SELECT COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS INQUIRY: SOUTH ASIA
Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office
CONTENTS
I. Introduction
Inquiry Terms of Reference
Overview
II. India
Political Role
Economic Role and the impact of
Globalisation
Society
III. Pakistan
Political Role
Economic Role
Society
IV. Security
India/Pakistan and the Kashmir
issue
Terrorism
WMD Proliferation
V. Regional
Stability and Governance
India's
Central Role
India's
involvement in Regional bodies
(SAARC,
SAFTA, ASEM/ASEAM, SCO, BIMSTEC)
VI.
India's International Role
India's Growing Influence
India's
profile at the UN
India and the WTO
India in the Commonwealth
IBSA
Energy Security
India in the Global Market
Reliability of Supply
Climate Change and India
Sustainable Development
VII. India's
UK and EU Relations
India's UK Bilateral Relations
Trade Issues
Development Assistance
Whitehall Work on Globalisation
Human Rights Issues
India's relations with the EU
Annexes
South Asia: Political Histories
Kashmir: A Brief History
South Asia: Political Structures
UK/India Joint Declaration (Sept 2004)
UK/Pakistan Joint Statement (Dec 2004)
Visa Operations in India and Pakistan and Regional
Statistics
Consular Issues and Statistics
I. Introduction
1. The
Terms of Reference given by the Select Committee on Foreign Affairs (FAC) for
this Inquiry on South Asia are as follows:
- Political and economic
developments in India and its growing importance.
- Relations
between India and Pakistan, and the question of Kashmir.
- India's role
in the region and its links with its neighbours.
- India's contribution to the international
system, including to the United
Nations and other multilateral fora, such as the non-proliferation
regimes.
- The roles of
the United Kingdom and the European Union in South Asia.
2. For
the purposes of this Memorandum South Asia encompasses India, Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan and Maldives. This Memorandum reflects the
context set by the above terms of reference of the inquiry, focusing
particularly on India as required by the FAC.
This is not a full reflection of British Government policies in the
region, where the relationship with other countries, in particular with
Pakistan, is of major importance to key British interests.
3. This
inquiry comes at a pivotal time for South Asia. The region as a whole is increasingly vital to our domestic and
foreign policy agendas. It is fast
growing in political and economic weight, and offers enormous opportunity. There are also significant challenges posed
by instability and conflict, corruption, poverty, extremism and terrorism.
4. We have strong political, economic,
cultural and historical links across the region. There is a large South Asian
diaspora in the UK. The UK is a key investor,
strategic partner and development funder in these countries. The relationship with India is closer than
it has ever been across a broad range of policy areas. The UK also has vital interests at stake in
good cooperation with Pakistan, particularly on counter-terrorism and over
Afghanistan, but also because of our deep people to people ties, growing
investment, and strong development partnership. Throughout the region our key priorities cover the development of
democracy, counter-terrorism, immigration, climate change, sustainable
development, globalisation, counter-proliferation of WMDs, the rule of law and
economic benefit. We work to achieve these objectives in conjunction with the
UN, EU, G8, Commonwealth, and with other international partners. We also increasingly work with the countries
of South Asia - notably India - to achieve these objectives in the region and
internationally.
5. The
development challenge in the region is immense. The UK will disburse over £500m
of bilateral aid this financial year to the region as a whole. The UK's largest
single bilateral aid programme is to India amounting to £248m in 2005/6 and set
to increase to £300m. The Millennium Development Goals will be won or lost on
Indian soil: even after reaching Middle Income Country status, India will have
close to 300m people living on under a dollar a day. Across large swathes of
the country, development indicators are currently worse than in most of
Sub-Sahara Africa.
6. The FAC will visit India first. India
dominates the region, geographically, economically, culturally and politically.
The UK's relationship with India is strong, wide and deep. The Joint
Declaration signed by the Prime Minister and Dr Manmohan Singh in September
2004 reflected this by establishing a strategic partnership. It pledged closer
co-operation in foreign and defence policy (including counter-terrorism and
immigration); economic and trade issues; science and technology; climate
change; sustainable development; expanding educational and cultural links; and
other areas.
7. The
trade and investment relationship between India and the UK has huge potential
for our future competitiveness, productivity and global economic reach. The
Select Committee on Trade and Investment (TISC) recently held an inquiry on
this issue. The Indian economy continues to grow at about 8% year on year.
Bilateral trade in goods and services has doubled since 1993. In 2005 the total
value of bilateral trade between the UK and India was £7.9 billion, a rise of
almost 20% (from £6.6 billion) in 2004. In 2005/06, Indian investments into the
UK grew by 110%. India is now amongst the largest foreign investors in the UK.
British people of Indian origin constitute some 2% of the UK population,
contributing at least an estimated 4% of GDP.
8. India
is currently the fourth largest emitter of greenhouse gases in the world and
global climate security is strongly linked to how India develops. It faces a
near-doubling of energy demand over the next 30 years and relies heavily on
coal. Its overriding desire to secure development and alleviate poverty through
economic growth has consequences for taking action to produce clean energy and
India strongly resists submission to reduction targets. The UK has made some
progress (either bilaterally or through the EU) in engaging with the Indian
Government on this over the past two years.
An EU-India Initiative on Clean Development and Climate Change was
launched at the EU-India Summit in September 2005 and the G8 Action Plan
contains several initiatives that involve India. The UK and India have every
interest in addressing the problem together, not least because of India's
importance as a possible model for the developing world.
9. The
bilateral visits agenda is rich. Highlights in coming months are likely to
include several Cabinet and other Ministers, royalty and an array of prominent
public figures travelling to India.
10. The
FAC will also visit Pakistan. Pakistan
is a vital partner for the UK: we have a large number of common interests. 800,000 people of Pakistani origin are
British citizens living in the UK while 80,000 British passport holders live in
Pakistan. Our shared trade is worth
almost £1 billion a year. There is a
strong development partnership: the UK was proud to help Pakistan deal with its
devastating earthquake in October 2005, and in the reconstruction phase that
continues now. We are both fighting
extremism in our communities and work together on counter-terrorism. Pakistani help is essential in combating the
Taleban threat to Afghanistan, including to UK troops deployed there. The bilateral relationship is encapsulated
in the Joint Statement agreed by the Prime Minister and President Musharraf in
December 2004: "UK-Pakistan, A Partnership for Peace and Prosperity". It covers a broad set of issues, ranging
from tackling extremism and countering terrorism, supporting stability in
Afghanistan and non-proliferation, to achieving the Millennium Development
Goals and improving trade. This will be
complemented later this year by a 10-year development agreement currently being
negotiated.
11. High-level
bilateral visits are again a regular feature, with a series of further
ministerial and other high level visits planned for coming months.
12. The Pakistan
economy is growing at 7% a year. Britain and Pakistan have always enjoyed good
trade relations and many Pakistani businesses see Britain as the country of
first choice to do business with. There are over 80 British companies operating
in Pakistan, with plenty of interest from others. Bilateral trade has doubled
in the last four years. UK Exports continue to show strong growth (of 37.3% for
the period Jan-April, 2006 compared to the corresponding period last year). The
trade balance is still in favour of Pakistan, but since 2003 the UK trade
deficit is showing a downward trend. In 2005 this decreased by 85% from £219m
in 2004 to £32.6m. At the same time UK foreign and direct investment (FDI) into
Pakistan stood at £190m, a year on year increase of 34.4%.
13. Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka, Nepal, Bhutan and the Maldives each face significant challenges as
they seek to fulfil their potential.
14. In
Bangladesh, a parliamentary democracy, and the recipient of £125m of DFID
assistance this financial year, progress has been made on gender equality
issues and it has social indicators in some cases better than India's. But
there are concerns including an often dysfunctional and confrontational - not to say violent - political culture,
corruption, poor governance and growing extremism. The hope is that an
acceptable, free and fair parliamentary election in January 2007 will provide a
platform for the next government to address these concerns. Prospects for the
elections are however far from certain.
15. The ceasefire
in Sri Lanka exists on paper only following the recent escalation in violence,
though the government and the Liberation Tamil Tigers of Eelam (LTTE) continue
to express support for the ceasefire agreement and Norway's role as facilitator
of the peace process. Restraint and a reduction in the violence is the key
short term requirement. The absence of a roadmap for a negotiated settlement is
increasingly of concern - achieving broad political support in the South for a
credible political offer to the Tamils will require a bold lead from President
Rajapakse.
16. Following a
popular uprising in April 2006 which forced the King to relinquish absolute
power Nepal's reinstated democratic government remains fragile. The Seven Party
Alliance (SPA) government is negotiating with the Maoists about the transition
to elections for a Constituent Assembly, including when and how the Maoists
will disarm and enter government. Mutual confidence is low. The Maoists have
made thinly veiled threats to provoke civil unrest if their demands for
immediate access to power are not met. The SPA and the Maoists each invited the
UN to assist with arms management and to monitor the election process. The
Government still needs to give the UN a specific and clear mandate for it to
take this forward promptly. The UK has set aside funding (£1.9m) in support of
the UN for this. India is especially concerned about events in Nepal because of
the long and open common border.
17. Bhutan is at
a key point of transition. The King has introduced a new constitution under
which he plans to abdicate in 2008, to be replaced by a constitutional
monarchy. There will be elections, although no sign yet of political parties
being formed. In a small, landlocked country of some 600,000 people, the
economy is healthy: hydro-electric power is generating revenue (selling to
India); tourism is growing. Bhutan enjoys good relations with India, more
difficult ones with Nepal: the refugee problem remains unresolved (there
are100,000 mainly Bhutanese refugees in camps inside Nepal).
18. Maldives has
embarked on a process of political reform allowing for multi-party
representation. Difficult relations between the government and opposition have
hindered progress to date, though there are encouraging signs now of a more
constructive atmosphere.
19. A number of
issues have wider regional significance. These include: water; movement of
peoples; energy; and economic co-operation. They all have far-reaching
political and economic implications. The major external players in the region
are China, the US and to a lesser extent the EU. All strongly influence South Asian issues. Afghanistan, Iran and Russia also have a
bearing on the region. Furthermore,
India itself is increasingly developing as a leading global player.
