ANNEX I - Iran's Domestic Political Situation
Political structure
1. Under the Iranian
Constitution, Iran is an Islamic Republic and the teachings of Islam are to be
the basis of all political, social and economic relations.
2. The structure of authority is
opaque, with competing power centres. Overall authority is vested in the
Supreme Leader, currently Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who was preferred in this
role by Khomeini to be his successor in 1989, a choice then made official by
the Assembly of Experts, a body of 96 religious scholars elected by universal
adult suffrage from all over Iran. The President too is elected by universal
adult suffrage, and serves a four-year term. He may serve no more than two
consecutive terms in office.
3. The Majles (parliament) has
290 elected members representing regions or one of the three recognised
religious minorities (Jews, Christians and Zoroastrians). The Majles also
approves the members of the Council of Ministers (the President's Cabinet).
4. Political parties were legalised
in 1998 after a 13-year ban and are still at an early stage of development.
Factions, particularly in the Majles, are often defined broadly as "reformist",
"hardline conservative" or "pragmatic conservative".
5. Legislation passed by the
Majles must be approved by the Guardian Council, which reviews it for
constitutionality and adherence to Islamic law. The Council is composed of six
theologians appointed by the Supreme Leader and six jurists nominated by the
judiciary and approved by the Majles. The Council has the power to veto
candidates in elections to parliament, local councils, the Presidency and the
Assembly of Experts.
6. The Council for the
Discernment of Expediency was created in 1988 to resolve disputes over
legislation between the Majles and the Guardian Council. It also advises the
Supreme Leader on national policy and constitutional issues. It is currently
led by former President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani and includes the heads of
all three branches of government and the clerical members of the Guardian
Council. The Supreme Leader appoints other members for a five-year term.
Political situation
7. The "reformist" President
Khatami was elected in August 1997 with an overwhelming majority, and
re-elected in June 2001. However, there has been a swing towards more hardline
conservative forces in recent years, in part because of the reformists' failure
to address growing economic concerns. In the most recent Majles (parliamentary)
elections in 2004, conservative candidates swept the board (after the Guardian
Council - which can veto candidates it considers contrary to the interests of
the Islamic Republic - blocked the candidacies of more than a third of the 8000
candidates, most of whom were reformists, and 85 of who were incumbent MPs).
8. The vetting procedures
dissuaded many potential candidates from even putting their names forward. The
Guardian Council has vetoed all female candidates from standing in any
presidential election as well as the December 2006 Assembly of Experts
elections.
President Ahmadinejad
9. Ahmadinejad was elected in
June 2005, on a platform of "economic justice" (especially improving the
economic situation of the poorest), anti-corruption, and nationalism. His
campaign stressed his humble background, simple lifestyle and personal piety.
10. Since coming into office,
Ahmadinejad has used economic and political tools to entrench the control of
his hardline supporters over the key levers of power. Members or former members
of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), created by Ayatollah Khomeini
in May 1979 to "protect the revolution and its achievements" have taken on more
political roles (including Ministerial and provincial governor positions) as
well as their growing commercial interests. There has also been increased activity
by the IRGC-linked Basij (revolutionary volunteers) and morality police.
11. While Ahmadinejad is not the
key foreign policy player, he has put his stamp on foreign policy, particularly
through public statements - including his vitriolic comments about Israel, as
well as the nuclear file.
12. But over the past year
Ahmadinejad has come under increasing domestic criticism, for his
confrontational foreign policy, poor management of the economy, and failure to
fulfil campaign promises to tackle corruption. His relations with some other
regime leaders are strained or hostile, and his support in the Majlis remains
fragile. In December 2006, his candidate list, "The Pleasant Scent of Service",
did poorly in local elections, on a high turnout. Pragmatic conservatives
showed a stronger performance.
Economic outlook
13. Ahmadinejad's populism is also
leaving its imprint on the economic outlook. He has tried to win favour among
the poor with high levels of public spending. High oil prices helped him
promote this agenda. Budget mismanagement and soaring inflation are evident.
And the government's insistence that banks must pay out cheap loans has hit the
financial sector hard.
14. Since
Ahmadinejad came to power, much needed but painful structural reforms - eg on fuel subsidies - have been further delayed. The
Revolutionary Guards are further extending their grip over the economy; huge
contracts have been handed to companies they control, often without any form of
tendering.
15. Ahmadinejad's
confrontational foreign policy approach has also had an impact. Fear of
possible future sanctions has hit economic and investor confidence: businesses
are deferring investment decisions and the stock market has fallen below 10,000
points. Foreign investment has all but dried up, foreign export credit agencies
are taking steps to limit their exposure and firms are finding it harder to
raise international finance for major projects. US actions against Iranian
banks and UN Security Council sanctions against Bank Sepah have made Western
financial institutions more cautious and many have reduced services.
16. Technocrats in the oil industry are especially concerned. The health of
the sector - which provides 50% of government income - is an indicator of
overall economic performance. At present, projects lie stalled and foreign
firms are increasingly reluctant to invest in Iran because of the political
situation. As a result, and given the annual decline in production from some of
the largest and ageing oil fields, Iran faces a real challenge simply to bring
enough new production on stream to maintain stable production and export
levels. In the current climate there is
no prospect of Iran significantly increasing its small gas export volumes. Temporary solutions - such as turning to
parastatal bodies and the Oil Stabilisation Fund to finance and deliver oil and
domestic gas projects - continue to make the economy's structural problems
worse medium term.
