Examination of Witnesses (Questions 20
- 39)
MONDAY 20 NOVEMBER 2006
MR RAHUL
ROY-CHAUDHURY,
DR GARETH
PRICE AND
DR CHRIS
SMITH
Q20 Sir John Stanley: Are you going
to elaborate on that any further, and tell us what the British
Government should be saying? In what way should the Indian Government
be more constructive towards the situation in Sri Lanka?
Dr Smith: One of the problems
that India faces is that the Sri Lanka issue is inherently tied
up with politics in Tamil Nadu and the politics of Tamil Nadu
in turn radically affect coalition politics within India, so you
have got that terrible bind that the Indian centre is in relating
to how it approaches the LTTE on the one hand and the Sri Lankan
Government on the other. If it backs one it loses; if it backs
the other it loses as well, but there are gains to be made. There
is also the legacy of the fact that Sonia Gandhi is one of the
most important power brokers, if not the most important, in India
at the moment, and of course it was the LTTE that assassinated
her husband. That is a constraint in recognising or dealing with
the LTTE in any shape or form.
In terms of the situation in Sri Lanka, I think
one of the problems that has been there over the course of the
peace process is that the international community and the Sri
Lankan Government—and I would include India as a part of
the international community—have not really recognised the
bargaining power of the LTTE. The Sri Lankan state has fundamentally
lost the monopoly of force in Sri Lanka for many years. All the
negotiating pitches and all the encouragement from the international
community—from India and so on—have been in relation
to returning Sri Lanka to, or maintaining, the territorial or
nation state status of the country, which effectively means that
the LTTE's bargaining position is very strong, but the level at
which it is being asked to negotiate is actually much lower. Effectively
what it is being asked to do is go back to the situation before
1983 and the status quo ante, which of course the LTTE is never
going to do. It is never going to do it when it also knows that
it has broken the monopoly of force once controlled by the Sri
Lankan Government.
India, I think, could play a constructive role
by dealing with the practical political issues on the ground,
which I think have been overlooked or ignored by the international
community. We know the international community has problems when
it comes to looking at partition, confederation and so on. Of
course it does.
Q21 Sir John Stanley: Thank you.
Mr Roy-Chaudhury, what should the British Government be saying
to the Indians vis-a"-vis Sri Lanka?
Mr Roy-Chaudhury: Thank you, Sir
John. I think there are two complicating factors. One is that,
as Chris pointed out, for India's policy towards Sri Lanka, Nepal
and Bangladesh there is an inherent domestic dimension for India.
That complicates it, whether in terms of Sri Lanka, and the Tamil
community or the Tamil province, which has a larger population
than Sri Lanka in the south of India; or Nepal, where there are
a number of very strong border links, and Nepali citizens in India;
or Bangladesh, from where a large number of illegal migrants have
come into India. There is an inherent relationship to India's
domestic policy when it looks at these three countries.
The second complicating factor is that India
has intervened in all three countries—in Sri Lanka in 1987
to 1990, when an Indian peacekeeping force was there; in Bangladesh
when it assisted in the creation of Bangladesh, which was, earlier,
East Pakistan; and in Nepal. It carried out a blockade of Nepal
in the early 1990s and has been intervening in Nepali politics
from the 1950s. So these are the two complicating factors, but
the advice to the British high commissioner, I think, would be
very straightforward and simple. That is, to look at the Nepal
example. What we have seen in the last few months in Nepal has
been an amazing degree of consultation among three countries—India,
the United States and Britain—and there have been meetings
at different levels on Nepal among senior officials of these three
countries. There has been a greater sense from India's perspective
that Nepal was a major problem, which would threaten Indian security
if Nepal was moving into a failed state syndrome; but I think
the key is to try to accentuate and encourage consultations between
India and other major powers on these countries—Sri Lanka
and Bangladesh, in addition to Nepal.
What form the consultation will take or how
it will evolve is something that is too early to say. The important
thing would be to try to get India to talk to Washington and London
about these three countries, as it has been doing about Nepal,
and to provide a sense that although, on one level, India is,
as Chris said, a hegemon—the most powerful and largest state
in the region—it cannot, on another level, be inactive on
these issues, because they could very well get worse. One way
to operate would be to work with other countries on this issue,
and we have recently seen United Nations involvement in Nepal
over the arms management deal and the peace accord that is to
be signed early next week. These are encouraging developments,
which would not have been possible a few months ago, but I would
see the Nepal example as a trendsetter or at least as an attempt
to look at Sri Lanka and Bangladesh from India's perspective.
