|
Comments from Human Rights Watch on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Human Rights Annual Report 2006
Introduction
Human Rights Watch thanks the Foreign Affairs Committee for the opportunity to comment on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's Annual Human Rights Report. We look forward to answering further questions from the committee at the oral session on 24 January 2007.
Every year the FCO's report on human rights plays an important role in highlighting some of the worst human rights abuses in the world. This is an important exercise for two reasons. Firstly, by publishing these annual reports, the FCO helps to expose the behaviour of human rights abusing states and this exposure can serve to shame abusers into changing that behaviour.
Second, these annual reports help to underline the need for the UK and its international partners to be honest with themselves in dealing with abusive governments around the world. British diplomats can and do still argue that engaging the governments of countries like China, Russia or Pakistan may be important to the national interest, despite their poor human rights record. But they cannot deny the abusive nature of those states if the FCO's own human rights report states otherwise.
As in previous years, the 2006 FCO report contains much useful and factually accurate material. Human Rights Watch welcomes the FCO's stated commitment to upholding human rights and the rule of law. We also welcome the government's operationalisation of that commitment through the programme of human rights work outlined in this report.
The following comments do not represent a comprehensive critique of the report or of the FCO's approach to human rights as a whole. Rather this submission seeks to highlight two important areas where HRW feels the report falls short, and where the government's rhetoric on human rights does not match its conduct, policies and positions: 1. Human Rights and Counterterrorism 2. The role of the EU in promoting Human Rights
1. Human Rights and Counter-terrorism
The FCO says that it has a good story to tell in respect of observing human rights and the rule of law in pursuit of its counterterrorism aims. Indeed it says in this report (in our view rightly) that human rights must be a central component of any successful counter-terrorism strategy. However HRW believes that the UK is in fact undermining its counterterrorism strategy by failures in at least three areas:
· Selective criticism and inaccurate reporting of human rights failings of states in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia. · Shortcomings of the UK's own positions and policies, including the FCO's efforts to deport security detainees to countries where they are at risk of torture. · Reluctance or failure to criticize the United States for abuses carried out by US forces in pursuit of counter terrorism aims, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq.
Selective criticism and inaccurate reporting of human rights failings of states in the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia
In many parts of the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia an epidemic of human rights violations has been continuing for many years now fuelling grievances which underlie the conflicts, instability and political/religious extremism of these regions. Abuses and violations include routine denial by governments of political freedoms, severe shortcomings in the application of the rule of law, and brutal government persecution and harassment of political opponents.
Success in addressing the conflicts and extremism of these regions - now seen as so vital to the UK's own national security - depends in great part on success in addressing the human rights abuses and the long history of impunity which lie at the roots of these conflicts and crises. But these issues must be addressed in a consistent, non-selective way. Ultimately, the momentum for democratic accountability and rule of law that is required to create sustainable stability and respect for human rights will have to come from within these regions themselves. But outside powers including the UK are already deeply implicated.
Unfortunately the approach adopted by the UK government to the human rights dimensions of several of these conflicts and crisis appears to be selective, and some of its reporting of the human rights issues at play in these conflicts is inaccurate, misleading or incomplete. This is serving to undermine the UK's political credibility and leverage, contributing to widespread perceptions of Western double standards in its dealings with the Muslim World.
Iraq and Afghanistan are good examples. Alongside the US and other Western allies, the UK is playing a leading role in seeking to bring stability to Iraq and Afghanistan. Both of these important strategic projects have suffered serious setbacks in the course of 2006 and in both countries human rights and the rule of law have suffered serious deterioration. The British government has been reluctant to acknowledge the extent of the failures in these countries. This is reflected in the report's discussion of human rights in Iraq and Afghanistan.
