Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)
SIR RICHARD
DALTON AND
DR. ROSEMARY
HOLLIS
2 MAY 2007
Q1 Chairman: We have before us two
people whom we know very well, Sir Richard Dalton and Dr. Rosemary
Hollis, and we are just beginning an inquiry that will look at
Iran. We thought that it would be helpful if we focused initially
on the recent captives crisis and the events surrounding it. I
am conscious that, because of the election timetable, some of
my colleagues are not here today. Nevertheless, we have a quorum,
and I am sure that we will be able to cover all the territory.
Would you both set out how you saw the objectives
of the Iranians in capturing and detaining our marines and sailors?
Why did they do it? What were they trying to achieve? What was
their purpose and did they meet their objectives in doing this?
Sir Richard Dalton: We do not
know. We do not know what their objectives were because we do
not know who took the decision. There are three options. The first
is that the system decided that it wanted to make an example of
the British and this was the way to do it using its constitutionally
decreed arrangements, ratified if necessary by the supreme command
of the armed forces, Ayatollah Khamenei. At the other end of the
spectrum, it might be that local commanders decided that this
would be a good thing to do; they believed that they had mounted
a successful operation against the British in 2004 and it was
a good time to do it again. In between those two options, it could
be that the commanders thought that it was a good idea and checked
it with their military superiors, who had a quiet word with somebody
on the political side who said, "Well, go ahead and do not
worry; the system will back you up after you have done it."
We have no evidence that I am aware of publicly to choose between
those three options.
Speculating about their motives, I think that
they wanted to show that they were tough and ready to repel anybody
who wanted to aggress against their territory, so they had a general
objective of showing military determination. Secondly, they wanted
to taunt the British, who are regarded as enemies, particularly
in the Revolutionary Guard and in the higher clerical circles.
The target was one that they would have spotted because they keep
an extremely close watch on what goes on, and they would have
concluded that for low military cost they might well be able to
make a significant political demonstration against the United
Kingdom, their habitual enemy.
There might have been feelings to assuage because
they—particularly in the Revolutionary Guard—had been
on the receiving end of some setbacks, such as the arrests in
Irbil by the Americans, with five of the Revolutionary Guards'
associates kept by the Americans. There had also been a high level
probable defector, Mr. Asgari, which was a blow to their pride.
The Revolutionary Guard commanders may have thought that it was
a good time to show that they could not be taken for granted and
were ready to defend their position. Speculation about who took
the decision and what their motives were is beside the point.
The system took up the action as soon as the news came through
to Tehran that the captives had been taken and ran with it. Within
a matter of minutes or hours, it became a system-wide exercise.
Q2 Chairman: We will go into other
aspects of that in a moment, but have you got anything to add,
Dr. Hollis?
Dr. Hollis: I go along with everything
that Sir Richard has said about the options over how it originated.
I concur totally that once it had started, the system was going
to play it for all it was worth. I would add that the Iranians
seem to have a propensity to play on a very large battlefield
and to try to have as many options in the air as possible. While
it is not actual warfare, it is a sort of asymmetrical warfare.
That fits in with Iran's own rhetoric in which it said that, "If
the Americans attacked us, they would be mistaken if they assumed
that we would retaliate with missile attacks on US assets in the
region. We have many other ways of making their life difficult."
That episode fits nicely with Iran's sense of its place in the
region. It has multi-faceted relationships in the region and multiple
opportunities to make its presence and position felt.
Q3 Sir John Stanley: Sir Richard,
will you explain why you appear to rule out a fourth option, namely
that it was retaliatory action for the taking into custody of
certain Iranian personnel and, if the media reports are to be
regarded as authentic, for the news that more would be taken into
custody in Iraq by Iraqi security forces and the US?
Sir Richard Dalton: I certainly
do not rule that out. I said that they wanted to assuage their
feelings that had been sorely hurt by that action. It could have
been a direct retaliatory action on the grounds that the UK would
be a softer touch than getting directly at the United States.
Q4 Chairman: In your answer earlier,
Sir Richard, you referred to the regime taking on the issue and
using it. In an article that you wrote a few weeks ago, you said
that the Iranians appear to have been improvising rather than
working on an overall diplomatic plan. Could you summarise how
the Iranian diplomacy worked once they had taken it on in the
way that you described?
Sir Richard Dalton: I do not know
any of the inside story. You would have to ask the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office to give you a good answer to that question.