ANNEX II - 21 October 2003 "Tehran Declaration"
Joint statement at the end of a visit to
the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Foreign Ministers of Britain, France and
Germany
Tehran, October 21, 2003
1. Upon the invitation of the
Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the Foreign Ministers of Britain,
France and Germany paid a visit to Tehran on 21 October 2003. The Iranian
authorities and the Ministers, following extensive consultations, agreed on
measures aimed at the settlement of all outstanding IAEA issues with regard to
the Iranian nuclear programme and at enhancing confidence for peaceful cooperation
in the nuclear field.
2. The Iranian authorities
reaffirmed that nuclear weapons have no place in Iran's defence doctrine and
that its nuclear programme and activities have been exclusively in the peaceful
domain. They reiterated Iran's commitment to the nuclear non-proliferation
regime, and informed the Ministers that:
a) The Iranian Government has decided
to engage in full cooperation with the IAEA to address and resolve, through
full transparency, all requirements and outstanding issues of the Agency, and
clarify and correct any possible failures and deficiencies within the IAEA.
b) To promote confidence with a view
to removing existing barriers for cooperation in the nuclear field:
(i) Having received the necessary
clarifications, the Iranian Government has decided to sign the IAEA Additional
Protocol, and commence ratification procedures. As a confirmation of its good
intentions, the Iranian Government will continue to cooperate with the Agency
in accordance with the Protocol in advance of its ratification.
(ii) While Iran has a right within
the nuclear non-proliferation regime to develop nuclear energy for peaceful
purposes, it has decided voluntarily to suspend all uranium enrichment and
reprocessing activities as defined by the IAEA.
3. The Foreign Ministers of
Britain, France and Germany welcomed the decisions of the Iranian Government
and informed the Iranian authorities that:
a) Their Governments recognize the
right of Iran to enjoy peaceful use of nuclear energy in accordance with the NPT.
b) In their view, the Additional
Protocol is in no way intended to undermine the sovereignty, national dignity
or national security of its States Parties.
c) In their view, the full
implementation of Iran's decisions, confirmed by the IAEA Director-General,
should enable the immediate situation to be resolved by the IAEA Board.
d) The three Governments believe that
this will open the way to a dialogue on a basis for longer-term cooperation,
which will provide all parties with satisfactory assurances relating to Iran's
nuclear power generation programme. Once international concerns, including
those of the three Governments, are fully resolved, Iran could expect easier
access to modern technology and supplies in a range of areas.
(e) They will cooperate with Iran to
promote security and stability in the region, including the establishment of a
zone free from weapons of mass destruction in the Middle East in accordance
with the objectives of the United Nations.
ANNEX III - 15 November 2004 "Paris Agreement"
"Paris Agreement" between the
Islamic Republic of Iran and France, Germany and the United Kingdom,
with the support of the High Representative of the European Union
The Government
of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Governments of France, Germany and the
United Kingdom, with the support of the High Representative of the European
Union (E3/EU), reaffirm the commitments in the Tehran Agreed Statement of 21
October 2003 and have decided to move forward, building on that agreement.
The E3/EU and
Iran reaffirm their commitment to the NPT.
The E3/EU
recognise Iran's rights under the NPT exercised in conformity with its
obligations under the Treaty, without discrimination.
Iran reaffirms
that, in accordance with Article II of the NPT, it does not and will not seek
to acquire nuclear weapons. It commits itself to full cooperation and
transparency with the IAEA. Iran will continue to implement the Additional
Protocol voluntarily pending ratification.
To build
further confidence, Iran has decided, on a voluntary basis, to continue and
extend its suspension to include all enrichment related and reprocessing
activities, and specifically: the manufacture and import of gas centrifuges and
their components; the assembly, installation, testing or operation of gas
centrifuges; work to undertake any plutonium separation, or to construct or
operate any plutonium separation installation; and all tests or production at
any uranium conversion installation. The IAEA will be notified of this
suspension and invited to verify and monitor it. The suspension will be
implemented in time for the IAEA to confirm before the November Board that it
has been put into effect. The suspension will be sustained while negotiations
proceed on a mutually acceptable agreement on long-term arrangements.
The E3/EU
recognize that this suspension is a voluntary confidence building measure and
not a legal obligation.
Sustaining the
suspension, while negotiations on a long-term agreement are under way, will be
essential for the continuation of the overall process. In the context of this
suspension, the E3/EU and Iran have agreed to begin negotiations, with a view
to reaching a mutually acceptable agreement on long term arrangements. The
agreement will provide objective guarantees that Iran's nuclear programme is
exclusively for peaceful purposes. It will equally provide firm guarantees on
nuclear, technological and economic cooperation and firm commitments on
security issues.
A steering
committee will meet to launch these negotiations in the first half of December
2004 and will set up working groups on political and security issues,
technology and cooperation, and nuclear issues. The steering committee shall
meet again within three months to receive progress reports from the working
groups and to move ahead with projects and/or measures that can be implemented
in advance of an overall agreement.
In the context
of the present agreement and noting the progress that has been made in
resolving outstanding issues, the E3/EU will henceforth support the Director
General reporting to the IAEA Board as he considers appropriate in the
framework of the implementation of Iran's Safeguards Agreement and Additional
Protocol.
The E3/EU will
support the IAEA Director General inviting Iran to join the Expert Group on
Multilateral Approaches to the Nuclear Fuel Cycle.
Once
suspension has been verified, the negotiations with the EU on a Trade and
Cooperation Agreement will resume. The E3/EU will actively support the opening
of Iranian accession negotiations at the WTO.