The report lists its current human rights concerns in Afghanistan (pp 30-36) as freedom of expression, women and children, the death penalty and economic and social rights. While it is important to highlight these concerns (which we share), HRW believes it is also important to address squarely human rights aspects of the actions and policies of US forces in Afghanistan and of the British led NATO force, ISAF. In the struggle against the Taleban the Afghan government and its international allies are currently pursuing a counter-productive policy of relying on war criminals, human rights abusers, and drug-traffickers. These people should instead be prosecuted. In particular it is essential to: focus NATO's security operations on protecting Afghan civilians; ensure maximum protection of civilians from the effects of combat operations, particularly the effects of aerial attacks; ensure that detainees are treated in accordance with international standards and address insecurity caused by warlords and illegal armed groups throughout the entire country (i.e. not just Taleban related insecurity). Respect for human rights on the part of international forces as well as Afghan actors must be an important and necessary component of any counter-insurgency strategy in Afghanistan.
The report paints a wildly optimistic view of the human rights situation in Iraq (pp66-77), stating that "progress is being made" in building "a culture of respect for human rights". Compare this to this assessment from Jan Egeland, the top UN aid official, shortly before he left office at the end of 2006: "One hundred or more dead people every day and night is an outrage... I know of no other place on Earth where so many people are killed, massacred and tortured to death as in Iraq." The UK, together with its US ally, now finds itself in a position in Iraq where it is propping up a government that is deeply implicated in escalating sectarian violence, massacres and torture.
With regard to the conduct of coalition forces in Iraq, the FCO's report is particularly defensive and misleading. For example on the impact on civilians of major military operations carried out by coalition forces in Iraq, the report takes at face value assurances by the US that "all possible steps are taken" to ensure the safety and well-being of civilians in areas where such operations take place. There is no evidential basis for such a position. Equally the report takes at face value assurances by the US with regard to the treatment of detainees. The report states that "allegations of abuse by coalition forces against detainees have been thoroughly investigated". However HRW has collected evidence suggesting that prisoner abuse by US forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan has not been properly investigated nor, in the few cases where convictions have been secured, adequately punished. There has also been an almost total failure on the part of the US authorities to pursue prosecutions of higher ranks under the principle of command responsibility, thus perpetuating the myth that detainee abuse is the work of "a few bad apples" rather than part of a systemic failure.
The FCO report notes that the UK has contributed funds toward the training of judges and other advisers for the Iraq High Tribunal (IHT) "to ensure that the IHT can maintain high standards so that the accused can be given a fair trial". HRW monitored most of the trial of Saddam Hussein and his co-defendants - the Dujail trial - which ended in November 2006 with a conviction and death sentences for Saddam and two others. In a report published shortly afterwards - Judging Dujail: the first trial before the Iraqi High Tribunal http://hrw.org/reports/2006/iraq1106/ - HRW concluded that the trial was so deeply flawed that the verdicts were unsound and should be overturned. We found that the IHT was undermined from the outset by Iraqi government actions that threatened the independence and perceived impartiality of the court. Other shortcomings included: regular failure to disclose key evidence, including exculpatory evidence, to the defense in advance; violations of the defendants' basic fair trial right to confront witnesses against them; lapses of judicial demeanor that undermined the apparent impartiality of the presiding judge; and important gaps in evidence that undermine the persuasiveness of the prosecution case, and put in doubt whether all the elements of the crimes charged were established.
The Dujail trial was an opportunity squarely to address the fundamental and long standing problem of impunity in a Middle Eastern state through a rigorous judicial process. It was also an opportunity to establish a legal and factual record of the egregious human rights abuses carried out under the regime of Saddam Hussein and to demonstrate, in a high profile case, that the invasion had resulted in the establishment of the rule of law in Iraq. These opportunities were squandered. Instead, an unfair trial and appeals process and a fast tracked, cruel and televised execution most likely turned a brutal dictator into a hero and martyr for many Arab nationalists and Islamists.
The FCO's report correctly draws attention to the deteriorating human rights situation in Iran (pp63-66) since the election of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in June 2005 brought an end to the reformist presidency of Mohammed Khatami. However, lack of international leverage on Iran means that there is very little that can be done to address this deterioration. Indeed one can plausibly argue that UK-backed US policies in the region (particularly in Iraq) have inadvertently helped to empower the Iranian regime at home and to increase its regional influence, especially in Iraq. This in turn has further reduced the extent to which the UN, the EU and others can bring pressure to bear on Iran to improve its record on human rights. Furthermore the focus of UK policy towards Iran on counter-terrorism and Iran's nuclear programme comes at the expense of efforts to promote political reform and respect for human rights.