It was clear, as in the case of the capture in 2004, that the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Tehran had to play catch up to
find out which units were holding those people and why, what the
line of communication was and what the view of the political leadership
was of the action taken to capture them. How matters evolved in
that interplay of the different actors in Tehran is, in my experience,
always shrouded in mystery. They keep their counsel very close.
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is a faithful expounder of an
agreed line, but does not take a foreign embassy into its confidence
about what line is being taken by which players in the preparation
of that agreed line.
Q5 Chairman: A question for both
of you: do you feel that the Iranians now regard the way in which
they handled our personnel as sensible? I refer to their use of
confession, televising, and the threats that were made to the
personnel. In retrospect, might they think that perhaps they should
not have done that?
Dr. Hollis: If I may say so, I
think that the Iranians deemed it a pretty successful manoeuvre
from start to finish. It ended happily, and at the right time.
They had sent messages, they had tested to see how far they could
go and they regrouped when they came up against the limits of
that. I dispute the argument that they made at the time of the
release of the personnel to the effect that, had Tony Blair not
taken the issue to the Security Council and to other members of
the European Union, it could all have been resolved sooner. The
fact that they said that was indicative of the careful manoeuvres
in which they were engaged, and it justified their position. However,
by taking the issue to the UN Security Council and to fellow EU
members, the British in effect raised the stakes, but also established—for
all to see—the extent of support that they were likely to
receive. They demonstrated to the Iranians that they were not
a pushover.
Sir Richard Dalton: I broadly
agree with that. I would add that it was a very high risk strategy
for the British to go to the Security Council at the time that
they did. Making a large public fuss is rather different from
making private representations to allies and regional neighbours
of Iran. The more one uses publicity and the international pulpit,
as it were, the higher the value of captives to some of the extremists
in the Government whom one is trying to influence. The fact that
the release of Faye Turner was aborted as a consequence of going
to the Security Council shows the degree to which a risk existed.
In addition to the EU partners, who I suspect
would have been prepared to go into reverse in some of their dealings
with Iran had the issue remained unresolved after a period of
time, the key influences on the Iranians were, I think, the regional
ones. As Dr. Hollis said, a major Iranian objective was to show
power in the region, yet they had a stream of phone calls from
all their regional neighbours, saying, "Please bring this
to an end."
Q6 Mr. Horam: Why did the Syrians
take the line that they took? They made it plain that they were
against the Iranian position. Why would they do that?
Sir Richard Dalton: I do not think
that they made it plain publicly. There have been articles suggesting
on the basis of Syrian briefings that the Syrians were pleased
to help. That would fit with the Syrian wish to make it plain
to the west that it is not a country to be put into the doghouse
and isolated, in the way that might be associated with US policy,
but rather is a reasonable country, that can be dealt with. Putting
a good word in would have been a logical course as part of the
Syrian campaign to rehabilitate its image.
Q7 Mr. Horam: That is part of its
wider game plan.
Sir Richard Dalton: Yes.
Q8 Mr. Horam: Do you agree, Dr. Hollis?
Dr. Hollis: I do. The Syrians
saw it as an opportunity to demonstrate that they could be useful.
I think that they capitalised to the extent that the US official
Nicholas Burns, talking this morning about US-Iran relations,
mentioned the Syrian Foreign Minister Mr. Muallem by name as one
of the players who will be present with neighbours of Iraq and
other interested parties in the next two days of diplomacy on
reconstructing Iraq. Given during Mr. Burns' presentation this
morning on diplomacy with Iran, I remark that as an indication
that the Syrians have quite successfully reinserted themselves
in the regional game.
Q9 Chairman: May I take you back
to the issue of how the release was arranged? Was it as a consequence
of the internal power struggle within the regime? Sir Richard,
you said originally that we do not know why they were taken. Why
were they released when they were and why do you think that Ali
Larijani decided to go on Channel 4 News? Was that part of the
power struggle or was it for other reasons?
