Examination of Witnesses (Questions 75
- 79)
WEDNESDAY 22 NOVEMBER 2006
MS VICTORIA
SCHOFIELD AND
PROFESSOR SUMANTRA
BOSE
Q75 Chairman: Welcome, Ms Schofield
and Professor Bose. As you know, our inquiry is looking at South
Asia as a whole, but some aspects of the region are clearly particularly
difficult. What we hope to get from the two of you is a deeper
knowledge particularly of the Kashmir question. May I begin by
asking whether you could clarify the Indian position on Kashmir?
I understand that India always talks about the Simla agreement
as the basis for discussions, but I should be interested to know
what its attitude is to the United Nations resolutions and the
whole origins of this current situation.
Ms Schofield: As you rightly say,
the Indian position does take the Simla agreement now as the basis
for negotiation, and that is to be on a bilateral basis with Pakistan.
Previously, prior to Simla, the international community was involved
by definition, because of the UN resolutions, but the Indian Government
saw the Simla agreement as an opportunity to depart from having
any international mediation or, indeed, facilitation. That situation
has changed slightly in recent years, but ever since 1972 their
stated position was, "This is a matter between Pakistan and
ourselves and we do not want any mediation at all," which
was contrary to Pakistan's position; it was only too eager to
have mediation.
The situation regarding the UN resolutions,
from the Indian point of view, is that they are absolutely obsolete,
and India has never regarded them, since 1948-49, as a basis for
negotiation. The Pakistanis have suggested that India has reneged
on the holding of a plebiscite, but the Indian Government's position
is that according to the agreement—the prerequisite before
the plebiscite could be held—was for troops, or the invaders,
so to speak, or in other words the Pakistani-sponsored troops
that were in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, to withdraw. So,
whereas in all publicity we see the Indian Government criticised
for not holding the UN plebiscite, from their position—and
it is strictly from the Indian Government's position—the
arrangements for the holding of a plebiscite were never adhered
to. In other words, Pakistan never withdrew its troops, so the
plebiscite could not be held; but today in 2006 the Indian Government
completely considers that time has moved on and there is no question
of holding a plebiscite and no question of following the recommendations
of the UN resolutions.
Professor Bose: The Indian stance
on Kashmir is characterised by some ambivalence, because, for
the home audience in India, Indian officials tend to emphasise
that Kashmir, including the "Pakistani-occupied" portion
of Kashmir, is an integral part of India, with the obvious implication
that the matter is settled, and was settled long ago—in
the 1950s, in fact. On the other hand, for the international audience
Indian leaders do say that there is a bilateral dispute with Pakistan,
in which case the matter is not settled. A second dimension of
ambivalence is involved, in that India still formally lays claim
to the Pakistani-controlled part of Jammu and Kashmir; but at
the same time, for the last 50 years, since the mid-1950s, Indian
leaderships have both privately and publicly made it known that
their first preference would be the conversion of the line of
control in Kashmir into the formal international border with Pakistan.
So a double ambivalence is involved.
There are two reasons for Indian officials'
emphasis on the Simla agreement. First, the Simla agreement for
the first time characterised the Kashmir dispute as a bilateral
problem between India and Pakistan, rather than one necessitating
international intervention by the UN or some other third party;
but equally significantly, it was the Simla agreement of July
1972, negotiated between Prime Ministers Indira Gandhi and Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto, which renamed the ceasefire line running through Kashmir
as the line of control, and according to the language of the agreement
both countries undertook not to violate that line, without prejudice
to the recognised legal position of each country on Kashmir. India
is very much the status quo power in the territorial dispute over
Kashmir—hence the emphasis on the provisions and principles
of the Simla agreement.
Chairman: Thank you. That is very helpful.
Q76 Mr Hamilton: What I am confused
about is that at a time when many areas of the world that are
claiming independence and self-determination are getting that,
through UN resolutions and international pressure, Pakistan's
claim—that Kashmiris should decide for themselves what their
status should be—is being ignored by India. India says,
as you both rightly said, that these United Nations resolutions
are now out of date. Why cannot Kashmiris have the right to self-determination
when most other peoples in the world are able to do so—or
have pressure put on other nations to enable them to?
