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UNCORRECTED TRANSCRIPT OF ORAL EVIDENCE To be published as HC 363-i House of COMMONS MINUTES OF EVIDENCE TAKEN BEFORE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
Wednesday 28 February 2007 SIMON MCDONALD, CMG, DR. PETER GOODERHAM DR. ROSEMARY HOLLIS, DR. NOMI BAR-YAACOV Evidence heard in Public Questions 1- 83
USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT
Oral Evidence Taken before the Foreign Affairs Committee on Wednesday 28 February 2007 Members present: Mike Gapes (Chairman) Mr. Fabian Hamilton Mr. John Horam Mr. Paul Keetch Andrew Mackinlay Mr. Malcolm Moss Mr. Ken Purchase Sir John Stanley Richard Younger-Ross ________________ [Relevant documents: Prime Minister's Statement to the House on Iraq & Middle East, 21/02/07, "Saudi Arabia puts its regional clout at risk", IHT, 09/02/07, "My secret talks with Syria, by Israel envoy", Daily Telegraph, 02/02/07,"A two-headed monster: Palestine's new government", Economist, 17/02/07.] Examination of Witnesses
Witnesses: Simon McDonald, CMG, Director, Iraq, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Dr. Peter Gooderham, Director, Middle East and North Africa, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, gave evidence. Q1 Chairman: Good afternoon, everybody. Thank you very much for coming, Dr. Gooderham and Mr. McDonald. We are very pleased to have you here. As you know, the Committee is examining the whole issue of global security, but we are focusing on the middle east at the moment and we shall visit the region in a few weeks. Both of you are very experienced in the region and in your current posts, so we shall be very grateful for your expertise and insights on the current situation. I shall begin by asking some questions about the current Palestinian situation and the internal politics of the Palestinian Authority. How would you assess the current power balance between Fatah on the one hand and Hamas on the other? Dr. Gooderham: Thank you, Chairman. I am happy to be here this afternoon to answer these questions. One needs to reflect back to the situation that has developed over the last year or so since Hamas won the elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council. Since then, it has attempted to govern through the Palestinian Authority. On the other hand, of course, there has been President Abbas, who is a member of Fatah and who was also elected, through the presidential elections the previous year. So there has been a rather uncomfortable arrangement between the President and the Palestinian Authority-the Government, if you like, of the Palestinian Territories. In recent weeks, we have seen an effort by both sides to forge a Government of national unity. That is what was brokered by the Saudis in Mecca earlier this month. Under that arrangement, the Ministries will be shared out between Hamas, Fatah and some of the other political groupings in the Palestinian Territories. Under the arrangement, if it is promulgated and the Government are formed and approved by the Palestinian Legislative Council, Hamas will still have the largest number of seats in the Government, but some Fatah members will come in, as well as some independents. That is the situation today. We are in wait-and-see mode now, as we see how the agreement brokered in Mecca is taken forward. Q2 Chairman: How important is the Mecca agreement? Does it simply reflect the current balance between Fatah and Hamas, or does it point a way forward for the future? Dr. Gooderham: We certainly hope it points the way forward for the future. We have been hoping that some arrangement of that nature could be brought about for some time. We have not been happy with the situation that we were confronted with roundabout this time a year ago, when a Hamas Government came into office who were not committed to the three principles that the Quartet had set out. It is not clear yet whether the agreement brokered in Mecca can be said to reflect those three principles, but President Abbas has said that it is a good first step. There is more work to be done between now and the formation of the Government, and naturally we very much hope that the programme of that Government will reflect the three principles, which would enable us to engage with them. Q3 Chairman: But there was this quote from the Financial Times, which I would be interested to know whether you agree with: "Under Mecca, the Islamists do not, and Hamas will not, recognise Israel." Dr. Gooderham: I do not think we can say that definitively, because we do not know what the full extent of what will follow from Mecca will amount to. This is a process. We know from discussions with President Abbas that what he was most anxious to achieve at Mecca was a cessation of the violence between Hamas and Fatah that had broken out over the past couple of months and which naturally was of great concern to not only him, but the international community as a whole. To that extent, it appears that the Mecca agreement has been a success. It has resulted in an ending to the intra-Palestinian fighting. It is still too early to say what that will mean in terms of the new Government's platform. Q4 Chairman: But you have an agreement that was signed not only by the internal Hamas leadership, Ismail Haniya, but the most important Hamas leader, Khaled Mashal. He is based in Syria, but he was in Mecca. Is that a constraint on the future movement of Haniya or does it mean that the external Hamas people are fully signed up to the process? Dr. Gooderham: We hope very much that it is the latter. It is significant that Mashal, as well as Haniya, were there and that the agreement was brokered by the Saudis. That is something that the whole international community applauded. It understood the significance of that. We must wait to see in the days ahead what that amounts to in terms of a programme for the new Government. It is significant that Mashal was present at the Mecca discussions and that he, as you said, put his name to the agreement. Q5 Mr. Keetch: Dr. Gooderham, you were right to say that Mecca is a process and that we going down it. We still have to see how it develops and how the words of Mecca are put into action. However, the process will succeed only if Israel and the international community-notably the United States-actually accept it. How do you judge their initial reaction to the agreement? Unless they support it, it will go nowhere. Dr. Gooderham: Your analysis is exactly right. In light of what they said publicly and what they have said to us privately, our understanding is that they are also in wait-and-see mode. It would be fair to say that they would not regard the Mecca agreement as it exists today-the document and the letter of designation, which President Abbas sent to Haniya, the formal process for producing a new Government-as sufficient to constitute a programme that reflects the three Quartet principles. The United States, at least, has put its name to Quartet statements since the Mecca agreement, which make it clear that we recognise that it is a process and that we shall wait to see what further there is to come. Q6 Mr. Keetch: You mentioned the Quartet. Are you happy that it remains united, strong and together on the process? Again, it is surely vital that, if the process is to succeed, the Quartet should remain united in its previously described principles. Dr. Gooderham: Yes, I agree. It is easy to have a very gloomy view of the overall prospects for the Palestinian issue, but there have been some positives in recent months. One them is most definitely the role of the Quartet and the United States' willingness to commit to that. The Quartet is now meeting regularly at the so-called principles level; its most recent meeting was last week in Berlin. It clearly intends to meet again in the near future, which is all to the good. We are not at the moment a member of the Quartet in the sense that we do not sit at the meetings. The European Union represents us at the Quartet, but it is clear from the read-outs that there is a good atmosphere among the four participants and a good understanding of what needs to happen in respect of the international community. Q7 Sir John Stanley: Dr. Gooderham, you have made no mention so far of the utterly dire humanitarian position in Gaza and on the west bank, which has been deteriorating steadily. From any humanitarian standpoint, it is absolutely appalling, and it continues as we have this meeting today. Do you agree that the Mecca agreement and the fact that Hamas appears to have gone at least some way towards the recognition of international agreements justifies the Quartet starting to make some moves on the lifting of economic sanctions, particularly when those sanctions are impacting so harshly on the Palestinians in Gaza and on the west bank? Dr. Gooderham: First, it is important to say that we would not use the term "economic sanctions". In fact, what we have done since Hamas came into office is to find ways to get assistance to the Palestinian people directly, bypassing the Palestinian Authority. The figures speak for themselves. Over the past year, the European Union has given about €680 million to the Palestinian people through various mechanisms, including, of course, the temporary international mechanism. That is a record figure-the most money that the EU has ever given to the Palestinian people in any one year-and it is a reflection of the concern about the worsening humanitarian situation in the territories, which you rightly draw attention to. That situation is getting worse for a number of reasons, but not because the international community, for its part, is not providing assistance to the Palestinian people. On the contrary, our assistance over the last year has reached record levels and the UK, for its part, is the biggest donor among the EU member states. Our contribution bilaterally last year was £30 million. If you add the contribution that we give on a pro rata basis to the European Commission's funds, we gave over £70 million last year. Q8 Sir John Stanley: Whether you want to characterise them as economic sanctions or not, the reality is that desperately needy people, both in Gaza and on the west bank, are dependent on outside help for the basic necessities of life-food, medicine, and so on. In many cases, they are unable to work and earn their own livelihood. Do you not agree that that is an unacceptable situation from a humanitarian standpoint? Also, could you reflect on what I said earlier: does the Mecca agreement not justify at least some modification of the policy and, coupled with that, some greater determination by the Quartet to make it clear to the Israeli Government that, although they are fully entitled to protect and defend themselves and to deal with acts of terrorism, that simply cannot continue at the expense of the basic human rights and humanitarian needs of the people of Palestine, in Gaza and on the west Bank? Dr. Gooderham: Again, I agree very much with you. We hope very much that it would be possible to work with the new Government, once formed, and once we have clarity on the extent to which their programme reflects the three Quartet principles. It is not only the international community that will need to be satisfied of that; Israel will also need to be satisfied. About 50% of the revenues that come into the Palestinian Authority are customs revenues that Israel collects on behalf of the Palestinian Authority. However, since the elections for the PLC, Israel has not been prepared to transfer those revenues to the Palestinian Authority, with the exception of $100 million that was transferred as a result of the bilateral meeting that President Abbas and Prime Minister Olmert held just before Christmas last year. We hope very much that all concerned, including Israel, will be able to conclude matters, once we have further clarification that this is a Government with whom we can do business and with whom we can resume direct assistance. In the meantime, we will continue to use mechanisms such as the temporary international mechanism to continue doing everything that we can to alleviate the plight of the Palestinian people-we completely agree that their plight is awful, and getting worse. Q9 Chairman: Before I bring in my colleagues, I would like to clarify what your assessment is of the total revenues now going into the Palestinian Authority. You said that the Israelis were responsible for payment of about 50% of those revenues and that they have paid some of that, in the form of the $100 million that you have just referred to, but presumably several hundred million dollars are still being held. Has the increase in the total EU contribution-reaching, as you said, a record level-in effect been a substitution for the money that the Israelis have held back, or is it not as simple as that? Dr. Gooderham: It is not quite as simple as that because, as I said, the money that the European Union-both the Commission and individual member states-has given has bypassed the Palestinian Authority, so we have not actually given any money to it over the last 12 months or so. My recollection is that before Hamas came to office, the revenue of the Palestinian Authority was about $120 million a month, of which about half-some $60 million-came from customs revenue, which Israel collected on behalf of