Strategic and political concerns appear to colour the report's treatment of Israel. The report's description of human rights violations by both sides in the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians (pp77-84) is generally balanced and accurate. It rightly draws attention to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza since the Israeli military redeployment there. However while it calls on the Palestinian Authority to "reform the security sector so that it can take action against groups and individuals responsible for armed violence," it does not draw attention to the manner in which Israeli actions and policies - including the perpetuation of the military occupation and the expansion of settlements in the West Bank - have undermined the ability of the PA to carry out such reform. Furthermore it fails to call on Israel to address the serious and systemic failure of its own justice system to prosecute and punish Israeli military personnel responsible for human rights abuses or to provide redress for victims of abuses. The picture one gets from reading this report is that the main stumbling block to addressing the human rights crisis in the OPT is as much the Palestinians' resistance to Israeli occupation of their lands as the occupation itself.
An even more serious concern is the report's treatment of the July/August 2006 conflict between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon. During the fighting the British government rightly joined the United States in condemning Hezbollah for its attacks on civilians in northern Israel. But it refrained from serious criticism of Israel for its more lethal (and likewise illegal and reprehensible) indiscriminate attacks harming civilians in Lebanon. On Israel's behalf, the UK also resisted calls for a humanitarian ceasefire and gave a green light to the transfer of American weapons to Israel through the UK, leading many Lebanese to see the UK as complicit in the violence they suffered at the hands of the Israelis. This lack of balance is perpetuated in the FCO report. The report correctly mentions (in the section on Syria on p.105) that Hezbollah's indiscriminate rocket attacks killed over 40 Israeli civilians. But in a section on the July/August 2006 conflict (p 215) there is no mention of the Lebanese death toll of as many as 1,000 civilians or of the thousands of maimed and injured. The massive destruction to Lebanese property and infrastructure is alluded to in the context of the reconstruction effort but there is no mention of how this destruction came about and no analysis of the human rights dimensions of the destruction and its clear contravention of international humanitarian law. Furthermore there is nothing on the deadly legacy of tens of thousands of cluster sub munitions which Israel fired on Southern Lebanon in the last days of the war.
Saudi Arabia (pp98-101) is one of the few friendly Middle Eastern states which the FCO human rights report includes in its section on the "major countries of concern". The report lists numerous very serious concerns, including state sanctioned discrimination against women, foreigners, non-Muslims, non-Sunni Muslims, restrictions on workers rights, press freedom, freedom of expression, freedom of assembly, freedom of religious and the extensive use of the death penalty. However the report ignores one of the most serious human rights abuses in the kingdom - namely the continued use of torture - and gives little evidence for its statement that "the overall situation continues to improve" in Saudi Arabia. Indeed, to our knowledge, no such evidence exists.
HRW welcomes the inclusion of Syria (pp104-107) among the major countries of concern in this year's report. Certainly on grounds of Syria's human rights performance it merits inclusion. But on the same grounds several other important Arab countries, including Egypt, which has seen a serious deterioration in the human rights environment in the past 18 months, also merit inclusion. The impartiality of the report is thus undermined by the suspicion that the inclusion of Syria, but not other equally poor human rights performers in the region, is politically motivated by the UK's opposition to Syria's regional policies with regard to Israel, Lebanon and Iraq.
Also inexplicable on the basis of its human rights performance is the exclusion of Pakistan from the list of major countries of concern (though it does get mentioned in other sections). The human rights environment in Pakistan has deteriorated dramatically under the military government of Pervez Musharraf and in particular in the past two years as the situation in the border region with Afghanistan has deteriorated. It seems reasonable to suppose therefore that the reluctance to highlight human rights abuses in Pakistan stems from the Pakistani regime's perceived importance as an ally in the war on terror. For the same reason Prime Minister Tony Blair refrained from any public or, as we understand it, any private criticism of the Musharraf regime on his visit to Pakistan in November 2006.