Ms Schofield: Why, indeed? That
is obviously the argument from the Kashmiri separatist point of
view. But, as we know, no country gives up territory voluntarily;
indeed, it is extremely rare for a country to do so. Referring
to Professor Bose's comments, since the instrument of accession—the
act of accession—the Indian Government's position has been
that this issue was all decided—the Maharaja decided to
accede the whole state to India—so they do not consider
further action necessary, because it would be a question of unscrambling
what has already been decided. It is a fact that the state of
Jammu and Kashmir is not a heterogeneous unit.
Although a very vociferous movement has hit
the international headlines since the insurgency started in 1989,
it is not a movement that is endorsed or supported by all the
inhabitants of the state. So, there is very much a feeling from
the Indian Government that if you unscramble Kashmir, with all
sorts of movements of dissent you could unscramble the whole of
India. This is the stock-in-trade argument that they use, but
it is not supported by the Kashmiri separatists, because they
say, "No, we are different. The Maharaja only relinquished
specific powers and we are still waiting to have our self-determination".
So it has been for the last 60 years: one side believes one argument
is valid and the other side believes that another argument is
valid.
It has been very difficult, because the Indian
Government will, as we know, not be subjected to force from any
third party. Many countries can suggest that they allow the Kashmiris
the right of self-determination, but the Indian Government is
not about to do so if it feels that the outcome will be a demand
for secession of all or part of the state.
Professor Bose: Just to add to
that, it is not just India that has given up on the plebiscite,
so to speak. Kofi Annan visited the sub-continent a few years
ago, in 2000 I believe, and publicly said that the 1950s Security
Council resolutions calling for a plebiscite under the supervision
of the United Nations are unenforceable and essentially defunct.
In 2004, General Pervez Musharraf also said that the plebiscite
option is now obsolete and some alternative route to resolving
Kashmir has to be found.
There is another catch. The Pakistani sponsorship
of the plebiscite is very legalistic, and there is nothing wrong
with that. The Pakistani understanding of the plebiscite has always
been that it should be limited to two options: India or Pakistan,
the two sovereign states. However, there is a considerable segment
of the population in the disputed territory of Kashmir, on both
sides of the line of control, more in certain regions than in
others, to be sure, whose understanding of self-determination
is actually an independent or sovereign Kashmir as a first choice.
The official Pakistani understanding of the plebiscite—self-determination
through democratic expression of the free will of the people—does
not accommodate this widespread understanding of self-determination
that is prevalent among the population of Kashmir, in both Indian-controlled
Kashmir and Pakistani-controlled Kashmir. So, the waters are rather
muddy here.
Q77 Mr Hamilton: Some Pakistani Kashmiris,
especially in this country, blame the British Government of the
1940s for this mess. Do think that that is now irrelevant as well?
Ms Schofield: Clearly, it is time
to move on, but it is a very emotional argument that is, in the
current climate, a very powerful argument for disaffection against
Britain and the British Government and, consequently, for the
disaffection and alienation that we see in Britain by British
Muslims today. Although we should say it is time to move on, I
would say that among a certain segment of both Kashmiris and British
Pakistanis who support the Kashmiri position of requiring self-determination,
the British role should not be overlooked; it should be evaluated
and considered, obviously with a view to being able to move on.
As we know, the Government, as we saw in 1997
when Robin Cook made certain statements about Britain's role,
was roundly snubbed by the Indian Government, so there is no question
of Britain actually being able to move in and assume a neo-imperial
role in this respect. It is valid to know the history, which clearly
indicates that this issue was left unresolved at the time of partition
without sufficient understanding that leaving a large territory
that geographically abuts both India and Pakistan and has both
Muslims and Hindus would be a massive bone of contention, as it
has proved to be these past 60 years.
Professor Bose: Blaming the former
colonial power is an easy way of scoring debating points and it
exists in all sorts of erstwhile colonial territories—Cyprus,
for example—and many other places. But it is not a major
issue in Kashmir or in the sub-continent more generally. In fact,
I have heard a greater sense of grievance being vented against
other external parties such as the United Nations for not insisting
on the plebiscite, or the United States for not taking advantage
of its superpower status to do something. What that something
is, is open to question and debate.