Sir Richard Dalton: There is a
power struggle for influence in foreign affairs between Dr. Larijani
and President Ahmadinejad. It could be that Dr. Larijani spotted
an opening to insert himself, not only to solve a problem for
Iran but also to show that he can deliver, which could be relevant
to his standing in Iran. We need to step back a little and ask
ourselves why the Iranians decided not to put them on trial, which
was touted, as you know. There are precedents for taking people
who have transgressed the sea borders of Iran—it did not
happen in this case, but it has happened in other cases—putting
them on trial and sentencing them for quite long periods. It was
always a distinct possibility, but, speculating again, it would
appear that the Iranians concluded that to put them on trial would
prolong the issue to Iran's disfavour and, as Dr. Hollis said,
it had got all it was going to get out of the issue after a couple
of weeks. At that point, there was scope for a pragmatic international
actor, as Dr. Larijani is, to a degree, to step in.
Dr. Hollis: I agree that there
is a power struggle. I was taking soundings as much as I could
from Iranian contacts, including those in Iran as the situation
unfolded, and my sense is that President Ahmadinejad was persuaded
to stay out of this until he was given the opportunity to do the
theatre at the end. In the internal power struggle there was a
division of labour and Dr. Larijani felt to me to be very much
in charge at the Iran end of the overall direction that it was
going to take. As one Iranian described it to me, the President's
reward for not trying to hijack the issue was the drama at the
end.
Q10 Andrew Mackinlay: My questions
are for both of you. You gave us possible reasons, or options,
but one that you did not mention—it comes later in my brief,
but I will touch upon it now—is the dispute about whether
the Royal Navy was in internationally agreed Iraqi waters, in
that area that is blurred or in dispute, or in Iranian waters,
and I want to link this to the Security Council. As I understand
it, we went to the Security Council seeking condemnation of the
taking of our people, and so on, but other members of the Security
Council, particularly the Russians, were not prepared to say that
these were Iraqi waters. It strikes me that they had an unexpected
bonus because the Security Council did not do what the United
Kingdom wanted it to do with regard to the location. That was
a point to Iran, and it could pump the air. I am concerned that
we did not do our preparation before we went to the Security Council
in order to know what other Security Council players would sign
up to. It seemed to me that there was a diplomatic failure or
error by us and the Security Council. If the Chairman will allow
it we may also come later to the matter of whether internationally
other people agree about the status of these particular waters
and the location of our RIB craft. I want to bounce that off you
both, because it seems it was a bit clumsy in New York.
Dr. Hollis: Sir Richard called
it a high-risk strategy. I admit that I felt at the time that
it went as far as it could with the Security Council because not
only did the Iranians learn that the British would have support,
but the British learned the limits of that support. The silver
lining was that not endorsing the British claim about where exactly
the British vessel was presented the opening for the resolution
of the crisis. Both sides could agree that it is a sensitive area,
in which one has to be doubly careful, and there is some value
in closer engagement to ensure that misunderstandings do not happen
in the future.
Sir Richard Dalton: I shall add
to that by saying that I do not believe that the we are talking,
for practical purposes, about disputed waters. An enormous amount
of shipping goes up and down those waters, and there have not
been any similar incidents—at least, they have not been
publicised. That is because it is very much in the Iranian interest
to respect the international acquis, even if it is informal, as
to where the border is.
When we had difficulties with the Iranians in
2003 over movements by their forces toward and beyond the Iraqi
border, I took the issue on instructions to the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs. It stoutly maintained that Iran's policy was to respect
the commonly accepted borders in order that there could be a proper
negotiation in due course with an independent Iraqi state, at
which the borders would be fixed once and for all at what, for
Iran, would be a relatively favourable situation—that with
which it was left after the Iran-Iraq war in 1988.
The reason why the Iranians did not contest
where the UK said the line was in the northern waters of the Persian
gulf was that it did not wish to set up an irritation in its relationship
with Iraq that would make the maritime border harder to deal with.
Q11 Andrew Mackinlay: This is a very
important point. The British Government's position was that the
waters were indisputably Iraqi. You said that there was a modus
vivendi by which merchant shipping was let go, as happens in an
awful lot of waterways around the world that are subject to opposing
claims. I think that you have concurred with my feeling that,
in fact, the waters were disputed, and that the Government would
have known that. There might well have been a custom and practice
that craft of all nations could go into the waters and that that
would not be an issue. It became an issue the moment that somebody
wants to say, "You are in our waters—in our bailiwick".
Sir Richard Dalton: I would not
agree with that. Only if two parties to a border dispute it can
we say that a border is disputed. Neither Iraq or Iran is disputing
the line that exists on the Admiralty charts that are used by
90%.— [Interruption.]
Q12 Andrew Mackinlay: Whose Admiralty?