Q22 Sir John Stanley: Dr Price, do
you want to come in on Sri Lanka and on what British policy towards
India regarding Sri Lanka is?
Dr Price: On the point about the
change—that has come from advice, and as Rahul says, there
has been a process of consultation with the US and the UK—there
are times when India's hegemonic status is used very beneficially.
The most recent example that leaps out is the rescue from Lebanon,
when India rescued not only Indian citizens, but citizens of Sri
Lanka and Nepal. Generally, with regard to Sri Lanka, Nepal and
Bangladesh, there are often problems of asymmetric perceptions
between India and its neighbours. India might look at its policy
in terms of one set of issues, while, in Bangladesh, a much lower
level of issues might be involved, such as how many visa counters
are open. India might be looking at the issue in terms of the
economic benefit of Bangladesh doing X, Y and Z and might very
often be looking at different levels.
Q23 Sir John Stanley: Thank you.
Briefly, are there any comments that you would like to make on
British Government policy towards India vis-a"-vis Bangladesh?
Dr Price: With Bangladesh, you
have the two parties, one of which is more pro-Indian and one
of which is anti-Indian. Bangladesh's relationship with India
is fraught. Not dissimilarly from China, India has hoped to push
economic ties to make the relationship better, but it is largely
relating to Bangladesh's internal politics that the Indo-Bangladesh
relationship faces problems.
Q24 Sir John Stanley: Finally, turning
to Nepal, I do not have any pecuniary interests to declare, but
I should state that I chair the all-party group on Nepal. I am
obviously well aware, as I am sure that the rest of the Committee
is, of the huge sensitivities in Nepal regarding its very big
neighbour to the south, so my question to you on British Government
policy towards the Indian Government and Nepal is whether the
British Government should be telling the Indians to get more involved
or, perhaps, less involved in the politics of Nepal?
Mr Roy-Chaudhury: I would say
that the key would be to be involved and to facilitate stability
in Nepal. We are looking at a key period in Nepal's history, where
there is a prospect of an end to the insurgency and of stability,
at least as one could define it for Nepal. The prospects are there,
but there are tremendous concerns. There is tremendous mistrust
between the Maoists and the military and there are differences
over the monarchy. This is a key period for the US, the UK and
India to work together to facilitate a stable process, and that
will be really key.
It is difficult for India not to be involved,
because this is one of those things in which India sees itself
having some sort of role, but the key is to get other people involved
as well. In a way, that will balance the Indian perception and
involvement on these issues. There is a sense, not only from India's
point of view, but from Nepal's point of view, that it will be
difficult for India to be involved unilaterally, so there needs
to be broader involvement. The key is the attitude in India to
facilitation. Not so long ago, India used to bristle at any attempt
at intervention or facilitation by a third party vis-a"-vis
Pakistan or any South Asian issue. Today, we see a greater confidence
in Delhi and among policy makers in Delhi that facilitation per
se is not necessarily a bad thing, especially if there is a sense
that it will bring about a more stable situation. We have seen
Washington's facilitation along with the United Kingdom during
the border confrontation with Pakistan in 2001-03 and earlier
in the 1999 Kargil conflict. But today in Delhi there is a greater
comfort level on foreign facilitation in the region and Nepal
is the result of that greater confidence in Delhi. Delhi cannot
do very much about it but it is not such a bad thing to work with
Washington and London and the United Nations to see whether there
can be stability and peace in Nepal.
Q25 Sir John Stanley: Dr Smith or
Dr Price, do you want to come in on Nepal?
Dr Smith: As Rahul said, India
is involved. You cannot really ask if India should be more or
less involved because it will be involved to a significant degree
come what may. It is important if you take India's involvement
as given, however that might manifest itself, that it is perceived
on the other side—in Nepal, Bangladesh, or, indeed, Sri
Lanka—as being done in a far better spirit than might have
been interpreted hitherto. As I said earlier, and Rahul agreed
with me, there is hegemony in the area, and India is considered
to be a bit of a bully. There is a lot of bridge-building to be
done between India and the other countries in the region. When
India moves in it tends to move in a politically aggressive way,
and in terms of greater confidence, more trust, less suspicion
on the other side, if there is anything that the United Kingdom
can do to assist the other side in receiving those signals in
a better and more constructive way it would be useful. But India
is involved, whichever way you look at it.
