Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80
- 91)
WEDNESDAY 22 NOVEMBER 2006
MS VICTORIA
SCHOFIELD AND
PROFESSOR SUMANTRA
BOSE
Q80 Mr Pope: That is quite interesting.
It was my assessment that the situation is almost static, but
that there will be small steps forward. So buses being able to
cross the line of control is a welcome move, but there will not
be any historic shift in the medium term, will there?
Ms Schofield: No, I do not think
so. In a way, it would almost be dangerous if there were, because
if it were too dramatic, it could be quickly reversed. Musharraf
says that he is allergic to the line of control, and the Government
of India imply that the line of control is the only acceptable
solution as far as they are concerned. Siachen is a possible issue
for agreement.
Q81 Chairman: We will come on to
that. Do you want to add anything, Professor Bose?
Professor Bose: There are two
problems with the current peace process. First, there is not that
much by way of tangible progress. Sure, there are certain cross-border
links: there is the recent joint anti-terror mechanism, although
we will have to see how that goes. But there is really no definite
decisive forward movement on the issue of Siachen, for example,
which has been hanging fire—that is probably not the most
apt term—for the past couple of years at least. There is
no sign of a resolution to that in sight.
The Indian preference is to drag out the peace
process as much as possible. By contrast, the Pakistanis are eager
for swift results. There is a chance of Pakistani restlessness
and impatience piling up and leading to a loss of faith in the
peace process as a whole. The second problem, which I allude to
briefly for the moment, is that the substantive positions on what
a solution to the Kashmir dispute could look like are very far
apart.
For example, Musharraf keeps talking about what
would amount to a joint India-Pakistan condominium of Kashmir,
an idea that has been around for the past 50-plus years. That
implies a direct Pakistani role in what is today Indian-controlled
Kashmir, and that is unacceptable to the Indians. They would be
phobic to any development of that nature. Those are the two problems
there already.
Q82 Sir John Stanley: May I ask you
both whether Britain has any worthwhile contribution to make to
try to move the two countries towards a settlement of the Kashmir
issue? Do you think that our past is against us and we should
be keeping out of it, or should we be speaking out loud and clear?
If so, what do you think we should be saying to the two Governments?
Ms Schofield: Britain does have
a role if one considers Kashmir as a humanitarian issue. That
is where Britain has already played an important role, although
not necessarily formally with the Government. British commentators
have highlighted human rights abuses on all sides. They have studied
the situation with the militants and the Indian army and the situation
in Pakistan-administered Kashmir.
A watchful eye is helpful. As I say, at Government
level it is extremely difficult because, interestingly, the Pakistani
Government would very much appreciate British mediation, but only
if it pushed Pakistan's position. It would not appreciate British
mediation if the suggestion was, "You are best off with the
line of control". As we have heard, it is a muddle because
one country will say one thing on the one hand and want another
thing on the other. Clearly, Pakistan would only want help if
favourable to its position.
Conversely, the Indian Government are absolutely
allergic to anything that smacks of third-party mediation. However,
in a case of dire distress, for example during the Kargil situation,
the then Prime Minister of India was only too happy to pick up
the telephone and speak to President Clinton, who in turn spoke
to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif. So the situation shifts depending
on what is happening.
It is clear that the Indian Government gets
annoyed by Britain, the United States or other countries talking
about a situation that they consider part of their internal affairs.
But they have slightly softened and the facilitation mode is now
less unacceptable than previously—anything that breaks the
log jam. But as Professor Bose says, the real conundrum is that
Pakistan's and India's visions of what might be the eventual resolution
of the Kashmir issue are on completely different levels at the
moment.
Professor Bose: It is fair to
say that Britain is regarded as a relatively benign influence
in the subcontinent, so there would not be any great opposition
per se to Britain playing a greater role of some sort, as long
as that role were played very discreetly and with the utmost attention
to diplomacy. I think the reason for the snub to Robin Cook some
years ago was that his intervention was not perhaps as discreet
and diplomatic as it could have been, hence some feathers were
ruffled.