the Palestinian Authority. An additional $30 million came from international support and contributions from the European Union and other donors. The remainder came from funds generated within the territories. As far as I am aware, that last figure has remained more or less stable over the last 12 months. It might have fluctuated a bit, but not dramatically. That is pretty much all that the Palestinian Authority has been able to draw on for its funding, which has obviously precipitated the difficulties experienced by Palestinian Authority employees, of which there are about 88,000 in the non-security sector. As a result, they have not been getting their salaries. The temporary international mechanism was designed to overcome that. About 88% of all those employees are now getting some assistance through that mechanism. It is not a full salary; I am not pretending that they are as well off as they were before Hamas came to office. That would be incorrect, but they are getting some relief. Q10 Chairman: Has there been an assessment of the amount of money coming from the Arab and Muslim worlds to the Palestinians? Are there any data on that? Has that figure gone up since Hamas came to power, or has it gone down? Dr. Gooderham: There are certainly no official figures of which we are aware. Some support has been given by some Arab states to President Abbas and his office, particularly in recent months. It is clear that Hamas has received funding, notably from Iran, and possibly from Syria as well. However, as far as we can determine, most of the funding went directly into Hamas's pockets, and not to the ministries of the Palestinian Authority. Q11 Chairman: Thank you. If you have more detailed information, it would be helpful if you could send us a note. Dr. Gooderham: Happily. Q12 Mr. Hamilton: We have discussed the role of the Quartet in the region and how it has been trying to help the Palestinian Authority to manage, or at least play a role in bringing both sides together. However, do the British Government have a separate role and how are they viewed by the peoples of Israel and the Palestinian territories? Dr. Gooderham: There is definitely a role for us. We would not describe it as a separate one, but as a complementary one to that of the Quartet. I think that we are seen by the Israelis, Palestinians, most others in the region, our European partners and the US as a Government who over a good many years have demonstrated a commitment to, and expertise in this issue. I think that it is fair to say, therefore, that we are in the inner circle, as it were, of key international players. The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary have devoted a lot of time and attention to the issue in order to see what role we can play. We have tried to forge ahead in many areas in order to identify a distinct role for ourselves. We have been very active in helping the Palestinians to rationalise and improve their security sector, which certainly the Israeli Government have welcomed and see as a positive step-as do the Palestinians, of course. We have been working with the US security co-ordinator, General Dayton, to achieve that end. We have also been trying, particularly through the Department for International Development, to improve the governance arrangements in the Palestinian territories. You may recall that we hosted a conference in London about two years ago. It was designed to address that set of issues. It did not have the lasting impact that we would have liked, but we certainly have not given up. We see it as an essential prerequisite to what we hope will be the eventual formation of a Palestinian state. Q13 Mr. Hamilton: You do not believe that we are viewed with suspicion by the Palestinian population because of our close alliance with the United States and their friendship with Israel? I take it that that does not come into it. Dr. Gooderham: I think we are viewed by both the Palestinians and the Israelis as a country with influence and one that is trying to find a way to resolve the conflict. I think that, by our actions and by our words, we have a good track record in that respect. Q14 Mr. Hamilton: Do other European countries split their diplomatic representation in the way that we do, with an ambassador in Tel Aviv to deal with Israel and a consulate general in East Jerusalem to deal with the Arab and Palestinian populations? Are we unique or does everyone do that? Dr. Gooderham: Everyone does that, yes. Q15 Mr. Hamilton: Let me move on to the issue of Hamas. You have explained to us in great detail what the Mecca agreement means and how we hope that a Government of national unity can be created with Fatah and Hamas working together for the benefit of the Palestinian people, but have we had any informal contact with Hamas ourselves as a Government? Dr. Gooderham: No, we have not had contact since early 2005. Q16 Mr. Hamilton: In spite of the fact that Hamas continued to say that it was devoted to the destruction of the state Israel, will we be prepared to talk to this new unity Government once it is formed, even though Hamas is part of it? Dr. Gooderham: I come back to what I said earlier. We have to wait and see. I am sorry that I cannot be more forthcoming than that, but it really is a case of needing a little bit of time. President Abbas himself has drawn attention to that and has explained that this is the first step-he describes it as a good first step-and we obviously hope that he is right in that assessment, but we are not there yet. We need more time. I think that I am right in saying that Prime Minister Haniya has another three weeks before he has to present his Government to President Abbas for approval and then it goes to the PLC for ratification. There is still some time for the process that was launched at Mecca to evolve in what we hope will be a positive direction. Q17 Mr. Hamilton: I have one final question on this. In the light of what my colleague Sir John Stanley has just said, have we made any representations to the Israeli Government about releasing the rest of the money and resuming full payments to the Palestinian Authority? There clearly is a great deal of suffering not only by those who work for the Government of the Palestinian Authority -they are not getting their full salary-but by the very poorest people as well. Perhaps we could help if Israel is prepared to release those funds. Dr. Gooderham: We have made representations. Naturally, we welcome the $100 million that Prime Minister Olmert agreed to release as a result of his meeting President Abbas just before Christmas. We would like to see a transfer of the remainder of the funds, which Israel is collecting on behalf of the Palestinians. We take note of its view that the money should not be transferred to the PA itself as long as the PA is governed by a movement that is not yet committed to the three Quartet principles. There are other mechanisms, however, such as the temporary international mechanism, which is one that we have used ourselves to provide money to the Palestinian people, and one that we have encouraged the Israelis to use as well. Q18 Mr. Purchase: I would like to continue on the same theme, which is in regard to the continual and greater suffering of the Palestinian people whom I support. In the words of John Stanley, "We were there together". Since then, the situation has got worse, which is a tragedy for ordinary people. We saw support for Hamas grow simply because the ruling party Fatah was not delivering. Therefore, they voted and decided on Hamas, which I like no more than the Quartet does, but, for me, that is not a reason to stop speaking to it. Yet the Quartet laid down its three conditions: renouncing violence, recognising Israel and agreeing to past commitments. The first thing that a new Government do is not necessarily agree to past commitments-they are a new Government. It seems a bit thin to make that a condition. Recognising Israel? Well, there are many countries in the world that do not recognise other countries; China and Formosa come to mind, but that never stopped us talking to them-again, it is a very thin reason. Renouncing violence? There are so many states in the world that actively engage in violence, but we still talk to them. The conditions that we are imposing are superficial at best and malevolent in other circumstances, when we know that, ultimately, the whole of diplomatic history is littered with examples of not talking to someone, but really talking to them and then having to talk to them in order to make progress. You know better than me that the poor people of Palestine in these circumstances are suffering massively for exercising their democratic right. As diplomats, you must respond to this in a human way. Dr. Gooderham: We certainly do. On your point about the three Quartet principles, they do not set the bar very high at all. They are principles that the previous Palestinian Authority had no difficulty in signing up to and that President Abbas himself has proclaimed as his own platform and starting point. It would be an enormously retrograde step if the international community as a whole was to accept or conclude that this is, as it were, the best that we can achieve with the new Government. It would take us years, if not decades, backwards from where we had got to. Admittedly, if you recognise that the high point was 2000, we have been clearly sliding back from that since, with the intifada and so on. However, it is quite clear that if the international community was to abandon the three principles and simply forget about them, we would be going even further in a downward direction, away from the ultimate goal, to which the whole international community-virtually without exception-is committed: the two-state solution. Q19 Mr. Purchase: Very often, when you have minimum goals-if that is the right phrase-there is still a need to talk, to have a discourse, to interact, in order just to reach what you regard as a very low hurdle. It may well be a low hurdle. Why can we not talk now to put forward these ideas, views and conditions? They would be pre-talks, before the conditions are met. At least we would see some progress. At least, we would have some comfort knowing that progress was in prospect, if not actually being made. Dr. Gooderham: The answer to that is that it has been our judgment-and that of the Quartet and of the international community more broadly-that the approach that is more likely to bring us to a position where we can talk to an organisation such Hamas is to make clear to them what the basic framework and principles have to be for dialogue. If we do not establish that and, if we simply start from ground zero, there will be no pressure on the organisation to move or to evolve into the sort of movement that we would like it to evolve into, which is to say one that is committed to the three principles. That is why we have adopted the policy that we have. Chairman: Thank you. We will move on to Israeli politics. Q20 Mr. Horam: How do you assess the state of Israeli public opinion in the light of these developments? Are things changing or not? Dr. Gooderham: Simon may want to say something as a former ambassador in Tel Aviv, but perhaps I will start off by saying that I think it is fair to say that the reaction in Israel to the Mecca agreement has been pretty negative. Q21 Mr. Horam: Pretty negative? Dr. Gooderham: Yes, pretty negative. The Government in Israel, like ours and others, are adopting a wait-and-see approach, but it is fair to say that the reaction in the Israeli media has been pretty negative. Q22 Mr. Horam: Why is that? Dr. Gooderham: Because they feel that the agreement does not even come close to the three principles, so in their eyes it is a disappointing outcome. However, our assessment is that this is a process, and we should not rush to judgment; we do not think that it would be right to do that. We hope that there is more to come, and we naturally hope that over time the Israeli people will come to a similar conclusion. The Israeli Government are not in a strong position domestically, largely because of the fall-out from the Lebanon war last summer, which continues to reverberate in Israeli politics. Inevitably, that constrains the extent to which the current Government are able to operate in respect of these issues. Q23 Mr. Horam: Does it really hog-tie them completely? Dr. Gooderham: Not really, because Olmert has taken steps. He met President Abbas before Christmas, and then there was the trilateral meeting with Abbas and Condoleezza Rice, as a result of which Prime Minister Olmert has committed to another bilateral meeting with President Abbas, which we welcome. That is against the backdrop of critical commentary in Israel over the performance of his Government, which inevitably constrains his room for manoeuvre somewhat. Simon, do you want to add anything? Mr. McDonald: I should like to add a couple of points, if I may. First, I am struck that although, as Peter says, the Government have little room for manoeuvre, there is still great popular support for a peaceful, two-state solution. Q24 Mr. Horam: That remains strong, does it? Mr. McDonald: That remains strong. Recent polling put it as high as 74%, so there is interest among the populace. However, as Peter said, the Government are constrained. The polls are poor for Mr. Olmert's