Q26 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: We have discussed
a number of aspects of the bilateral relationship between the
United Kingdom and India and these are obviously strong, as they
are for slightly different reasons between India and France. What
about the European Union? In so far as the EU can be said to have
a foreign policy at all, is it taken seriously in New Delhi? Is
it a factor at all, does it have any substance and if so, what?
Mr Roy-Chaudhury: If you look
at trade statistics and at India's trade relationship with the
EU, it is very clear that the bulk of the bilateral trade is between
India and Britain. In most respects Britain stands out as a key
player in the India-EU relationship. My own sense is that in respect
of the EU as an entity, there is an existing EU-India strategic
relationship, although a lot of people in Delhi wonder what it
entails. But there is on paper a strategic relationship between
India and the EU.
My sense is that for India the EU essentially
means Britain, whether that is in terms of trade relations, student
and cultural exchanges or the political relationship. The only
area where the EU is being seen now as a larger conglomerate of
states is in issues such as the nuclear suppliers group, as a
large number of EU member states are also members of the nuclear
suppliers group. For the India-US nuclear agreement to go through,
India needs to get a consensus in its favour in that group. Today,
for the first time, India is looking individually at EU member
states and ticking them off or crossing them off in the sense
of support from the EU, whether it is Finland or other countries.
But practically, the EU relationship with India is, for India,
largely a British-Indian relationship.
Q27 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Any other
observations?
Dr Smith: Very briefly, that will
come. Because of economic dynamics on both sides, there will be
a need to recognise that they must work together much more. As
Rahul said, it tends to be via the UK at the moment, and that
will erode over time.
One should not forget that Indian political
culture, bureaucracy and so forth is a difficult animal to understand,
get to know and deal with. That is getting easier. As India becomes
more of an internationalised nation state, it is becoming a lot
easier, but India is not the easiest country to get to know. English
is widely spoken, which facilitates links and so on, but there
is still a learning curve that EU countries have to go through
to push relations forward. That is going to be slightly more difficult
than in other countries, I suspect.
Q28 Mr Heathcoat-Amory: Could I ask
a bit more about trade? I think that we face the failure of the
Doha round, and therefore a number of trading blocs are seeking
bilateral deals now. The European Commission has made moves towards
some sort of free trade agreement with India, covering not just
goods, but investment, services and so on. Some Indians who I
have spoken to are rather surprised by that because the EU is
seen as rather protectionist, and they doubt whether the Commission
can deliver on this. In fact, quite recently, there have been
bad experiences over textiles. We are open and free traders by
history and instinct, so we will do our best, but is there any
feeling that Europe can do business on trade, and, if so, would
it be worth while?
Mr Roy-Chaudhury: My sense is
that it is still very limited. I do not think that that level
of confidence, as Chris was saying, is there between India and
the EU today. For Delhi, it is a question of looking at certain
advantages that could be accrued if it goes into a certain relationship
with the EU, but my sense is that confidence levels are not really
there for Delhi to make a major move on that, so I would be hesitant
in endorsing that as an Indian viewpoint.
Dr Price: It varies a little by
sector perhaps. In agriculture, the EU and India are a very long
way away, but if you look at services, India's big issue in Doha,
apart from agriculture, was that Indians be allowed to come and
work in other countries. In terms of services trade, I think that
there might be much greater synergies between the EU and India,
which could be taken forward, but agriculture will remain problematic.
Chairman: Thank you. Can we move on to
some other countries?
Q29 Mr Horam: Russia traditionally
has been India's close partner, which obviously reflects the non-aligned
period and so forth. Do you see that carrying on with the same
strength as it has in the past, and how far do you think that
Russia's increasing ties with China will affect that traditional
relationship?
Mr Roy-Chaudhury: The India-Russia
relationship traditionally has essentially been a defence and
military-dominated relationship. Trade levels between India and
Russia are, I think, at $4 billion, and they have been $4 billion
for the last 10 years, notwithstanding whatever political momentum
is put into the trade relationship.
There are two key issues for the India-Russia
relationship in the future. The first is a continuation of the
defence and military relationship, partly in terms of a realistic
assessment on the ground. Today the bulk of the Indian military
is Russian-sourced, which means that about 70% of spare parts
are dependent on Russia or of Russian origin. So the military
relationship will continue, but move into certain areas, particularly
strategic systems. Today, there is collaboration between India
and Russia on the fifth-generation advanced strike aircraft and
a cruise missile, which is under development and has been tested
by both countries. That will be the key India-Russia strategic
defence relationship.