That said, my view is that Britain could play
a constructive role as part of a broader, concerted, multilateral
effort to push the India-Pakistan peace process along. I am talking
about Britain acting in concert with other major players. What
form such a multilateral effort could take is of course open to
question, but I am fairly sure that without discreet but stronger
international support for the India-Pakistan peace process, it
will not yield dividends or results.
Q83 Sir John Stanley: Thank you.
May I turn to another aspect—the Kashmiri independence parties?
Could you give us your interpretation of just how strong or, perhaps,
declining a force they are? How big or how little a stick do they
wield as far as the Indian political system is concerned? Could
you give us your perspective on the degree of influence that they
exercise?
Ms Schofield: The movement has
changed in the last 15 years. It was at its height in the mid-1990s
and it really took the wind out of Pakistan's sails in terms of
requisitioning a plebiscite, because there was to be no provision
for a third option. This was bandied about—Pakistan would
not accept the third option—but the Kashmiris themselves,
once they began to get going and learnt more about their own history,
said—I heard this frequently when I was in the valley—"Why
should we swap one set of masters for another? If we are to be
free, let's be free." This was very much in the spirit of
the collapse of the Soviet Union, the creation of the five central
Asian republics, the fall of the Berlin wall and so on.
There was a movement, but in a way it was unchoreographed.
The people used to say, "We would like our azadi—freedom,"
but if you tried to pin them down and say, "What do you mean
by freedom? Which parts could have freedom?" you found that
it was about defining what was meant by the state of Jammu and
Kashmir. This is where even their movement came unstuck, because
they began to realise that if it were put to a vote, the Buddhists
of Ladakh would not necessarily vote for independence, because
there are only about 130,000 Buddhists and their fear has always
been that they would be swamped by the valley, hence their movement
wanting their own autonomous hill council answerable to New Delhi.
The Hindus of Jammu would clearly not want to be part of the independence
movement. Then you have the situation in the northern areas; you
have the situation in Pakistani-administered Kashmir.
So when you tried to pin people down on what
they wanted, that was more difficult. The independence movement
has almost been reduced down to the valley. Of course, the valley
is much smaller than the whole state of Jammu and Kashmir, which
begs the question whether an independent valley would be viable
as we understand an independent country to be. Essentially, people
have wanted not to give a definition. I have even talked with
people who have said, "Let us get our independence from India
first and then we will decide whether we want to be part of Pakistan
or independent. Let's not put the cart before the horse. Let's
not consider the endgame," but that makes things very difficult.
It is now a movement of dissent. The movement
for accession to Pakistan is very, very small. The Pakistani Government
might not like to admit it, but it is mainly in the border areas
round Baramulla and Sopore that there are still groups that talk
about becoming part of Pakistan. Increasingly, however, independence
is an idealistic idea that people are not sure they will ever
see realised. Even some of the pro-independence Kashmiris are
suggesting that what they mean by that is good governance. This
is where the idea comes from that they will warm to a soft-border
idea, because then, they feel, they will have a bit of support
from Pakistan. What they fear more than anything is the border
being sealed and the Indian army moving in and repressing any
dissent at all. Independence is still an unclear, uncharted movement,
but it does exist.
The problem is that, because of the way the
elections are set up, those people will not contest any elections
controlled by the Indian Government, so it is very difficult to
understand what body of public opinion is behind them. There have
been no polls. The All Parties Hurriyat Conference sits outside
the State government and speaks very eloquently. Its members are
now able to travel, sit in international forums and seminars and
put forward its position on human rights and the abduction of
various people but, in terms of quantifying popular support, because
the APHC has never contested elections, it is quite difficult
to know exactly how much support it has.
Q84 Sir John Stanley: Professor Bose,
could you give us your perspective on the independent Kashmiris?