Q78 Mr Pope: Most of the problem
spots of the world appear to have been ruled at one time by Britain,
so it is an emotive point. Do you feel that Pakistan is under
an imperative to try to resolve the issue of Kashmir? Over the
last 15 years two democratically elected leaders of Pakistan have
been deposed, almost directly as a consequence of problems in
Kashmir. The huge spending on defence and the armed forces in
Pakistan clearly has some effect in distorting the Pakistan economy.
I should have thought that in those circumstances it would be
a top priority to try to resolve this issue amicably, in one way
or another, in the short term. Could you give me your views on
that, please?
Ms Schofield: You are right. It
is clearly a running sore, especially from an intellectual perspective.
It costs a lot of money and in a way means that Pakistan cannot
get on with its life and relations in South Asia. It is a logical
area to move forward on. But large segments of Pakistani society
have an emotional attachment, and in a way it is a vicious circle,
because the Government plays to those emotional attachments. Their
domestic community is expecting something more on Kashmir than
merely giving up after 60 years and accepting what they refused
to accept in 1948-49. In other words, the line of control as the
international frontier, which makes it very difficult for any
Government.
That said, the Government of President Musharraf
has made some remarkable progress—I say that having first
spoken to President Musharraf about Kashmir in 2000. At that point,
he was adamant that the UN resolutions and the plebiscite should
be held and his learning curve has been very steep and swift.
He is determined that it is in Pakistan's interest to resolve
the issue. But there has to be something to hand out to the domestic
community.
There is also the argument that Pakistan's only
real enemy, so to speak, is India. What, then, do you do with
the Pakistan army? Fortunately, or unfortunately, its attention
has now shifted and there is occupation for the Pakistan army
relating to events in Afghanistan. While you may say it is eminently
sensible to solve Kashmir, previously the argument was that the
Pakistan army which is really the guiding force behind whatever
happens in Pakistan, be it a civilian or a military government,
will not let a solution happen because they would effectively
be out of a job. These undercurrents are also at play.
Professor Bose: Kashmir has been
Pakistan's sacred national cause since 1947, and there is a wide
and prevalent irredentist view about it among both the élites
and the masses in Pakistan. At the same time, it has become increasingly
clear that an indefinite conflict or indefinite state of confrontation
with India over the Kashmir issue is not a serious strategic option
for Pakistan. Pakistan is caught in a bit of a cleft stick, if
that is the correct expression.
Q79 Mr Pope: What do you think the
prospects are for the peace process and dialogue over the coming
year? If there are elections in Pakistan in 2007, will they make
it more difficult to move the peace process forward? You said
that the issue plays well with parts of the Pakistan populace.
Will that constrain President Musharraf in the two elections?
Ms Schofield: We are getting into
a very interesting scenario in relation to Pakistan. It is clear
that President Musharraf wants to stay, and intends to do so.
The presidential elections will most likely come first so that
he can ensure that he stays in power. If he does, that will obviously
influence the outcome of the Assembly elections, so it could well
be more of the same, which would mean more of the same peace process.
The lobby that is opposed to the peace process—it
is mainly the orthodox lobby, which believes that Musharraf has
already given over too much on Kashmir—will not hold much
sway, especially at election time. The danger is that a very discontented
member of that lobby manages to get to Musharraf before or immediately
after the elections and the whole apple cart is upset. We really
do not know what will happen. There is always a danger. Musharraf
has supporters, but he also has detractors who are unhappy about
the rapprochement with India for the reason that Professor Bose
gave: it has been part of Pakistan's irredentist policy always
to be fighting for Kashmir.
Overall, the process involves almost leaving
aside a resolution for Kashmir; we are now talking about solutions
rather than resolutions. In this electronic age and the new age
of South Asian politics, the average Pakistani, like the average
Indian, wants the peace process to move forward. Borders can no
longer be sealed. Twenty years ago, one could impose a news blackout
and seal borders, but such things are impossible with the internet
and e-mail. Indeed, the younger generation want to get together.
There are many aspects on which Pakistan and India can co-operate;
hence the peace process will work towards the cultural, social
and educational exchanges that they all want. If that is tied
in with who will actually be running Pakistan, it should be more
of the same.
I am not sure that we will see a resolution,
as it were. The process will just continue ticking over. Unless
Musharraf suddenly feels that he has to play the strong man and
make a demand of the Government of India—he indicates every
so often that he is getting discontented with not moving forward—we
will probably have more of the same over the next couple of years.
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