In addition, another relationship is emerging,
and that is an energy relationship. For India, Russia is increasingly
seen as a major source of energy. India's largest investment in
oil and gas abroad is in Russia, in the Sakhalin oil and natural
gas fields. Much more effort is being put into the Russia-India
energy relationship than was the case in the past. I see those
two as the key drivers for the India-Russia relationship, which
is a far cry from the earlier relationship during the erstwhile
cold war. Today, India feels that it has a number of options in
foreign policy terms, and the end of the cold war and of the Soviet
Union was a part of its foreign policy orientation towards Washington.
The relationship will be qualitatively different, but it will
continue on strategic defence requirements and energy issues.
On the Russia-China relationship, there is today
a meeting among the Foreign Ministers of Russia, China and India,
which takes place once a year. For the first time, there was also
a summit between the three leaders of Russia, China and India.
My own sense is that that does not really mean much. It is important
that India talks to Russia and China, but it does not take priority
over India's relationship with Washington. Although there may
be a burgeoning relationship between Russia and China, my sense
is that that in itself is not going to impact on India.
The area where there could be convergence is
in the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation—the SCO. India
is an observer at the organisation, but it is an area in which
there could be more co-operation on anti-terrorism, energy security
and so on. But beyond that framework, I do not see the relationship
having much impact on global politics among the three countries.
Q30 Mr Horam: How about Japan in
all this? That is the other big power in Asia. How far does it
want to play a part in that or in promoting India-Japan relations?
Mr Roy-Chaudhury: Yes, Japan is
becoming a key player in the region. One example of the way in
which India considers these issues took place last June, when
during a period of difficulty between Japan and China, the Indian
Defence Minister flew out to Tokyo, from Tokyo to Beijing, from
Beijing to Singapore, and then back to Delhi—a route that
very few Defence or Foreign Ministers would have dared to do.
They would have not been welcome in either Tokyo or Beijing if
they had gone to the other country first.
Japan is playing an increasingly important role,
according to Indian perception. The problem essentially was over
India's nuclear tests, when Japan came down very strongly—for
obvious reasons—on India's tests in 1998, but that period
is over, and today there is a strategic dialogue between India
and Japan.
Q31 Mr Horam: Is it economic, political
or both?
Mr Roy-Chaudhury: A bit of both.
The bottom line for Japan is its energy resources. Japanese tankers
take oil from the Persian gulf. They sail to the western part
of India, and US naval forces are there. From Cape Comorin to
the strait of Malacca and Singapore, there is no military presence
other than that of the Indian navy. For Japan, strategically,
it is important to work with India on security of sea lines of
communication in the Bay of Bengal and the eastern Andaman sea.
That is the political part of the co-operation. It is important
for Japan to ensure safety and security of sea lines of communication,
and India, as the only military naval power in that part of the
world, has an important role and responsibility to ensure the
security and stability of those lines.
Dr Smith: May I add a quick comment
about Russia? During the Soviet era, the Soviets were reluctant
to transfer technology to India, whereas the Russians have been
much more forthcoming. India is hungry for technology, which will
help consolidate that relationship no end. There are cost benefits
because of the cost of technology from the west.
Q32 Mr Horam: Is the Russian technology
good enough?
Dr Smith: Let me answer in a slightly
different way. India, particularly its military, which is my former
area of expertise, has, as far as I am aware, always preferred
western technology. However, it has often found it difficult to
get its hands on such technology, in terms not just of political
access or political constraint, but of cost. By contrast, in the
1970s, 1980s and 1990s, the Soviet Union made available as much
military technology and equipment as it felt could be absorbed.
Some bits of the technology are better than others. Although India
would prefer the extremely high-tech systems on offer from the
west, it has traditionally accepted, although possibly not as
a first choice, Soviet and then Russian technology.
Mr Roy-Chaudhury: I would largely
agree with that in the sense that, for many users, Russian equipment
is more rugged and easier to use. It is not sophisticated technologically
but it works in terms of quantity and so on. However, there have
been problems. For example, there has been a high casualty rate
of MiG aircraft in the Indian air force.
There is now tremendous military interest in
acquiring technology from the west—for example, there is
a $6 billion prospective order for medium combat aircraft. The
sense is that Washington, for the first time, will be one of the
key players in getting this order. The concern in Delhi remains
about access to spare parts and technology in view of sanctions.