Professor Bose: The Kashmiri independence
movement is very factionalised and demoralised. Leaders are typically
inept on both sides of the line of control, and the organisations
are weak. The paradox is that independence politics is not irrelevant
in Jammu and Kashmir on either side of the line of control. That
is because the idea of independence still has significant popular
resonance on both sides of the line of control, but, as I said
earlier, more in certain regions of the disputed territory than
others. It is uneven support, but it is very much there.
That is why the leaders and groups that might
represent the independentist tendency cannot simply be moved out
of the political arena despite their obvious weaknesses. It is
not entirely their fault that they are weak and disunited. They
have been subject to repression and manipulation by two states,
not one. It is a political point of view that needs to be taken
into consideration when thinking about any settlement.
During 2004 and 2005, the main pro-independence
group, the Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front, or JKLF, conducted
a mass signature campaign in Indian-controlled Kashmir, limited
mainly to the Kashmir valley, though not entirely. It claimed
to have secured 1.5 million signatures. The valley's population
is 6 million at the most, so that is a quarter of the valley's
population, which is quite impressive. The petition that those
1.5 million people signed said that the people of Kashmir and
their representatives should be given some sort of seat at the
table in negotiating the terms of a settlement and that the peace
process should not remain confined to the interstate India-Pakistan
dimension.
That is a reasonable stance, I think, but it
also reveals that independentists have realised—at least,
some of them have realised—that their ideal scenario is
unattainable. It is a fantasy, and some way out has to be found.
Q85 Chairman: Can I take that a step
further? Are Jammu Kashmir Liberation Front-type politics stronger
in the diaspora than in Kashmir?
Ms Schofield: The diaspora is
a very vocal body that I think has formed many opinions in Britain.
The fact is that a lot of the diaspora are not from the valley
at all. They are from Mirpur.
Chairman: I have many in my constituency.
Ms Schofield: I am sure that you
do. I am sure that they are all from Mirpur. There has been friction
between the two groups, especially when the valley Kashmiris were
not allowed to travel. On one hand, they are grateful that they
have raised international awareness of the Kashmir issue, but
on the other they are slightly irritated that the Mirpuris have
been putting it about that they suffered. They have not suffered
at all; it is the valley Kashmiris who feel that they have suffered.
It is arguable that if the state were put back together again,
there would be a row between the Mirpuris and the Kashmiris, who
do not speak the same language. The Mirpuris do not speak Kashmiri.
Isolated from the ground realities, they have been much harder
on their objectives for an independent Kashmir. Once you get into
the practicalities, the difficulties have been revealed.
Adding to what Professor Bose said about the
JKLF and the independence movement, which clearly needs a seat
at the negotiating table notwithstanding the fact that it has
not participated in elections, you have the long arm of the militants.
The assassination of Professor Abdul Ghani Lone was a clear indication
that, when there is recognition that we actually do have to talk
to the Indian Government, one loses one of one's nine lives pretty
quickly. That fear always exists among the All Party Hurriyat
Conference that, if they look like they are too close to negotiating
with the Indian Government, they will not survive.
Q86 Chairman: What about the role
of the Pakistan Government in their relationship to those groups?
Do the Pakistani Government try to influence them and engage with
them?
Ms Schofield: Very much so. They
have their favourites and, currently, their favourite is the Mirwaiz
Omar Farooq, whereas the All Party Hurriyat has now split. Indeed,
the JKLF has split. It has various factions and that makes things
so difficult. There is so much personality politics that it is
difficult to find the coherent voice of the Kashmiri people; both
Governments play on that. It is difficult to find the one spokesman.
It is not even like the Palestinian situation way back, in which
you felt if you were talking to Yasser Arafat that you were at
least talking to the Palestinian movement. You are not quite sure
who you are talking to because you will hear different things
from different leaders.