II. India
Political Role
20. The domestic
political scenery in India has changed since the 1970s. The relative decline of
the Congress Party and the rise of regional, lower-caste and Hindu political
groups have transformed Indian politics, the party system and the balance of
power. There is no longer a 'natural party of government'. The Congress Party
and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) are still the two main political forces,
but neither can command a Parliamentary majority in its own name. The balance
of power is with a loose collection of regional and other parties. The
governing Congress-led United Progressive Alliance is reliant upon the support
of left-wing parties.
21. The balance
of power between federal and state governments is changing. There is a growing
sense of loyalty at the state rather than the national level. As a result,
50-60 state parties are represented in the national legislature making it
essential that the national parties forge partnerships with them in order to
form a government. Coalition politics, and associated constraints on policy
making, are now a fixture. Three types of broad coalitions are likely: BJP or
right wing-anchored; Congress-anchored; or a 'third front' of mainly left wing
parties aligned with regional or caste-based groups. India has been governed by
each of these types of coalition in the past fifteen years.
22. Congress no
longer commands the exclusive support of Hindu Brahmins, tribals, lower castes
and Muslims. Most of these groups find regional and caste-based parties more
attractive. Caste-based politics also complicates the BJP's hunt for votes and
allies. Regional and caste-based cleavages make it more difficult to campaign
on a single national platform.
23. India's
political establishment remains "senior"; the average age of MPs in Parliament
when the 14th Lok Sabha began in May 2004 was 52.
24. At the state
level party affiliation is fluid; tactical alliances and seat-sharing
arrangements are common practice and anti-incumbent sentiment is almost a
given. The importance of caste (and religion) in state elections varies greatly
from state to state, as does the importance of state elections for political
coherence and longevity at the centre. Uttar Pradesh has a population of 170
million, including many Muslims, and returns 80 members of parliament; eight
out of thirteen Prime Ministers have been from this state. Meghalaya is largely
Christian and elects two members.
25. India's rate
of population growth remains considerable: a child is born every 1.25 seconds;
the population grows by 15.3 million every year (adding almost as much as the
total population of Chile annually). Widening disparities in terms of growth
and development between and within states pose a threat to India's long-term
economic unity, with implications for political and social stability. The
contrasts are stark. For instance, the world's largest slum, Dharavi in Mumbai
covers 1.7 sq km; on the other hand, an average of 5 million new mobile phone
connections are added every month. The growing states of the west and south
have poverty levels below 25%, literacy rates of 46-88%, and receive 89% of
investment. The stagnant states of the east and north have poverty levels above
33%, low literacy rates, and receive only 11% of investments. As the gap
between the economically successful states and the rest widens, existing
inter-state tensions are likely to be exacerbated, with the poorer states
demanding 'social justice' (subsidies, labour demarcation, etc.) and the
wealthier demanding greater economic reform.
26. Notwithstanding
the demise of single-party government in New Delhi, there remains broad
consensus that India needs strong and stable central government to protect and
advance its national interests and to mediate between states. In addition,
recent fiscal problems faced by a number of states have forced them to seek
additional federal resources in return for agreement on policy reforms. This
has acted as a counter to decentralisation.
27. Many Indians
look to the political system to deliver social equity or justice (there are
over 27 million cases pending in India's courts and obstacles to the effective
functioning of the police and criminal justice system - including
under-resourcing - mean justice is simply not accessible to many citizens).
Economic Role and the impact of Globalisation
28. India is
emerging as a global player, economically and politically. The geopolitical and
economic consequences of its projected rise will be profound. It is predicted
to become the most populous country in the world by 2035. It is currently the world's fourth largest
economy in PPP terms (IMF figures), and is forecast to become the world's third
biggest dollar economy before 2050, and fastest growing one by 2020. The economy is growing steadily at
7-8%. Despite its huge poverty tail
(300 million people on less than $1 a day) India is beginning to impact on the
global economy, and at an accelerating pace.
29. Economic
success has been underpinned by dynamic private sector activity in services
(around 60% GDP) and manufacturing - particularly in the IT, BPO services,
pharmaceuticals, biotech, textiles and automotive industries. Much of this
growth is in the southern and western states, which have embraced the new
technology and enterprise opportunities available in a globalising economy.
Regional disparities are widening. Agriculture now accounts for less than a
fifth of GDP, but around two thirds of the workforce are dependent on the
sector, so it remains an important determinant of welfare.
30. India's
growth could accelerate, if fuelled by a number of factors:
· the
process of economic reform and improved governance may move faster than
anticipated, in particular unleashing the country's huge manufacturing and
agricultural potential. The 11th five-year plan (starting in 2007) is likely to
target 10% annual growth.
· India's
huge educational drive - fuelled by the competition from such a young
population (54% under 25) - may accelerate the success story, as India becomes
the workforce of the world in the decades of 2020 and 2030, in sharp contrast
to ageing Europe, US, China, Russia and Japan.
31. But there are
also risks that economic growth could be undermined by:
· Inconsistent
levels of governance, both administrative and political. Inertia.
Corruption. A statist mindset
which constrains the private sector.
Coalition politics could compound all this, and inhibit political
leaders from taking the longer economic view.
· Employment
generation, one of India's most daunting challenges. India will need to find
the jobs to replace the subsistence farming that keeps 650 million people
currently dependent on agriculture.
· Rising
energy demand in Asia and competition between Japan, China and India for
resources directly affect their own political, economic, climate and energy
security interests (and, of course, those of the UK). The consequent decisions taken in India now on energy
infrastructure, particularly on carbon intensive coal-fired generation, will
have huge implications for global climate security for decades to come.
· If
India's large public deficit is not tackled, government debt could crowd out
private investment, limit government investment in infrastructure and undermine
financial stability. FDI inflows could
then decline.
· India's
inadequate infrastructure risks putting India at a disadvantage against Asian
competition. Problems in the
energy/power sector are a particular worry.
Water management needs significant investment too.
· A
widespread belief in the political establishment that economic reform is
somehow inversely related to retaining political power. The upset that the BJP faced in 2004 and the
perceived failure of their "India Shining" campaign merely reinforced this
belief. India watchers agree: either
the reform process and its benefits have not been "marketed" well enough and
consistently enough or large sections of the population still feel relatively
untouched by the benefits of reform.
Society
32. There is a
world-wide Indian diaspora of some 20 million. Another 3 million Indian
migrants live in Gulf countries as guest workers. There are nearly 1.5 million
Britons of Indian origin in the UK together with 175,000 Indian nationals
residing in the UK. India watchers
increasingly refer to India's "soft" power.
Indian language films and filmstars have a huge following in the UK and
across South Asia. Indian celebrities
from the creative arts are especially influential in India and among the
diaspora worldwide.
33. A major trend
in migration is the very high level of cross-border economic migration between
India and neighbouring countries - but mainly into India. There are an
estimated 2-3 million Nepalese migrant workers in India. Estimates for the
number of Bangladeshis in India vary widely (and are vigorously disputed) but
12 million is not an unrealistic figure. Whilst the overwhelming majority of
migrants come and go voluntarily, there are cases of coerced migration and
trafficking, eg children from Bihar illegally taken by private contractors to
work on road construction in Nepal.
34. The majority
of migrants move within India, eg over 800,000 Oriyas are estimated to have
migrated to Gujarat. Some migration is seasonal; some itinerant labourers are
continually on the move; most migrate permanently in search of a better life.
India is experiencing an explosion of rural-to-urban migration. The drivers
remain constant: unemployment and agricultural interruptions are 'push'
factors; the lure of employment, education opportunities and services and
resources are 'pull' factors. Awaiting these migrants are a host of
difficulties. Most Indian cities are already very densely populated, each
facing the same problems of grossly inadequate housing, transportation,
sewerage, electric power, water supplies, schools and hospitals. Congestion,
noise, traffic jams, air pollution, and major shortages of key necessities
characterise urban life.
35. India is
constitutionally a secular state in which tolerance is extended to all
religious groups - but religion and caste always have potential to cause
trouble. Hindus constitute 82% of the population, Muslims 12%, Christians and
Sikhs over 2% each leaving the balance of Buddhists, Jains, Parsees and Jews.
For historical, social and political reasons Muslims in India are economically
and educationally disadvantaged compared to Hindus.
36. Communal
relations have tended to be good, though sporadic and usually low-level
communal violence is a periodic feature of Indian life and tensions run higher
in some areas, most notably Gujarat. Communal clashes are often sparked, or
exacerbated, by property or commercial disputes rather than by religious
differences and intolerance. The most notable recent exception was the severe
rioting in 2002 in Gujarat. There are
concerns that Hindu-Muslim animosity may sharpen in wake of terrorism designed
to exploit these tensions and to divide the two communities yet despite this
revivalist Islam has made only limited inroads so far.
37. There are
several thousand castes in India. Caste membership is determined by birth,
fixing an individual's status in the overall hierarchy and still to a
considerable extent determining his/her occupation. About 15% of the population
classified by the Constitution as members of the most disadvantaged castes are
entitled to their own representation in Parliament and a reserved quota of
government jobs and places in higher education. Many states have extended this
system of reservations to other disadvantaged groups. The government provoked a
violent reaction from members of higher castes earlier this year when it
announced it would reserve 27% of seats in higher educational institutions for
other disadvantaged classes. Higher-caste protestors demanded that merit should
be the sole criterion for admission.
38. Caste tension
and discrimination, not necessarily overt violence, pervades Indian society and
caste identities run deep, including in cities. Caste violence does take place
but not on a scale that attracts sustained national media or political
attention.
III. Pakistan
Political Role
39. Pakistan's
government has alternated between weak civilian and military rule since 1947.
President Musharraf's coup in 1999 led to a hybrid Government in 2002, when
there were elections for the National Assembly and Senate. The ruling party,
the PML(Q) holds most seats but not a majority, and governs in a coalition with
the MQM and the PPP (Patriots). The PPP is the largest opposition party. The
six party religious alliance, the MMA, has a majority in the NWFP and governs
in coalition with the ruling party in Baluchistan. The PML(Q) holds the
Government of Punjab and Sindh. The next elections are due by the end of 2007.
40. Pakistan is a
strategic player in the region. It
recognises its key role in ensuring stability in Afghanistan, and has been
supportive of the E-3's efforts to ensure Iran does not develop nuclear
weapons. Relations with India continue
to play a significant role in Pakistan's foreign policy, but they are no longer
the lens through which all Pakistani foreign policy has to be seen. Pakistan is a predominantly moderate Muslim
country that has a lot to offer the world.