Irrespective
of progress on the nuclear issue, the E3/EU and Iran confirm their
determination to combat terrorism, including the activities of Al Qa'ida and
other terrorist groups such as the MeK. They also confirm their continued
support for the political process in Iraq aimed at establishing a
constitutionally elected Government.
15 Nov 2004
ANNEX IV - 5 August 2005 E3/EU Proposal
FRAMEWORK FOR A
LONG-TERM AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN
AND
FRANCE, GERMANY & THE UNITED KINGDOM,
WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE HIGH
REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
I. PREAMBLE
1. The introduction would
provide the political chapeau for the overall agreement, setting out the
principles on which a long-term relationship between the E3/EU and Iran would
be based. The E3/EU propose that it
should comprise the following elements.
2. The E3/EU and Iran would:
a. stress the
importance of developing relations of trust and co-operation between the E3/EU
and Iran for the preservation of international peace and stability;
b. define the
relationship between the E3/EU process and the EU/Iran negotiations on a
Political Dialogue Agreement and a Trade & Co-operation Agreement as
complementary and mutually reinforcing;
c. commit themselves
to establishing a long-term relationship in the security and political field
based upon shared principles and conditional on both sides' adherence to all
the principles and commitments set out in the overall agreement;
d. welcome Iran's
commitment that, in accordance with Article II of the Treaty on the Non
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, it does not and will not seek to acquire
nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction;
e. recall that
Article IV of the Treaty on the Non Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons stipulates
that nothing in the Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting the inalienable
rights of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use
of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in
conformity with Articles I and II of the Treaty;
f. affirm that a
final agreement on long-term arrangements providing objective guarantees that
Iran's nuclear programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes would lead
immediately to a higher state of relations based on a process of collaboration
in different areas;
g. underline their
determination to strengthen their long-term relationship through an enhanced
programme of economic and technological co-operation, particularly through
early completion of negotiations between Iran and the European Union on a Trade
& Co-operation Agreement, and the associated Political Dialogue Agreement.
II.
POLITICAL AND SECURITY CO-OPERATION
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
3. This section would define the principles on
which the long-term relationship would be based. The E3 and Iran would reaffirm their commitment to the Charter of
the United Nations, and recall the United Nations Millennium Declaration and
other appropriate international instruments.
The E3/EU propose that, within the context of an overall agreement, this
section could include, inter alia, the following mutual commitments in
conformity with the Charter of the United Nations:
a. to fulfil in good
faith obligations in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, under
the generally recognised principles and rules of international law, and under
relevant international agreements;
b. to the principle
of the resolution of disputes by peaceful means and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international law;
c. to refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any state or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations;
d. to the principle
of the sovereign equality of all States;
e. to co-operation
between States in the various spheres of international relations;
f. to promote
respect for and observance and protection of human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction of any kind;
g. to affirm their
commitment to prohibiting discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status; and
h. to establish
conditions under which justice and respect for States' obligations under
treaties and international law can be maintained;
4. Within the context of an overall agreement
and Iran's fulfilment of its obligations under the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the United Kingdom and France would
be prepared to reaffirm to Iran the unilateral security assurances given on 6
April 1995, and referred to in United Nations Security Council Resolution 984
(1995). Specifically:
a. the United Kingdom and the
French Republic would reaffirm to Iran that they will not use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons except in the case of an invasion or any
attack on them, their dependent territories, their armed forces or other
troops, their allies or on a State towards which they have a security
commitment, carried out or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon State in
association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon State; and
b. the United Kingdom and the
French Republic would recall and reaffirm their intention, as Permanent Members
of the Security Council, to seek immediate Security Council action to provide
assistance, in accordance with the Charter, to any non-nuclear weapon State,
party to Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, that is a victim
of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear
weapons are used.
AREAS OF
CO-OPERATION OF SPECIAL INTEREST
5. As part of an overall agreement the E3/EU
propose that both parties should make commitments in the following areas.
Non-proliferation
6. The E3/EU and Iran would:
a. recall the statement of the
President of the United Nations Security Council on 31 January 1992 and United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 (2004) and reaffirm that the
proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as their
means of delivery, constitutes a threat to international peace and security;
express grave concern that illicit trafficking in nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons, as well as their means of delivery and related materials,
which adds a new dimension to the issue of proliferation of such weapons and
also poses a threat to international peace and security; co-operate to take
appropriate and effective measures against such activities; and stress the
importance of effective national export controls;
b. reaffirm their commitment to
abide by security and non-proliferation treaties to which they are party, and
recall the need for more consistent monitoring, effective implementation and,
where necessary, firmer enforcement of such treaties;
c. stress the importance of
universal adherence to and full implementation of and compliance with
disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and of the full implementation of
the IAEA safeguards agreements and additional protocols; work towards the conclusion
of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty; where it has not already been done,
conclude an Additional Protocol; become party to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test
Ban Treaty; and subscribe to the Hague International Code of Conduct against
Ballistic Missile Proliferation;
d. reaffirm their commitment to
the objective of an effectively verifiable Middle East zone free of weapons of
mass destruction, nuclear, biological and chemical, and their means of
delivery, consistent with the resolution on the Middle-East adopted at the 1995
NPT review and extension conference, United Nations Security Council Resolution
687 (1991), and the relevant resolutions of the United Nations General
Assembly.
e. confirm that the prevention
of proliferation of WMD should not hamper international co-operation for
peaceful purposes, in accordance with the relevant international obligations,
while underlining that the goal of peaceful utilisation must not be used as a
cover for proliferation.