Government; he has a 65% negative rating, and his Defence Minister has a 1% approval rating. Q25 Mr. Horam: So there is a complete dislocation between the aspirations of the Israeli people, who still want peace, and their expectation as to whether the Government can deliver it. Mr. McDonald: At the moment. Q26 Chairman: Before we move on, can I ask you whether support for unilateralism is now completely off the scale-is it minimal in Israeli politics? Mr. McDonald: My observation is that Mr. Olmert's platform last March was the Hitkansut-the convergence plan-which was unilateral, as the disengagement from Gaza had been. That plan is parked because of his political difficulties. However, he is still interested in it personally. If he could find a way, he would still be interested in making progress. At the moment, he is just not able to. Q27 Mr. Horam: Can we come back to the Mecca agreement. That was a bit of a gamble for Saudi Arabia, was it not? Mr. McDonald: I think that is putting it a bit too strongly. Earlier on I mentioned the role of the Quartet. One of the other positives of recent months has been a much greater commitment by a number of Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, to trying to find a solution to the Israel problem. Q28 Mr. Horam: In those Arab states, would you call Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates a quartet? Mr. McDonald: Yes, they are the so-called quartet. They are not the only countries to be involved. The Americans have also had a series of meetings with the Gulf Co-operation Council countries, two of which are members of the quartet. Q29 Mr. Horam: But they are all marching together, are they? Mr. McDonald: They are all clear about the importance of trying to find a lasting solution to the Israel and Palestine conflict. The Lebanon conflict last summer was a wake-up call for all of us, including Arab Governments. Q30 Mr. Horam: These Governments are always getting wake-up calls, and they do a little bit then back off and go to sleep again. Is that what happens? Dr. Gooderham: Well, I do not think that they have dozed off yet, considering the Mecca agreement, which you just mentioned. What really precipitated the Saudi determination to broker an agreement in Mecca was the sight of Palestinians fighting each other in Gaza in an ugly way. It looked for a moment as though the matter could get seriously out of control, and people were talking about a civil war and so on. That horrified many around the world, including of course in the middle east itself. Q31 Mr. Horam: But what can the Saudis really do? They have a lot of money, so they can put some money behind the problem? What do they want? How far are they prepared to push it? Dr. Gooderham: They are trying to push it. As I said earlier, they are trying to get Hamas to understand the importance of accepting a Government of national unity with a platform that reflects the three Quartet principles. That would be in Hamas's own interests as well as those of the Palestinian people as a whole. Q32 Mr. Horam: But are the Saudis prepared to wield the stick as well as offer the carrot? Dr. Gooderham: They are trying to use whatever influence they can, and they succeeded in Mecca, at least to the extent of bringing about a cessation of the violence between the Palestinian factions, so they are to be applauded for that. I certainly do not think that they have now given up. They will want to continue. Q33 Mr. Horam: They will continue to make these efforts? Dr. Gooderham: I believe that they will, yes. Q34 Mr. Horam: How will Iran see all this? There is a rivalry between the Saudi and Iranian Governments and people and so forth. How will they look at the Saudis exercising their muscle a bit more? Dr. Gooderham: One would hope that the Iranian Government will also agree that the sight of Palestinians fighting each other on the streets of Gaza should not be allowed to continue. One would hope that they will also see merit in the effort that the Saudis put into brokering the Mecca agreement. It is no secret, of course, that Iran is a supporter of Hamas. It has said from time to time that it would accept any outcome to which the Palestinian people themselves were committed. Naturally, we hope that it will abide by that and that, if a Government of national unity are formed and their platform reflects the three Quartet principles, Iran will not attempt to undermine that Government and bring about their collapse. Q35 Mr. Hamilton: To follow on from what John Horam has just asked, as the country that feels that it is the regional power in the middle east, will Iran not feel outflanked by the Saudis and quite resentful? Is there any danger that if Hamas does co-operate or is pushed into some sort of recognition, however neutral, of the state of Israel, Iran will withdraw its funding from Hamas? Dr. Gooderham: I would be surprised if that were the outcome. You say that Iran sees itself as the regional power. I do not think that any other country in the region sees it, or wants to see it, as the regional power. Some of the activity that we have seen on the part of the Arab Governments, particularly since the Lebanon war, has clearly reflected that. There has been a determination to demonstrate that actually there are other Governments in the region who can play a positive role and are determined to try to do so. That is why there has been the emergence of the so-called Arab quartet, which is an informal grouping. I do not think that those countries themselves would want to call themselves the Arab quartet, but that is the term of art that has arisen to describe their coming together and they are willing to get much more involved, particularly on the security side in the Palestinian Territories. That is where they have really put some effort in-to try to sort it out, rather as we have been trying to sort out the messy set of arrangements that exists for the Palestinian security forces. Q36 Mr. Hamilton: Will Iran withdraw funding from Hamas if Hamas does not do what Iran thinks is the right thing to do? If Hamas is persuaded to recognise the state of Israel in some form, will its funding be cut off by Iran? Dr. Gooderham: I do not see why it should be. In our view, we have not seen anything to suggest that it would be. Clearly, we would prefer to see a Palestinian Authority getting funding through overt means-through the revenues deriving from customs and through international donations that are given in an overt fashion. We would much prefer that. Chairman: Let us move on to some questions on Syria. Q37 Mr. Moss: Dr. Gooderham, turning to the Syrian connection, it seems that the international community is continually looking for signs that Syria is prepared to become involved in a more positive way with Hamas, and prepared to use its influence over Hamas. Brokered talks between Khaled Mashal and President Abbas were held back in January in Damascus. Do you see that as a positive sign that Syria is inclined to become more involved? Dr. Gooderham: Our assessment at the moment is that the jury is still out on that particular aspect of Syrian behaviour. Simon might want to say a word about Syria's relationship with Iraq, which is one of the three- Mr. Moss: I am coming to that. Dr. Gooderham: In which case, I suggest that Simon hangs fire. As far as Syria and Hamas are concerned, we have certainly, along with many others, appealed to the Syrians to use their influence in a constructive way to bring Hamas to reconcile itself to the three Quartet principles. I cannot say that we have got any explicit evidence yet that that is the case, but we shall keep trying, and we hope very much that Syria will use its influence in that way. Q38 Mr. Moss: Thank you. Turning now to the Syrian and Iranian connection with Iraq, in his statement to the House on Iraq and the middle east last week, the Prime Minister said that there were signs that Syria's role in Iraq may be changing for the better. What is the evidence for that? Do you think that Syria will continue down that road? Mr. McDonald: As you know, on 31 October last year Sir Nigel Sheinwald went to Damascus and saw President Bashar. As Peter has said, there were three areas of discussion-three tests, if you like, on how we judge progress-one of which was Iraq. Since that visit, relations between Syria and Iraq have improved somewhat. The first evidence of that was that they re-established diplomatic relations. Secondly, Muallem, the Syrian Foreign Minister, visited Baghdad and reopened the Syrian embassy. Since then, there has been a series of high level visits between the two capitals. Most importantly, Bulani, the Iraqi Interior Minister, went to Damascus and they agreed a memorandum of understanding covering sensitive border issues. President Talabani has been twice to Damascus. We see a more positive rhythm in the relationship between Syria and Iraq. I have to say that the story is most positive between those two. I do not think that the Lebanon side and the Palestine side have been as positive. Q39 Mr. Moss: Turning to Iran and its involvement or otherwise in Iraq, in the same speech, the Prime Minister gave support to the evidence provided by the Americans about Iranian involvement, particularly with regard to the sophisticated nature of some of the roadside bombs that are now being used. He said: "No one can be sure of the precise degree to which those in the senior levels of the Iranian Government are complicit, but it is certainly very clear that that is the origin of that weaponry."-[Official Report, 21 February 2007; Vol. 457, c. 269.] Is there any evidence from the work that British diplomats are doing in, say, south-east Iraq, that we have obtained that supports that American view? Mr. McDonald: We share American concerns. It is because the Prime Minister is reading the material produced by the military and the diplomats in the south-east that he made the statement that he did. But with-I am sorry, I have lost my train of thought. I shall have to recompose myself. Q40 Mr. Moss: Perhaps I can return to the question a little bit more specifically. Is there any real evidence, from military or other intelligence, of movements of armaments across the Iran-Iraq border, whereby the Iranians are arming some of the insurgents in Iraq? Mr. McDonald: We believe that there is evidence. That is part of our dialogue with Tehran, and representations have been made in Tehran and London. Our approach has been somewhat different from the American approach. We have not had press conferences. We are trying to change Iranian behaviour. That is a central feature of our dialogue with Tehran. I have to say that the American policy is evolving. Yesterday, Secretary Rice announced that the US will take part in a meeting in Baghdad next month that will include the Iranians. We have always had dialogue with Tehran; the Americans have not, but on the issue of Iraq, they are reconsidering that. Q41 Chairman: Do you interpret that to mean that the American Administration are now accepting the Iraq Study Group's recommendations without saying so? Mr. McDonald: Yes. Q42 Mr. Keetch: This comes back to Mr. Purchase's point. It is remarkable that we will talk to the Iranian Government, even though they want to obliterate the state of Israel and are probably acting to get weapons into southern Iraq to attack British troops, but we will not talk to Hamas. Many might construe that to be a not very concise position. I want to be specific about the point that Malcolm Moss talked about. Is it your belief that weapons and technology, such as the improvised explosive devices that are being used in southern Iraq, are coming across the border with the tacit agreement of the Iranian regime, or is it more likely that Revolutionary Guard units are doing it on an ad hoc basis? Is Tehran is saying yes to it, or is it being played out by elements of the Iranian military? Mr. McDonald: If I may so, Mr. Moss gave us a very helpful quotation. The Prime Minister was very clear, and for good reason. We do not know precisely. We see evidence of the weapons coming across-that is a fact-but the motivation and the authorisation are not clear to us. That is why the Prime Minister spoke with such precision. Q43 Mr. Keetch: And have we got our Royal Marine boat back from the Iranians? Dr. Gooderham: Not to my knowledge. Q44 Sir John Stanley: Did the U-turn on American policy to which you have just referred owe anything to the British Government? Mr. McDonald: I would not characterise it as a U-turn, because the Americans and the Iranians have already had some contact, including in the Iraq context. In November 2004, there was a meeting in Sharm El-Sheikh, which brought together Iraq's neighbours and the G8. In a meeting in New York in September last year to discuss the compact, Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Mottaki were sitting in the same room, so there is a process in place. It is significant that the Americans are making something of it-it has been part of our dialogue with them-but there was more than one pressure. I do not think that we can claim credit. Q45 Sir John Stanley: Could you tell us what the British Government are seeking from the Syrian Government? Mr. McDonald: In relation to? Sir John Stanley: In relation to Iraq, Iran and Lebanon. Mr. McDonald: I shall deal with Iraq. There is still