With the Pakistan Government it is difficult
because they have their different agendas. They have their agenda
for the international community. They have their agenda for the
domestic community. Notwithstanding the change in position in
respect of the plebiscite—a remarkable change—they
do not really want to let go of the Kashmir issue. They want to
feel that they have a role to play, which is why President Musharraf
is suggesting the soft-border, joined condominium. It would suit
Pakistan very nicely. It certainly would not suit the Indian Government.
Pakistanis do care; Kashmir may be part of their irredentist foreign
policy, but there are segments among the Pakistanis who genuinely
care about the Kashmiri Muslims, and play the Muslim brotherhood
card and say that they are worried about what is happening to
"our Muslim brethren", but I would not say that the
Government is entirely altruistic.
Q87 Mr Pope: I was interested in
the issue of the popularity or otherwise of the notion—perhaps
a romantic notion—of the struggle for independence, and
how strong that is in Pakistan-administered Kashmir and whether
it is linked to what you have told me. How much support is there
for the insurgency in Azad Kashmir?
Ms Schofield: There was a lot
of support for the insurgency. The time when people really thought
that there would be change was in 1990, when it really was a mass
political movement. Women were out on the streets. It was a completely
different genre of revolt from what it is now. The Azad Kashmiris
were all for a change, but again they would say one thing, but
actually mean another. Again, this is one of the incongruities
of the whole issue: whereas the Pakistan Government were happily
supporting the self-determination of the Kashmiris in the valley,
they were not supporting—and do not support—the self-determination
of the population of Azad Jammu Kashmir or Pakistan-administered
Kashmir at all. Just as in the valley, no Kashmiri who is part
of an independence movement party can contest the elections. It
is a small population. Numbers are hard to assess, but it is 1
million to 2 million in Azad Jammu Kashmir. While they grumble
about their rights and the manipulation of the elections, they
do not really think that their situation will change. They see
essentially the importance of the Mangla dam and Pakistan will
not give up on that, no more than it will give up on Northern
Areas with the Karakoram highway. The most that they feel that
they can push for is compensation when the level of the Mangla
dam rises or falls. It really is not a movement that is comparable
with the valley movement.
Mr Pope: That is very helpful.
Professor Bose: The stronghold
of pro-independence politics in Pakistani-controlled Kashmir is,
of course, in Mirpur, in the southern part of Azad Kashmir—that
is what you see reflected in your constituency—and to some
extent also in Poonch. Although Poonch is divided, there are a
lot of strongly pro-Pakistan people there too, along with independence
supporters. I would say that the core stronghold of pro-independence
sentiments is the Kashmir valley, on the Indian side of the line,
plus certain areas of the Jammu region in Indian-controlled Kashmir
adjacent to the valley that are predominantly populated by Kashmiri-speaking
Muslims, as is the valley. It is important to understand that
the pro-independence sentiment is as much the preserve of an ethno-linguistic
community as anything else. It is to do with the sense of Kashmiri
culture, history and tradition that revolves around the Kashmir
valley.
Obviously, the Hindus, Sikhs and Buddhists of
Indian-controlled Kashmir want no part in pro-independence activity.
However, pro-independence appeals also largely fall on deaf ears
among Muslims in Indian-controlled Kashmir who are not Kashmiri-speaking
and part of the cultural orbit of Kashmiriness. As Victoria said,
the numbers are significantly larger on the Indian side of the
line than on the Pakistani side. Azad Kashmir has perhaps 3 million
people at the most, and of course a significant number are in
the diaspora. In the Kashmir valley there are at least 6 million,
plus another 1 million or 2 million in the Jammu region who could
be classed as independence supporters.