Shortcomings of the UK's own positions and policies, including the FCO's efforts to deport security detainees to countries where they are at risk of torture
HRW welcomes the report's categorical statement on torture: "Torture has no place in the 21st Century. It is one of the most abhorrent violations of human rights and human dignity. Its prohibition is absolute" (p 187). HRW also welcomes the international work the FCO is doing to cement the global ban on torture. There are sound practical and strategic as well as moral reasons for pursuing an uncompromising approach to torture. However, as HRW pointed out in a report published in November 2006 - Dangerous Ambivalence: the UK's attitude to torture http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/eca/uk1106/ - we believe that in at least four important respects the government is actually undermining international efforts to eradicate torture.
First the government has sought (and so far failed) to allow evidence obtained under torture in other countries to be used in British courts. Second the government is seeking to find ways around the prohibition on the deportation of terrorism suspects to countries which routinely practice torture by obtaining diplomatic assurances from those countries. Third it is seeking to undermine Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights by arguing that when it comes to deportation of terrorism suspects the risk of torture should be balanced against national security concerns. And fourth it has failed squarely to challenge the egregious failures of the United States to protect detainees from serious abuse, including torture and death, either when they are in US custody or when they are "rendered" to other countries, sometimes with the express purpose of extracting information from them under coercion.
The first issue (regarding the use of evidence obtained under torture) does not fall within the remit of the FCO and is not covered in this report. With regard to the other three issues, the report inadvertently reveals the extent of the UK government's failures - which are spelt out in detail in the HRW report alluded to above.
On deportations, the report makes several unfounded or misleading statements. The government's policy hangs on the validity of memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with countries such as Jordan, Lebanon and Libya to which it wishes to deport terrorism suspects whom it is unable or unwilling to prosecute in the UK. HRW has studied this issue in detail and arrived at the conclusion that the diplomatic assurances contained in these MoUs that the suspects will not be mistreated are ineffective and do not provide adequate protection against torture. In torturing political opponents these countries already stand in gross violation of international law. It is therefore completely implausible to argue, as the FCO does that non-binding bilateral "diplomatic assurances" will provide protection against torture. Furthermore the monitoring mechanisms which the MoUs envisage will not work as a safeguard. The argument put forward by the government, and in this report (p 180), that MoUs will actually help to improve the human rights situation in Libya, Lebanon and Jordan (and in other countries with which the UK is seeking to sign similar MoUs such as Egypt) is quite fanciful and misleading - this is neither the purpose of MoUs and nor will it be a spin off consequence. No evidence is put forward to support this argument - whereas the dismal record of all these countries on human rights points very clearly in the opposite direction.
On Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights the FCO report seeks to justify the government's misguided efforts to introduce the principle that risk of torture and ill-treatment should be balanced against the threat to national security when considering the deportations of terrorism suspects. So far, the European Court of Human Rights has valiantly resisted efforts to introduce the principle of balance when it comes to torture and ill-treatment - for example in the ruling on Chahal v UK in 1996. Now the UK is intervening to support the Netherlands in the case of Ramzy v the Netherlands. "We believe," says the FCO report (p 181), "that the current heightened security threat means that it is proper for the court to revisit the issue." It is hard to escape the conclusion that the government is involved in an effort to water down Article 3 and the global prohibition on torture and ill-treatment, including the ban on returns to risk of such abuse.
Reluctance or failure to criticize the United States for abuses carried out by US forces in pursuit of counter terrorism aims, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq
We have already noted the reluctance of the UK government (and of the FCO human rights report) to criticize the failures of the United States government with regard to human rights and international humanitarian law in its pursuit of its political and military objectives in Iraq and Afghanistan. The report is also symptomatic of the government's reluctance to criticize the United States government's practices in the wider effort to combat international terrorism, especially the policy of rendition and the systemic abuse of detainees at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, and in other US detention facilities.