an ongoing problem between Syria and Iraq, with links between Damascus and ex-Ba'athist rejectionist elements, so that is an issue between us. There is also an issue of militants infiltrating the Syria-Iraq border. Those are the two main things on our minds. Dr. Gooderham: With respect to the Palestinians, we are looking to Syria for co-operation on Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad, both of which are housed in Damascus. We have long felt that the Syrian Government have considerable influence over both organisations. We would like to see them use that influence in a constructive way to bring about the kind of Government that would allow for a resumption of negotiations leading to a two-state solution. That is very much what we would like to see them do on that front. On the Lebanon front, if we were doing a scorecard, this would be the one on which we would have to give the lowest marks to the Syrians. We have not seen the kind of evidence that we were hoping to see in the wake of the war last summer that would suggest to us that Syria is playing a constructive role in respect of the very fragile situation in Lebanon. The international community is working very hard to support the democratically elected Government in Lebanon, which has been in crisis for some months. We believe that Syria is contributing to that crisis, and we would like to see it play a much more positive role in bringing the Ministers who have left the Government back into the Government and allowing that Government then to govern as normal. Q46 Sir John Stanley: Do you consider that the Syrian Government have ruled out the possibility of a return of Syrian military forces into the Lebanon? Dr. Gooderham: I would not want to use the words "ruled out". One would like to think that, after leaving Lebanon in the wake of the assassination of former Prime Minister Hariri, that that is it-they are not planning to return again. We have not seen any evidence to suggest that they are planning a return; it would clearly be a very negative step if they were to do that. Q47 Mr. Purchase: Turning to Egypt-long a major player in the middle east and a helpful player in terms of Palestine and Israel-recent developments have made life more difficult. Hamas is now in control in Gaza and the strip to Egypt and there are traditional links between Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood. It is Egypt's belief, view and evidence that an inhibiting factor to its becoming an increasingly democratic state is the presence of the Muslim Brotherhood and its activities. Given all of that, is the relationship with Hamas and Egypt under a great deal of stress? Is there any prospect of continuing discussion there, if nowhere else? They have some mutually dependent activities, particularly in relation to Gaza. How do you see that developing over the next few months? Dr. Gooderham: You have characterised it very well. Egypt enjoys a difficult relationship with Hamas. The Egyptians have been for some time, and continue to be, active behind the scenes in trying to get a grip, as it were, on the security situation, particularly in Gaza. They are certainly very active as a member of the so-called Arab quartet to that end. There was a recent Quartet meeting in Berlin last week. One of the agreements that came out of the trilateral meetings between Rice, Abbas and Olmert is that the quadrilateral committee, which involves the three plus Egypt, should reconvene to try to tackle the growing problem of the smuggling of arms from Egypt into Gaza, which all concerned, including President Abbas, are very worried about. That is precisely the sort of area where Egypt can play a very positive role. Q48 Mr. Purchase: Just to develop things a little from there, as we mentioned earlier, Egypt has played a key and helpful role in the Israel-Palestine conflict for many years. Given the situation that we have been referring to-Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood-do you believe that Egypt can still be seen as a key diplomatic broker in those circumstances between Palestine and Israel? Dr. Gooderham: Very much. It is hard to imagine that an Israel-Palestine political process would get very far without the active support of the Egyptian Government. That is why we are so pleased to see them as actively engaged as they are. It seems to us that they are a central player. Q49 Mr. Horam: Looking at this in context, do you regard this period as a bad one for the resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli problems? Is it particularly bad because of the weakness of the respective Governments-the Palestinian authority and the Israeli side-and something that we have to live with for a bit longer, or what? Dr. Gooderham: We would not want to conclude that we just have to live with it. That is a counsel of despair, and we would not want to conclude thus. However, clearly, in historical terms, the last few years have not been good. As I said earlier, if you regard the effort made by President Clinton leading up to Camp David in 2000 as the point at which we got closest to the establishment of a Palestinian state, we have been going backwards since then. Simon referred earlier to Prime Minister Olmert's commitment to disengagement. Clearly, Israel has got out of Gaza, at least in the sense that the settlements have been removed and there is no permanent military presence in Gaza. Our hope since then has been that we can get back to a situation at which the next stage in the process can resume. We believe that the way to achieve that is through direct negotiations between the Israelis and the Palestinians, involving the United States and others as necessary. Q50 Mr. Horam: Is there not a vicious circle in the sense that the difficulties that we now face in Palestine and Israel are hitting back on Iraq and on Lebanon and so on? Dr. Gooderham: It is certainly true to say that all of those issues are linked. That is the argument of many who follow developments in the region, and we would agree with it. The Israel-Palestine issue is so central to the future of the region in general that it is widely accepted that, if we could resolve it, although that would not resolve all the other issues in the region-it would be naive to suppose that-it would have a very positive impact. Conversely, if we are not able to resolve it, it will remain the cancer in the region that is responsible for so much anger and hostility. That is why we are not alone in believing that we have to do everything that we can to try to resolve the issue. Q51 Chairman: Can I finally ask you how much you think the Sunni-Shi'a conflict in Iraq and, potentially, in Lebanon could damage the wider prospects for a political solution in the region? Obviously, the Gulf Co-operation Council states are very nervous about Iran. You referred to the Arab quartet. The interesting thing is that all those countries are Sunni. Is there a hidden Sunni agenda on the wider concerns in the Arab world about not just Iranian influence, but internal Sunni-Shi'a conflicts in some of the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia and on what is happening in Iraq and Lebanon? Dr. Gooderham: Simon will want to say something, I am sure, about Iraq specifically. On the region in general, yes, of course everybody who has an interest in stability and prosperity is worried about the prospect of sectarian conflict breaking out, whether just in individual spots or, worse still, across the whole region. I am sure that that is a strong motivation for the Arab Governments that we have been discussing to want to get on top of issues such as Palestine, Lebanon and, indeed, Iraq. Mr. McDonald: Clearly, there are severe problems between the Sunni and the Shi'a in Iraq. However, it is essential that the situation should not break down into a Sunni-Shi'a civil war. I do not think that we are there yet. A key feature of the Baghdad security plan that is now under way is that the Government of Iraq as a whole-Sunni-Shi'a-are implementing that plan in an even-handed way against militants in both Shi'a and Sunni communities. They are not targeting only one group. So the Government as a whole are coping with their problems. Today, I have just come from lunch with Speaker al-Mashhadani, who is a Sunni, and he is leading a delegation of Iraqi MPs-Members of the Council of Representatives-and they come from all confessional backgrounds. A woman was also part of the delegation. Over lunch, they had a regular old ding-dong, but these people from different backgrounds are now prepared to debate and discuss matters. That is what we have to work with and work on, so that they cope with the differences through debate, not through violence. Q52 Richard Younger-Ross: You used the term "civil war", although it is not a civil war. How would we know when it was a civil war? How would you define that? Mr. McDonald: I would define a civil war as rival centres of power competing-as with the Wars of the Roses in England, or the religious wars in Germany in the 17th century-but this is still fighting within one polity. I do not think that the battle lines are drawn between bits of territory within Iraq. It is still a unitary country. There is still a Government with all confessions represented, and that is the focus. There is no rival Government that is out there and seeking to topple this legitimately elected Government. Chairman: Thank you. No doubt, we will have many opportunities to come back on that issue and the other issues that we have touched on. Mr. McDonald and Dr. Gooderham, thank you very much for coming today. We will now adjourn for a couple of minutes, to allow our other witnesses to come to the front. Anybody who wishes to leave, please leave now-that will save us a lot of time.
Examination of Witnesses Witnesses: Dr. Rosemary Hollis, Director of Research, Chatham House, and Dr. Nomi Bar-Yaacov, Foreign Policy Adviser on Middle Eastern Affairs, gave evidence Q53 Chairman: Good afternoon and welcome, Dr. Hollis and Dr. Bar-Yaacov. We know you both very well; you have given evidence to the Committee before, so it should be less of an ordeal for you than for those who come here for the first time. You heard the previous session and we would like to explore the same areas with you. May I begin by asking for your assessment of the Mecca agreement between Hamas and Fatah? Dr. Hollis: I shall give mine and then Nomi will give hers. My assessment is that it is a welcome development because-I can substantiate this-although all the possible scenarios on the Israeli and Palestinian fronts, and the latter in particular, might be unattractive, this is the best of those scenarios-a unity Government. The alternatives included, first, the complete collapse of the Palestinian Authority; secondly, an internal Palestinian war, which we have seen a bit of already, and which would result in a very chaotic situation in the west bank and Gaza; and thirdly, a dysfunctional situation in which Hamas struggles on. I would like to point out that new elections now would be illegal under Palestinian Basic Law and that, therefore, it would be difficult for the international community to call for something that undermines the Palestinian constitution. In conclusion, a functioning Palestinian Authority involving both factions is a positive step, because the Quartet, including the European Union in particular, would otherwise find themselves literally with a trusteeship on their hands that they never asked for. Dr. Bar-Yaacov: I would like to add a couple of words, although I might be a little more blunt than Rosemary. The alternative to the Mecca agreement was civil war in Gaza. I think that we saw that. It happened at the moment when Hamas managed to overrun Fatah's preventive security force. Hamas showed that it potentially has the upper hand in terms of force. Both factions are arming rapidly via tunnels from Egypt in order to fight each other, and but for Mecca, we would be in a dreadful place. I also think that it is very important to note that it is a terrific achievement for Saudi Arabia, which is part of the so-called Arab quartet, which you discussed in the previous session. That comprises Egypt, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia. Given that Israel and Palestine are in the middle east, that is a welcome development for further engagement with the Arab world in order to resolve the conflict. It can have a positive role, as opposed to the ambiguous, more difficult one that it played in the past. I would also like to remind the Committee that Saudi Arabia also proposed what is today known as the Arab initiative adopted by the Arab League in Beirut in 2002, which is a very welcome peace agreement. We are increasingly seeing Saudi Arabia playing a very constructive role. Personally, I welcome the agreement and see it as a very positive step forward. If the national unity Government are formed-there is no given that Haniya will succeed in forming such a Government, but I certainly hope that he will-I think that it should be viewed as an interim Government. I do not think that the Government would necessarily last for very long, because of internal differences between Hamas and Fatah. Q54 Chairman: Is the arming that you talked about still going on despite the agreement? Dr. Bar-Yaacov: The arming is going on, but there is no