Regional security
7. The E3/EU recognise that they share a number
of specific security concerns and interests with Iran and the important role
Iran can potentially play in ensuring regional security and stability. As part of an overall agreement, the E3/EU
would welcome an expanded dialogue and relationship on these issues. To this end, the E3/EU would, as part of an
overall agreement, commit to working with Iran to encourage confidence-building
measures and regional security arrangements.
Such discussions would take place in close consultation with all the
States of the region. The E3/EU and
Iran would recognise that any regional security arrangements must take account
of the legitimate interests of all the countries in the region, thus
contributing to the stability and security of the region as a whole.
8. In this context, the E3/EU would recall their
and Iran's past and present contributions to the reconstruction of Afghanistan
and Iraq, and reaffirm their determination to strengthen co-operation in these
areas, and to work together to support the political process in both these
countries with the goal of establishing democratic and stable states, based on
the rule of law, which coexist with their neighbours, and by preventing any
support and encouragement for groups that use violence for political ends.
Terrorism
9. The E3/EU and Iran would commit themselves to
supporting the declaration on terrorism proposed by the Secretary General for
the United Nations Millennium Summit, recognising that this definition might
evolve before or during the Summit itself.
This states that 'the targeting and deliberate killing of civilians and
non-combatants cannot be justified or legitimised by any cause or grievance, and ... that any action which is intended
to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the
purpose of such an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population
or to compel a government or an international organisation to do or to abstain
from any act constitutes an act of terrorism'.
To this end, the E3/EU and Iran would commit themselves to:
a. combat by all means, in
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to international
peace and security caused by terrorist acts;
b. complement international
co-operation by taking additional measures to prevent and suppress, through all
lawful means, the financing and preparation of any act of terrorism, in the
framework of full implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution
1373; and
c. refrain from organising,
instigating, assisting or participating in terrorist acts in another State or
acquiescing in organised activities in their territories directed towards the
commission of such acts.
Combating drug
trafficking
10. The
E3/EU recognise that Iran has been and will continue to be a key international
partner for the EU in stemming the flow of opiates to Europe and therefore
commit to developing co-operation on issues related to: illicit drug
production, drug trafficking, chemical precursors trafficking,
money-laundering, drug demand reduction, preventative and educational measures,
treatment and rehabilitation of drug abusers, and assistance in drafting
national legislation.
11. In
support of this goal the E3/EU will:
a. actively
support efforts to establish an EU Action Plan with
Iran, building on the 'EU commitments to action';
b. actively
support international programmes designed to tackle Iran's drug problem;
c. take
steps with Iran to implement joint projects in close consultation with
Afghanistan and Iraq to establish border police structures, training of police officers and border
management. As a first step, the E3/EU
will focus their co-operation on enhancing capacities for Afghan/Iranian
co-operation in the fields of cross-border police co-operation, intensified
communication on both sides of the border, as well as the training of customs
officers, and on the development of projects on demand and harm reduction in
Iran.
IMPLEMENTATION MECHANISM
12. In the course of the
negotiation the E3/EU and Iran would establish an appropriate consultation and
co-operation mechanism with a view to developing a long-term relationship on
political and security issues, taking into account the continuing EU-Iran
negotiations on a Political Dialogue Agreement.
13. To this end, the E3/EU propose
the creation of a high-level committee on political and security issues, which
would be made up of representatives from respective Foreign Affairs and Defence
authorities. This Committee, which
would meet periodically, would review progress on this part of the
agreement and provide a forum for
discussing issues of regional, international and mutual interest. The Committee would report regularly to the
appropriate EU bodies and to the Government of Iran.
III.
LONG-TERM SUPPORT FOR IRAN'S CIVIL NUCLEAR PROGRAMME
PRINCIPLES
14. The E3/EU recognise Iran's
rights under Article IV of the NPT to develop research, production and use of
nuclear energy without discrimination in conformity with its obligations under
the NPT.
15. The E3/EU recognise Iran's
right to develop a civil nuclear power generation programme to reduce its
dependence on oil and gas and to choose the most appropriate mix of energy
sources to meet its needs as it perceives them, consistent with its
international obligations.
16. The E3/EU therefore declare,
within the context of an overall agreement and a mutually acceptable agreement
on long-term arrangements, their willingness to support Iran to develop a safe,
economically viable and proliferation-proof civil nuclear power generation and
research programme that conforms with its energy needs.
17. The E3/EU fully support
long-term co-operation in the civil nuclear field between Iran and Russia.
FRAMEWORK
18. Within the context of an
overall agreement, co-operation between the E3/EU and Iran in the civil nuclear
field would move forward within the following framework:
a. Iran would have
access to the international nuclear technologies market where contracts are
awarded on the basis of open competitive tendering, recognising the right of
companies to determine their own commercial strategies and choices;
b. co-operation
would be conditional on Iran's full implementation of its relevant
international obligations and commitments, including the long-term arrangements
agreed between the E3/EU and Iran, resolution by the IAEA of all questions
raised under Iran's Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and continued
co-operation with the IAEA;
c. under United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and based on respective national,
European and international norms, the E3/EU and Iran are obliged to implement
export controls. The E3 would commit
themselves to implementing these controls in a non-discriminatory way, bearing
in mind the new context that would be created by the confidence building
measures and commitments undertaken by Iran under an overall agreement.
