Select Committee on Foreign Affairs Sixth Report

3  The Government's Diplomatic Strategy

15. The FCO provided us with a paper on the Government's handling of the crisis. It said the Government "initially pursued a policy of quiet but robust diplomacy" against Iran, with Lord Triesman meeting or speaking to the Iranian Ambassador in London on an almost daily basis, and sometimes more than once a day. We were told that the Government initially kept its "public statements low key to give the Iranians room for manoeuvre." However, when "it became apparent that this strategy was not having the necessary effect on the Iranians", the Government "decided to ratchet up the pressure by going public with the facts, and increasing diplomatic activity through third parties and international institutions." This diplomatic pressure was intensified when the then Foreign Secretary announced a "freeze on all other official bilateral business with Iran until this situation is resolved." [33]

16. At a press conference, the then Prime Minister had characterised this approach of international pressure alongside dialogue as a "dual track strategy". He remarked that "it would be utterly naïve to think that our personnel would have been released unless both elements of the strategy had been present."[34]

The UN Security Council

17. As part of the Government's decision to "ratchet up the pressure", it decided to go to the United Nations Security Council to seek a statement on the crisis. Sir Richard Dalton, the former British Ambassador in Tehran, told us that he disagreed with this decision. He remarked that "the pressure that really counted was the pressure in the region, rather than what actually happened in the Security Council."[35] Sir Richard added that the UN route was a "very high risk strategy", borne out by the fact that "the release of Faye Turner was aborted as a consequence" of this move.[36] The note provided to us by the FCO barely mentioned the statement finally agreed to by the Security Council, but when he appeared before us, Lord Triesman defended the decision:

We needed to explode the myth that our sailors and marines were in Iranian waters for as long as that contention was being made in public in world forums. That meant going to the UN and the EU.[37]

18. It appears that the Government was less successful than it had hoped by taking the matter to the UN. The Associated Press reported that the Government's draft statement released to the Council called on it to "deplore" Tehran's actions and insist on their "immediate release" whilst affirming that the personnel were "operating in Iraqi waters".[38] The statement issued by the Security Council failed to include any of these three points. The text in full read:

Members of the Security Council expressed grave concern at the capture by the Revolutionary Guard, and the continuing detention by the Government of Iran, of 15 United Kingdom naval personnel, and appealed to the Government of Iran to allow consular access, in terms of the relevant international laws.

Members of the Security Council support calls, including by the Secretary-General in his 29 March meeting with the Iranian Foreign Minister, for an early resolution of this problem, including the release of the 15 United Kingdom personnel. [39]

19. Sir Richard Dalton told us that Russia was not prepared to side with Iran or the UK on where the capture took place.[40] Media reports stated that the Government failed to get its way after four hours of negotiations and had to accept the 'watered down' statement above.[41] Lord Triesman told us that Russia was "really difficult" at the Security Council.[42]

20. When asked why the Security Council refused to adopt the Government's line on the position of the sailors, Lord Triesman stated that technical questions surrounding where the sailors were at the point of their seizure "never emerged as an issue" during the Council's debate.[43] This remark is somewhat surprising given the fact that Lord Triesman had earlier told the Committee that the Government had gone to the Security Council in an attempt to "explode the myth" that "our sailors and marines were in Iranian waters."

21. An indication of what the Government may have been attempting to secure at the Security Council can be gleaned from the EU statement, which is much stronger and more specific on the issue:

The European Union deplores the continued arrest of 15 British citizens by Iran on 23rd of March and underlines the European Union's unconditional support for the government of the United Kingdom. All evidence clearly indicates that at the time of the seizure, the British Naval personnel were on a routine patrolling mission in Iraqi waters in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1723. The seizure by Iranian Forces therefore constitutes a clear breach of international law.[44]

22. In our private session with the then Minister, Lord Triesman told us that the Government "knew that Iran would dislike the fact that we had used that as a lever. It is very averse to being criticised in the UN and by UN resolutions."[45] The fact that the Government appears not to have been able to achieve its main objectives at the UN brings into question the wisdom of its tactical approach.