It is one of the largest troop contributors to UN Peacekeeping missions.
Pakistan's strategic importance during the Cold War and Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan ensured close Western links. Pakistan's recognition of the Taleban
stemmed from a desire to defuse old cross-border Pushtun frictions, for
stability on its western border and, perhaps most importantly, for a
Pakistan-friendly government in Kabul to prevent perceived Indian interference
and influence.
41. The dilemma
for President Musharraf is how to tackle terrorism and extremism whilst at the
same time preventing alienation of his wider domestic constituency. This has
been a delicate balancing act. Al Qaeda and the Taleban pose as much of a
threat to President Musharraf as they do to UK interests. Pakistan has made a serious dent in the
former's leadership operating on its soil.
But a wider threat remains. The Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA) have traditionally been free to run their own affairs, including when
under British rule. The attempt to
establish more direct central control has been costly. The Government has just
signed a peace deal with local tribes in north Waziristan, and is now promoting
a comprehensive development strategy for FATA.
It is seeking to use the substantial funds available (both internal
resources and support from external donors) to pay for this. Pakistan's vital efforts against terrorism
and extremism involves close co-operation with, and support from, the UK
amongst others in the international community.
Economic Role
42. Pakistan is a
developing country, which has seen rapid growth in recent years. In 2005 it had
one of the highest GDP growth rates in Asia, and at 8.6% was second only to
China. However, it also remains an
impoverished and underdeveloped country. It has suffered from decades of
economic mismanagement and low levels of foreign investment. Almost 50% of the population is illiterate.
43. Things are
now starting to change. Reforms begun
in 2000/1 have resulted in a stronger economic outlook and accelerated growth
in the manufacturing and services sectors, reducing the relative dependence on
agriculture. Following the lifting of
G7 sanctions, imposed after Pakistan tested nuclear bombs in 1998, there has
been an increase in exports and an improvement in Pakistan's balance of
payments.
44. There are a
number of success stories in the Pakistani economy - one of which is
textiles. The sector's value added
amounts to about 10% of GDP and 40% of the country's manufacturing output. Despite the conclusion of the Multi-Fibre
Agreement in January 2005, which opened up textiles to full competition,
Pakistan's textile and clothing exports continue to fare well. The service sector has also seen strong
growth rates.
45. Privatisation
and strong performance in manufacturing and services has led to an inflow of
FDI. Levels have risen to $970m so far
this year (excluding privatisation), up from $515m for the same period last
year. The sectors attracting the most
FDI are power, telecommunications and oil and gas exploration, which make up
over 40% of all FDI. The UK is an
important source, contributing around 20% to total FDI levels.
46. Although the
economy is heading in the right direction, risks still remain. High growth rates in recent years (over 5%
GDP growth per annum since FY 2002/3) have put the economy at risk of
overheating.
47. The
government budget has been generous in the lead up to an election year, with
spending increases of 27%. It has been
labelled the 'budget for the poor' and offers substantial pay rises to
government officials and food subsidy increases. These initiatives are encouraging. But with little sign of an attempt to widen the tax base, they
beg the question: how will the increased spending be financed?
48. Overall the
outlook for the Pakistani economy is positive and its stands to benefit further
from enhanced integration of the South Asia region. At the moment South Asia is one of the least economically
integrated regions of the world. In
total it covers 3.5% of the world's land surface, contains almost a quarter of
the world's population, but shares only 1.3% of the world's trade. Although trade and FDI are growing as a
percentage of GDP in Pakistan, very little is from within the region,
reflecting ingrained suspicions and decades of political conflict with
India. Trading within the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) accounts for less than 5% of the
members' total global trade. However, this may change with the formation of the
South Asian Free Trade Area, which the Pakistani government ratified earlier
this year. It creates a framework for a
reduction in tariffs by 2007 and the creation of a free trade zone in South Asia
to be in place by 2012.
Society
49. The
challenges facing Pakistan are considerable. Feudal structures have
historically been strong and civilian institutions correspondingly weak. In
recent times, political parties have relied more on the personalities of their
leaders to attract voters than on comprehensive policy platforms. A weak
judiciary, a lack of accountability, corruption and patronage at all levels
persist whatever the complexion of the government. The involvement of the
military across a wide spectrum of society, together with the domination of the
feudal elite, continue to take a toll.
Many of Pakistan's sectional interests feel excluded from national
institutions: this is a major factor undermining social cohesion and producing
ethnic and sectarian violence. State education is poor, which has led to a
growth in both private and madrassa education. Although there have been
considerable advances in recent years, a quarter of the population lives below
the national poverty level. These factors all constitute further major
challenges to a cohesive society.
50. Even before
the foundation of Pakistan, modernists and Islamic radicals contested the idea
of what kind of state it should be; simply a country where Muslims could live
together or a state where Islamic law would prevail. Those who led the call for
a separate Muslim homeland, including Mohammed Ali Jinnah, were largely
modernists. However, the martial law regime of Gen. Zia ul-Haq in the 1970s and
1980s introduced a policy of 'Islamisation' of the country's institutions,
including Islamic penal codes and economic principles, and left an enduring
legacy which sits uneasily with Pakistan's moderate sufi traditions. The
majority of the population today remains largely moderate, although devout, but
religious radicalism has grown and sectarian tensions are never far from the
surface. President Musharraf is
committed to a progressive agenda he terms 'enlightened moderation'. But attempts by the Government to reform
Islamic laws have met with stiff opposition.
Most recently the Government had to stall passage of its 'Women's
Protection Bill' to amend the Hudood ordinances - laws which are highly
discriminatory against women - following parliamentary opposition.
IV. Security
India/Pakistan and the Kashmir issue
51. The UK has
welcomed progress made in recent years between India and Pakistan within their
Composite Dialogue process. These
discussions cover: Peace and Security; the Wular Barrage/Tulbul Navigation
project; Siachen Glacier; Sir Creek; Economic and Commercial Cooperation;
Terrorism and Drugs and the Promotion of friendly exchanges. Separately, the Indians have formed five
Working Groups to provide a structured framework for looking at ways to improve
the situation in Kashmir. The five
groups will discuss:
- measures
for improving the condition of people affected by militancy, plus schemes for
rehabilitating orphans and widows affected by insurgency;
- simplifying
cross-Line of Control travel, increasing goods traffic and expanding
people-to-people contacts, including the promotion of pilgrimages and group
tourism;
- economic
development, employment generation and the balanced regional development of
Kashmir;
- the special
status of India-administered-Kashmir within the Indian Union, and to consider
how to strengthen democracy, secularisation and the rule of law (this Working
Group has yet to meet);
- good
governance, the strengthening of local self-governance and the implementation
of the Right to Information Act.
52. The India-Pakistan
relationship has been transformed since 2002 when the two countries appeared to
be on the brink of war. Despite some difficulties following recent terrorist
atrocities in Mumbai, the Joint Statement agreed at Havana (in the margins of
the NAM Summit) in September 2006 means that both countries have re-committed
themselves to continuing the process.
As a close friend of both countries, we remain in regular contact with
India and Pakistan, and we will continue to encourage both countries to seek a
durable resolution to all the issues outstanding between them, including over
Kashmir.
53. The situation
in Kashmir continues to be of concern.
Cross-Line of Control terrorist
groups continue to operate in Indian-administered Kashmir, and there are almost
daily attacks. Despite relatively
successful elections in Indian-administered Kashmir in October 2002, and some
signs of increased "normalcy" eg large numbers of Indian tourists, there is
still widespread alienation among people in the Kashmir Valley (in contrast to
the two other regions of Jammu and Ladakh).
The Indian Government has made some efforts to begin dialogue with
separatist groups and to address popular concerns, but there has been limited
progress so far. Over half a million
men are stationed with the security forces (army, central paramilitaries,
police) in Indian-administered Kashmir.
Human rights violations by the security forces have reduced in recent
years but are still a cause of concern.
Terrorism
54. Terrorism is
a growing concern in South Asia. Most of the countries in the region are
affected to a greater or lesser degree by terrorism on their territory.
Suspicions and allegations about external involvement in or support for
particular attacks colour a number of bilateral relations within the region, in
particular India-Pakistan, and also India-Bangladesh and Afghanistan-Pakistan.
The links between domestic extremist groups in the region are becoming more
evident, as are links to UK-based extremists. It is widely thought that some
core Al Qaeda leadership are in hiding in the remote Afghanistan-Pakistan
border region.
55. Pakistan-based
terrorists and their links to the British-Pakistani diaspora currently pose the
greatest terrorist threat to the UK.
Working with the Government of Pakistan is therefore a top UK
counter-terrorism priority. Some
British-Pakistani terrorist networks are closely linked to Al Qaeda; some are
more loosely associated. The attacks in
London on 7 July 2005 and the more recent arrests in connection with Operation
Overt (the series of arrests made in the UK on 10 August in relation to a plot
to explode a number of US-bound aircraft) demonstrated that these terrorist
networks seek to co-operate, facilitate, and train with extremists in Pakistan. Pakistani and UK Government co-operation was
a crucial feature of Operation Overt.
56. The
Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) was proscribed by the UK in July 2006. Proscription of other groups, including Hizb
ut Tahrir (HuT), is kept under constant review.
57. Terrorist
groups, including ever-mutating splinters and off-shoots, still conduct attacks
in Indian-administered Kashmir on Indian security forces and civilians. It is not clear where all of these groups
are based. Most have a jehadi style
Islamist agenda for Kashmir. Such
groups - particularly in recent times Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) - have conducted attacks in both India and
Pakistan. The UK has proscribed LeT and
JeM.
58. Recent
attacks in India include the Delhi bombs (29 October 2005) with around 60
fatalities; an attack on a police Special Task Force station in Hyderabad;
shootings at an Indian Institute of Science conference in Bangalore (28
December 2005, one dead); the Varanasi bombings (7 March 2006); the Mumbai
bombings (11 July 2006 nearly 300 killed); and the bomb attacks in Malegaon (8
September 2006, at least 30 killed).