Sir Richard Dalton: Our Admiralty.
The charts used by the British Navy are the charts used by 90%.
of the world's shipping, I am told. At the time of the incident,
neither Iraq or Iran was disputing the line. There is a lack of
clarity in international law because there is no treaty between
the sovereign Government of Iraq and Iran to define the line.
Royal Navy policy was to leave a 1 km buffer zone between an operation
and the commonly accepted and undisputed line in the Persian gulf
because of the possibility of mistakes. They were outside that
self-imposed buffer area by 0.2 km.
Q13 Mr. Purchase: Could I just remind
you that on 2 April Ali Larijani said there was no need to proceed
with the trial, on 3 April Jalal Sharafi was freed in return to
Tehran and on 4 April Iran was told it could have access to the
five detainees from Irbil? The Secretary of State for Defence,
Des Browne, said there was no deal. You suggested, Sir Richard,
that there was a firm refusal, both in public and private, to
pay a price. Not that I want to spoil the Prime Minister's tea
party on his 10th anniversary, but he also said there was no deal
and that it happened without any negotiation or any side agreement
of any nature. Does it not seem a bit of a spin to suggest that
there was no negotiation and no side agreement—yet on 5
April the lads were out?
Dr. Hollis: I do not know whether
spin is at work here. I think the word "negotiation"
could be interpreted in different ways. I think what was meant
was that there was no negotiation in the sense that there was
no concession made and no demand and therefore no responding concession.
I think there was a great deal of diplomatic activity—some
might call that negotiation—around the issue. It could well
be that there is nothing to hide here. It is a success.
Q14 Mr. Purchase: They are free,
sure. It is a success. But credibility is stretched a little—isn't
it?—when we have these closely related events of what appears
to be recanting on two positions, then the next thing the lads
are out but there was no deal.
Dr. Hollis: Wait a minute. You
are talking about the service personnel recanting.
Q15 Mr. Purchase: No, I am talking
about the five detainees from Irbil. We gave the Iranian authorities
access to them.
Dr. Hollis: I am sorry. I was
connecting it back to the business of where they were in the territorial
waters.
Q16 Mr. Purchase: I am sorry if I
misled you. Perhaps I did not provide a full enough description
of the events. On 4 April, Iran was told it could have access
to the five detainees from Irbil.
Sir Richard Dalton: I think what
is happening here is that there was a very helpful coincidence,
but how it arose I do not know. My hunch is that it arose out
of UK-US diplomacy rather than US-Iran diplomacy or UK-Iran diplomacy.
It is an obvious thing to do to ease the path of an Iranian climbdown
for consular access to be given to these US detainees in Irbil.
It is a small step towards normal international practice by the
United States Government and is actually very welcome on its own
merits.
The return of Mr. Sharafi is even more of a
mystery. He is the second secretary from the Iranian embassy in
Iraq who had been kidnapped. There is no evidence linking the
United States authorities with that. But he was returned to Iran
in the course of the exchanges between the UK and Iran about the
Royal Navy captives. It seems to me to have oiled the wheels.
Q17 Mr. Purchase: In the middle of
all this, on 3 April Nigel Sheinwald had a telephone conversation
with Mr. Larijani. The whole thing seems to me to fit together
for a negotiation—with people saying, "We'll do this
if you'll do that."
Dr. Hollis: Wait a minute. If
you look at the Jon Snow interview with Mr. Larijani—
Q18 Mr. Purchase: On Channel 4?
Dr. Hollis: Yes. Larijani gave
lots of information without demands. It seems to me that a lot
of information was being passed among all the players who got
involved, some publicly and some behind the scenes. Deductions
were made as to what would smooth the path of diplomacy. I am
not trying to defend anybody's position, but I recollect that
watching it unfold was like watching a carefully choreographed
dance.
Mr. Purchase: I am happy with the outcome.
It seems faintly ridiculous that we should deny, or that it should
be denied, that anything was done to enable the happy release
of our sailors to take place.
Q19 Chairman: Can I rephrase the
question? Is it not really that we had sequenced, unilateral steps
such as confidence-building measures rather than a negotiation?
Sir Richard Dalton: It could be.
It is not the same thing.
Chairman: It is not. Therefore, you could
say that there was no negotiation, but you could also take unilateral
steps, or get your allies to do so, to help build confidence in
order to secure the release.
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