23. We conclude that the Government's decision to adopt a 'dual track' diplomatic approach against Iran during the captured personnel crisis was broadly the correct one. However, we further conclude that the attempt to use the UN Security Council to increase the pressure on Iran was much less successful than it had hoped.

Statements Regarding the Location of the Personnel

24. The Government has insisted, and continues to insist, that the British personnel were captured whilst patrolling in Iraqi waters. On 25 March, the then Prime Minister said:

There is no doubt at all that these people were taken from a boat in Iraqi waters. It is simply not true that they went into Iranian territorial waters, and I hope the Iranian government understands how fundamental an issue this is for us.[46]

25. On 28 March, the Ministry of Defence led a media briefing on the position of the sailors.[47] Along with this briefing, it supplied the chart below.

© Crown Copyright/MOD

26. The Ministry of Defence gave what it was certain was the position of the merchant vessel that the British personnel had boarded:

The merchant vessel was 7.5 nautical miles south east of the Al Faw Peninsula and clearly in Iraqi territorial waters. Her master has confirmed that his vessel was anchored within Iraqi waters at the time of the arrest. The position was 29 degrees 50.36 minutes North 048 degrees 43.08 minutes East. This places her 1.7 nautical miles inside Iraqi territorial waters. This fact has been confirmed by the Iraqi Foreign Ministry.

The briefing went on to state that:

The Iranian government has provided us with two different positions for the incident. The first we received on Saturday and the second on Monday. As this map shows, the first of these points still lies within Iraqi territorial waters. We pointed this out to them on Sunday in diplomatic contacts.

After we did this, they then provided a second set of coordinates that places the incident in Iranian waters over two nautical miles from the position given by HMS CORNWALL and confirmed by the merchant vessel. The two Iranian positions are just under a nautical mile apart—1800 yards or so. It is hard to understand a reason for this change of coordinates. We unambiguously contest both the positions provided by the Iranians.[48]

27. There has been some dispute over the map that was produced by the Ministry of Defence. We asked Martin Pratt, Director of Research at the International Boundaries Research Unit at Durham University, for his analysis. He argued that the Government's map was "certainly an oversimplification" and that "it could reasonably be argued that it was deliberately misleading."[49] His particular concern was that the Government chose to downgrade a land boundary signed between Iran and Iraq in 1975 (known as the "Algiers Agreement") to a "territorial water boundary" on its map. Mr Pratt sent us his own map based on his understanding of the Iran-Iraq boundary:

28. Mr Pratt noted that "no maritime boundary has ever been agreed between Iran and Iraq." He claimed that the "southern terminal point" of the 1975 Algiers Agreement "lies just under 1.7 nautical miles northeast of the position" given by the Government. He said that the Government's map actually combined two lines: the section of the land boundary that follows the Shatt al-Arab waterway between the high and low water lines; and the median line between the two low water lines running through the territorial sea. He stated that the Government's coordinates actually placed the personnel in what is technically land territory rather than in the territorial sea.[50]

29. Mr Pratt argued that there were a number of reasons "for exercising caution before making categorical assertions about whether the incident took place in Iraqi or Iranian waters." These include the unstable coastline, the fact that Iran is not a party to the law of the sea conventions, and issues relating to the Algiers Agreement. On this final point, he noted that Article 2 of the protocol "made provision for the boundary to continue to follow the thalweg" of the Shatt al-Arab "if the thalweg shifts as a result of natural causes" (the thalweg is the line of greatest depth down the channel). Thus, "there may be a question as to whether the boundary still follows the line defined in 1975 or whether it actually follows the course of the thalweg of the river today." In conclusion, Mr Pratt argued:

If the incident occurred where the MoD suggested, it is difficult to see how Iran could legitimately claim sovereignty over the waters in which the arrest took place. Nevertheless, there are sufficient uncertainties over boundary definition in the area to make it inadvisable to state categorically that the vessel was in Iraqi waters. If the incident occurred seaward of the terminus of the boundary in the Shatt al Arab agreed in 1975 (as Iran claimed) the uncertainties increase significantly.[51]

