the party leaders
to accept the offer. This was poorly judged, and the leaders refused.
The king capitulated, and the House of Representatives was reinstated
on 28 April. Since that date the Maoists and the SPA have been
engaged in negotiations which on 7 November produced a comprehensive
statement of understanding. An interim government is to be established,
including Maoist representation, Maoist arms will be placed beyond
use with UN supervision, and elections to a Constitutional Assembly
will held in June 2007.
Writing in the Kantipur daily on 20 March
2005, Shyam Shrestha, the editor of the left-wing political magazine
Mulyankan, placed the blame for 1 February squarely on
the shoulders of the senior leadership of Nepal's main political
parties:
"We must end this excruciating cycle of
struggling for democracy and having it taken away. In 1950, we
got a sort of democracy, in 1953 it was taken away. In 1959, democracy
was restored and in 1960 it was abolished. In 1990 we reinstated
democracy and within 10 years it was gone again. Does every generation
have to fight for democracy all over again? We must make democracy
sustainable so that no one can ever take it away. It must be the
kind of democracy that makes the people completely sovereign.
Only that will remove the excuse some people have for taking up
arms."
6. POSSIBLE ROLES
FOR THE
UK
The UK has a strong and historically deep relationship
with Nepal and can be of great assistance to the country as it
seeks to move beyond conflict and to address some of the socio-economic
problems that gave rise to the conflict in the first place.
The immediate problem Nepal will face is one
of how to contain the needs, aspirations and frustrations of the
large number of semi-educated young men and women who took up
arms within the Maoist organisation but will soon be bereft of
any role, status or means of support. Similarly, it would seem
likely that large numbers of soldiers will be demobilised from
the Nepal Army if the ceasefire continues to hold. Assisting Nepal
in finding solutions for these people is of the utmost importance.
Second, Nepal must be helped to develop a culture
of democratic leadership. The Maoist leadership is widely seen
as less corruptible and more principled than that of the main
parliamentary parties, and this could be dangerous for the long
term future of democracy in Nepal if it is indeed the case as
some argue that the Maoists' long-term aim remains the establishment
of a single party state.
Finally, one part of Nepal's crisis over the
years has been a crisis of education. In particular, the study
of history and political science needs to be strengthened in its
higher education sector.
Michael Hutt
Professor of Nepali and Himalyan Studies
School of Oriental and African Studies
October 2006
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