Written evidence submitted by Federico
Bordonaro
INDIA'S
LIKELY GRAND
STRATEGY IN
A CHANGING
SOUTH ASIAN
CONTEXT
India is gradually emerging as a major global
power. While Delhi's rise as an economic giant has often attracted
the attention of international players and observers in recent
years, India's grand strategy and its security policy have somehow
been less analysed by mainstream media. Nonetheless, India's perception
of its strategic environment and its recent strategic dialogue
with the US, China, and Russia reveal the profound implications
of Delhi's ambitions in a complex geostrategic area: South Asia
and the Indian Ocean.
Although various efforts to improve political-strategic
relations with India's traditional rivals have been made by Delhi
recently, it is safe to assume that some patterns of India's security
policy will dominate its moves in the coming years.
First of all, Pakistan will remain India's main
geopolitical rival, and the Kashmir question will require considerable
diplomatic efforts if the two states are to avoid escalating conflict.
Islamabad will also remain Delhi's main obstacle to the latter's
maritime hegemony in the Northern Indian Ocean, also as a result
of a renewed Sino-Pakistani strategic cooperation.
Secondly, China's rise as Asia's major power
will challenge India's grand strategy, notwithstanding bilateral
efforts to improve their traditionally poor relations decisively
and to finally overcome the fallout from the 1962 border war crisis.
Beijing's maritime ambitions in the Indian Ocean, as well as China's
thirst for energy, will likely cause the two rising powers to
compete in energy-rich regions from Myanmar to the Arabian Sea.
India's perception of a hostile alignment of its neighbouring
countries (Bangladesh and Pakistan, but potentially also Nepal)
with China adds to Delhi's determination to beef up its own military
power.
Thirdly, the US-India nuclear deal (being currently
discussed in both countries and highly controversial) is the signal
of an increasingly crucial strategic cooperation between Washington
and Delhi, as the US-India-China power configuration in South,
Southeast and East Asia is rapidly emerging as a decisive global
strategic triangle and India's concerns about China's rise meet
US needs to contain Beijing.
Fourthly, Islamic radicalism will continue to
pose a threat to India's stability and to complicate Delhi's political
relations with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka.
Fifthly, India will attempt to modernise and
upgrade its military hardware, notwithstanding inner divisions
about the right way to utilise Delhi's growing power and influence.
As a consequence, the US, Russia, Israel, the UK, and France will
compete to benefit from India's defence market, while the political-strategic
considerations concerning Delhi's weapons acquisitions and nuclear
military power will also come into play in the bilateral relationship
with such providers.
INDIA'S
GEOSTRATEGIC PERCEPTIONS:
BACKGROUND AND
IMPLICATIONS
In spatial terms, India perceives its security
as being connected to three geopolitical circles. The first one
is the near or immediate neighbourhood and it encompasses India
and its territorial waters. No intrusion from external powers
into this space is, or will be, permitted by Delhi. The second
circle is the so-called extended neighbourhood of South Asia and
encompasses the whole Indian Ocean littoral. Here, competition
with China and Pakistan will likely be stiff both for strategic
dominance and political influence. Finally, the third circle is
the global stage itself on which India aims to play an increasingly
influential role.
For Delhi, the modernisation and enhancement
of its military hardware, as well as the creation of a stable
network of strategic partnerships, are the two vital elements
in order to achieve its security and economic goals in the three
circles.
As a consequence, maritime and air power projects,
as well as strategic relations with the US, Russia, Israel, and
EU powers, will form the bulk of India's grand strategy in the
near future.
Project Seabird and India's quest for maritime
power
India's ambitious Project Seabird, which has
already suffered from many delays, consists of the Karwar naval
base, an air force station, a naval armament depot, and missile
silos all to be realized in the next five years. The naval base
INS Kadamba in Karwar, Karnataka state will protect the country's
Arabian Sea maritime routes. Kadamba will become India's third
operational naval base, after Mumbai and Visakhapatnam. Six frontline
Indian naval ships, including frigates and destroyers, took part
in the commissioning. Kadamba extends over 11,200 acres of land,
along a 26-km stretch of sea front, and it will be the first base
exclusively controlled by India's navy. Eleven ships can be berthed
at Kadamba once the first phase of it is achieved; 22 ships can
be berthed there after the second phase of construction is completed
around 2007, according to INS Kadamba's first Commanding Officer
Commodore K P Ramachandran.
Notwithstanding budgetary problems that plagued
Phase I of the project, Phase II (2006-10) will represent a huge
effort that will double the existing facilities.
The geopolitics of the Arabian Sea and the Western
Indian Ocean largely explain India's determination to mount an
$8.13 billion enterprise. The China-Pakistan-India triangle is
more than ever the Arabian Sea's decisive geostrategic setting.
For the Chinese, this trilateral relationship is crucial for two
reasons: from the point of view of energy security, the Arabian
Sea and Pakistan are Beijing's access points to the oil-rich Middle
East; from the perspective of military security, Pakistan provides
China an effective counter-balancing partner in front of India's
ambitions.
Therefore, faced with geographic constraints,
the Chinese successfully proposed to Islamabad in 2001 the sharing
of the Gwadar naval base. This latter serves the Chinese purposes
in three ways: first, it serves as a tool to secure Beijing's
access to the Gulf's resources; second, it is a useful military
base to counter Washington's influence in Central and South Asia
(in fact, the Sino-Pakistani agreement came into being just four
months after US troops entered Kabul in 2001); third, Gwadar functions
as an excellent wedge between India and the Middle East and as
an offset against India's naval power.