use for the arms. That is what has stopped. The arming is certainly going on, because there are many tensions between the two factions. There are a lot of unsettled scores in Gaza: more than 100 deaths earlier this month; and many of the powerful families have taken serious losses. Unsettled scores are not usually solved by peaceful means. If the national unity Government do not succeed and do not get the international community's backing and recognition, we will see a return to violence very quickly. Q55 Chairman: How long do you think we can have what Dr. Gooderham referred to as the "wait-and-see approach" to this agreement? Dr. Bar-Yaacov: Not too long, because the guns are back. The euphoria of the Mecca agreement did not last very long in Gaza. We saw the celebrations-the media are always where the spotlight is. Today, we see that guns are back in the streets. We see the executive force of Hamas displaying its arms and flexing its muscle, particularly in the evacuated settlements. We also see the presidential guard, Abbas's force, displaying its armour in the streets. There is a lot of tension in Gaza at the moment. I would not describe the situation as calm and I think the wait-and-see policy should be turned into a rather more proactive policy of seeing how we can support the formation of a national unity Government and how we could work with them, given that the alternative is dire. Q56 Chairman: But the Quartet itself is not united, is it? There are divisions within the Quartet as to how to react to this situation. Dr. Bar-Yaacov: Yes, the Russians have already reacted, saying that they are calling to lift the boycott on the Palestinian Authority and on Hamas more specifically. The French made similar noises. However, so far, the position of the Quartet is what it came out with in a very weak statement at the end of the Berlin statement, which was what Peter Gooderham described as a kind of wait-and-see policy. Not much has come out of the Quartet policy thus far. However, it has decided to meet in an Arab country soon and to conduct talks with the so-called Arab quartet, which I have just discussed. Again, that is a very welcome move, and I think that the Arab influence is extremely positive. The Arabs clearly know what the dynamics are. Their interest is certainly peace, or, rather, stability, as peace is not really on the horizon at present. Dr. Hollis: I simply mention that last year, when Hamas won its victory, in January, the Quartet and, more to the point, the European Union adopted a wait-and-see policy, waiting until the Palestinians had formed a Cabinet-in fact, until June-before they had the temporary international mechanism for paying the salaries of doctors, teachers and so on around the edges of the PA. In other words, it took six months to adjust to the election of Hamas. If another six months are spent adjusting to the unsatisfactory, inconclusive nature of the deal done in Mecca, an insufficient signal will be sent to the Palestinians-by that I mean both Fatah and Hamas. Fatah needs to know that there are rewards for working with the status quo. So far it has had signals that if it waits on the sidelines, the international community will bring down Hamas and then Fatah can come back to power. That has not been a very productive signal to send. Both factions need to know that there will be rewards for coming to a more practical and more moderate position on this issue of accepting precedent. Down the line, there could be an expectation of recognition of Israel at the same time as contemplating a peace deal with Israel that would be a two-state solution. That would be the moment at which Hamas would have to choose. A lot of Palestinians would expect it to choose in favour of the two-state solution rather than sticking to its principles. I am advocating that signals be sent. Fortunately, divisions within the Quartet are sending some signals that there may be light at the end of tunnel. Q57 Mr. Keetch: It is interesting that, when I asked Dr. Gooderham about the Quartet, he talked of it being united and staying together. Clearly, you do not share that view. I tend to be more on your side of that argument than his. I asked Dr. Gooderham about the reaction to the Mecca agreement in the United States and Israel. Unless they sign up to it, it ain't going to go very far. Did Israel and the United States react how you expected them to react? Do you think that it was generally helpful or are there signs that it could be improved, specifically in the case of the United States given that we are looking at a certain change of President in a couple of years? Will that be helpful? Dr. Hollis: I will say something about the US; I would rather Nomi answered about Israel. If you do not believe that anything is worth doing unless the US is on board for it, we will not do anything. There has been a tacit division of labour between the US and the EU many times in the past, when the EU has had the encouragement of the United States to hold a situation because politically it was impossible for US politicians to do so. If handled skilfully, there could be acceptance. Signs need to be given to the Palestinians of both factions that there will be benefits for them to come up with a better joint position than they have at the moment. The United States and Condoleezza Rice, in particular, were supposed to have said, "Wait a minute. Who was it who decided to create a vacuum in Iraq? Who was it who made the decision to dismantle all the Government institutions that we now have to build up from scratch?" My concern would be that, while fiddling around waiting for everybody to agree or to get a better position out of Hamas or the Palestinians, two years down the line somebody will be asking, including in America, "Whose decision was it to let this situation drift so that we have no Palestinian Authority?" Dr. Bar-Yaacov: I will reply about the US as well as Israel. In the US, unfortunately the reaction was quite predictable. One has to look at who the decision makers are in the US. The National Security Council plays a very important role there and the role on Palestine-Israel is led by a neo-con, Elliott Abrams. He is very powerful and accompanies Condoleezza Rice on all her trips. He was there recently during the Quartet meeting. He opposed the Oslo agreement; he opposed the idea of exchange of land for peace; and his hardcore approach has been very detrimental to the process for a long time. It is part of the reason why the road map is so watered down. As Rosemary was saying, there have been tremendous efforts on the part of the Quartet to move the process forward. There have to be some incentives and some rewards, and one of the reasons why Abbas was pushed to Mecca and why he signed to the deal in its current shape and form was that he did not get anything from the US in return. He really did not. He had to go to Mashal with something and say, "Okay, come my way. Come closer to my position and, in return, I will give you one, two, three or four." But he got zero. That unfortunately is where the US's role stands. However, the recent developments that Condoleezza Rice announced in respect of talks on Iraq that will include Iran and Syria are welcome. I should be very surprised if, in the sideline of those talks-not officially but unofficially-the question of how to deal with Israel and Palestine does not come up. Let us consider the proximity and the mere dialogue. The fact that there will be a meeting at a fairly high level at which Syrians and Iranians will be present is, of course, welcome. As Simon McDonald said in the previous session, the current Israeli Government are very weak. They were dealt a heavy blow after the debacle in Lebanon and have very little support, so they are not really in a position to come out with any great peace moves. So in that sense, yes, unfortunately, the reaction was quite predictable. Q58 Mr. Hamilton: May I return to internal Israeli politics and ask you both to comment on what is actually happening in Israel? As you say, Dr. Bar-Yaacov, the Kadima Government of Ehud Olmert have been considerably weakened by the Lebanon conflict last year. We know that they are now down to 14% in the polls-even worse than the Labour Government in Britain-and that Binyamin Netanyahu, the former Prime Minister, who is a hard-liner, is increasing in popularity and is getting quite substantial backing financially from certain Israeli businessmen. Is there a danger that Olmert's Government could collapse altogether, even though they had quite a mandate from the electors just a year ago? Even if that does not happen, will the drift in leadership, with Olmert simply trying to survive in government and as Prime Minister, detract from the Israeli Government's concentration on the peace process? Dr. Bar-Yaacov: I think that you have summed it up. I think that the Government's weakness has detracted from the peace process, because Olmert, unfortunately, is dealing with his own political survival. If you look at the current composition of the coalition, you will see that Avigdor Lieberman, who is a settler himself and a staunch advocate of the settlement policy, joined it recently. Shas, which is also not a moderate party, is in the coalition, as are the pensioners. Labour has also lost face after the war, with a Defence Minister who did not do a particularly good job either. They are a very weak Government, as you stated, and they are not going to make any bold peace moves-not only not at this time, but sooner or later they will collapse. The question is when. Olmert is also under criminal investigation and the Vinograd Commission interim report is due next month. That commission is looking into the conduct of the Prime Minister, and that of other senior Ministers during the Lebanon war, and is unlikely to have any kind words about it. It is really just a question of time as to how long he will last. Once he goes, legally Tzipi Livni, the current Foreign Minister, will become the Foreign Affairs Minister. Although she has a lot of popularity in public, she does not have much political force and support within Kadima, her own party. Plus, Kadima's political platform has gone. It won the election on a platform of unilateral disengagement and, because that failed in Lebanon and in Gaza, it is unlikely to happen again. The question is what is it standing for. I do not think that Kadima is going to be there for that much longer-certainly not as the leading power in Israeli politics. Q59 Mr. Hamilton: And Netanyahu. Dr. Bar-Yaacov: Yes, Netanyahu-very much so. He is racing ahead in the polls. He has got so much more support. He has five times more support-four to five times, depending on the polls-than Kadima or any other party at the moment. We all know who he is and what he stands for. He is a quite hardcore, right-wing politician. He stayed with Likud when Sharon split the centre into Kadima. He not only has a lot of financial support, but has a lot of public support. Q60 Mr. Hamilton: At the moment, if I am not mistaken, Likud only has 14 seats in the Knesset. Is that right? Dr. Bar-Yaacov: At the moment, but the most recent poll that I read on Ynet, an Israeli internet service, said that it was going to get 31. Q61 Mr. Hamilton: That is still far short of a majority, though, is it not? It would need 61 for a majority. Dr. Bar-Yaacov: Yes, but it will get it. If you look at the composition of the parties, it will not have any problem forming a coalition. Q62 Mr. Hamilton: Finally, if we assume that within the next 12 months the likelihood is that the Olmert Government collapse and there are fresh elections and if, according to your analysis, Likud becomes the leading party with Netanyahu-who knows what will happen to the Labour party?