Pakistan is also a victim of terrorism, including assassination attempts
(there were two attempts on the life of President Musharraf in 2003 and one on
the life of Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz in 2004), and sectarian violence such
as the recent assassination of Pakistan's most senior Shia cleric.
59. There are
several insurgencies in the North East of India including the one in Assam, led
by ULFA (United Liberation Front of Assam).
There are Maoist (Naxalite) insurgents in the East and parts of central
India (particularly Bihar, Jharkand, Chattisgarh and Andhra Pradesh). The authorities are very concerned about the
spread of Naxalite activity. More
civilians are thought to have died in Naxalite violence this year than in
violence in Indian-administered Kashmir.
There is also a significant criminal element to most of these
insurgencies. Pakistan has also confronted an armed insurgency in Baluchistan
(where there is a strong sentiment against perceived misappropriation of
natural resources by the centre).
60. The
Bangladesh Government is also tackling a serious terrorist problem. On 17 August 2005 in what was seen as a
demonstration of co-ordination, over 450 bomb attacks took place simultaneously
across Bangladesh, killing two people.
In the following months, further attacks led to the deaths of around
twenty more people. A banned extremist
group Jamaat Mujahidin Bangladesh (JMB) claimed responsibility - the Government
has since captured the leaders. There
have also been a number of assassinations in Bangladesh, primarily linked to
other domestic extremist groups. There are concerns that there may be some Bangladesh-based
connections with terrorist groups active elsewhere.
61. Nepal has faced a ten year Maoist insurgency
which has resulted in the deaths of some 13,000 people, many at the hands of
the security forces. The Maoists have
used terrorism, extortion, abductions and other human rights abuses to pursue
their cause. Since the restoration of
multi-party democracy and the mutual ceasefire in April 2006 fighting between
the Maoists and the (formerly Royal) Nepalese Army has largely ceased. But
Maoist abuses continue.
62. In
Sri Lanka the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) have been waging a
violent campaign, including terrorism tactics, against the Government for over
twenty years to try and secure a separate state, or at least federal
devolution, in the north and north-east of the country. Recent weeks have seen a resurgence in open
hostilities resulting in considerable loss of life, including to
civilians. Norway, as facilitator to
the peace process, continues to work hard, with the full support of the
international community, including the UK, to bring the parties to resume
negotiations for a peaceful settlement.
WMD Proliferation
63. India and
Pakistan have both ratified the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and the
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). India is destroying its stockpile of chemical weapons under the
CWC verification regime. The Pakistani
Ambassador is President-designate of the five-yearly BTWC Review Conference
scheduled for later this year.
64. Neither
country has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), nor the
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).
Both India and Pakistan are on the list of countries which must ratify
the CTBT before entry into force. For
many years their nuclear status was ambiguous: even when India conducted a partially
successful nuclear test in 1974, it characterised it as a "peaceful nuclear
explosion". But in 1998 India conducted
a series of nuclear tests, closely followed by Pakistan, and both countries
openly declared themselves to have nuclear weapons programmes. However, since nuclear-weapon States (NWS)
are defined by the NPT as "states which manufactured and exploded a nuclear
weapon or other nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967", India and
Pakistan have to be regarded as non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS) for NPT
purposes.
65. In the
aftermath of the 1998 tests the UN Security Council, on the basis of a P5 Joint
Communiqué, unanimously adopted UNSCR 1172.
This condemned the tests and, among other things, called on India and
Pakistan to stop their nuclear weapon development programmes and to become
parties to the NPT.
66. The UK is a
member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).
The NSG's present Guidelines on nuclear-use-only items prohibit their
supply to any NNWS which does not have a safeguards agreement with the IAEA
covering all its nuclear material (a so-called "comprehensive
safeguards agreement", CSA). For the
purposes of the NSG Guidelines India and Pakistan are not nuclear weapons
states. There is no prospect of either
accepting a CSA, which would require them to put under safeguards materials
they intend for their nuclear weapons programmes. Consequently the Guidelines require that NSG members should not
supply nuclear use only items to either country.
67. On 15 March
2002, the then Minister of State Ben Bradshaw set out HMG's policy towards
nuclear exports to both countries. This
policy was to deny all exports for items on the NSG Dual-Use List to India and
Pakistan and to discourage contacts between UK nuclear scientists and their
South Asian counterparts.
68. This policy
was revised in August 2005 with respect to India. It now stipulates that we will continue to refuse:
· applications
in respect of all NSG Trigger List items; and
· applications
in respect of all items on the NSG Dual-Use List, when they are destined for
unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, or when there
is an acceptable risk of diversion to such activities.
69. We will now,
however, consider on a case-by-case basis licence applications for items on the
NSG Dual-Use List destined for other activities. We will also consider all applications to export other items
assessed as licensable, including those assessed as licensable under WMD
end-use control, on a case-by-case basis, taking into account:
· the risk of use in, or diversion to, unsafeguarded nuclear
fuel cycle or nuclear explosive activities, or acts of nuclear terrorism;
· the
risk of possible onward transfer of these items to other States for
proliferation purposes, including the recipient State's export control
performance; and
· the
potential utility of the items concerned for, and contribution that they would
make to, such activities.
70. We will
continue to consider applications for exports which will contribute to the
physical protection or security of civil or military nuclear facilities or
assets in India. Licences may be issued
in exceptional cases, consistent with our obligations and commitments.
71. We will
encourage contacts between UK nuclear scientists, academics and those working
in or with the UK nuclear industry with their Indian counterparts, except where
we consider that such contacts might be of assistance to the weapons-related
aspects of its nuclear programme. In
light of this new policy towards India, the UK-India Civil Nuclear Contact
Scheme has been introduced to oversee and facilitate contacts between the UK
and India, maximising scientific collaboration within the parameters of the
UK's existing international and domestic legal obligations. Where such contacts involve the transfer of
technology, which require export licences, we will continue to consider
applications for such licences in accordance with the provisions of UK export
control legislation, on a case-by-case basis.
72. This
announcement followed careful consideration of moves by India to improve its
non-proliferation laws and their implementation. Following the revelation of the proliferation network run by AQ
Khan, it was concluded that it was inappropriate at that point to make similar
changes to our policy towards Pakistan.
73. Separately
from this process, US President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
agreed on 18 July 2005 to launch the US-India Civil Nuclear Co-operation
Initiative (CNCI). The US
Administration would seek agreement from Congress to adjust US laws and
policies, and work with others to change the NSG guidelines, to enable full
civil nuclear energy co-operation and trade with India.
74. In return,
India would:
· identify and separate its civilian and military nuclear
facilities and programmes in a phased manner, placing the former under IAEA
safeguards in perpetuity;
· sign
and adhere to an Additional Protocol on its civilian facilities;
· continue
its unilateral moratorium on nuclear testing;
· work
with the US for a multilateral Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty;
· adhere
to the Missile Technology Control Regime and NSG guidelines.
75. The Prime
Minister welcomed the announcement of the CNCI. In addition to its non-proliferation benefits, the Initiative can
make a significant contribution to energy security, development, economic and
environmental objectives for India and the international community. HMG remains committed to the objective of
universal NPT adherence, but we recognise this is a long-term objective. The CNCI makes no difference to India's
status under the NPT as it can only sign up to the Treaty as a Non Nuclear
Weapons State (NNWS). India has taken
action in recent years to conform to international non-proliferation norms, for
example the adoption of new export control legislation in April last year. The commitments made in the US-India Joint
Statement of 18 July 2005 represented further progress.
76. Implementation
of these commitments will bring India further into, and thereby strengthen, the
broader nuclear non-proliferation framework, of which the NPT is the
cornerstone. In particular, the CNCI
will reinforce the centrality to this framework of both IAEA safeguards and the
Additional Protocol, and can only aid the latter becoming a universal standard.
77. The NSG has
discussed the CNCI at its meetings since the 18 July announcement, though no
decision has yet been taken on whether to amend its Guidelines. In parallel, India has held two meetings
with the IAEA to discuss Safeguards.
These have been regarded as initial talks that have gone well, but
further work is needed. In the US,
legislation has slowly been going through Congress to allow US bilateral
cooperation.
V. Regional Security and Governance
India's Central Role
78. Since the end
of the Cold War India's foreign policy orientation has been in transition. This has also been driven by India's
impressive economic growth. It has
developed closer ties with Western nations, in particular the US (as
exemplified by the negotiations on civil nuclear cooperation) but also the UK,
EU and Japan. India has been trying to move away from its "hyphenated
relationship" with Pakistan, to be looked at as a serious regional and global
player in its own right and on a wide range of issues. However, the relationship with Pakistan
remains very important, both for bilateral reasons, and because of its
implications for the stability and potential development of the region.
79. The
adversarial relationship with Pakistan dominated India's outlook for much of
the post-1947 period. India and
Pakistan have fought three major wars (and one minor one) and threatened a
fourth in 2001-02. The issue of Kashmir
has been the key bone of contention. Since 2004 three rounds of negotiations
('Composite Dialogue') over a range of bilateral issues have made some progress
towards normalising relations. Several confidence-building measures have been
agreed. A cease-fire along the Line of
Control is nearly three years old. The
volume of trade has grown, albeit from a very low base, though around half
still flows via Dubai. There are direct
people-to-people links, including a bus service across the Line of Control. But
there has been no substantive progress on topics where control of territory is
at issue, ie Kashmir, the Siachen Glacier and Sir Creek. Full normalisation of relations is unlikely
until there is final agreement on the status of Kashmir. Without this, South Asia remains arguably
the most likely arena where the failure of deterrence could lead to the use of nuclear
weapons.
80. Though
instrumental in securing Bangladesh's secession from Pakistan in 1971 India's
relations with Bangladesh have always been strained. The relationship is stymied by a number of contentious issues:
unresolved borders (including enclaves in both countries), trade, shared
rivers, illegal immigration, transit rights and the alleged presence of
anti-Indian insurgents in Bangladesh. Each country has opposing priorities:
Bangladesh focuses on trade and water; India on insurgents/security, illegal
immigration and transit rights to its North Eastern states. India's economic and military power and
sheer size dominate the national psyche in Bangladesh perhaps even more than in
India's other neighbours.