IRANIAN ACCESS TO THE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR
FUEL MARKET AND CO-OPERATION IN NUCLEAR ENERGY
19. In line with these principles, and in the
context of an overall agreement and growing confidence between the E3/EU and
Iran, the E3 would support the development of Iran's civil nuclear programme in
the following areas:
a. in the field of civil
nuclear research through implementation of the E3/EU's offer of an expert
mission to help identify the requirement for a research reactor in Iran and how
best to meet that requirement. The
E3/EU would ensure Iran faced no discriminatory obstacles to filling the
requirements jointly identified; and
b. in other fields of peaceful
use of nuclear energy, excluding fuel-cycle related activity, the E3/EU would
commit themselves not to impede participation in open competitive tendering.
20. The E3 Governments also support the development
of co-operation in the following main areas, to be included in a final
agreement:
a. in fields such as
radio-isotope production, basic research and the peaceful use of nuclear energy
in the fields of medicine and agriculture, subject to further expert discussion
between the two sides;
b. in establishing co-operation
between regulatory authorities in the E3/EU and Iran and the IAEA in order to
assist with the design and implementation of international standard nuclear
safety and security regimes. This could
include formalised co-operation between regulators to share developed expertise
and offering advice on security aspects such as the implementation of the
Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, after Iran's
accession to the Convention in its amended version. These areas of co-operation could be refined during the proposed
visit of Iranian experts to the E3/EU.
21. To this end, the E3/EU will actively support
commencement of negotiations on an agreement between EURATOM and Iran. This would create a framework for closer
co-operation between Iran and all EU Member States.
FUEL ASSURANCES
22. The E3/EU recognise that Iran should have
sustained access to nuclear fuel for the Light Water Reactors forming Iran's
civil nuclear industry. These
arrangements are currently provided for through bilateral agreements and
contracts with states/companies with which it is engaged in nuclear co-operation. The E3/EU note that under the Iran/Russia
agreement on nuclear co-operation, Russia has committed itself formally to
supplying nuclear fuel for the life-time of Russian-built reactors in Iran. But the E3/EU stand ready to explore
additional ideas in this context.
23. In order to provide Iran with additional
assurances that external supplies of fuel could be relied upon in the long
term, the E3/EU would propose to develop with Iran a framework which would
provide such assurance, without prejudicing any future multilateral
arrangements developed under IAEA auspices.
24. Both the E3/EU and Iran would aim to have IAEA
(or possibly other international) endorsement for any framework developed, and
the IAEA might be invited to monitor the operation of the mechanism and certify
its operation on objective principles.
25. Any fuel provided would be under normal market
conditions and commercial contracts and subject to proliferation proof
arrangements being agreed for safety, transport and security of the fuel,
including the return of all spent fuel.
26. The framework could involve a combination of
the following mutually reinforcing measures:
a. E3/EU - Iran ad hoc mechanism
27. This would involve establishment of a specific
mechanism to be agreed between the E3/EU and Iran should the contracted
supplier not be in a position to provide the fuel pursuant to its agreements
with Iran for non-commercial reasons not connected with proliferation or
safeguards related concerns and Iran faced serious difficulty in procuring the nuclear
fuel necessary for the safe and sustained functioning of its Light Water
reactors. In such an event, the E3/EU
and Iran would immediately convene an ad hoc senior officials meeting to assess
the situation, and identify and review relevant measures. The E3/EU Governments would, in parallel
convene a meeting with relevant companies to review what action could be taken
to avoid any shortage of energy. The
IAEA could, as appropriate, be invited to such meetings for advisory purposes.
28. The mechanism might seek initially to restore
fuel supplies from the contracted supplier.
If this was not possible, it could seek to identify an alternative
fabricator capable of producing the required design of reactor fuel. If no such fabricator could be identified,
possibilities would be investigated to establish and licence a new fabrication
line, outside Iran, able to meet the future fuel supply needs at market
prices. Any such alternative supply
mechanism would be dependent on satisfactory arrangements being established for
long-term management of spent fuel outside Iran.
29. The E3/EU would commit themselves to exploring
ways with industry to provide assured enrichment services at market prices for
fuel fabrication outside Iran if the usual enrichment services provider were
unable to meet its contractual obligations for non-commercial reasons; how such
a commitment would be formally presented remains to be defined.
b. Establishment of a buffer store
30. In order to provide the necessary time for a
solution to be found through the E3/EU - Iran ad hoc mechanism without
adversely impacting the operation of Iran's nuclear power reactors, the E3/EU
commit themselves to assisting in the establishment of a buffer store of fuel,
sufficient to maintain supplies at the contracted rate for a period of 5
years. This store would be physically
located in a mutually acceptable third country, and would be available to draw
from while long-term arrangements are put in place. The E3/EU would welcome early discussion with Iran on establishment,
maintenance and use of the buffer store.
c. Multilateral arrangements
31. The E3/EU and Iran would engage with the IAEA
and others to develop international mechanisms following on from the ideas
identified in the "Multilateral Nuclear Approaches" report on security of fuel
supply.
CONFIDENCE BUILDING
32. The E3/EU reaffirm Iran's inalienable right to
the peaceful use of nuclear energy, exercised in conformity with the NPT. In this context, the support of E3 countries
for expanding international co-operation in Iran's civil nuclear sector and for
the development of a safe, economically viable and proliferation proof civil
nuclear power generation and research programme will present Iran with new
opportunities.
33. Effective long-term co-operation between Iran
and the international community in the civil nuclear field along the lines set
out in this document will, however, require the continued building of
confidence over a significant period.
34. As Iran will have an assured supply of fuel
over the coming years, it will be able to provide the confidence needed by
making a binding commitment not to pursue fuel cycle activities other than the
construction and operation of light water power and research reactors. This commitment would be reviewed jointly in
line with the review mechanism envisaged in Paragraph 58.