30. At the time we questioned Lord Triesman we did not have the benefit of Mr Pratt's evidence. Nevertheless we did raise this issue with Lord Triesman. He told us:

I know that some of the physical features move around not on a day-to-day basis but between seasons. For those reasons, there is a process—the Algiers process—that enables all the parties in the upper Persian Gulf to raise questions about where the international boundary should be thought to be at any one time. There is a formal mechanism for doing that, and it has been used: it is not a kind of antique that nobody has ever touched. The process is available, but on this occasion, there was no question of that kind raised. The Iranians, in all their discussions with me, and as far as I know with [British Ambassador] Geoffrey [Adams] in Tehran, were not raising that issue at all. They came along with their maps—and we all had maps in front of us—with that international boundary on them, and that was the basis on which they were operating as well. The only question they had was which side of that line it was.[52]

However, as we have seen, the Algiers process relates to the land boundary between Iran and Iraq, not the "territorial water boundary" that the Government's map referred to, suggesting an inconsistency between Lord Triesman's answer and the Ministry of Defence's cartography.

31. Lord Triesman went on to state that the notion that there is no international boundary was "de facto" a false one, although "de jure, maybe nobody has yet agreed about where it will be permanently."[53] Neil Crompton, Head of the Iran Desk at the FCO, expanded on this:

There are very established channels of navigation that shipping in that area uses, so there is a clear de facto line.[54]

This corresponded with Sir Richard Dalton's analysis, borne out of his experience as Ambassador in Tehran. He said he did not believe the waters were "disputed" in practical terms:

An enormous amount of shipping goes up and down those waters, and there have not been any similar incidents—at least, they have not been publicised. That is because it is very much in the Iranian interest to respect the international acquis, even if it is informal, as to where the border is.

When we had difficulties with the Iranians in 2003 over movements by their forces toward and beyond the Iraqi border, I took the issue on instructions to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It stoutly maintained that Iran's policy was to respect the commonly accepted borders in order that there could be a proper negotiation in due course with an independent Iraqi state, at which the borders would be fixed once and for all at what, for Iran, would be a relatively favourable situation—that with which it was left after the Iran-Iraq war in 1988.

The reason why the Iranians did not contest where the UK said the line was in the northern waters of the Persian gulf was that it did not wish to set up an irritation in its relationship with Iraq that would make the maritime border harder to deal with.[55]

32. We conclude that there is evidence to suggest that the map of the Shatt al-Arab waterway provided by the Government was less clear than it ought to have been. The Government was fortunate that it was not in Iran's interests to contest the accuracy of the map. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government state why it chose to mark the boundary as a purely 'territorial water boundary' rather than including aspects of the 'land boundary' agreed to in 1975.

Access to Iranian Officials

33. In its written submission, the FCO stated that:

Efforts to engage the Iranians directly were hindered by the fact that the Iranian New Year holiday covered the period from 21 March-3 April, and many key officials were apparently simply not available in the early days of the crisis. As is usual, the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs also required all contact to take place through them.

The note informs us that the then Foreign Secretary spoke to the Iranian Foreign Minister Mottaki twice, on 25 and 27 March. The British Ambassador in Tehran, and initially the Chargé d'Affaires, went to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nearly every day during the crisis. The then Prime Minister's foreign policy adviser, Sir Nigel Sheinwald, only spoke to Dr Ali Larijani on 3 April, the day before the Government was informed that the personnel would be released.[56]

34. We asked Lord Triesman about the quality of access that the Government had to Iranian officials. In particular, given the evidence noted above that suggests Dr Larijani was the key interlocutor on the Iranian side, we inquired as to whether Lord Triesman himself had made any efforts to contact him. He replied:

I saw the ambassador on eight occasions and spoke with him in two very long phone calls as well. My understanding was that he was able to speak to Mr Larijani, but that Mr Larijani was unlikely to speak to me. We made an application—which I think I am right in saying was first made at the beginning of that period, or close to it, on 30 March as I recall—to have a discussion with Dr Larijani. We got no response at all to that.[57]