81. In early 1997
the two countries signed a landmark agreement (renewed annually) on water
sharing for the Ganges rivers and for improved liaison over refugee and border
security issues. The fall from power in 2001 of the Awami League and the return
of the Bangladesh National Party in coalition with Islamist partners, have led
to cooler relations. India remains concerned over the influence of the Islamist
parties and by the rise of Islamism and terrorism in Bangladesh.
82. Bangladesh's
growing problem of extremism, a political-criminal nexus and a general lack of
good governance present a potential threat to the region's stability. Elections
are due in January 2007 but Bangladesh's parliamentary democracy is undermined
by deeply confrontational relations between the two main parties. The government
needs to do more to establish a free and fair election playing field. Failed
elections are not out of the question. India will want to let the dust settle
on the elections before moving forward on any initiatives to improve relations.
83. Against a
backdrop of pre-election uncertainty, the major Indian corporation, Tata, has
recently suspended plans for a $3bn infrastructure project in Bangladesh,
amidst reports that Bangladeshi Ministers were concerned about popular reaction
to official endorsement of such a large Indian investment.
84. The two major
influences on India's relations with Sri Lanka have been security and the
shared ethnicity between Tamils in southern India and in northern and eastern
Sri Lanka. The failed 1987 Indo-Sri Lankan Accord, the fighting between Indian
peace keeping troops in Sri Lanka and the LTTE in the 1980s, and the
assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 by an LTTE suicide bomber have made deep
wounds. India has called on Sri Lankan President Rajapakse to bring an end to
the killing of Tamil civilians and spell out his vision of devolution. India is
a strong supporter of Norway's role as facilitator of the peace process.
85. Despite
President Rajapakse's suggestion that the Indians should play a more central
role in the peace process, Delhi has so far resisted this and continues to make
clear its strong support for the Norwegian efforts. It meanwhile stresses to the government of Sri Lanka the need to
tackle the serious humanitarian and human rights situation.
86. Relations
with Nepal are close, yet fraught. Under the 1950 Treaty of Peace and
Friendship each government agreed, inter alia, to give citizens of the other
'national treatment with regard to participation in industrial and economic
development' and 'the same privileges in the matter of residence, ownership of
property, participation in trade and commerce'. Political instability within Nepal and the Maoists' 'people's
war' launched in 1996 have been of great concern to India, not least because of
suspected links between Nepalese Maoists and Maoist groups in India, but also
because of the rise in criminal activity, eg smuggling, in border areas and
unrestricted migration. The Treaty has
been and still is the subject of a certain amount of resentment in Nepal; the
Maoists have demanded that this 'discriminatory' Treaty should be abrogated.
87. In recent
years India has helped broker agreements between the political parties, King
and Maoists. In late 2005 they helped
broker the 12 Point Agreement between the Seven Party Alliance (SPA) - now the
Government - and Maoists. Since the
people's uprising in April 2006 and the return of multi-party government, India
has supported the attempts by the SPA to bring the Maoists into government,
once the management of arms has been satisfactorily resolved. After initial hesitation, India has
recognised the value of a UN role in providing technical assistance to the
peace process. Prime Minister Koirala has good relations with Indian leaders,
and made a high profile visit to New Delhi in June 2006 during which a
substantial Indian aid package for Nepal was announced. India naturally has influence over all key
players in Nepal, including the Maoists.
Indian influence can sometimes stir controversy in Nepal, but all parties
in Nepal recognise that they have more to gain from good relations with India than
not.
88. Like
Nepal, Bhutan is a buffer state with China. India has always seen Bhutan's
internal stability as integral to her national security. The 1949 Treaty of Friendship with Bhutan
stipulates that Bhutan will be guided by India's advice in regard to her
external relations and makes India responsible for Bhutan's external
security. This relationship has worked
well and served India's interests when in December 2003 the Royal Bhutan Army, in co-ordination with Indian
forces, began successful military operations against guerrilla bases in
southern Bhutan. The bases had been
established by groups seeking to establish an independent Assamese state in north-east
India. India provides Bhutan with
developmental assistance and co-operation in infrastructure,
telecommunications, energy and industry and hydro-electricity projects which
have boosted Bhutan's GDP exponentially.
Bhutan is sensitive to India's concerns about its relationship with
China.
89. India and
Maldives have enjoyed friendly relations since the latter's independence in
1965. The maritime boundary was settled
in 1976 and in 1988 - at the request of Maldives and in keeping with India's
preparedness at the time to take a lead in the region - India dispatched 1,600
troops by air to restore order in the capital after an attempted coup. The Indian Navy provided early post-tsunami
assistance to the islands.
90. India's
other important relationships in the wider region include:
· Burma:
while India says it shares the concern to see democracy established in Burma,
it argues for a policy of engagement.
It is very conscious of the need to work with the Burmese regime for
security reasons (north-east insurgent groups have used Burma in the past), and
for reasons of strategic competition with China.
· Afghanistan:
India has very good relations with President Karzai's Government. It has given a lot of reconstruction
assistance - $650 million - and has an active presence on the ground. It is very concerned about Taleban influence
and possible linkages to terrorists operating against India. Difficulties in the India-Pakistan
relationship can sometimes spill over into relations with Afghanistan.
· Iran:
India, which is home to over 27 million Shia Muslims, is proud of its
"civilisational relationship" with Iran.
There is also strategic interest in good relations with Iran because of
Pakistan. Recently there has been a
focus on potential energy deals (sale of LNG and an oil/gas pipeline via
Pakistan). The Indian Prime Minister
has said that India does not wish to see Iran develop a nuclear weapon, but it
is also keen to find a peaceful resolution through negotiation.
India's involvement in Regional bodies
91. South
Asia is characterised by very low levels of economic integration and
intra-regional trade. Economic
co-operation has traditionally been held hostage to narrow political and
security perceptions and the fear amongst her neighbours that India will become
even stronger. Formal trade and
non-trade barriers are indicators of political unwillingness to open markets to
real competition. India is key to any
successful regional trade agreement. It
is at the heart of the region, and any regional economic endeavour will need
Indian support if it is to work. As a
regional player with global ambitions, India does not want to be left out of
any emerging groupings. But concrete
benefits have been fairly limited so far.
SAARC
92. The South
Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) comprises Bangladesh,
Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan (recently
joined). It was established in 1985
with the objectives of, inter alia, promoting the economic growth, social
progress and cultural development in the region. After a slow first ten years SAARC has now begun to make some
progress on economic and trade matters.
But regional co-operation is affected by the state of India-Pakistan
relations in particular.
SAFTA
93. The South
Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) was signed in January 2004 and began
implementation from January 2006 with full operational efficacy anticipated for
2016. SAFTA's key objective is the
liberalisation of trade in goods. Its
scope is not particularly ambitious, but resistance to trade liberalisation is
still strong as the economies of the area do not feel ready to expose
themselves to the competition of neighbours.
Disagreements have continued over the list of 'sensitive' (ie exempt)
items, rules-of-origin issues and compensation levels for SAARC's Least
Developed Countries.
ASEM/ASEAN
94. Since the
early 1990s India has had a so-called "Look East" policy for several
reasons: a reorientation following the end of the Cold War, to provide an
alternative to the problematic relationship with Pakistan to the West, and to
boost Indian influence in Asia as a whole, particularly with those countries
traditionally within China's sphere of influence.
95. Since 2002,
India has been an ASEAN Dialogue Partner.
It is a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), participated in the
first East Asia Summit (in December 2005), and joined the Asia Europe Meeting
(ASEM) in September 2006. It is in the
process of negotiating a Free Trade Agreement with ASEAN, as well as bilateral
agreements with several ASEAN members.
96. India
attaches some importance to these relationships, but they are not at the top of
its foreign policy priorities. It is
much closer to some countries, eg Singapore, than others.
Shanghai Co-operation Organisation
97. India (and
Pakistan) received observer status in 2005, and has been keen to maintain a
presence in the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO). The SCO is primarily centred around economic
co-operation and Central Asian security-related concerns (terrorism, separatism
and extremism) but the overall geo-political direction of the organisation is
being driven by Russia and China towards curbing Washington's influence in
Central Asia. India has not applied for
full SCO membership and is unlikely to do so for fear that it will undermine
developing relations with the US.
BIMSTEC
98. The Bay of
Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Co-operation
(BIMSTEC) was established in 1997 to foster socio-economic co-operation among Bangladesh,
India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand.
Bhutan and Nepal were admitted as full members in 2004. BIMSTEC is
envisaged as facilitating trade and development between its member states -
five of which are SAARC countries and two of which are members of ASEAN. The seven countries have endorsed a plan for
a free trade pact by 2017 whilst India, Sri Lanka, and Thailand are committed
to trade liberalisation by 2012. In theory,
BIMSTEC could displace SAARC as it is not hostage to Indo-Pakistan relations.
Whether it does or not will be largely up to India, the potential lynchpin of
BIMSTEC. If India wants to get the best
out of BIMSTEC's potential it will have to re-energise its economic reforms and
improve its infrastructure, especially in the underdeveloped East and North
East. But in the day to day Indian
international trade agenda BIMSTEC does not feature much.
VI. India's
International Role
India's Growing Influence
99. India
tries to find a balanced way through its traditional NAM loyalties and emphasis
on south-south cooperation, and its increasing interest in the US. The relationship with the US has been
transformed in the last ten years, though suspicions remain, in particular of
the US foreign policy agenda. India has
put much effort into defending and promoting the civil nuclear agreement with
the US, which symbolises the transformation since 1998 when the US imposed
sanctions following India's first openly military nuclear test.
100. India's
relations with China have changed quite dramatically from being one of
competition to co-existence and co-operation.
Trade between the two countries is booming and continues to grow as
they, like the rest of the world, explore the potential in each other's expanding
markets. The historic suspicions that
have dogged the relationship since the end of the 1962 war still remain, but
are no longer a significant issue.
Relations between India and China matter to the UK at economic, military
and strategic levels. How these two
countries get along together will have an impact on the wider world for many
years to come.
International Organisations:
India's profile at the UN
101. Reflecting
India's contribution to the work of the UN, the size of its population, and the
importance of its emerging economy, the UK has supported India's bid for a
permanent seat on the UN Security Council since 2003. India is active across the board at the UN. It is also an influential member of the G77
(group of 132 developing countries).
102. India is the
third largest contributor to UN peacekeeping, with over 9000 troops and
civilian police deployed on 12 UN peacekeeping operations. Over half are deployed to the UN Mission in
the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUC).
