Regional States
47. The FCO note says that many countries supported
the Government's diplomatic lobbying efforts against Iran. Arab
countries, led by the Iraqis, "were particularly active."
In the assessment of the FCO, "the impact in the Gulf States
was of real significance."[78]
Lord Triesman told us that,
a significant number of Arab and Islamic states,
or the secular Islamic states—I make that distinction because
Turkey played a significant role in this—were very willing
and very vigorous. At one stage, we were told that Mr Mottaki
[Iran's Foreign Minister] was complaining that one of the reasons
he could not speak to us more often was that he was on the phone
all the time to all of those people who were phoning him.[79]
Sir Richard Dalton agreed. He told us alongside the
EU statement referred to earlier,
the key influences on the Iranians were, I think,
the regional ones. … A major Iranian objective was to show
power in the region, yet they had a stream of phone calls from
all their regional neighbours, saying, 'Please bring this to an
end.'[80]
48. Members of the Committee raised the issue of
the detained personnel with Syria's President, Bashar Assad, whilst
on a visit to Damascus at the time of the crisis. We asked Sir
Richard for his assessment of Syria's role. He replied:
There have been articles suggesting on the basis
of Syrian briefings that the Syrians were pleased to help. That
would fit with the Syrian wish to make it plain to the west that
it is not a country to be put into the doghouse and isolated,
in the way that might be associated with US policy, but rather
is a reasonable country, that can be dealt with. Putting a good
word in would have been a logical course as part of the Syrian
campaign to rehabilitate its image.[81]
The United States
49. There were press reports that the United States
had offered to conduct aggressive military patrols over Revolutionary
Guard bases to underline the seriousness of the situation, but
that the Government asked the Americans not to embark on this
course.[82] We raised
this with Lord Triesman. He replied:
The United States had two carrier battle groups—I
believe they were the Eisenhower and Nimitz groups. Each contains
quite a large number of ships, and the two would obviously have
sizeable air power based on them. Their plans and manoeuvres,
as I understand it, had been formulated a long time in advance.
In general, such manoeuvres involved them staying on the Iraqi
side of the waterway and inland. In the past, they have certainly
involved them flying over oil installations on that side of the
border, both at sea and inland. We simply expressed the view—at
this stage I would rather go no further—that low flights,
even over the oil platforms, would not be helpful in trying to
conduct the discussions that were going on.[83]
50. We conclude that the Government appears to
have made good use of third parties in applying pressure on Iran.
In particular, we believe that representations made to the United
States not to conduct their intended military plans and manoeuvres
were particularly important in helping to prevent an escalation
of the situation.
77 Ev 12, para 6 Back
78
Ev 12, para 6 Back
79
Q 126 Back
80
Q 5 Back
81
Q 6 Back
82
"Americans offered 'aggressive patrols' in Iranian airspace",
The Guardian, 7 April 2007 Back
83
Q 121 Back