The issue of India's Air Force
Recently, Air Chief Marshall Tyagi wrote to
Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee pointing out that "Unless
immediate steps are taken to arrest the reduction in Indian Air
Force's force levels, the nation will for the first time in its
history, lose the conventional military edge over Pakistan."
IAF analysts are concerned with Delhi's insufficient pace in upgrading
its hardware.
The issue is perceived by the military as increasingly
worrisome, which suggests that Delhi will try to launch a modernisation
campaign by seeking out Russia (its traditionally major defence
partner), the US, France and Israel (which is becoming India's
2nd weapon supplier and is negotiating projects for joint R&D
on advanced radar systems, long-endurance and high-altitude UAVs
(unmanned aerial vehicles), electronic warfare systems, and third-generation
night-fighting capabilities).
Mr Tyagi underscored that the Pakistan Air Force
(PAF) is being "beefed up" with 44 US F16s, while China
is supplying J-10 and JF-17 aircraft equipped with Russian engines.
He thus called for the IAF to proceed with the acquisition of
40 Russian-made Su-30 MKIs and he also proposed the purchase of
126 Multi-Role Medium Range Combat Aircraft as soon as possible.
According to some sources, India's needs have
rapidly attracted the interests of some major global players.
US air giant Boeing is lobbying the Indian Air Force to purchase
the F/A-18 Super Hornet and is facing competition from Dassault
Aviation of France, the producer of the Mirage, Sweden's Gripen-SAAB,
Russia's Sukhoi fighters and F-16s from Lockheed Martin.
Strategic partnerships
On 2 March 2006, the US and India reached agreement
on their controversial nuclear deal, which must be approved by
the US Congress and is causing political disputes among US and
Indian parties. The deal would provide India with American nuclear
technology and fuel, without India having to sign the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Moreover, Delhi would have to open only
14 of its 22 nuclear reactors to international inspections.
Although some Indian factions believe that it
would be very difficult for Delhi to separate civilian and military
nuclear activities, the majority of the deal's critics think that
Washington would endanger the entire non-proliferation architecture
without getting any real guarantee on India's nuclear relations
with other powers.
As of early November 2006, when the US had its
mid-term elections, it seems likely that the final decision by
Washington will be postponed to 2007.
However, the significance of the US-Indian nuclear
deal goes beyond the mere cooperation on atomic power and reveals
a changing mutual perception by the two parties. After the end
of the Cold War, India has progressively emerged as the South
Asian potential hegemon and as a power with global ambitions.
India's traditional pro-Russian stance was mitigated
in favour of a more independent foreign policy, and the US rapidly
emerged as a potential strategic partner rather than adversary
in the eyes of many Indian decision-makers, although the more
Socialist-oriented factions in Delhi still hold political influence.
Such an evolution does not mean a complete reversal
of the Cold War period. In fact, India is trying to expand its
network of strategic cooperation rather than playing one alignment
(for instance, the one with the US) against other ones.
Although Washington has renewed its strategic
ties with Delhi's arch-rival Islamabad after 1991, the US has
been showing signs of diffidence toward Pakistan since 9/11. In
the Summer of 2006, right after the nuclear negotiations with
India, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice cropped Pakistan's
nuclear ambitions when she denied that a comprehensive nuclear
deal could be reached between Washington and Islamabad that would
parallel the US-Indian deal.
Washington would like to keep excellent strategic
relations with both Pakistan and India; however, in contrast to
the Cold War situation, it is likely that India will become the
US favourite South Asian strategic partner in the next decade.
Should the US-Indian nuclear deal fail to be implemented, however,
the strategic rapprochement between Washington and Delhi would
be delayed and complicated, and Russia would probably benefit
from Delhi's disappointment.
These problems notwithstanding, the common US
and Indian perception of China as a potential Asian hegemon that
needs to be checked will push Washington and Delhi toward cooperation
in the long run.
Further, since Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Pakistan
are perceived by India both as geopolitical rivals—played
by China as encircling forces to contain India's rise—and
as the sources of social destabilization because of their developed
Islamist networks, it is likely that Delhi will seek US help against
Muslim extremism and the ensuing militant activities.
As a result, a comprehensive strategic partnership
with India seems to be appealing to Washington both as a geopolitical
tool to check Beijing and as a political, cultural, and military
rampart against Islamism in South Asia.
CONCLUSIONS
India's foreign and security policy will continue
to be focussed on Pakistan and China in the coming years. With
Islamabad, relations have improved since 2003 but both countries
have failed to radically transform their rivalry into an even
embryonic cooperation. Mistrust continues to dominate the bilateral
ties and it is unlikely that Delhi and Islamabad will refrain
from attempting to get nuclear strategic dominance over the opponent
even during détente.
The Kashmir region has already witnessed three
Indo-Pakistani wars in 1947, 1965 and 1971 plus a more limited
conflict in 1999, and its political and territorial status remains
unsettled. Since Kashmir is a convergence zone between the Russian-dominated
Eurasian landmass, the South Asian geopolitical region, and the
East-Asian geostrategic realm (dominated by China), a multilateral
solution to its crisis may be the only viable alternative to the
alternation of détente and conflict between Delhi and Islamabad.
Both the rise of China and the instability of
India's neighbourhood (Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka) suggest
that a strategic rapprochement with Washington will be sought
by Delhi even if the current nuclear deal meets with fatal obstacles
in US politics. In fact, at a time when the US is experiencing
serious troubles in achieving its strategic goals in the Middle
East, in Afghanistan and in North-East Asia, the eventuality of
a complete failure of the new US-Indian strategic dialogue would
be a deadly blow to Washington's geostrategy.
Federico Bordonaro
7 November 2006
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