The Indians have also supplied MONUC with attack helicopters, which have
played an important role in disarming and demobilising the belligerents.
103. The Indians
are active in the contentious debate in New York on UN management reform. The 2005 UN World Summit agreed a series of
management reforms to modernise the UN, including through a more efficient,
effective and accountable UN Secretariat. Reform should be increasingly in
India's interest, as its own contribution to the UN regular budget will
increase as its economy grows. But
India, like her G77 partners, is concerned that the reform agenda might reduce
the power of the wider membership in the General Assembly and place the
Secretariat more under the influence of the major (predominantly western)
financial contributors.
104. India
initiated negotiations for a UN Comprehensive Convention on International
Terrorism. India has played a positive
role in that process and in discussion of a draft UN Counter-Terrorism
Strategy. Like us, the Indians want a
strong condemnation of terrorism by the UN; they support the SG's work on the
issue; and want all parts of the UN system to be better co-ordinated.
105. The UN Human
Rights Council (HRC) was established in 2006 to replace the discredited
Commission for Human Rights. India made
a series of election pledges for its seat on the Council, including committing
to work for the success of the Council and to continue to support UN
bodies. It was elected
comfortably. India was generally
flexible and constructive in the procedural HRC negotiations in June, and helped
promote some good solutions on moving the Council's establishment forward.
106. India is a Non-Annex I
country within the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and is a
signatory to the Kyoto Protocol which India ratified in August 2002. As a non-Annex 1 country India has no set
Kyoto target to meet between 2008-2012.
India shares with the rest of the G77 the view, acknowledged in the
UNFCCC, that the burden of reducing global CO2 emissions rests in the first
instance with the developed world.
India is suspicious of any action that it perceives to be an attempt to
lock it into emission reductions targets that might prove harmful to its
economic growth.
India and the WTO
107. India is an
important and active country within the WTO.
It is a leading member of the G20 grouping of advanced developing
countries, which also includes Brazil and China. India's position in the current round of negotiations (the Doha
Development Agenda- DDA) is driven by a mix of interests. India wants to protect its subsistence
farmers and about 600 million people who depend directly or indirectly on
agriculture, particularly from subsidised imports and on non-agricultural
market access - NAMA (protection of its infant industry and a fear of an influx
of Chinese textiles and manufactured goods).
At the same time, India recognises that an increasing number of its
industrial sectors (pharmaceuticals, auto parts etc) are beginning to be
globally competitive, hence there has been significant autonomous reductions in
industrial tariffs in recent years, and it may be willing to go further as part
of a WTO agreement.
108. India, like
the UK, wants to see a reduction in developed countries' trade-distorting
agricultural subsidies. Given the
potential benefits that the Round could deliver, particularly for the poorest
developing countries, but also for India's fast-growing emerging economy, we
are urging them to take the most constructive approach possible.
109. The WTO Round
remains the UK's main priority and India also remains ready to engage. But with the current impasse in the WTO
negotiations, India is increasing its focus on potential bilateral and regional
trade agreements, and appears to be giving the launch of formal negotiations
with the EU a high priority.
India in the Commonwealth
110. India has
always placed a key role within the Commonwealth. Some say it was India's decision soon after Independence to
continue in the Commonwealth which influenced other Asian and African countries
to join the organisation and which therefore opened the era of the modern
Commonwealth.
111. India is the
largest member state of the Commonwealth with nearly 60% of its total
population. It is the fifth largest
contributor to the Commonwealth Secretariat's budget after the UK, Canada,
Australia, and South Africa. India is
an active member of key Commonwealth bodies, including the Committee on
Terrorism and played a key role when a member of the Commonwealth Ministerial
Action Group on the Harare Declaration (CMAG).
India continues to show its commitment to the Commonwealth by being one
of the principal donors for the Commonwealth Small States Office in New
York.
112. India will be
hosting the 2010 Commonwealth Games in Delhi.
IBSA
113. The
initial purpose of the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum was to
foster south-south co-operation between three key regional developing nations
and present a cohesive voice at the bargaining sessions anticipated for the
Doha Rounds of WTO talks. The common
challenges of poverty alleviation, economic development and social equity
provided the early focus, but specific trade and sectoral issues also featured
highly at the September 2006 IBSA Summit in Brasilia. IBSA is also seen by India as a potential gateway to wider
regional markets already governed by customs unions (MERCOSUR and SACU) and
some work on preferential trade arrangements between India and these two
groupings is now underway. IBSA has
also pressed for a more representative (multilateral) UN; specifically, India
and Brazil support each other's candidature for inclusion as permanent members
of the Security Council.
Energy:
Energy Security
114. India has
recently launched an Integrated Energy Policy to address energy security. But even if the policies are implemented,
the demand for imported oil and gas will continue to rise well beyond India's
indigenous capacity to meet demand. The new policies propose to:
· Increase
the production of domestic coal and gas through new exploration licences.
· Increase
civil nuclear power production based on domestic thorium.
· Promote
the use of renewable and next generation energy sources. The Indian government
is promoting the use of ethanol made from sugar cane and bio-diesel extracted
from local plants. Additionally, India is emerging as a growing market for
solar, wind and hydroelectric power.
· Liberalise
the fuel market.
· Invest
significantly in energy efficient technologies and R&D.
India in the Global Energy Market
115. While India
has significant reserves of (low grade) coal, it is relatively poor in oil and
gas resources. India's rapidly
increasing demand for energy will lead to a substantial increase in demand
particularly for oil. The World Energy
Outlook projects India's dependence on oil imports will grow from 70% to 92% by
2020. Its oil reserves amount to 5.9
billion barrels, 0.5% of global reserves, with a total proven, probable, and
possible reserves of close to 11 billion barrels. The majority of India's oil reserves are located in fields
offshore from Bombay and onshore in Assam. Recently there have been significant
finds of oil in the deserts of Rajasthan by UK-based Cairn Energy.
116. India imports
around 65% of its oil requirements from the Gulf region. Conscious of this growing reliance on the
Gulf, India is seeking to diversify its suppliers. Indian investment in overseas oilfields has reached $10 billion
in the last few years, not including a $25 billion deal with Iran. In support of this, India is developing new
relationships, for example in Sudan, where India has invested $750 million in
oil; Nigeria where India negotiated a purchase of about 44 million barrels of
crude oil per year on a long-term basis; and in Syria, where India recently
finalised a contract for the exploration, development and production of
petroleum with a Syrian company.
117. India is
trying to gain a foothold in the Caspian basin. India has provided Tajikistan with a $40 million aid package and
undertook to refurbish an air base near the Tajik capital Dushanbe.
118. The Russian
territory of Sakhalin, Vietnam and Myanmar are also potential suppliers to the
Indian market and areas in which Indian firms have made major investments.
119. The government
is trying to promote a shift towards natural gas and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG). There have been recent finds in the
Krishna-Godavari basin. But new finds
do not match growing demand. India will
be a major importer of natural gas and LNG over the next few decades. The cheapest way to supply India with gas is
through pipelines from Central Asia and the Middle East, through Pakistan.
120. India remains
confident that there will be agreement on an Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) Pipeline
at some stage, although problems over the price of the gas and the security of
the pipeline are yet to be resolved.
The other gas pipeline India is actively considering is the
Tajikistan-Afganistan-Pakistan (TAP) pipeline.
This pipeline is also fraught with problems. However with Gazprom showing an interest in this pipeline, the
TAP pipeline seems to be nearer to implementation than the IPI one.
121. On the eastern
coast, imports of small amount of natural gas from Bangladesh may be
feasible. However, Bangladesh's
internal party politics do not allow it to take a decision in favour of exports
to India. Consequently, India is
focusing on costlier LNG imports especially from Oman, Qatar and
Australia. Construction of the required
infrastructure is already underway.
Reliability of supply
122. India is
becoming increasingly aware that its economy is highly vulnerable to supply
disruptions and, until recently, India did not have an energy security policy
or contingency plan in case of crisis.
The Indians are aware that they are the late entrants in the acquisition
of equity oil and are therefore prepared to take more risk in acquiring equity
oil concessions. As well as these
purchase strategies India is building a strategic crude oil reserve facility on
its southern and eastern coasts.
123. India's rising
energy demand directly affects the UK's energy security interests. Indian energy demand is driving up oil
prices; India is investing in maritime capabilities to protect transit routes;
state owned companies are buying oil and gas assets in countries that will
influence their foreign policies in ways the UK may find difficult (eg Burma).
Environment:
Climate Change and India
124. The impacts of
climate change in South Asia could undermine domestic priorities in sustainable
economic development and lead to regional conflict, migration and an increase
in competition over natural resources.
Temperature increase of 3-4 degrees centigrade over the next thirty
years could cause Himalayan glaciers to shrink; areas that rely on glacial
runoff would suffer severe shortages with 500 million people depending on the
glacier-fed Indus and Ganges rivers for water.
Desertification, deforestation, soil erosion and a reduced water table
are already major problems - more climate change will worsen this. A one-metre sea rise would affect 5,763
square kms, and threaten another 7.1 million people. Goa would lose 4.3% of its land, including tourist areas. Rice and wheat production would drop
significantly because of climate change.
Gujarat, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Punjab, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh
would be worst affected. Temperature
rise would lead to increased pest populations and crop losses and vector-borne
diseases such as malaria would invade new areas.
125. Again, the
decisions taken in India on energy infrastructure, particularly on carbon
intensive coal-fired generation will have huge implications for global climate
security for decades to come.
126. India has no
targets, specific policies or programmes to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions. However, it has numerous
policies, driven by concerns about energy security and environmental health,
which also deliver climate change benefits.
These include policies on energy efficiency, energy conservation,
promotion of renewables and protection of the environment. Action is in the form of voluntary targets, policies
and regulation - tasking states to prepare energy efficiency or renewable
energy plans and then providing incentives for states to implement the
policies. There has been some initial
work on climate change impacts, but there is limited research and understanding
of adaptation to climate change and what this may mean for India. Adaptation to
climate change may be included in the national policy agenda in the near
future, however.
127. The Indian
government resists discussion on emissions reductions, particularly with regard
to targets, and looks critically at some international collaboration which it
fears might lead to targets. The Indian
political view is that India's need for economic growth must not be compromised
by environmental concerns.