The Government, he said, was only able to speak to Dr Larijani after he appeared on Channel 4 News and gave a signal that "he was willing to take part in a discussion."[58] We asked Lord Triesman why it took Channel 4 News to open up a channel of communication with Dr Larijani. He denied that this was the case:

Actually, he opened up the channel, because he refused to deal with us through any channel, until he decided to make the announcement that he was available.[59]

He later went on to state that it was Dr Larijani who contacted Channel 4 News.[60] Dr Rosemary Hollis argued to the Committee that Sir Nigel was only able to speak to Dr Larijani "after he was given the terms of the conversation on British television."[61]

35. The Government left it until 30 March to contact Dr Larijani. The sailors were detained on 23 March—a full week before this approach was made. 30 March itself was a Friday, the day of rest in Iran. 31 March and 1 April fell on the British weekend. Dr Larijani appeared on Channel 4 News on the Monday, and spoke to Sir Nigel Sheinwald on the Tuesday. The personnel were told they would be released on the Wednesday. There was not a significant amount of time between the Government's application to speak to Dr Larijani and the success of this application.

36. In her statement to the House on 28 March, the then Foreign Secretary said:

I regret to say that the Iranian authorities have so far failed to meet any of our demands or to respond to our desire to resolve this issue quickly and quietly through behind-the-scenes diplomacy.[62]

Yet it seems to have taken two days for the Government to make an application to speak to the man described by Dr Hollis as "very much in charge" in Tehran.[63] Sir Richard Dalton told the Committee that "access to Mr Larijani has not been a problem in the past", so it appears odd that an application was not made earlier in the process.[64]

37. We conclude that although the Government was making every effort to resolve the situation quietly through bilateral diplomacy in the first few days of the crisis, its application to speak to Dr Ali Larijani could and should have been made much earlier than 30 March. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government state whether any internal review is being carried out into the lessons learnt from the failure to engage at a sufficiently early stage with the right interlocutors within the Iranian regime.

The Question of a Deal

38. In the chronology above, we noted that five Iranians were detained by Iraqi and American forces at the Iranian consulate in Irbil on 11 January. On 4 February, Jalal Sharafi, Second Secretary at Iran's Embassy in Baghdad was kidnapped by men wearing Iraqi uniforms. We noted that Sir Richard Dalton believed the detention of the British personnel may have been a direct retaliation for these events.[65] Returning to the chronology, Jalal Sharafi was returned to Tehran on 3 April, and Iran was told that it could have consular access to the five Irbil detainees on 4 April. On the same day, President Ahmedinejad announced the release of the British personnel.

39. The Government has been adamant that there was no deal struck for the return of the British personnel. The then Prime Minister told a press conference:

We have managed to secure the release of our personnel I think more quickly than many people anticipated, and have done so incidentally, and I want to make this very, very clear, without any deal, without any negotiation, without any side agreement of any nature whatever. We made it clear at the outset we weren't going to do that and we held firm to that position throughout.[66]

40. We raised the question of a possible deal with Sir Richard Dalton and Dr Rosemary Hollis. Sir Richard supported the Government's stated approach to this issue:

I would have thought that it was very important for Britain not to be seen to be paying a price to get its own captives back. That was a fundamentally important objective of Her Majesty's Government, and I support it. Somebody who acts illegally to take captives in such a way will only be encouraged to do so again, if they gain something tangible from it.[67]

Sir Richard also commented on the possible relationship between the Iranian detainees and the release of the British personnel:

I think what is happening here is that there was a very helpful coincidence, but how it arose I do not know. My hunch is that it arose out of UK-US diplomacy rather than US-Iran diplomacy or UK-Iran diplomacy.[68]

Sir Richard told the Committee that he agreed that whilst there might not have been negotiations for the release of the personnel, there may have been unilateral confidence-building measures taken to ease the situation.[69]