35. The E3/EU would expect Iran to invite the IAEA
to agree a mechanism to verify the implementation of the final agreement.
36. As an essential element of this mechanism for
international confidence building, Iran would undertake to:
a. make a legally binding commitment not to
withdraw from the NPT and to keep all Iranian nuclear facilities under IAEA
safeguards under all circumstances;
b. ratify its Additional Protocol, in accordance
with its existing commitment, by the end of 2005;
c. in the meantime, fully implement the
Additional Protocol pending its ratification and to co-operate proactively and
in a transparent manner with the IAEA to solve all outstanding issues pursuant
to the Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol including by allowing IAEA
inspectors to visit any site or interview any person they deem relevant to
their monitoring of nuclear activity in Iran; and
d. agree arrangements for the supply of fresh
fuel from outside Iran and commit to returning all spent fuel elements of
Iranian reactors to the original supplier immediately after the minimum cooling
down period necessary for transportation.
37. In line with IAEA Board Resolutions, the E3/EU
would also expect Iran to stop construction of its Heavy Water Research Reactor
at Arak, which gives rise to proliferation concerns. The E3/EU repeat their existing offer to send an expert mission
to Iran to help identify research requirements and the most suitable type of
equipment to meet those requirements.
38. The E3/EU would work with Iran to establish a
group to identify alternative uses for the equipment, installations, facilities
and materials whose use, construction, testing or development would not form
part of Iran's long-term civil nuclear industry. The group could consider alternative areas of employment for the
scientists, technicians and workers currently employed in these
facilities.
CONSULTATION
MECHANISM
39. The E3/EU and Iran would conduct regular
consultations on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and the development of the
Iranian civil nuclear programme through a specific consultation mechanism to be
agreed.
IV.
ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CO-OPERATION
PRINCIPLES
40. The E3/EU consider that an overall agreement
would lead to the development of a programme of economic and technological
co-operation with Iran, complementing the envisaged EC/Iran Trade &
Co-operation Agreement, which will constitute the main vehicle for the
long-term development of economic relations between Europe and Iran.
ENERGY CO-OPERATION
41. The E3/EU would recognise the fundamental
importance of energy co-operation to their long-term relationship with
Iran. As part of an overall agreement:
a. the E3/EU and the European Commission would
be prepared to issue a policy declaration that they regard Iran as a long-term
source of fossil energy for the European Union and recognise the growing
importance of Iranian gas supplies to Europe in the coming years;
b. the E3/EU and the European Commission would
commit to developing a strategic energy partnership through the Trade and
Co-operation Agreement and in this context through the High Level Working Group
on Energy;
c. in the context of the High Level Working
Group on Energy and in the framework of the Memorandum of Understanding of 19
October 2002 between the European Commission and the Iranian Ministry of
Petroleum on co-operation in the energy sector, the European Commission would
explore the possibility of opening the EU-Iran
Management and Technology Centre with a view to commissioning joint
studies on areas in which the EU and Iran can develop co-operation in the
energy sector as well as providing technical support for the implementation of
the policy declaration mentioned in Paragraph 41a;
d. the E3/EU and Iran, as well as the
Commission, would discuss possible future oil and gas pipeline projects.
PROMOTION OF TRADE
AND INVESTMENT
42. The E3/EU recognise the importance of the
proposed EC/Iran Trade & Co-operation Agreement to developing the long-term
commercial and economic relationship between the EU and Iran, noting that this
will facilitate market access, promote commercial exchanges, and open up a wide
range of further co-operation activities in the economic, commercial and other
fields.
43. As part of any overall agreement the E3/EU
would therefore commit themselves to working to bring the current negotiations
between Iran and the European Community on a Trade & Co-operation
Agreement, and the associated Political Dialogue Agreement, to an early
conclusion.
44. The E3/EU and Iran would agree to continue and
strengthen mutually beneficial practices in the areas of export credits and
investment guarantees, particularly in light of the additional confidence that
an overall agreement and a closer political and economic relationship would
give to investors and export credit agencies alike.
WTO
ACCESSION
45. The E3/EU welcome Iran's successful application
to open WTO accession talks, recalling that this has been a significant benefit
of the dialogue initiated by the Paris Agreement.
46. The E3/EU confirm their continued political
support for Iranian accession to the WTO and their willingness to offer
technical support to assist Iran in making the necessary technical adjustments
to its economy. Working with the WTO Secretariat
and Commission, the E3 would agree to offer assistance to help Iran with WTO
compliance, including on tariff structures, technical barriers to trade, rules
of origin, intellectual property, and other areas as appropriate.
PROMOTING TRADE AND
TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY: EXPORT CONTROLS
47. The E3/EU note that enhanced confidence
regarding the civilian end-use of goods transferred to Iran, including through
the establishment of export control systems, would facilitate decisions on
individual licences. The E3/EU also
recognise that effective export control systems will make a significant
contribution to developing mutually beneficial economic relations and state
that they apply international export control regimes and respective national
and European regulations on a non-discriminatory basis. The E3/EU therefore agree to convene a joint
export control workshop in Tehran, which would allow for exchanges on the
implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 and
national/EC laws.
48. As a follow up the E3/EU is also prepared to offer
support to Iran in establishing an efficient system of export controls.
49. Civil aviation. The E3/EU would continue to promote the sale of aircraft parts to
Iran and be willing to enter into discussion about open procurement of the sale
of civil passenger aircraft to Iran.