128. The UK is
actively engaged with India on climate change through the ongoing Structured
Dialogue on Climate Change (SDCC) that encompasses work on the impacts of
climate change in India, vulnerability of certain sectors and adaptation
strategies, as well as study of barriers to transfer of low carbon
technology. Ensuring intergovernmental
engagement has been at the core of the bilateral work on climate change and
environment.
129. The Department
for International Development (DFID) is focussing on climate adaptation and
collaborating with the Ministry of Rural Development and with state governments
in Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Orissa.
These projects are to help communities adapt to drought and floods,
which are expected to become more frequent and severe as a result of climate
change. DFID also contributes to the
Disaster Risk Management Programme under the Ministry of Home Affairs, to
support disaster preparedness in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and
Delhi.
130. The UK climate
change agenda is also being pursued through Indian involvement in the G8
Gleneagles Dialogue on Climate Change, Clean Energy and Sustainable
Development. At the first ministerial
meeting of the Dialogue in London last year, both countries announced a joint
study on barriers to technology transfer for a low carbon economy. The study was lead by the Ministry of
Environment & Forests, with cross-Government representation on the Steering
Group. The results will be presented at
the second ministerial on 4-6 October 2006 in Mexico. The UK engagement with the Indian Government in the Gleneagles
process should continue over the coming year with a planned project working
with the Ministry of Urban Development on integrated transport systems to be
taken further at the second Gleneagles ministerial meeting.
Sustainable Development
131. India has a
wide range of climatic conditions incorporating almost all the world's types of
habitat. India has about 45,000 plant
species and an equally rich and varied fauna with about 75,000 species of
animals. There are over 63 National Parks and Sanctuaries located in different
parts of the country. Deforestation,
habitat degradation, inadequate water supply, poor energy sources and water quality
are region-wide problems, which need to be addressed on a priority basis. In the cities, especially Mumbai, Delhi,
Kolkata and Chennai, air pollution and solid waste management is an
increasingly serious problem. A list of major environmental issues and concerns
in the region includes: integrated land use planning, deforestation,
desertification, solid waste management, declining availability of fresh water
and deteriorating water quality, growing urbanisation, population explosion,
environmental diseases, degradation of marine and coastal resources, loss of
biological diversity and climate change.
132. The Joint
Declaration of the UK-India Summit in September 2004 paved the way for the
UK-India Sustainable Development Dialogue, established in October 2005. Under the Dialogue the UK and India have
formed working groups on each of four themes: sustainable forestry; reducing
illegal trade in wildlife; desertification; and Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR).
VII. India-UK and India-EU Relations
India-UK Bilateral Relations
133. Bilateral
relations are now closer than they have ever been across a broad range of
policy areas. During Prime Minister
Manmohan Singh's first visit to the UK on 20 September 2004 he and the Prime
Minister launched a Joint Declaration (the Prime Ministers' Initiative). This is the umbrella statement of policy
under which the two countries will take forward detailed work on co-operation
under the strategic partnership. It
covers five main areas for future co-operation: home affairs and
counter-terrorism; foreign and defence policy; public diplomacy, including
educational and cultural links; trade and economic links; and sustainable
development.
134. The Joint
Declaration also established the UK-India Joint Economic and Trade Committee
(JETCO) to "enhance bilateral trade and investment in specific
sectors". JETCO has formally met twice - in January 2005 in New Delhi,
when Patricia Hewitt and Kamal Nath chaired the meeting and agreed a ten-point
action plan, and in January 2006 in London.
The next meeting will take place in India in January 2007. On the UK side, UKTI sector teams are taking
forward much of the work, with other departments or professional groups leading
on specialist issues (Law Society on legal services, Patent Office on
intellectual property rights, DCMS on creative industries etc). A UK-India Investment Summit will be held in
October 2006 alongside the now annual political summit.
135. The Economic
and Financial Dialogue was also announced in September 2004. The Chancellor and his Indian counterpart
agreed its terms of reference in February 2005. It provides for annual ministerial sessions and was formed to
discuss bilateral economic issues and economic policy agendas, in the context
of globalisation. It covers
international economic issues, sustainable economic development, structural
reform, reform of financial systems and markets, improving regulatory
frameworks, and international development.
136. The Joint
Declaration established annual summit meetings between the Prime
Ministers. At the 2005 summit, the
Prime Minister announced the UK/India Education Research Initiative. This pledged £10 million of UK government
funding, plus corporate sponsorship with the aim of stepping up existing
educational relations between India and the UK over the next five years. That sum has since been enhanced by £2m
further finding from the Treasury, £6m from the Indian Government, and nearly
£2m in funds and in kind from industry.
137. At the summit
in October 2006 we hope to see enhanced collaboration on counter-terrorism: the
UK and India have each suffered recent terrorists attacks on our transport
networks and can learn from each other's experiences. We expect also to agree
the groundwork for closer collaboration on renewable energy sources, access to
energy, clean energy technology, and wider issues on adaptation to climate
change. The UK-India Investment Summit will be a key opportunity to identify
further avenues for bilateral investment, including how the UK and India can
work together to open up markets in India: Indian infrastructure projects alone
are expected to require $150bn of investment over the next 10 years.
Trade Issues
138. Bilateral
trade of goods and services between India and the UK has doubled since
1993. In 2005 the total value of
bilateral trade was £7.9 billion, a rise of almost 20% (from £6.6
billion). The UK is India's fourth
largest trading partner and India is one of the UK's largest export markets in
the developing world.
139. India is now
the third largest investor in the UK. About 500 Indian firms have set up
operations in the UK, the majority from the ICT sector. In 2005-2006 there were
76 new Indian investment projects into the UK, an increase of 110% from the
previous year. The UK is the top European investment location for Indian
companies targeting the European market and beyond.
140. The UK is the
third largest investor in India (it has the 3rd largest share of new
investments approved since 1991 - 10.04% well ahead of Germany, Japan and
France).
141. Despite this
apparent success, there are a number of market access issues that JETCO, in
parallel with EU-India and WTO dialogues, is seeking to overcome:
· Legal/regulatory
barriers
· Bureaucracy
· Inadequate
infrastructure.
· Bars
to or limits on FDI in some sectors (eg legal services)
· Foreign
banks may take a 75% equity share in Indian banks, but only in non-profitable
ones.
· FDI
up to 51% in retailing of single brands.
142. Other bodies
are active in promoting trade links. The Indo-British Partnership Network, working
with UKTI, seeks to facilitate access Indian markets for UK SMEs. The Asia Task
Force (ATF) is an informal stakeholder group responsible for advising the
Secretary of State for Trade and Industry. The ATF works to reduce barriers to
UK companies setting up operations in Asian countries, and ensuring that, in
both trade and investment terms, they are able to take full advantage of the
rise of India, China and emerging Asia.
Development Assistance
143. During the
Prime Minster's visit to Delhi in 2002, he pledged to increase UK bilateral
assistance to India to £300 million.
Since then, DFID has been increasing its aid year-on-year. DFID disbursed £248 million in 2005/06. It is due to reach £300 million in
2008/09. DFID's current support
includes a £252 million multi-year contribution to a national programme to
reduce maternal mortality and infant deaths, as a fifth of the world's maternal
deaths and a quarter of its infant deaths occur in India; and £210 million of
multi-year support to a national programme of elementary education that is
helping bring ten million out-of-school children into education.
Whitehall Work on Globalisation
144. HMG continues
to assess the emergence of India, the better to calibrate the UK's responses.
· Businesses
are increasingly global, not national entities, which use international supply
chains. Increasingly UK and Indian
companies are working in partnership to their mutual benefit.
· India
has a comparative advantage in well-educated, low cost and English speaking labour,
and in mass production techniques.
India's advantages are an increasingly integral part of UK firms' supply
chains. We believe the branching out of
Indian firms beyond national boundaries will further accelerate the efficiency
gains from global supply chains.
· India
is at the forefront of some global economic trends - IT, outsourcing, and
biotechnology. Off-shoring business
activities are becoming integrated in the UK economy and many British household
name companies now have a supporting function performed in India.
· As
the economy continues to open up India is likely to offer enormous potential
for British businesses, particularly given the close cultural and historical
ties with the UK. In terms of number of
projects, India is now one of the highest investors in the UK.
· We
want to work with India to tackle obstacles to foreign investment and business
activity in its markets. Amongst other
things this will require reducing restrictions on foreign investment and
reforms to labour markets. Helping the
government in tackling corruption will also be key.
· The
UK is in an advantageous position to develop a special relationship with India.
We have extensive people-to-people links and a cultural affinity. There are educational and healthcare links and
human capital, including a shared intellectual base. The existing diaspora contributes greatly to the UK economy and
influences the movement of people between our two countries. In 2005 over 600,000 British nationals
visited India and our Posts in India issued over 300,000 visas, with an
estimated 500,000 Indians travelling to the UK.
Human Rights issues
145. A substantial
proportion of parliamentary and public correspondence with the Foreign and
Commonwealth Office regarding India is on a range of human rights issues,
notably issues relating to Dalits ('untouchables' - who remain among the
poorest of Indians) and attacks on religious minorities. These together with other human rights or
societal issues are regularly raised with the Indian Government, and with
national and state level bodies. Our
Posts continue to take opportunities to work with non-governmental
organisations in India and elsewhere on caste and other human rights issues.
146. India has a
robust parliamentary tradition, an independent judiciary, professional and
apolitical armed forces, a vibrant civil society, and free media.
147. India
has signed and ratified all of the six core UN human rights treaties except the
Convention Against Torture (CAT), which it has signed but not ratified. We continue to encourage India to ratify the
CAT. In May, India was elected to the
UN Human Rights Council. While
recognising the challenges faced by India in narrowing the gap between the
spirit and implementation of the UN Rights Conventions (civil, political,
economic, social and cultural), and recognising also the progress made in a
number of areas, it remains the case that implementation varies from state to
state in India and awareness of human rights issues is inconsistent. Gaps remain between legislation and
enforcement in numerous areas - minority, gender and child rights, for
example. As a result, the rights of
women, children, minorities, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes often
suffer. The socially and economically
disadvantaged sections of society are particularly vulnerable.