-what does that say about the possibility for a future peace agreement with the Palestinians, assuming that a Government of national unity are formed and survive within the Palestinian Authority? Is not the real problem in Israel and the Palestinian territories the dire lack of any sort of leadership, and leadership towards a peace agreement? Should not the Israelis be looking beyond this, and thinking as the public thinks, that Iran is its main enemy. We know what President Ahmadinejad has been saying about Israel, so is it not time that Israel made peace with the Palestinians and Syrians, perhaps? It needs the leadership to do that. Dr. Bar-Yaacov: It would need the leadership and it does not have the leadership, so at the moment it feels that it is alone and under menace from Syria, from Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa brigades, and all the different militant groups as well as Iran. As you know, fear of Iran is certainly something that is dealt with all the time. The question is not so much whether Israel wants to make peace with the Palestinians because, as Simon said earlier, 75% of the population still wants a two-state solution; the question is how we get there. There is a tremendous lack of leadership. I will take you back a step. You mentioned Labour. Labour primaries are scheduled for 28 May. The key runners for the party are Peretz, the current Minister of Defence. If he wins, that is likely to split the party because a lot of people are very unhappy with his conduct; then you will see a split Labour, and you know what that means. The other two contenders are Ehud Barak, former chief of staff and former Prime Minister and Ami Ayalon former head of Shin Bet, the Israeli internal security and author of the Ayalon-Nusseibeh peace principles; he is progressive and someone with vision. Barak also carried Israel to Camp David; hopefully lessons have been learned and next time he will do better. Will it win the next election? That is unlikely, so in terms of a timetable you are looking at Labour getting its act together with the peace platform. Meanwhile, it is a question of containment and management. I do not think the national unity Government in Palestine will last more than six months, maximum a year. So you are looking at a whole set of steps to manage the situation-this is the optimistic view-before you move into a conflict resolution phase from a conflict management phase. Q63 Chairman: Did you want to say something, Rosemary? Dr. Hollis: Only that in a piece of work that I did with an Israeli colleague, looking at the spectrum of opinion among Israelis about a deal with the Palestinians, we came up with five different substantial views. I think you could divide the population into a set of 20 per centers, and 75% encompass the three versions that involve some version of a Palestinian state. But essentially one of those involves the Palestinian state being more Jordan than it is Gaza. It is certainly a hunk of the west bank attached to Jordan, and Egypt picking up the impossibility of the Gaza strip and helping it make sense-that kind of thing. You can get the Israelis to hypothesise any number of solutions to their conflict with the Palestinians. I think it would need even more than a strong leader to galvanise them and deliver any one of those. It is not surprising therefore that they sometimes look to the Arabs to provide the strong leadership, and they look back fondly on when Sadat went to Jerusalem. If only an Arab leader would emerge that would make that kind of gesture. There can be no solution unless there is a cohesive effort with all the principal players involved: the United States, the Europeans backing the Arabs involved to back up rewards for Israel as a result of conceding on statehood, and on and on. If we are to wait for an Israeli leader to solve the problem, we can forget it. Chairman: Sir John Stanley will ask about the Israeli-Palestinian situation and then we will move on to the region and the British role. Q64 Sir John Stanley: Can we go for a moment from the theory of the peace process to the reality of the land process, because for 80-plus years it has always been about land and it still is, ultimately, about land? Can you tell us from the information that you have whether the process of settlement expansion, new housing developments, outpost creation, land transfers from Palestinian ownership into Israeli ownership and the squeezing out of Palestinians from East Jerusalem has been halted or whether it continues? Dr. Hollis: It continues. If you look at the territory on the ground including the barrier, the route it takes, the major highways-some with six lanes-that carve through the land with embankments on either side, the confiscations that have taken place to build and install Israel's security arrangements and then you consider the settlement expansion, which is pretty much the expansion of the main settlement blocks, and the arrangements that are being made in the neighbourhoods of Jerusalem that make nonsense of any kind of city life, it is understandable why the Palestinians wonder what will be left at the end of the day for them to call a state. Dr. Bar-Yaacov: There are 102 illegal outposts. Prime Minister Olmert has not dismantled one since he came to power. The road map calls for the halt of settlement expansion and the dismantling of illegal outposts. That is phase one of the road map. The Quartet goes on to demand certain conditions of the Palestinians, but I have not seen a demand made recently of the Israelis. I think that it is of utmost importance. You are talking about the policy of Her Majesty's Government. That is a parallel that is often made in the Arab world. Every day, I read op-ed pieces that are published across the Arab world, including Palestine, that say, "Why are demands only made of the Palestinians and not of Israel?" That is the plan on the table at the moment. There are 121 official settlements throughout the west bank and 102 illegal outposts and construction within those continues, as Rosemary mentioned. Q65 Mr. Horam: I would like to look at the situation rather differently. How are the foreign policy initiatives of the British Government and Israel perceived by the middle east? Dr. Bar-Yaacov: In Israel and Palestine? Mr. Horam: Yes. Dr. Bar-Yaacov: There is a mixed view. The troop withdrawal from Iraq is encouraging some of the more optimistic people in Palestine to think that the UK is breaking ranks with the US and that the Bush-Blair Catholic wedding is no longer so holy. That is an encouraging sign because the US is not liked by Palestine. It is seen by the Palestinians as completely partial to Israel. Therefore, there is an opportunity here. Q66 Mr. Horam: Has the Bush-Blair theme been very damaging? Dr. Bar-Yaacov: It has been very damaging in the eyes of the Palestinians and the exact opposite in the eyes of Israel. That is why I asked if you were talking about Israel and Palestine. In Israel, the press is full of reports of British academics making anti-semitic statements and boycotts and that goes on. There is a lot of that in the Israeli press, more so than one realises here. That is another angle of it. It is not just the politics; it is also attitude towards Israel, so the view is mixed. Dr. Hollis: Over the past decade, Blair's premiership has made a difference to informed Israelis' perceptions of Britain. They no longer assume that the Foreign Office is automatically on the side of the Arabs. What I would say, however, is that with their political instincts, they can work out just how much influence Blair has, and therefore the British Government have, to make a difference. He was riding on a high for the first few years, including through 9/11, when the Israelis felt that at last people outside would understand their circumstances. However, partly because Iraq has gone so badly, there is a perception that maybe the Brits are losers and maybe they are not so astute in the way in which they handle the region; maybe they fail to get anything terribly useful out of the relationship with the United States. On the Arab side, I personally found much more hostility than I ever used to have to endure, just by virtue of being British. Although I know that there is no question but that the Governments in the region will deal with visiting Members of Parliament and official representatives of Her Majesty's Government with absolute protocol and politeness, and will urge the British to understand their point of view and tailor policy to it, in civil society there is a level of contempt for the British now. It used to be possible to live beyond the Balfour declaration, although you were constantly reminded of it. Now there is a sense that the British are back with the new imperialists, carving up the region. There is a perception that the only reason to go into Iraq was for oil and the pursuit of material interests. There is absolutely no buy-in to the notion that British foreign policy is driven by values or the export of values. That is considered nonsense. In Egypt last year, I was asked by a little group of intellectuals and journalists to explain why Tony Blair had decided to take Britain into war in Iraq. After I had finished a 15 or 20-minute explanation-the best explanation that I could offer of exactly how all this came about-they trashed it completely and said, "Nonsense. It was not for that at all. It was for the oil and power, and Israel." Repairing Britain's image in the region or establishing any significant influence there will take a while. The last nail in the coffin was Lebanon last year. Government Ministers, including the Prime Minister, were not seen to be quick enough to lament the civilian loss of life. Never mind that they were correct that you cannot necessarily implement a UN resolution for a ceasefire immediately. To suggest that, because of that, there was nothing they could do was to give away the information that they really hoped that Hezbollah would take a beating. Q67 Mr. Horam: Do you agree with that assessment from Dr. Hollis? Dr. Bar-Yaacov: I think that the Government were quite seriously damaged by their position in Lebanon and by not calling for a ceasefire early on. That caused them tremendous damage. I think it varies: I was focusing on the positives earlier-on the withdrawal from Iraq rather than the decision to go to war in 2003, but the Palestinians are very wary. To reiterate what I said earlier, it is more about the closeness of the UK to the US and people's total lack of time and appreciation for US foreign policy. Mr. Horam: That is a pretty bleak assessment from both of you. Chairman: Before you ask another question, may I warn our witnesses that we are expecting a vote, or possibly two, at 12 minutes past Four? Could you ask your question quickly, John? Q68 Mr. Horam: If you were in Margaret Beckett's or Tony Blair's shoes, given what you both just said, what would you be doing? Dr. Hollis: About what? Mr. Horam: About Israel and Palestine. Dr. Bar-Yaacov: First and foremost, they should support the formation of a national unity Government and try to put themselves in the Palestinians' shoes, both those of Hamas and those of Abbas. They tried a certain policy with Abbas and it failed. Why did it fail? Why does Hamas have as much support as it does? They must come to terms with the fact that Hamas is there for the duration. Hamas is not going to go anywhere; it is part of the fabric of Palestinian society. So how do we work with it in order to stabilise Palestine, because a stable and prosperous Palestine is in the strategic interest not only of Israel, but of the whole region and the UK Government. The focus, first and foremost, should be on Gaza. Gaza is the flashpoint at the moment. In the west bank, the Israelis are in control. I am not suggesting that that is a good thing. It is under control to a certain extent. There was the raid into Nablus where Hamas is setting up an executive force. But Gaza really should be the main focus and Gaza is pretty separate at the moment from the west bank. So we are talking about an economic plan, a political plan and a security plan and they should all go in tandem. The security situation is a key to everything so the question is how do you deal with security sector reform. How do you deal with the fact that you have two armed factions? Hamas's executive force is a force that the Interior Minister set up because it was not recognised and it wanted an independent force. It is an armed force of at least 6,000 men. You have the Ezzedin al-Qassam, the military wing of Hamas, raging with arms and you have Palestinian Islamic Jihad, which is a faction that does not recognise the Mecca agreement and does not want to be part of the national unity Government. It is fully supported by Iran, with a philosophy of the more Israelis it can kill, the merrier. The question is how you support the national unity government to be strong enough to clamp down on Palestinian Islamic Jihad and groups like that. You have a very broad agenda on the Palestinian front and how to revive the economy is an urgent matter. Peter Gooderham spoke about the temporary international mechanism at length. The TIM gives money to employees. It is not an economy. It does not create jobs. It is a sort of SOS. You need to deal with the whole job creation issue. Then you have to deal with Israel. You have to make certain demands of Israel in order to make Israel a partner for the Palestinians to negotiate with. The starting point is the road map, the Arab initiative. There are a number of plans on the table to work with and, as Rosemary said, they are about reaching out to public opinion. The ideas of two-state solutions are worlds apart. What are the borders? You have to really invigorate the peace process with a lot more force: intellectual force and people on the ground. The people want peace. They do not quite know how to get there. The Israelis and the Palestinians are not going to get there alone. There is no way that they will get there alone. They need the UK Government's help and it is urgent. Dr. Hollis: Nomi has given us a huge long list of all the things that the British Government have got to do, but I do not think that the British Government can do all those things. I would also caution that the British Government have tended to help with security in the past and they may want to stop doing that. Chairman: Can I ask you to be patient with us? We will go and vote and then we will come straight back. I am not sure whether it is one or two votes; we hope that it is only one. If it is two it will take half an hour; if it is one it will take 15 minutes. The meeting is adjourned until then. We will be back as soon as possible. Sitting suspended for a Division in the House. On resuming- Chairman: I apologise for the delay. We were told that there would be two votes, but then of course there were not. The Opposition obviously know