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
CO-OPERATION
50. Recognising the benefits of scientific and
academic co-operation to both sides, the E3/EU commit to developing long-term
scientific co-operation with Iran.
51. In this context, the European Union, through
the Commission, would agree to send an expert team to Iran to draw up Iran's
'Scientific Profile', within the context of the EC/Iran Trade &
Co-operation Agreement.
52. The E3/EU would agree to facilitate Iran's
access to advanced technologies, respecting national law and international
commitments regarding export control; they would strengthen existing and
encourage new scientific co-operation between scientists, universities and
scientific institutes. This
co-operation should cover both fundamental and applied research.
53. In the field of environmental technologies, the
E3/EU would be prepared to develop co-operation with Iran in the fields of
water supply, waste management, protection of natural habitats and preparedness
for natural disasters.
54. In the field of communications and information
technology, the E3/EU would be prepared to co-operate with Iran to improve
internet connection stability.
55. The E3/EU would also be interested in
developing and deepening co-operation with Iran through relevant international
fora, particularly in the field of air pollution.
56. Education and vocational training. The E3/EU
would be prepared, through their relevant agencies, to co-operate with Iran in
developing its system of vocational education.
BUILDING A STRUCTURE
OF ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CO‑OPERATION
57. The E3/EU and Iran would look to invigorate
co-operation through a mechanism, to be agreed, to complement any wider EU/Iran
structures agreed under the Trade & Co-operation Agreement, and cover other
areas of mutual interest, although of lower priority than those set out above,
including but not exclusively:
- Air transport safety. The E3/EU would co-operate in the fields of
air traffic management, certification, accident, investigation and airport
security.
- Railway transport. The E3/EU would co-operate with Iran in
establishing a transport master plan; they will encourage and support
co-operation with Iran in the area of railway rolling stock, signalling and
high speed technology.
- Maritime transport. The E3/EU would facilitate the negotiation
of a maritime transport agreement with Iran.
- Seismology and seismic
mapping. The E3 would, through their
relevant institutions contribute to a seismic mapping exercise, with a focus on
the most densely populated areas of Iran and work to develop co-operation in
the fields of risk and disaster management.
- Infrastructure. The E3/EU would facilitate access to
European technology related to
constructing earthquake resistant buildings.
- Agriculture and food
industry. The E3/EU would be prepared
to offer co-operation in ecological agriculture, including natural herbicides
and pesticides, food safety; and the regulations and trade aspects of sanitary
and phytosanitary standards.
- Tourism. The E3/EU would be prepared to assist Iran
in developing its reputation as a tourist destination and support co-operation
in the development of new tourist resorts.
V. REVIEW MECHANISM
58. The E3/EU and Iran would agree to implement the
agreement in good faith. The agreement
would be subject to review, at Ministerial level, every ten years. Any change to these arrangements would be
subject to explicit agreement by both the E3/EU and Iran.
59. The E3/EU would be willing to circulate the
final agreement as an IAEA Information Circular (INFCIRC) and UN Document for
information and with a view to possible endorsement by the international
community.
ANNEX V - 6 June 2006 E3+3 Proposal
ELEMENTS
OF A LONG TERM AGREEMENT
Our goal is to develop
relations and cooperation with Iran based on mutual respect and the
establishment of international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of
Iran's nuclear programme. We propose a fresh start in negotiations of a
comprehensive agreement with Iran. Such
an agreement would be deposited with the IAEA and endorsed in a Security
Council resolution.
To create the right conditions for
negotiations:
We will:
- reaffirm
Iran's right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in conformity with
its NPT obligations, and in this context reaffirm their support for the
development by Iran of a civil nuclear energy programme;
- commit
to actively support the building of new light water reactors in Iran through
international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA Statute and the NPT.
- agree
to suspend discussion of Iran's nuclear programme at the Security Council on
resumption of negotiations.
Iran will:
- commit
to addressing all the outstanding concerns of the IAEA through full cooperation
with the IAEA;
- suspend
all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities to be verified by the IAEA,
as requested by the IAEA Board of Governors and the UN Security Council, and
commit to continue this during these negotiations; and
- resume
implementation of the Additional Protocol;
AREAS OF FUTURE COOPERATION TO BE COVERED IN NEGOTIATIONS ON A LONG TERM
AGREEMENT
NUCLEAR
We will take the
following steps:
Iran's Rights to Nuclear Energy
- reaffirm
Iran's inalienable right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of the NPT, and
co-operate with Iran in the development by Iran of a civil nuclear power
programme.
- negotiate
and implement a Euratom/Iran nuclear cooperation agreement.
Light Water Reactors:
- actively
support the building of new light water power reactors in Iran through
international joint projects, in accordance with the IAEA Statute and the NPT,
using state-of-the art technology,
including by authorising the transfer of necessary goods and the provision
of advanced technology to make its power reactors safe against earthquakes.
- provide co-operation with the
management of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive waste through appropriate
arrangements.
Research & Development in Nuclear Energy
- provide
a substantive package of research and development co-operation, including
possible provision of light water research reactors, notably in the fields of
radioisotope production, basic research and nuclear applications in medicine
and agriculture.
Fuel Guarantees
- give
legally binding, multi-layered fuel assurances to Iran, based on:
· participation
as a partner in an international facility in Russia to provide enrichment
services for a reliable supply of fuel to Iran's nuclear reactors. Subject to
negotiations, such a facility could enrich all the UF6 produced in Iran.