Q88 Mr Hamilton: May I just come
back to something that both of you have hinted at? How much are
the forces that are struggling for independence, or believe in
it and promote it, actually fuelled by a Kashmiri identity and
the Kashmiri language, and how far is there an Islamic push behind
it? One of the reasons why I ask that is that I have very good
friends—I also have a substantial Kashmiri population in
my constituency—who are Hindu Kashmiris from Jammu. They
often say that when they were children—they are in their
40s now—there was no problem with Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus
and Buddhists living side by side. Now that is not the case when
they go back to visit home and see their parents. They blame that
on the increasing Islamicisation of the independence movement.
How true is that?
Ms Schofield: It is a development
that really occurred even before the insurgency began, when the
Muslim United Front, the group of political parties that contested
the elections, was formed in 1987. It is a known fact that those
elections were rigged and the MUF was not able to get its candidates
elected. It was going to get only about four candidates in, but
they were not allowed in. That is where there was more Islamic
identification of the political movement. Because it was the MUF
it was able to speak from the mosques. Essentially, as has happened
in other countries, the political dissent that had been suppressed
went into the mosques. That is where there began to be that fusion.
There was a little bit of influence at that stage—they dressed
in white robes and played the Islamic card.
At that point there was the exodus from the
valley of the majority of the Hindu population. There were some
targeted assassinations, but then Governor Jagmohan assisted them
to leave—it was a murky area (in terms of whether the Hindus
really had to go), but you got this movement out. If you speak
to the JKLF now it says, "No, we are a Kashmiri movement
and we want the Hindus back, we want the Sikhs to stay, we want
everybody. It is for our independence." It very much tries
to make clear that its movement is not a Muslim movement at all.
From the outside, you get more identification of it being a Muslim
movement, but it does not have the extremism and radicalism that
we see in other Islamic movements. That was never part of Kashmir's
make-up. It had a far more Sufistic, softer face of Islam. However,
unfortunately, as the movement was radicalised with more militants
coming from Pakistan and the remnants of the Afghan jihad moving
over, the speech and appearance of certain elements seemed more
Islamic. However, I agree with Professor Bose that the actual,
genuine independence movement is more of a Kashmiri one. Equally,
it does not include the Muslims of the Jammu region who do not
speak Kashmiri.
Mr Hamilton: Thank you. That was very
helpful.
Professor Bose: It is difficult
to get away entirely from the religious and Islamic angle, for
one historical and two current reasons. The historical and sociological
reason is that the Kashmir valley, for example, has been an overwhelmingly
Muslim area since the 14th century—more than 95% Muslim.
True, that is a certain regional variant of Islam, but Muslim
none the less. That is the historical and sociological factor.
There are two current factors. First, a lot
of people in Indian-controlled Kashmir, in the insurgency-affected
areas, feel that they have been abused because they are Muslims
by a state—India—that although it might not be a Hindu
state, none the less is largely led and run by non-Muslims and
whose personnel on the ground in Kashmir, in particular the security
forces, are predominantly non-Muslim also. That is current factor
number one.
Current factor number two is that of course
this feeling that has developed since the insurgency really took
off in 1990 is very much fed and stoked by Pakistani sources and
most of all by the groups of so-called Jihadist orientation which
see the armed struggle in Kashmir specifically as a struggle to
liberate a Muslim land and people from alien, infidel occupation.
Mr Hamilton: Thank you. That is very
helpful.
Q89 Chairman: On that last point,
how much support comes from Pakistan, either from its Government
or elements within the Government, to people involved in the insurgency?
Ms Schofield: Traditionally, a
lot of support—it was at its height in the early 1990s.
Pakistan was taken by surprise by the insurgency. Obviously, it
has been looking to nab—as they themselves would say—the
Kashmir valley for a long time, especially since the 1965 war.
However, at that stage it was slightly dormant on Kashmir and
was preoccupied with Afghanistan. In 1989 and 1990 essentially
it was a people's movement, but the Pakistanis moved swiftly into
action. Given that the line of control was not sealed by any means—as
far as it was concerned, it was a porous border—there was
a lot of trafficking. There were the camps in the early 1990s.