much better than the Government what is going on. Dr. Hollis, you were in the middle of a reply when we adjourned. Please conclude what you were saying, and then I will bring in Dr. Bar-Yaacov too. Dr. Hollis: Basically, I was saying that, of the long list of things that need to be done and that Britain might do-the list that Nomi gave us-Britain ought to be careful about rushing in to do practical things to help in the way that we have done so far. Tremendous work was done by the British in helping the Palestinians to develop a prospective legal framework that would work with the economy and that they could put on the negotiating table when they entered detailed negotiations with the Israelis. Ever since the beginning of Oslo, the Brits have helped with the training of Palestinian security personnel. As of the Gaza disengagement, they again sent a team to help with the training of Palestinian security personnel. It was the Brits who sent people to oversee the detention of Palestinians who were wanted by the Israelis, after the Bethlehem siege and Jericho. I was simply saying that the British, given their problematic reputation in the region today, had better be careful, in the ways that they help, that they do not end up appearing to be subordinate, or jailer if you like, and facilitating the occupation rather than helping to end it. If that happens, then Brits will be in the firing line. Dr. Bar-Yaacov: I just want to clarify the question that John Horam posed to me, which was what were Her Majesty's Government to focus on? The United Kingdom is part of the EU, and the EU is part of the Quartet. It is very important to keep the Quartet as the main vehicle through which initiatives are funnelled. All the issues that I mentioned are very much the Quartet role. The UK should push these initiatives through the EU and ensure that everything that I said before-I can go into details about the economic plans, security plans and peace plans. However, one of the mistakes that was made in the past within the Quartet was that the US dealt with security and the political process unilaterally, meaning that they acted without consulting or showing any regard for the EU, the United Nations and Russia. It is very important to work on those three heads together: on security; the economy, and the political process, all in tandem. Otherwise, they do not work. It is a very delicate issue-I fully agree with Rosemary on that-but these initiatives are very welcome and very urgent, and they should be pushed through the EU. Q69 Chairman: Can we move on? We have spent quite a lot of time on Israeli politics. Do you think that the Israeli foreign policy approach, given their fear about Iran, should involve a new initiative to the Syrians? We know that there have been secret talks going on between Israel and Syria for two years-that has just been revealed. Do you think that there is any mileage in an Israeli-Syrian leg of a comprehensive agreement with the Palestinians, or is that just impossible at the moment? Dr. Hollis: The Israelis must be careful that they do not hang themselves to dry, by getting into something that is part of a comprehensive scheme for engaging all the players in the region. As of yesterday, we know that the Americans are prepared to go to this round table meeting of all the major players about the situation in Iraq. That seems to be a positive development, because in Iraq, just as in Israel-Palestine, you probably will not get a solution unless all the stakeholders have got buy-in. Otherwise, you will leave a spoiler outside. So the reason to try to get Syria in the tent, on Iraq or on Israel-Palestine, or on one in order to get the other, is to stop Syria being spoilers from the outside. However, in order for such an approach to work, ideally not only the Americans, the British and the EU members will all be conscious of where they are trying to take matters and pulling in the same direction, but so will most of the regional players. The trouble for Israel is that the value of an Israeli-Syrian dialogue about their bilateral relationship is not very great unless it is part of a regional initiative or dynamic. Dr. Bar-Yaacov: Israel has nothing to lose by talking to Syria at the moment. Earlier this week, the Israeli Cabinet had a very long and detailed briefing about Syria, among other subjects, from the Israeli security agencies, at which the military intelligence held a very different view on Syria from that of Mossad, the external security service. Some members of the military intelligence service were of the view that Syria is interested in genuine peace negotiations with Israel, and that Israel should pursue that. The problem is that the Israeli Government are very weak at the moment, and a weak Government cannot afford to take that sort of step, so I do not think that it is going to happen. Q70 Sir John Stanley: Do you think that there are circumstances in which the Israelis could resume a shooting and bombing war in the Lebanon? If so, what would those circumstances be? Dr. Bar-Yaacov: It is highly unlikely that Israel will resume a war in Lebanon. The circumstances would be if Hezbollah were to launch attacks into the heart of Israel, which we know that it has the military capability to do with weapons such as the Zilzal, Fajr-3 and Fajr-5. At the moment, Hezbollah is concerned about asserting its power internally in Lebanon, and it is highly unlikely that it will launch an attack on Israel. Under no circumstances would Israel launch an unprovoked attack on Lebanon, so I do not think that that is going to happen any time soon. Q71 Chairman: Can we move on to some of the other regional players. Is the Mecca deal a sign of an ongoing struggle between Saudi Arabia and Iran for influence not just on Israel-Palestinian issues but on wider questions? Is the engagement of the Saudis to which you have referred part of a wider sense that the Sunni world has to assert itself, otherwise the Iranian influences will grow among Saudi's neighbours in the Gulf and elsewhere- Dr. Hollis: That is very much my view. Dr. Bar-Yaacov: I think that it is part of it, but I also think that they started playing a role in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict by coming up with a peace proposal, later known as the Arab initiative, in 2002. This is not new; it is not just in the light of Iran's expanded nuclear power programme. Part of the picture is that they want to minimise the Iranian influence, but they also have a genuine interest in seeing peace and stability in the region. Dr. Hollis: In the mix, there are concerns about their own internal stability. Q72 Chairman: But that is also linked to what is going on in Iraq. Dr. Hollis: Exactly. Q73 Chairman: How many links are there between the internal Iraq conflict and the wider middle east peace process? Is it impossible to get solutions to the wider issues while the ferment is going on and the situation is deteriorating in Iraq? Dr. Hollis: The only way to understand what is going on in the region is to take a 90-year chunk of history, and to look at the break-up of the Ottoman empire and the introduction of a state system. That was the first time that such a system had existed in the region. Prior to that it was millennia of empires and city states. In dividing up the Arab world into separate states and introducing the Jewish homeland, a competitive system was set up. Since then, the leaderships in the different Arab states have had to establish legitimacy and, naturally, given the nature of the system, have done so in a competitive manner with each other. Who is going to stand up to the imperialists and chuck out the British or the French? Who is going to be the better socialist? Who is going to be the better defender of the Arab cause against Israel or, indeed, against the Persians, which is something that Iraq was pushing for? Who is going to be the better Muslim or defender of Islam and the holy sites, and on and on? In that mix, there was an assumption that the Sunni would be on top-Sunni or secular, and that is very secular, as in Syria. The disintegration of Iraq has thrown the whole system, the whole mosaic, up in the air. Personally, I think that the struggle between the Israelis and the Palestinians can be understood as unfinished business of the state-building project that began in the 1920s. Now, because of Iraq and the potential for the collapse of Iraq as it has been for the last 90 years-87 years-you have all these issues back up for grabs. What is necessarily the logic of a certain split that more or less follows what the UN said in 1947 should be the split between Jews and Palestinians in Mandate Palestine, and on and on? So all these questions are now up in the air and if all the guys in the region are connecting them, I think perhaps we should. Q74 Mr. Keetch: I want to follow on from that, Dr. Hollis, because that is a fascinating insight, particularly on Iraq. Specifically on Iraq, earlier you heard the Foreign Office people tell us that there were direct links of Syrian and Iranian influence with insurgents in the south and throughout Iraq, but they were not quite sure whether that was sanctioned by the Tehran Government or not. What is your assessment of that? Do you believe that there is military support, if you like, for the insurgents? Do you believe that they are supported by the Tehran Government or not? Dr. Hollis: A couple of things-first, I have been to Iran a number of times, including twice last year, and am fascinated by the Iranian-Iraqi connection. You would have to say that the situation in the 1990s-when there was very limited coming and going, except smuggling, on the Iraq-Iran border-was more abnormal than the situation after the collapse of Saddam Hussein's Government. In other words, normality on that border should involve a lot of interchange, with trade and family connections. There is, after all, a minority of Arabs in eastern Iran, who are not considered as elite as Persians in the Iranian context. When the Iraqis, especially Sunni Iraqis, want to be rude about fellow Iraqis, and you hear this in Jordan and Saudi as well, they say, "They've got a touch of the Persians about them." They are going back to the Safavid empire, which was a Persian empire encompassing Iraq. So there is this mix, this cross-over of the populations and their religious identities. In that situation, I do not think that you can draw a line, separate the two and say that they have no business in each other's affairs. Secondly, the Iranian Government are made up of a number of power centres-I would say not unlike the US Government. You do not have the US Government on board if you only have the White House and not Capitol Hill: we know about the rivalries between the CIA and the State Department, and so on. Iran has something akin to that. The only major distinction in political science terms is, of course, that a cleric is ultimately in charge. Imagine the investigation into the Iran-Contra affair to find out exactly who was doing what from inside the White House. I think that that level of investigation with the Iranians will probably be a luxury that we will not have. In the circumstances, it sounded pretty encouraging that the British Government were taking on the issue and discussing it, among other things, directly with the Iranians. Q75 Chairman: May I throw in the quote from the Prime Minister about the "arc of extremism" in the middle east? He seems to group together the Sunnis, Shi'as and others. Do you think that that is a helpful concept? Dr. Hollis: Only for about five seconds. It just does not take you very far. It simplifies the issue far too much. Dr. Bar-Yaacov: May I add one thing? Governments-not just this one-often make the mistake of lumping everybody in one box. To return to an earlier discussion, that is one of the mistakes made by Israel. Very few people distinguish between Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the al-Aqsa forces and numerous other groups. That is extremely unhelpful. It is important to scrutinise separately every group that commits violent acts. Chairman: We now move on to questions about Egypt. Q76 Mr. Purchase: The west, broadly speaking, has regarded Egypt as a key font of information, and even wisdom, on middle east affairs for many years. Unsurprisingly, when the west looks clearly at Egypt, it sees that it is not an entirely democratic state. It has encouraged, and at times worked quite hard, to bring about a more democratic, open and transparent society-to make it more like ours, so we think. It has not been tremendously successful by any measure and the continuing difficulties with the Muslim Brotherhood, which was started in the 1920s, have not made things any easier. Do you think that, by and large, the west's quest for an open and more democratic Egypt has borne any fruit at all? Or should we just leave the Egyptians to get on with it? Dr. Hollis: I think it is worth noting that the European Union, through its neighbourhood policy, and before that, the Barcelona declaration, on which it is built, has had a complex and multifaceted reform initiative under way. The Americans launched their broader middle east initiative as well. The Department for International Development moved from concentrating on Africa and poverty alleviation to work on the middle east and has some theories