Human Rights Watch has already made its concerns clear to the FAC regarding the treatment and legal status of detainees in Guantánamo Bay and other US detention facilities in a separate submission to the FAC (attached here as an annex). The FCO's report says that "the government has long made it clear that it regards the circumstances under which detainees continue to be held at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, as unacceptable." In fact it was not until mid 2006 that the UK government summoned up the backbone to express firm criticism of Guantánamo Bay. And the UK has done little to back up its words with actions. Despite the growing pleas for help, the UK long refused to provide a safe haven for the British residents who are still being held in Guantánamo Bay and continues to refuse to help find a safe haven for those detainees the US wants to release but is unable to because of fears of torture. Moreover, the government - like this report - has failed completely to criticize the US for stripping the Guantánamo detainees of access to courts to challenge the legality of their detention though habeas corpus proceeding or of their treatment, even if they have been tortured and even after they have been released. These court-stripping provisions threaten to return Guantánamo to a black hole, where the US government can act with impunity, and set a dangerous precedent that the UK should have been quick to condemn.
2. The EU underperforming on Human Rights
The FCO's Annual Report says rightly that "with its 450 million inhabitants, and its economic and political strength, the European Union has enormous potential to promote the human rights and fundamental freedoms it seeks for its own citizens through its political, trade and development relationships with the wider world" (p. 127). It is also clear, as the report suggests, that the UK's best hope of leveraging better protection of human rights in the world lies in working through the EU as one of its leading member states.
What the Annual Report does not say is that the EU is failing to fulfill its potential with regard to protection of human rights. On the contrary it is punching well below its weight in this area, and this needs to change - especially given the decline of US leadership and credibility on human rights in recent years.
The weaknesses of the EU with respect to promoting human rights are particularly evident in its policies on China, Russia, and the United States; on crises such as Darfur and other human rights problems in the global south; and on human rights issues within the EU itself, especially those related to immigration and asylum.
The FCO report's extensive section on China (pp 42-49) raises important human rights concerns from a UK perspective. But there appears to be little political will at the EU or bilateral (UK) level to raise those concerns at a high level. Most public EU comments are weak and lacking in conviction. The EU and the UK both maintain "dialogues" with China on human rights, but these are at a low-level, they use no clear benchmarks to measure progress from meeting to meeting, and they produce no obvious results. During the EU-China summit in September 2006 Finland's ambassador to Beijing, Antti Kuosmanen, stated on behalf of the EU presidency that human rights would "not be a dominant point" at the summit and that human rights were a "sensitive and delicate issue ... because we are dealing with values." Instead business and security issues dominated the agenda, as they did during Wen's latest meetings with Prime Minister Blair and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, as well as French President Jacques Chirac's visit to Beijing. Similarly, in October, the EU's External Relations Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner and Trade Commissioner Peter Mandelson urged a "comprehensive reframing" of the EU's relations with China but never mentioned human rights.
One area where this lack of pressure on human rights has been felt is Internet freedom. This issue is briefly mentioned but not addressed in any detail in the FCO's report. With no help from the EU to resist pressure, Internet companies such as Google, Microsoft and Yahoo are giving in to the demands of the Chinese government for censorship, surveillance and control.
Curiously, one positive development with regard to the role of the EU on human rights in China is not noted in this report. Despite Chinese lobbying, the EU resisted lifting its arms embargo on China imposed after the Tiananmen Square massacre in 1989. This was one example where the EU consensus rules facilitated a strong human rights position because the embargo, originally imposed without a time limit, required a common position to lift. But with China eager to have the embargo ended before the 2008 Olympic Games, the EU still has not articulated the benchmarks that must be met, such as a transparent and credible investigation into the Tiananmen killings, and thus has lost an opportunity for leverage on human rights.
UK concerns about human rights abuses in Russia, especially in Chechnya, are well put forward in this report (pp 86-98). Voicing these concerns at the EU level is clearly a more promising approach for the UK than working bilaterally. But EU policy toward Russia appears to regard energy security - understandably a major European priority - as being incompatible with challenging Russia's behaviour as a violator of human rights. The EU has held semi-annual "consultations" with Russia on human rights. But, as with China, these are at a low diplomatic level and have been unproductive in terms of improving Russia's human rights record. And human rights have not featured prominently on the higher level EU-Russia agenda. From time to time, the EU responds to individual cases or events such as the new Russian law on NGOs, but human rights rarely enter the public discourse of senior officials. Atrocities in Chechnya, rightly highlighted in the FCO report as the worst crisis of human rights in Europe, have been relegated from high level diplomacy, with no public demands for accountability or even information on the fate of those who, according to well documented evidence collected by HRW and others, have been tortured or "disappeared" by agents and allies of the Russian state.