Then there was a push on the Government: essentially they were
exporting terrorism. So some of the camps were closed down and
they reinvented themselves.
It is very difficult. If you talk to the Pakistani
Government, they will tell you that there were no camps at all,
but clearly there has been sustenance and support to such an extent
that a lot of the local Kashmiris complain that their movement
has been taken over by Pakistan. There is no doubt that there
was inter-fighting between the movements. The Hizbul Mujahideen,
which was essentially a creation of Pakistan, wiped out a number
of the leaders of the JKLF in the early 1990s. That was instrumental
in the JKLF renouncing violence. When Yasin Malik was released
in 1995 he renounced violence because the militant wing of the
JKLF had been decimated.
So it is a presence, but very difficult to quantify.
The difficulty from Pakistan's point of view is that, as I said,
it will say one thing to the international community, but it needs
an exit strategy—it does not want completely to rein in
the militant element because it still exerts pressure on the Indian
Government.
Q90 Mr Younger-Ross: I want to move
on to various other parts of Kashmir, outside Indian and Pakistan,
that are currently controlled by the Chinese. Can you comment
on the status of the Chinese-administered Kashmir areas?
Ms Schofield: There is no one
there, so at least there are no human rights abuses. I do not
see the situation ever changing. The Indian Government may not
like it, but the Aksai Chin is a remote area and it facilitates
China to cross from Xinjiang to Tibet. There is a stretch of road
of approximately 100 miles and China took it over without India
realising. India has not formally agreed to it and is currently
negotiating its border with China, but it is keen to improve relations
with China whose President is currently visiting India, so it
is highly unlikely that India would ever say that it wants that
bit back. It is a fait accompli and a facilitation because China
built and controls the road, and the area is so remote.
Q91 Mr Younger-Ross: You say that
there is no one there, not even nomadic tribes.
Ms Schofield: No, it is completely
uninhabited as far as I know. I wish that I had been there, but
I have not. It was convenient and practical for the Chinese to
build the road across the Aksai Chin rather than round. That is
why they whacked it through before any Indians, who do not go
up there, realised. Suddenly, a patrol saw the Chinese there and
that was that. It is a non-issue. It seemed to be an issue when
China was more supportive of Pakistan's position, but China has
now neutralised itself and wants peace between India and Pakistan.
It has been very reticent in any statements remotely supporting
Pakistan's position. I do not think that India, with all that
is going on, would muddy the water with China and insist on having
the Aksai Chin back. At some point, when it sorts out the line
of control, it may eventually agree to it officially, but no one
wants to agree to anything at the moment, so it remains (an unofficial
occupation)..
Professor Bose: May I respond
to your earlier remarks about insurgency in Kashmir? Pakistan's
support for insurgency in Kashmir is like a tap that is sometimes
turned on full blast and at other times is reduced to a trickle.
To the best of my knowledge, it has never been entirely shut off,
but the speed and velocity has been modulated over the years.
Over the past three years, direct and active support by the Pakistani
military has been reduced to more or less a trickle following
the 1999 and 2002 crises. However, it is difficult to deny the
claims of the Indian military and the Indian diplomatic establishment
that the Pakistan military have for a long time—since at
least 1987—been up to their neck, or even their eyes, in
supporting and even sponsoring insurgency in Kashmir. I have personal
experience of insurgency-affected areas close to the line of control
as well as in the interior of Indian-controlled Kashmir. It is
clear that, given the sophistication and quantity of weapons and
equipment that insurgent groups have, their high calibre of training,
and signs of logistical support from across the line of control,
a professional military establishment has been at work in supporting
insurgents. That is clearly proven.
Chairman: I am grateful to both of you.
We have had a useful discussion and I feel at least better informed
about many of my constituents' views, which is interesting. It
has been good preparation for our visit to the region next week
when these issues will no doubt be raised in Delhi and Islamabad.
Thank you very much.
| 