about how corruption can interfere with development. The Foreign Office has been more straightforward with its democracy initiative. I understand that, with the arrival of new Labour, the Foreign Office stopped talking about good governance and started talking about democracy. It was more up front about that. With all those initiatives, there is the problem that the westerners, as you have called us all, have not quite made up their minds about how crucial democracy is to economic development, or whether Government initiatives can really make a difference at a grass-roots level. Almost by definition, it is inappropriate to the good that you are selling. If you are selling democracy, you do not go and do it to people. In those circumstances, the Egyptian Government have put up a very sophisticated resistance to all efforts to "democratise" them. The lack of real conviction that it would serve their needs and serve the needs of stability in the region is one reason why not much progress has been made. Q77 Mr. Purchase: What would you to say to those who would encourage totally open elections? If the Muslim Brotherhood stood in its own name, with its own party and its own views, and got into government in Egypt, which would not be impossible, what would you say as an adviser to western Governments about our relations with Egypt? Dr. Hollis: You are suggesting a repeat of what happened in Algeria when the French, on behalf of the west, decided: "Enough". They did not like the idea of Islamists in power. I think that there is much to be said for exposure to power as a more effective way of changing radicals than excluding them from power, which increases radicalisation. The recipe for Egypt is probably more of some of what you have had so far. The Muslim Brotherhood did very well in all the seats that it went for when it ran in the last parliamentary elections. It contrasts very well with the Government in terms of corruption: the Government were found to be guilty of brutality and paying bribes to get people to vote in the elections. Because of the corruption, there is enormous cynicism among the Egyptian population that any of this means anything. There is a huge perception that the Government are corrupt, but that does not mean that the state is discredited, or that there is a love affair with Islamism. A version that brings such opposition into the system but does not overthrow the system overnight and introduce an Islamist Government, which I do not think will happen anyway, would be a more interesting test of the questions that you are asking than one extreme or the other. Q78 Mr. Purchase: At another level, the Egyptian Government clearly believe that the Muslim Brotherhood is a real threat to national security and that its influence spreads far and wide. If you were seeking a fifth or sixth term as president in the belief that the Brotherhood was a growing threat, not only to your power but to national security, how would you deal with that? Do you believe that the Brotherhood is a threat to Egyptian national security? Dr. Hollis: The Egyptians sometimes describe their state as a pharaonic state: it is all pervasive. Egyptians therefore have great difficulty in getting their heads around the idea of progressive reform. There is a sense that everything is forbidden except what is permitted and that you are therefore most likely to be breaking some law just by leading an ordinary life. The authorities will turn a blind eye, however, in the realisation that if they need to get something on you, they have probably got it. You know that, and they know that you know that, so there is a kind of psychological game going on. Egyptians have enormous difficulty describing to the likes of me how you would effect change. On freedom of the press, for example, you might say, "Reverse the system. Let's permit everything except what is forbidden when it comes to the press." That is a very exciting idea. However, the Government would interpret that as removing the finger from the dyke, because you have will have demonstrated that in one area at least you could operate in that way and the whole system would not come down. For fear of experimentation that could demonstrate that the state does not need to be as all-pervasive, they are not having any experimentation. Up against that, I simply do not know what to advise; I do not think that you can make much change from the outside. Q79 Mr. Purchase: Given that analysis, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood is not that surprising, and I broadly agree with you. What is the impact across the Islamic movement of the growing strength of the Brotherhood, with Hamas and others? Do you see them as an inspiration, as giving support or assistance to the growing Islamic movement? Are they a major influence? Dr. Hollis: The Egyptian Islamic heritage has been an inspiration across the region, and it is considered that scholars in Egypt and the scholarly tradition there of Islamic teaching are looked to for authority there and have been for hundreds of years, and the last 100 years in particular. I suppose I have just introduced a parallel for myself with Nasser. He was an inspiration in the region for Arab nationalism. Whether that meant that you were going to conduct your nationalist campaign on your own behalf or on behalf of Egypt-I suspect it would be on your own behalf. It is an inspiration to Islamist movements in the absence of any other mechanisms for opposition, but if you think that you can introduce a secular opposition in any of the countries of the region it is too late. So you either accept a version of Islam in your opposition movements or you do not have more democracy. Q80 Mr. Purchase: I have two small questions. You may have heard that, in our earlier sitting, I made reference to some interdependency and mutual agreement, or mutual interests, between Hamas and Egypt, particularly in Gaza. Does Egypt continue to have leverage with Hamas? How much leverage does it have? Will you intertwine that with the influence with the Brotherhood? Dr. Hollis: Nomi may want to come in on this. It was very apparent during Arafat's period in Gaza, when he was commuting between Gaza and Ramallah, that he was much more trusting, much more reliant on the Egypt connection, whereas the west bank continued to have some Jordanian connections. Jordan was the breathing space, and so on. The fact that the heart of the struggle between Hamas and Fatah is Gaza has increased the level of Egyptian influence, because that connection predates the current crisis. I am not sure whether the two Foreign Office officials were really saying this earlier. They said that Egypt was vital to getting the process off the ground, and I would agree with that. They said that Egypt's influence was useful, and I would have difficulty quarrelling with that, but it is slightly less than it was. Dr. Bar-Yaacov: Omar Suliman, the Egyptian security chief, has done and is continuing to do an incredible job in Gaza. The involvement is vast. Saudi Arabia has a political role to play in the zone of influence, but it is far away. Egypt borders with Gaza-and only Egypt borders with Gaza, because the border with Israel is not always open. Let us not forget that Egypt occupied Gaza between 1948 and 1967 and it knows every inch of it. If there is a spillover of the violence from Gaza, it will spill over into Egypt. It could also spill over into Israel, but it would definitely spill over into Egypt. Its interest in containing and dealing with Hamas is such that the relationship with the Islamic brotherhood will not spill over and fuel further extremism at its end. Egypt is extremely involved and has an extremely positive and ongoing role to play. It is currently training Fatah forces. It has an ongoing security role, as well as a political process role to play all the time. That was diminished only in the grandiose political sense that the Mecca agreement was not reached in Cairo or Sharm El-Sheikh, but Mecca. Okay, it is more to do with pride than practicality, but I would not underestimate the tremendous role that it has to play. There is a lack of satisfaction about its monitoring of the tunnels, which no one has mentioned. All the ammunition into Gaza is coming through tunnels in Egypt that are being dug all the time. It is important to monitor that issue, and more can be done on that front. Chairman: Final question. Q81 Mr. Purchase: Egypt's main goals in the region and the peace process are changing all the time. What do you think its main goals are now? Have they changed? Dr. Bar-Yaacov: I do not think that they have changed. My view is that Egypt is very interested in Israeli-Palestinian peace first and foremost because it has a border with Gaza. It has a peace treaty with Israel and it would like to see an Israel-Palestinian peace accord. I do not think that its role has necessarily diminished. It has continued. It is part of the so-called Arab quartet, but within that quartet it is certainly taking the leading day-to-day role in negotiations between the different Palestinian factions. Q82 Chairman: Finally, would you say the same for the Jordanian position? Has Jordon's position changed given that it has a peace treaty with Israel, too? Dr. Hollis: It was never the same as the Egyptian treaty. Q83 Chairman: I know that, but we heard King Abdullah here in November giving a very bleak, pessimistic assessment of what was happening in the region. I should be interested to know whether you feel that Jordan and Egypt are broadly on the same lines? Dr. Hollis: No, I do not think so at all. There is also a prestige and status issue for the Egyptians. In terms of the struggle to establish legitimacy in an Arab state system, Egypt was always the senior figure, but it has dropped back. In so far as the Saudis are really making the running with the new peace process, that will give the Egyptians mixed feelings. The Jordanians, especially since King Abdullah succeeded King Hussein, have been pretty modest about their role in the region. At the time of King Hussein, Arab leaders saw him as having ideas above his station because he had such an impoverished little country, which somebody else had designed for him and implanted him in. Contempt and competition among leaders can be terrifying when you pick up on the vibes. I think that Jordan is playing a relatively modest role, but now we sense that Jordan is in the position of being so much in the American orbit, and so useful to the American regional position, including intelligence, that the Government and therefore the king have a tremendous struggle to reconcile that with the feelings of ordinary Jordanians. The east bankers are Arab nationalists to the core, and it is a question only of whether they are more of the Iraqi branch of Arab nationalism, the Syrian branch or the south Arabian branch. They are pro-Palestinian in an Arab nationalist sense but suspicious of Jordanians of Palestinian origin. They can all agree to be anti-American, and there was quite a lot of support among Jordanians for al-Qaeda-type terrorism in Iraq as a result of the invasion, which they saw very much as an invasion, until al-Qaeda sadly struck inside Jordan and killed Jordanians at a wedding party in the process. There has been a revisiting of what the extremist forces are, but it should be no surprise that King Abdullah said long before it became fashionable, "Beware the Shi'a crescent." His fear is that the unravelling of Iraq will unravel Jordan and that it will be caught up in this. If the American endeavour in Iraq, with or without the Brits, fails, and there is a Shi'a-dominated, Iranian-influenced, largely religious Government in Iraq for the next five years or so, and in the process ethnic cleansing continues in Iraq and the Americans are anxious to get out fearing that they cannot do much more to hold the situation, Jordanians will feel that they have to help the Sunni Arabs of Iraq, as will the Saudis. The Syrians will be confused as to whom they should be helping, but they will probably feel the same as the Jordanians and the Saudis. Jordanians can foresee themselves having to get much more involved in the future of Iraq in support of characters who could, in fact, ultimately turn on them. In the past 24 hours the Jordanians have shut the border to Iraqi refugees-they already have 1 million of them. They change the identity of a country that has only 4.5 million or 5 million people in the first place. The Jordanians are trying to retain control of their destiny, which is slightly more alarming for them than Egypt's position, which is to try to retain its status. Dr. Bar-Yaacov: Just briefly, Jordan is caught up in so many problems of its own that the role that it can play is not as great as it would have liked, but the role is always positive. Chairman: I would like to thank you both for your evidence this afternoon. It has been extremely valuable. We have touched on a lot of complex areas and, as I said in the earlier session, we will be visiting the region and members of the Committee will be in most of countries that have featured in our questioning in the next few weeks. This has been extremely useful. Thank you very much. Dr. Hollis: Have a lovely time. Mr. Purchase: You said it as though you meant it. Chairman: Thank you.
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