Formal minutes
Tuesday 17 July 2006
Members present:
Mike Gapes, in the Chair
| Mr Fabian Hamilton
Mr John Horam
Mr Eric Illsley
Andrew Mackinlay
| | Sandra Osborne
Mr Greg Pope
Mr Ken Purchase
|
Draft Report [Foreign Policy Aspects of the Detention of Naval
Personnel by the Islamic Republic of Iran], proposed by the
Chairman, brought up and read.
Ordered, That the draft
Report be read a second time, paragraph by paragraph.
Paragraph 1 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraph 2 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 3 read, as follows
There have been two Government reviews into this
incident. The first, led by Lt Gen Sir Rob Fulton, the Governor
of Gibraltar, considered the circumstances in which the British
personnel were seized. This review has been kept confidential.
The Defence Secretary Rt Hon Des Browne MP told us that he would
pass to the Committee any information that he felt was relevant
to our inquiry. When we followed up, he told us that in his view,
there was nothing in the report that would inform the Committee's
inquiry beyond what was made public in his statement to the House
on 19 June. The second review, led by Tony Hall, a former head
of BBC News, focused on the Government's media handling following
the return of the personnel to the UK. The Hall Report was published
on 19 June.
Amendment proposed, in line 3, after the word "confidential."
to insert the words "This is not satisfactory. We are mindful
of the delicate nature of security and operational aspects of
this incident and its 'fallout' but at the very least a summary
or redacted version of General Fulton's findings should have been
published and presented to Parliament."—(Andrew
Mackinlay.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 1
Andrew Mackinlay
| | Noes, 3
Mr Fabian Hamilton
Mr Greg Pope
Mr Ken Purchase
|
Paragraph agreed to.
Paragraphs 4 and 5 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 6 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 7 to 11 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 12 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 13 to 20 read and agreed to.
A paragraph—(Andrew Mackinlay)—brought
up, and read, as follows:
It would appear that Russia may have been cognisant
of the shifting topography of these waters, the history of the
boundary and the issue detailed for us by Martin Pratt of Durham
University [see paras 24 to 32, below]. If so, it helps to put
into perspective Russia's position when the draft Security Council
statement was being considered.
Question put, That the paragraph be read a second
time.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 1
Andrew Mackinlay
| | Noes, 3
Mr Fabian Hamilton
Mr Greg Pope
Mr Ken Purchase
|
Paragraphs 21 and 22 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 23 read, as follows:
We conclude that the Government's decision
to adopt a 'dual track' diplomatic approach against Iran during
the captured personnel crisis was broadly the correct one. However,
we further conclude that the attempt to use the UN Security Council
to increase the pressure on Iran was much less successful than
it had hoped.
Amendment proposed, at the end, to add the words
"We agree with Sir Richard Dalton's assessment. We conclude
that the approach to the Security Council was badly timed and,
it would appear, ill prepared."—(Andrew Mackinlay.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 3
Mr Fabian Hamilton
Mr John Horam
Andrew Mackinlay
| | Noes, 3
Sandra Osborne
Mr Greg Pope
Mr Ken Purchase
|
Whereupon the Chairman declared himself with the Noes.
Paragraph agreed to.
Paragraphs 24 to 28 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 29 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraph 30 read, as follows:
We raised this issue with Lord Triesman. He told
us:
I know that some of the physical features move
around not on a day-to-day basis but between seasons. For those
reasons, there is a process—the Algiers process—that
enables all the parties in the upper Persian Gulf to raise questions
about where the international boundary should be thought to be
at any one time. There is a formal mechanism for doing that, and
it has been used: it is not a kind of antique that nobody has
ever touched. The process is available, but on this occasion,
there was no question of that kind raised. The Iranians, in all
their discussions with me, and as far as I know with [British
Ambassador] Geoffrey [Adams] in Tehran, were not raising that
issue at all. They came along with their maps—and we all
had maps in front of us—with that international boundary
on them, and that was the basis on which they were operating as
well. The only question they had was which side of that line it
was.
However, as we have seen, the Algiers process
relates to the land boundary between Iran and Iraq, not the "territorial
water boundary" that the Government's map referred to, suggesting
an inconsistency between Lord Treisman's answer and the Ministry
of Defence's cartography.
Amendments made.
Another Amendment proposed, at the end, to add the
words "The Government have either been less than frank about
this matter or there has been a degree of carelessness in their
map reading, cartography and history of these waters. This does
nothing for our confidence in the stewardship of these matters
or that there was adequate examination of all the facts. We do
not know if General Fulton was able to consider these matters
and we therefore reiterate our recommendation that as much as
possible of his report be published."—(Andrew Mackinlay.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 2
Mr John Horam
Andrew Mackinlay
| | Noes, 4
Mr Fabian Hamilton
Sandra Osborne
Mr Greg Pope
Mr Ken Purchase
|
Paragraph as amended agreed to.
Paragraphs 31 to 53 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 54 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraph 55 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 56 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 57 to 59 read and agreed to.
Paragraphs 60 and 61 read, amended and agreed to.
Paragraphs 62 to 67 read and agreed to.
Paragraph 68 read, as follows:
We conclude from the evidence that we have
received, that the Government had a thorough approach to its diplomatic
strategy during the crisis. Although there may have been some
tactical mistakes, it is difficult to fault the FCO's overall
approach. We conclude that this episode does show the positive
way in which diplomacy can be used to resolve a crisis peacefully
and we reject the argument that the FCO's approach has made the
British Government look weak. Our conclusion should not, however,
be taken to mean a lack of concern as to how British service personnel
came to be taken hostage so easily in the first place, an issue
which is under consideration by the Defence Select Committee.
Amendment proposed, to leave out from the beginning
to "We" in line 4.—(Andrew Mackinlay.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 3
Mr Fabian Hamilton
Mr John Horam
Andrew Mackinlay
| | Noes, 4
Mr Eric Illsley
Sandra Osborne
Mr Greg Pope
Mr Ken Purchase
|
Another Amendment proposed, to leave out from "peacefully"
in line 5 to "Our" in line 6.—(Andrew
Mackinlay.)
Question put, That the Amendment be made.
The Committee divided.
|
Ayes, 2
Mr John Horam
Andrew Mackinlay
| | Noes, 5
Mr Fabian Hamilton
Mr Eric Illsley
Sandra Osborne
Mr Greg Pope
Mr Ken Purchase
|
An Amendment made.
Paragraph, as amended, agreed to.
Resolved, That the Report
as amended be the Sixth Report of the Committee to the House.
Ordered, That the Chairman
do make the Report to the House.
Ordered, That embargoed
copies of the Report be made available, in accordance with the
provisions of Standing Order No.134.
Several Papers were ordered to be appended to the
Minutes of Evidence.
Ordered, That the Appendices
to the Minutes of Evidence taken before the Committee be reported
to the House. —(The Chairman)
[Adjourned till Wednesday 18 July at 2.00 pm
|