Sanctions were imposed during the Kargil conflict after the 1998
test, which led to the cannibalisation of a certain amount of
Indian military equipment. Certain components of the spare parts
for British Sea Harriers and Sea Kings were US-sourced. India
went to London saying, "We need spare parts for this."
London said, "It is not up to London. It is up to Washington
to provide that access."
That lesson is still of concern to Indian decision
makers. Whatever deal is finally done with the United States on
a weapons system, the provision of equipment in respect of sanctions
will be an important component. This has not existed in terms
of the India-Russia military relationship because the Russians
have never imposed sanctions on India. This is a new sort of relationship
that will be determined by the fine print in the agreement.
Chairman: Thank you. We now move on to
other areas.
Q33 Mr Illsley: I want to ask a series
of questions on other multilateral bodies and organisations of
which India is a member: the World Trade Organisation; the Commonwealth;
the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum; the South Asian
free trade agreement; the Association of South East Asian Nations;
and the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation. I want to get an idea
of which of those are important to India and which are less so,
and whether any of them give rise to particular tensions.
My colleague mentioned the Doha development
round of negotiations. India now has major industries that can
participate on a global level, yet it still is protective, particularly
on agriculture and such industries. Did India take a constructive
approach to the Doha negotiations? Is there any contradiction
between the growing industries and the need for protectionism
for others?
Dr Price: I think India's position
on the WTO is almost set by the various interests that determine
it. Farmers make up 60 to 70% of the population, and most of them
operate on a small scale. That community is certainly fearful
of foreign imports coming into India, and that determines agriculture.
If you look at the services side—the high-flying IT sectors
and so forth—they are much more liberal. They have tax advantages;
they are globally competitive, so they want greater access, in
terms of services. Industry groups, again, play a large part in
determining policy towards manufactured goods imports. So in some
areas India has a very defensive policy and in other areas it
is very aggressive, but that is also pre-determined by a quick
look at India's economy. How it works determines what its policies
will be on those different industrial, services and agricultural
sectors.
There is certainly no generic support for liberalisation,
but India's tariffs are coming down. They have halved over the
past five or six years, but India's central Government remain
reliant on customs duties and import and export duties for their
own finances, so they are in a bind on that level as well.
Q34 Mr Illsley: Is the rise of manufacturing
industries—I think that automotive parts is one that has
been quoted—going to be a threat to the 60 to 70% of the
population who are farmers? Obviously there will be some tension
between the various sectors.
Dr Price: I think up to four or
five years ago there was this idea that India could do in services
what China had done in manufacturing, so that rather than build
up a manufacturing sector India could go straight into post-industrial
services, biotechnology, IT and so forth. The problem and India's
big challenge is finding jobs for its work force. The demographics
of India are such that it is going to have a rapidly growing working-age
population over the next 20 years, which is fine if they are usefully
engaged. Over the past couple of years there has been a realisation
that India has to develop a manufacturing sector to absorb the
population.
Q35 Mr Illsley: They have got to
create a lot of jobs just to stand still.
Dr Price: And the services sector
is capital intensive in India's context. It is one person with
a computer, if you like, and it is high skilled, so to prevent
under-employment in the agricultural sector requires manufacturing
and, at the same time, migration, potentially.
Q36 Mr Illsley: What about within
the Commonwealth? I think India has 60% of the population of the
Commonwealth as well, and has played a major role in the Commonwealth,
whereas perhaps there are other countries that see it as a less
dynamic organisation these days, given the European Union and
so on. How does India see the role of the Commonwealth? Does it
see it as still a major organisation, going forward?
Dr Price: Very anecdotally, when
the Commonwealth games were held in Delhi, it was a major event,
but I would not like to comment more widely.
Mr Roy-Chaudhury: My own sense
is that there has been a major change in India's perspective on
its foreign policy, especially in its relationship with the world.
In this Washington plays a key role now, in terms of India's perspective
on a number of issues. If you are trying to prioritise it, India's
relationship with Washington today is its top priority. Everything
else, I think, takes a more limited perspective. My sense is that
the Commonwealth would be included in that.
Dr Smith: I would go slightly
further than that and say that yes, of course the main focus is
on Washington, but India now sees itself as an emerging global
player, and I think the view of the Commonwealth and the energy
that India is prepared to put into the Commonwealth will be reflected
in its global perspective, as that becomes a more dominant feature
of foreign policy.