· establishment
on commercial terms of a buffer stock to hold a reserve of up to 5 years'
supply of nuclear fuel dedicated to Iran, with participation and under
supervision of the IAEA.
· development
of a standing multilateral mechanism for reliable access to nuclear fuel with
the IAEA based on ideas to be considered at the next Board of Governors.
Review of Moratorium
The long-term agreement
would, with regard to common efforts to build international confidence, include
a clause for review of the agreement in all its aspects, to follow :
- confirmation
by the IAEA that all outstanding issues and concerns reported by the IAEA,
including those activities which could have a military nuclear dimension, have
been resolved; and
- confirmation
that there are no undeclared nuclear activities or materials in Iran and that
international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's civil
nuclear programme has been restored.
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
Regional Security Co-operation
Support for a new conference to promote dialogue and
cooperation on regional security issues.
International Trade & Investment
Improving Iran's access
to the international economy, markets and capital, through practical support
for full integration into international structures, including the WTO, and to
create the framework for increased direct investment in Iran and trade with
Iran (including a Trade and Economic Cooperation Agreement with EU). Steps
would be taken to improve access to key goods and technology.
Civil Aviation
Civil aviation
cooperation, including the possible removal of restrictions on US and European
manufacturers, from exporting civil aircraft to Iran, thereby widening the
prospect of Iran renewing its fleet of civil airliners.
Energy Partnership
Establishment of a
long-term energy partnership between Iran and the EU and other willing
partners, with concrete and practical applications.
Telecommunications Infrastructure
Support for the modernisation of Iran's telecommunication
infrastructure and advanced internet provision, including by possible removal
of relevant US and other export restrictions.
High Technology Co-operation
Co-operation in fields of high technology and other areas
to be agreed.
Agriculture
Support for agricultural development in Iran, including
possible access to US and European agricultural products, technology and farm
equipment.
6 June 2006
ANNEX VI - Glossary
Additional Protocol
- a set of provisions additional to an existing safeguards agreement, which, if agreed, requires states
to provide IAEA inspectors with greater
levels of information and access.
AEOI - Atomic
Energy Organisation of Iran
AP - see Additional Protocol.
AUC - Ammonium
Uranyl Carbonate
AVLIS - Atomic
Vapour Laser Isotope Separation
BNPP-1 - Bushehr
Nuclear Power Plant 1
BTWC - Biological
and Toxin Weapons Convention
Code 3.1 - Part
of the Subsidiary Arrangements of the CSA. The amended version, which Iran accepted in 2004 but then
declared to be suspended in 2007, requires
submission of information additional to that required by the original 1976 version.
Complementary Access -
Access to relevant sites provided by a state to IAEA inspectors, in accordance with the provisions of an
Additional Protocol
CRC - Convention
on the Rights of the Child
CSA -
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, i.e. an agreement that applies safeguards on all nuclear material in all
nuclear activities in a state (such as an agreement
between the IAEA and a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT)
CSL -
Comprehensive Separation Laboratory, at TNRC
CVL - Copper
Vapour Laser
CWC - Chemical
Weapons Convention
DIV - Design
Information Verification - an IAEA process of inspection to check whether actual facilities match up to
appropriate previously declared designs
E3 - France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom
E3/EU - France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom, with the support of the High Representative of the European Union
E3+3 - France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom, together with China, Russia and the United States, and with the support of
the High Representative of the European
Union
ENTC - Esfahan
Nuclear Technology Centre
EU - The European
Union
Euratom - The
European Atomic Energy Community
FAC - The House
of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs
FEP - Fuel
Enrichment Plant, at Natanz
FFL - Fuel
Fabrication Laboratory, at ENTC
FMP - Fuel
Manufacturing Plant, at ENTC
G8 - Canada,
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States
Green Salt -
Uranium Tetrafluoride, also known as UF4
HWPP - Heavy
Water Production Plant, at Arak
HWRR - Heavy
Water Research Reactor, also known as IR-40, at Arak
IAEA -
International Atomic Energy Agency
ICCPR -
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
IR-40 - The 40MW
Iran Nuclear Research Reactor, at Arak
IRGC - The
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps
JHL - Jabr ibn
Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories, at TNRC
LSL - Laser
Spectroscopy Laboratory, at TNRC
Majles - The
Iranian Parliament
MIX Facility -
Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production Facility, at TNRC
MLIS - Molecular
Laser Isotope Separation
NCRI - National
Council of Resistance of Iran - an Iranian opposition organisation
NPT - The
Non-Proliferation Treaty, or more properly, the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Paris Agreement -
between Iran and E3/EU on 15 November 2004 (see
Annex III)
PFEP - Pilot Fuel
Enrichment Plant, at Natanz
PHRC - Physics
Research Centre, formerly at Lavizan-Shian
TCA - Trade and
Cooperation Agreement
Tehran Declaration
- Joint statement by E3 Foreign Ministers on 21 October 2003 (see
Annex II)
TNRC - Tehran
Nuclear Research Centre
TRR - Tehran
Research Reactor, at TNRC
UCF - Uranium
Conversion Facility, at ENTC
UF4 - Uranium
Tetrafluoride, sometimes known as Green Salt
UF6 - Uranium
Hexafluoride
UN - The United
Nations
UNSC - The United
Nations Security Council
UNSCR - United
Nations Security Council Resolution
UO2 - Uranium
Dioxide
UOC - Uranium Ore
Concentrate, sometimes known as Yellowcake
WMD - Weapons of
Mass Destruction, usually referring to Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Weapons
WTO - World Trade
Organisation
Yellowcake -
Uranium Ore Concentrate