On several occasions in 2006 the European Court of Human Rights found Russia responsible for violating the right to life because of the role of Russian troops and their proxies in the forced disappearance of people in Chechnya. This is not mentioned in the FCO's report. HRW believes that European leaders are missing an important opportunity presented by the court rulings to press Russia to curb abuses and end impunity.
The EU has a mixed record in its attitude towards the United States. US detainee operations in Europe made some European governments (especially their intelligence agencies) complicit in torture and ill-treatment, arbitrary detention, and forced disappearance. Strong indications suggest that Poland and Romania allowed "disappeared" suspects to be held on their soil. While the US Congress did nothing to investigate these operations, the European parliament launched an inquiry. The temporary parliamentary committee (TDIP) found it "utterly implausible" that these activities could have occurred without the knowledge of European intelligence or security services. It found similar official complicity in the apprehension of suspects on European soil and their rendition to countries where torture and ill-treatment are routine, while also finding the US Central Intelligence Agency "clearly responsible."
Political and judicial actors in Italy and Germany have been most vigorous in seeking accountability for these illegal practices, in stark contrast to the EU (and indeed to the UK as well). An Italian court has issued arrest warrants for CIA agents and their Italian accomplices who were allegedly responsible for the 2003 abduction in Milan of Osama Mustafa Hassan Nasr, known as Abu Omar, and his rendition to torture in Egypt. In November 2006, in what it described as a "natural rotation," the new government of Prime Minister Romano Prodi replaced the head of the military intelligence services SISMI, who is under investigation for his role in the abduction. The real test for Italy will be whether the government forwards the court's extradition requests to the United States, and whether it releases information regarding its possible prior knowledge of the kidnapping.
In Germany, Federal prosecutors opened an investigation in February 2006 into Germany's possible complicity in the abduction and rendition of Khalid el-Masri, a German citizen apprehended in Macedonia in 2003, handed over to US operatives, and subsequently held in secret detention in Afghanistan (his case is also the subject of the European Parliament investigation mentioned above, and a U.S. federal court proceeding). El-Masri has claimed that he was beaten in detention and interrogated by a German official in Afghanistan. As well, a full parliamentary committee of inquiry is underway, investigating the possible complicity of the German government in abuses by US agents in the context of counterterrorism, including whether the Federal Criminal Police Office questioned terror suspects being held abroad, and the cases of Khalid El-Masri and Mohammed Haider Zammar, another man subjected to rendition to torture. The committee is also investigating media reports that German security agencies have known about U.S.-run secret detention sites in Europe and abusive practices therein since late 2001. These efforts to hold government and other actors accountable are laudable, given that Germany assumed the presidency of the Council of the European Union in January 2007 and is particularly susceptible to criticism regarding its own human rights practices.
As for US conduct outside of Europe, the EU, like the UK (see above), has not offered any high-level public comment on the findings of the UN Committee against Torture about US complicity in torture and other abusive interrogations. And it took the EU years-not until the EU-US summit in June 2006-to call collectively for the closure of the US detention facility at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. Furthermore, the EU has refused to make the humanitarian gesture of taking in Guantánamo detainees whom the US is willing to release but who cannot be returned to their native lands for fear that they might be tortured there. It was only non-EU member Albania that ultimately agreed to resettle five Uighur detainees who were freed from Guantánamo but could not safely be returned to China, as well as ethnic Egyptian, Algerian and Uzbek detainees. Another 16 Uighurs remain stuck in Guantánamo, as well as several others who are slated for release but cannot be returned to their home countries because of legitimate fears of torture, and have nowhere else to go.
