The Sale of Stories
54. On 19 June 2007, the Ministry of Defence published
the Hall Report which reviewed media access to the detained personnel.[86]
Tony Hall, a former head of BBC News, had been asked to conduct
this review following the controversy surrounding this issue.
We learn from the Hall Report that the FCO Press Office led on
the Government's relations with the media whilst the crisis continued.
A representative was regularly present at Cobra meetings. These
Cobra meetings ended on 4 April. In practice, the Navy then took
the lead on issues relating to the media handling of the return
of the detainees.[87]
The Hall Report argued that the Cobra process ended "in retrospect
too early".[88]
55. Two of the released captives sold their tales
to the media. Leading Seaman Faye Turney received a reported six-figure
sum for her story, which she sold to the Sun newspaper and to
ITV. Arthur Batchelor, the youngest of the captives, also received
payment for his story, in his case from the Mirror.[89]
Mr Batchelor told the Daily Mirror that the Revolutionary Guards
stole his iPod music device, and that he "cried and cried
like a baby."[90]
The Hall Report outlines how the Navy broadly took the lead on
the decision to allow the personnel to sell their stories. The
Defence Secretary was asked to "note" the decision.
Although the Defence Secretary would later accept full responsibility,
Tony Hall was not "able clearly to identify a single person
who in practice took the decision to authorise payment, or a clear
moment when that authority was given."[91]
56. We find it wholly unsatisfactory that Tony
Hall was not able to identify which single individual took the
decision to authorise payment for the stories of the personnel.
We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the FCO set
out who specifically took the decision to authorise the naval
personnel to sell their stories to the media.
57. The decision to allow the personnel to sell their
stories was met with fierce criticism. The Sunday Telegraph argued
that the Government, in particular the Navy and MoD, had been
"roundly pilloried from all sides and invited international
derision". The incident, it claimed, was a "Whitehall
farce".[92] Global
media coverage of the detainees' return and of the stories they
sold to the British press was to provide the rest of the world
with its lasting impressions of the incident. The potential for
this coverage to affect the United Kingdom's standing abroad,
particularly but not only in the Middle East, should have been
obvious.
58. We asked Lord Triesman about this incident. He
said that the decision to allow the personnel to sell their stories
was "a significant mistake."[93]
He added:
I am expressing the view that I take, which I
suspect is probably well shared around the FCO, which is that
it is undesirable. I would make exactly the same point about serving
diplomats or Ministers in the FCO or other Departments. We work
in a very sensitive world. Whether we use the word 'negotiation'
or not, these are very intricate, difficult discussions that can
easily go wrong, and future discussions can be hopelessly prejudiced
by unhelpful conduct from the past.[94]
We believe Lord Triesman's view is fundamentally
correct. However, his analysis relates to how such incidents might
impact on future discussions. We believe that the importance of
the impact that such incidents can have on framing the narrative
of the event they have just followed should not be ignored.
59. The Hall Report attempted to explain why such
a situation had arisen:
The relief at the release of the detainees—the
strategic objective of the intensive political and diplomatic
efforts over the preceding days—together
with the fact that it was about to be the Easter break, meant
that too many of those concerned failed really to think through
the media handling of the return of the detainees, and stay adequately
involved and in communication, particularly in a fast-moving 24/7
media environment. The return of the detainees remained the principal
national story and was still an important element of UK/Iran relations,
but it was not adequately treated as such.[95]
60. The criticism that "too many" did not
"stay adequately involved" may have an applicability
beyond the MoD. It is significant that the note provided to us
by the FCO does not even mention issues relating to the sale of
the stories. We asked Lord Triesman whether the FCO had been consulted
by the MoD, or if it had given it any advice as to how to handle
this situation. He told us:
The Foreign and Commonwealth Office was not consulted
on this decision, although we made known our view that we thought
it would be a significant mistake to allow the personnel to sell
their stories to the media.[96]
Tony Hall concluded that the MoD, not the Navy, should
"unequivocally" lead on media handling in cases of returning
detainees.[97] However,
he does not provide analysis of the need for inter-Departmental
co-ordination in such incidents. The FCO did get involved in earlier
discussions with the MoD with regards to plans for when the detainees
returned.[98] Yet as
Lord Triesman's reply indicates, whilst the FCO made its view
known, stakeholder consultation was not present once the detainees
returned.
61. We conclude that the decision by the MoD to
allow the returning detainees to sell their stories to the media
displayed a disturbing failure of judgement as to how the issue
would play internationally. We are particularly concerned that,
after having taken the lead on media relations until 4 April,
the FCO does not appear to have been closely involved after the
return of the personnel, despite the clear implications of continuing
press coverage for Britain's international standing and reputation.
We recommend that, in its response to this Report, the FCO indicate
when, in Lord Triesman's words, it "made known" the
view that "we thought it would be a significant mistake to
allow the personnel to sell their stories to the media."
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