41. Lord Triesman insisted to us that there were no discussions between the Government and the United States over the detainees at Irbil.[70] He also said he was "not aware" of any discussions between the US and Iran on this point. He went on to state that,

the Iranians said from the beginning that they wished to make no connections whatever with any other bilateral problem or multilateral problem with which we were all concerned. I confirmed immediately that that would be my understanding of all the subsequent discussions […] the concept of any exchange of consular access or exchange of personnel was ruled out on the first day and was never pursued.[71]

Asked to comment on Sir Richard Dalton's belief that the release of the detainees in Irbil was a "very helpful coincidence", Lord Triesman replied:

They were certainly a coincidence. If they improved the atmosphere, they improved the atmosphere. But I can assure the Committee in absolute seriousness that there was no such trading whatever.[72]

42. The Daily Telegraph made an important point on the subject of whether there was a deal or not. Referring to the speech of Iran's President in which he announced the release of the captives, it said, "Mr Ahmadinejad, not noted for his reticence, made no mention of British concessions."[73]

43. We conclude that there is no evidence made available to the Committee that any deal was reached between the Government and Iran over the release of the detainees. We believe that it was very important for the Government not to make such a deal.

Co-ordination of Government Strategy

44. The nature of the crisis required a coordinated approach from the Government, given the involvement of the FCO, the Ministry of Defence, the Cabinet Office and Number 10. The Government immediately decided to convene Cobra, the inter-departmental co-ordination facility that is used at times of crisis.[74] The Guardian newspaper reported concern amongst officials at the Foreign Office over the strategy of increasing international pressure on Iran, most notably after the then Prime Minister's call for a "different phase" on 27 March.[75] Lord Triesman rejected these claims:

I can assure the Committee that that is not what happened. I cannot recall a dissenting view in the Cobra discussions between anyone there, on any of the issues I described, and certainly not from the FCO. I mentioned the FCO, but the same goes for everyone.[76]

45. We conclude that there does not appear to be any obvious cause for concern regarding inter-departmental co-ordination during the period of the detention of the personnel. We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the Government inform the Committee whether it has carried out any review of co-ordination, and if so, that it provide the findings of this review to the Committee.

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33   Ev 12, para 7 Back

34   PM's comments on return of troops from Iran, 5 April 2007, www.pm.gov.uk Back

35   Q 35 Back

36   Q 5 Back

37   Q 101 Back

38   "Britain takes case Against Iran to UN", Associated Press, 29 March 2007 Back

39   Security Council Press Statement on Iran, 29 March 2007, www.un.org/News/Press Back

40   Q 47 Back

41   "EU backs Britain with stern warning to Iran", Daily Telegraph, 31 March 2007 Back

42   Q 132 Back

43   Q 112 Back

44   Declaration of the EU Foreign Ministers at the meeting in Bremen on 30th March, www.eu2007.de/en/News/Press_Releases Back

45   Q 132 Back

46   HC Deb, 28 March 2007, col 1500 Back

47   Ev 12, para 5 Back

48   MOD briefing shows Royal Navy personnel were in Iraqi waters , Defence News, 28 March 2007, available at www.mod.uk Back

49   Ev 24 Back

50   Ev 24-25 Back

51   Ev 25 Back

52   Q 135 Back

53   Q 136 Back

54   Q 136 Back

55   Q 10 Back

56   Ev 13, para 9 Back

57   Q 95 Back

58   Q 95 Back

59   Q 96 Back

60   Q 97 Back

61   Q 26 Back

62   HC Deb, 28 March 2007, col 1500 Back

63   Q 10 Back

64   Q 53 Back

65   Q 3 Back

66   Freed Navy Crew Returns to UK,5 April 2007, www.number-10.gov.uk Back

67   Q 24 Back

68   Q 16 Back

69   Q 19 Back

70   Q 118 Back

71   Q 119 Back

72   Q 120 Back

73   "The invisible men who defused the crisis", Daily Telegraph, 5 April 2007 Back

74   HC Deb, 28 March 2007, col 1499 Back

75   "Britain stumbles in diplomatic dance with Iran", The Guardian, 30 March 2007 Back

76   Q 102 Back

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Prepared 22 July 2007