In addressing the crisis in Darfur (which is set out in the FCO report's section on Sudan - pp 101-104), the EU underlines how much it has spent to support the African Union force (AMIS). However, considering the seriousness of the crisis and its potential implications for the region and for the future of the north-south peace agreement in Sudan, the EU has done little to persuade Khartoum to accept the better equipped and staffed UN protection force that the UN Security Council approved in August in SC resolution 1706. The EU imposed an arms embargo on Sudan during the north-south civil war, but has done nothing to enforce the embargo since the Darfur conflict began. Preferring engagement, EU members have resisted freezing assets and banning travel for senior Sudanese officials responsible for the Darfur slaughter. Far from matching US trade sanctions toward Sudan, the EU has seen its, and particularly France's, trade with Sudan increase massively as Sudan has joined the ranks of oil producers. Khartoum failure to disarm the murderous Janjaweed militia, to hold accountable those responsible for atrocities, or to co-operate with the International Criminal Court, as the EU and UN have demanded, was not been met with nearly vigorous enough action throughout 2006 in spite of some tough talk from Prime Minister Blair and some other European leaders.
Part of the problem is that Britain and France, as permanent members of the UN Security Council, have insisted that EU policy on Darfur be set in New York rather than Brussels. To its credit, the EU-especially Germany-played the key role in the council's establishment of a commission of inquiry to examine atrocities in Darfur and the later referral of Darfur to the ICC. But the important task of achieving justice for victims is no substitute for immediate action to stop the crimes that are being committed now. The EU's effort to enlist China and Russia in pressuring Khartoum to accept a UN protection force and reverse its brutal policies in Darfur has not been sufficiently sustained or intensive to make a difference on the ground, where Khartoum and its Janjaweed proxies persist in attacking civilians with impunity.
There are many other countries where the EU has underperformed on human rights. Sometimes business interests have played an important role.
· In November 2006, Germany succeeded in its aggressive push to get the EU to ease even the modest sanctions it imposed on Uzbekistan following the Andijan massacre of May 2005 despite no meaningful steps by the Uzbek government to meet the conditions originally set for lifting the sanctions. Rather than allow an independent investigation into the massacre, as required, Uzbekistan has offered only "dialogue" and an "expert seminar" on Andijan. Meanwhile, its crackdown on those who dare to voice their dissent has been ruthless, with a dozen human rights defenders convicted and imprisoned on politically motivated charges in 2006 alone. Germany argued that the sanctions had failed to produce positive results-despite Germany having done everything in its power to undermine the sanctions from the moment of their adoption - and the rest of the EU went along with the German position. The UK articulated a principled position on human rights abuses in Uzbekistan in the FCO annual report and elsewhere. But somehow this was not translated into firm action in its negotiations at the EU level.
· Germany has also prevented a firm EU position on Kazakhstan by lending its unequivocal support to the country's bid to chair the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 2009, rather than using Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbaev's desire for the leadership post as an opportunity to push for long-overdue, concrete political reforms that would strengthen the rule of law and protection of basic human rights.
· In Nepal following the February 2005 royal coup, the Nordic governments wanted to condemn the coup forcefully and stop the military government from using EU aid. But other EU governments, including France and Germany, weakened the EU consensus. All EU ambassadors were recalled to their capitals to protest the coup, but the French and German ambassadors returned before the end of a month. Britain also pursued an accommodationist policy, citing a historic relationship with Nepal, a fact that is not properly reflected in the FCO's report. The discord among EU members also threatened to derail efforts to deploy a UN human rights monitoring mission, which has since played an important role (as is acknowledged in the FCO report) in curbing abuses and facilitating a return to civilian rule.
· In Thailand, the EU responded firmly to the military coup in September that overthrew Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. But during Thaksin's five-year tenure, the EU expressed concern only quietly about deteriorating rights conditions - some 2,500 extrajudicial executions in Thaksin's war on drugs, suppression of media freedom, brutal counter-insurgency in the south, and the downgrading of refugee protection. Meanwhile, the EU sought a free trade agreement with Thailand.
· In the Middle East, the EU, which has human rights clauses in its trade-and-cooperation agreements with most countries, should have played a much more active role on human rights.
· In Ethiopia, the EU strongly protested against government abuses in the course of the hotly contested 2005 elections in Ethiopia. It also backed those words with some action, withholding or re-channeling more than $375 million in direct multilateral budget support to the Ethiopian government. The UK also suspended direct budget support. However, there has been no visible EU follow-up in addressing Ethiopia's continuing major human rights problems such as the repression of political opponents and the beatings, rapes, and extrajudicial killings of the Anuak ethnic group in the Gambella region and the brutal suppression of dissent and human rights abuses carried out by security forces and state authorities in Oromia.