Q37 Mr Illsley: Can I come on to
the India-Brazil-South Africa Dialogue Forum? What role does India
play in that? Is that similarly subservient to its relations with
the USA, and is there any link in there designed to assist with
the UN Security Council issue?
Mr Roy-Chaudhury: It is part of
what India sees as south-south co-operation. We are looking at
three countries in three continents, working together. India has
a strategic relationship, for what it is worth, with South Africa,
and a developing one with Brazil, but the way in which Delhi sees
it is that those three countries could play a critical role in
co-operating with one another through what is called south-south
co-operation. In no sense does it have the priority that other
relationships with India have, such as Washington's, but there
is a sense that Brazil, for example, was a major emerging power
about a decade or two ago. South Africa, again, has tremendous
potential. For Delhi, it is more a matter of global reach, but
it is in favour of technical co-operation with such countries,
often called south-south co-operation. There is not very much
more in it. It is difficult to see too many convergences of interests,
if you look at it systematically, among the three countries. On
the UN, also, there is something, but I do not see tremendous
dynamism in all this.
Q38 Mr Illsley: There is also the
South Asian free trade agreement. From what I can gather, there
is only a very small level of trade among the various trading
partners. My question is whether that will have any effect on
regional stability, given that Pakistan is a member of that organisation.
Also, how effective are India's look east policy and its relationships
with ASEAN countries?
Mr Roy-Chaudhury: On the South
Asian free trade area, there is a sense that the South Asian Association
for Regional Co-operation, which is the organisation promoting
the South Asian free trade area, is handicapped by the India-Pakistan
problems and the difficult relations in the past. I am not sure
of these figures, but I think that 70% of SAARC's trade is external
rather than internal. The internal component of SAARC trade is
about 30% or less. In ASEAN, for example, it is the reverse; 70%
of trade is inter-ASEAN and 30% is not.
Delhi has never felt that there is much momentum
in SAARC. There are complementarities among the countries in SAARC,
in terms of their manufacturing processes and culture and so on.
From Delhi's perspective, there is the problem of Pakistan's refusal
to provide most favoured nation status to India that India has
provided to Pakistan. SAARC and the South Asian free trade area
sound good politically but they are not going to be implemented
in the short term, with one exception: if there is a link with
energy. There are various proposals to bring energy from Central
Asia, via Afghanistan or Pakistan, into India. There are three
or four proposals for pipelines and if that takes off, I think
that we are looking at a massive growth area and massive interdependencies
among SAARC countries, particularly between India and Pakistan,
which will impact positively on the peace process. Unfortunately,
because of the political realities of Afghanistan and the Pakistan-India
relationship, we do not see much movement there. Also, Washington
is not particularly keen for a large percentage of South Asian
energy to be imported from Iran. That is something on which Washington
has put pressure on Delhi and Islamabad.
On South-east Asia, that is a different world
for India. It is a world in which there is far more manoeuvrability
and flexibility of options. There are no inherent constraints
such as are present in the South Asian dynamic because of historical
relationships and so on. There is a look east policy that has
focused on economic relations and is moving towards a more political
and possibly security dimension. The big question about India's
look east policy is where India and South-east Asia see each other
in terms of their relationships with Beijing. That is something
that India is concerned about. It would not want to be seen by
South-east Asians as countering Chinese influence in South-east
Asia but that may be what could result in the long term, if the
policy continues. There is a China factor which is very much present
in India's relationship with South-east Asia, but it is primarily
an economic one.
Q39 Mr Illsley: You may have answered
my final question when you made your comment about the USA at
the beginning. Why has India not applied for full membership of
the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation? Would that be due to its
leanings towards the United States?
Mr Roy-Chaudhury: There are two
reasons, I suspect. One is that there was a concern in Delhi that
if it applied for full membership of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organisation, China would want reciprocal membership of the South
Asian Association for Regional Cooperation. Although other countries
were keen that China became a member of SAARC, Delhi was keen
that SAARC be maintained with India playing an influential role,
which would be diluted if China became a member. What happened
is that Afghanistan has become a member of SAARC, but China remains
an observer. There was a sense that India felt that China would
require reciprocal membership of SAARC, which was something that
Delhi was not willing to do. The second reason is that China was
not particularly excited about India's full membership of the
Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and India was not keen to push
it, if that was not quite what China wanted.
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