· The government of Tunisia, intolerant of any entity that criticizes its record, has for years blocked a series of grants that the EU approved to the independent Tunisian Human Rights League, as well as grants that the EU wishes to make to other independent human rights organizations. Yet the EU has failed to publicly protest this ongoing practice except in the mildest terms.
EU policy on human rights has been particularly disappointing with respect to the treatment of migrants and asylum seekers. This important topic is covered in the FCO's Annual Human Rights Report only under the broader heading of "Human Rights and Conflict" (pp 225-231). What the report does not reflect is the fact that the EU's (and the UK's) determination to stem the flow of migrants at all costs has led it to ignore migrants' rights and narrow their right to seek asylum in Europe from persecution in their homeland. In January 2006, the Asylum Procedures Directive entered into force with its requirement that member states turn back asylum seekers from countries identified on an EU-wide list as "safe countries of origin." Lack of consensus about which countries should figure on the list-many of the proposed ones offer dubious safety-has so far held up implementation, but several member states already follow their own national lists of safe countries.
In its effort to "internationalize" migration management, the EU has allied itself with other repressive regimes, such as Libya, a launching pad for hundreds of migrants seeking protection and work in Europe. Libya-EU cooperation on migration is one-dimensional, focusing exclusively on blocking access to Europe, with little concern for the rights or asylum claims of the migrants. On the eastern border, the EU signed a readmission agreement with the Ukraine in October requiring it to readmit third country nationals seeking protection in the EU, despite continuing concerns about Ukraine's abusive detention practices and barely functioning asylum system. The two-year "grace period" before such returns commence is hardly enough time to set the Ukraine's beleaguered system right. Spain, which receives the lion's share of arrivals by sea, is pursuing readmission agreements with countries such as Senegal and Mauritania.
None of this is to deny that sometimes the EU plays a positive role in the promotion of human rights. As the FCO report rightly underlines, the EU can be a strong force for human rights through the accession process, where the requirement of unanimity for action tends to raise the bar for human rights performance of the candidate state-since any EU member can object that the candidate has not done enough to improve its human rights record-rather than stymie the projection of EU influence. That positive influence was felt most forcefully over the past year in the Balkans. In the recent past, it has been felt in Turkey as well, although the increasing reluctance of several EU governments to admit Turkey on any terms has now undermined much of the power of the stated human rights criteria for accession.
There are other examples where the EU has played a positive role especially when it comes to fielding operational missions. It has played a key part in forging a peace agreement in Aceh and mobilizing a monitoring team, although it has not pressed the Indonesian government to leave open the option of bringing those responsible for atrocities during the war to justice. A European force sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo ahead of the October 2006 elections provided an important boost to the efforts of the UN peacekeeping force to maintain security. Six thousand EU troops keep the peace in Bosnia, where the EU is expected to take sole responsibility for a scaled-down international civilian presence in mid-2007. In Kosovo, the EU is planning to take the lead in the international civilian mission that is expected to deploy in 2007 when the territory's status is determined. Its focus will be justice and policing.
However, these positive exceptions do not substitute for the lack of policy coherence that handicaps the EU's response to some of the most important human rights challenges facing the world today. Finding a firmer and more consistent voice on human rights is essential if the EU is to play a much-needed global leadership role.
Conclusion
As stated at the beginning of this submission, Britain's policy in a number of areas around the world deserves praise. Likewise, within the 350 pages of the report, there is much to commend.
But the potential impacts of the failure to incorporate a strong human rights component into the UK's counter-terrorism strategy, and of the failure to strengthen the role of the European Union in promoting and protecting human rights within the EU and in its external relations are serious and damaging. A weakening of human rights principles by any powerful government - including the UK and the United States - creates a more dangerous world for us all, whatever the justification. And the failure of the EU to match its influence in economic, commercial and development relations with a strong line on human rights is a terrible missed opportunity.
We thank the committee for their interest in these important issues.
Tom Porteous London director, Human Rights Watch
January 2007
|