India's relations with the EU
148. India and the
EU have each woken up to the importance of a strong relationship. The 2004 EU-India summit in The Hague
established a strategic partnership.
The UK Presidency of the EU took this a step further with the agreement
of the EU-India Joint Action Plan. This
forms the framework for concrete engagement on a range of issues under four
broad headings: political issues; people to people contacts; economic issues;
and trade issues.
149. The main
outcome of the October 2006 EU-India summit is likely to centre on progress to
date in implementing the Joint Action Plan.
Foreign and Commonwealth Office
London
October 2006
ANNEX
South Asia: Political Histories
At midnight on 14 August 1947 India became independent.
India held its first national elections in 1952, won by the Indian
National Congress under Jawahalal Nehru who advocated a socialist economic
model and a non-aligned foreign policy. India did not oppose the 1950 Chinese
occupation of Tibet but was humiliated during a Himalayan border war with China
in 1962. In 1965 India fought its
second war with Pakistan over Kashmir.
Against a backdrop of widespread disenchantment over a faltering economy
and a food crisis Congress, now led by Indira Gandhi, won the 1967 elections
with a reduced majority. Factional differences led to the party's split in
1969, but Gandhi continued to govern and in 1971 was returned with a massively
increased majority, after which she pressed ahead with new socialist economic
policies. Gandhi also intervened in the
Pakistan civil war and, when relations with the US deteriorated, signed a
20-year treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union - breaking explicitly for
the first time with the policy of non-alignment. In 1974 India tested its first
nuclear weapon.
Economic and social problems, compounded by allegations of
corruption, caused increasing political unrest across India, eroding Gandhi's
popularity. In 1974 she was found
guilty of misusing government machinery for election purposes, prompting
opposition parties to conduct nation-wide strikes and protests demanding her
immediate resignation. The following
year Gandhi took the drastic step of declaring a state of emergency. Many civil liberties were suspended,
national and state elections were postponed, non-Congress state governments
dismissed and opposition political leaders and activists imprisoned.
Gandhi called for elections in 1977 and suffered a resounding
defeat at the hands of the Janata Party coalition; Moraji Desai became the
first non-Congress Prime Minister of India.
However, Janata offered no leadership on solving India's serious
economic and social problems and in 1979 the coalition crumbled. Gandhi and her
Congress(I) party swept back into power with a large majority in January 1980 -
only to face a rising Sikh insurgency in the Punjab that culminated in the 1984
storming of the Golden Temple in Amritsar, the retaliatory assassination of Gandhi
by her Sikh bodyguards and communal violence that left thousands of mainly
Sikhs dead.
Congress chose Gandhi's eldest son Rajiv as Prime
Minister. Rajiv's youth and
inexperience were an asset in the eyes of citizens tired of the inefficacy and
corruption of career politicians and looking for new policies and a fresh
start. Rajiv initiated a series of
economic reforms but his departure from socialist policies did not sit well
with the masses, which did not benefit from the innovations. In 1987 India sent troops to Sri Lanka in a
failed attempt to enforce peace. At the
same time Rajiv's image as an honest politician was shattered when the 'Bofors
scandal' revealed that senior officials had taken bribes over defence
contracts.
At the 1989 elections former Congress minister VP Singh led
the Janata Dal coalition to a majority but rifts in the coalition led to
Singh's ouster in 1990. Rajiv was
assassinated by the LTTE when campaigning in Tamil Nadu in 1991 but Congress(I)
returned to power in coalition, served a full 5-year term and initiated a
gradual but otherwise unremarkable process of economic liberalisation and
reform. In 1992 Hindu-Muslim violence
following the demolition of the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya by Hindu mob killed
over 10,000 people.
In the course of the 1990s domestic politics took new shape
as traditional alignments by caste, creed and ethnicity gave way to a plethora
of small, regional political parties.
The Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) emerged from the 1996 elections as the
single-largest party but its coalition lasted a mere 13 days and was followed
by a period of short-lived coalition governments until elections in early-1998
brought the BJP back to power as lead party in yet another coalition
government. In May 1998 the Vajpayee government
conducted a series of underground nuclear tests, triggering US economic
sanctions and in mid-1999 India fought its Kargil war with Pakistan, derailing
a promising peace process that had begun three months earlier. On the back of the successful conclusion of
the Kargil conflict, the National Democratic Alliance (a new BJP-led coalition)
formed a government with Vajpayee as Prime Minister in October 1999.
The NDA's credibility was adversely affected by allegations
of corruption and its hindutva agenda was blamed for communal violence in
Gujarat that killed 2-3,000. Despite these setbacks economic progress,
political stability and a rejuvenated peace initiative with Pakistan suggested
that the NDA's popular standing was high.
In January 2004 Vajpayee recommended early general elections; it was a
grave miscalculation. The BJP's slogan
of 'India shining' did not resonate amongst the legions of India's rural poor
and the Congress-led opposition won an upset victory in the May election.
Sonia Gandhi declined to assume the office of PM in order to
defuse the controversy over her Italian birth and Manmohan Singh became Prime
Minister of a coalition of Congress and socialist and regional parties which
enjoys the outside support of India's communist parties. In his
two first years Singh has held his unwieldy coalition together and pursued a
gradualist economic reform agenda. He
has continued his predecessor's policy of rapprochement with Pakistan, promoted
India's bid for a permanent seat on the reformed UN Security Council and agreed
a controversial nuclear deal with the US.
The opposition BJP has been plagued by internal tensions and in-fighting
and poses no immediate threat to the government which is increasingly likely to
see out its full five-year term.
The 1947 Independence arrangement created Pakistan from the frontier areas of
British India, where the military had always been an integral part of local
administration. Civilian institutions
were correspondingly weak, provincial loyalties strong. Pakistan was envisaged
by the Muslim League to be a homeland for the Muslims of British India. However, Pakistan's new leaders found it
hard to devise a constitutional structure that could unite the various provinces,
and incorporate both the East and West portions of the country. Early state-building was further complicated
by a war with India in 1947, and the early death of Pakistan's founding father
M A Jinnah in 1948, and first Prime Minister, Liaquat Ali Khan in 1951.
It took almost eight years to agree a final
constitution. This established Pakistan
as a republic within the Commonwealth in 1956.
But the new parliamentary system was soon in difficulty. In 1958, General Ayub Khan launched
Pakistan's first military coup. Martial
law was declared, political parties abolished and a pattern of military control
was established that has characterised almost half of Pakistan's existence
since independence. In 1960 Khan became
President. A new constitution, placing
politics firmly under military guidance, was promulgated in 1962. But a failure to win a second war with India
in 1965, mounting corruption and increasingly uncontainable Bengali
frustrations in East Pakistan gradually undermined Khan's authority, finally
forcing his resignation in 1969. The
first election on a nationally democratic basis was conducted in 1970. The elections saw the East-Pakistan Awami
League gaining an overall majority, which the West Pakistan administration
refused to accept. This set the stage
for a new constitutional crisis that in turn led to civil war in March 1971
and, following Indian intervention, the emergence of East Pakistan as the
independent state of Bangladesh.
On 12 October 1999, Chief of Army Staff General Pervez
Musharraf assumed control of Pakistan in a bloodless coup from Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif. The Army took control of
all facets of government; the Senate, the Assemblies and the constitution were
suspended. Nawaz Sharif was removed and
General Musharraf declared himself Chief Executive. Retroactive legitimacy was given to the coup by Pakistan's
Supreme Court on 12 May 2000. On 20 June 2001 General Musharraf declared
himself President and Head of State, and dissolved the suspended
assemblies. However, the Court ruled
that elections should be held by 12 October 2002.
President Musharraf held a referendum on 30 April 2002. The question: 'Do you want to elect
President General Pervez Musharraf as President of Pakistan for the next five
years for: survival of local government system; restoration of democracy;
continuity and stability of reforms; eradication of extremism and sectarianism
and for the accomplishment of Quaid-i-Azam's concept'. Official figures reported a 71% turnout and
a 98% 'yes' vote.
On 10 October 2002 national and provincial elections were
held. No single party won an overall
majority. Musharraf's newly established party, the PML (Q) won the most
seats (121), followed by the MMA (a coalition of religious parties) and the PPP
(Benazir Bhutto's party). The MMA's
strong showing reflected significant opposition to Musharraf's support for the
US-led military action against the Taleban and al-Qaeda.
Shortly before the elections, on 21 August 2002, President
Musharraf promulgated the Legal Framework Order (LFO), which introduced 35 amendments
to the 1973 Constitution and gave him sweeping powers including the power to
dissolve the National Assembly and to appoint Provincial Governors, Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and single service chiefs. He declared that the amendments would not be subject to
parliamentary approval, but that parliament could pass new amendments with a
two-thirds majority. Under the LFO, all
actions of the government between 12 October 1999 and 22 August 2002 would be
validated upon reinstatement of the Constitution. The LFO also created a National Security Council (NSC) as a
consultative forum.
The LFO met with
bitter resistance from the opposition, particularly the alliance of religious
parties, the MMA (Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal), producing parliamentary gridlock
for over a year. Finally, in December
2003, the government came to an agreement with the MMA and obtained the
two-thirds majority necessary for approval.
Under the deal, President Musharraf agreed to seek a vote of confidence
from the electoral college, to consult the Prime Minister on the appointment of
armed forces chiefs, and to step down as Chief of Army Staff by December
2004. However, at Musharraf's
instigation, parliament subsequently passed legislation allowing him to hold both offices until 2007.
With Independence and Partition
in 1947 East Bengal emerged as the eastern wing of Pakistan, separated by 1000
miles of Indian territory from Pakistan's west wing. Differences of language
and culture led to frictions with West Pakistan, with Bengalis increasingly
resentful of what they saw as their political and economic subordination. In
the 1970 general elections the Awami League (AL), a Bengali nationalist and
secularist party led by Sheikh Mujib ur Rahman, won a landslide victory in East
Pakistan and an absolute majority in the Pakistan national parliament. Talks
with West Pakistan about the formation of a national government headed by the
AL, broke down. In March 1971 President Yahya Khan indefinitely postponed the
pending National Assembly session, precipitating massive civil disobedience in
East Pakistan and a secessionist uprising led by Mujib which the Pakistan Army
tried to put down with considerable loss of life. Indian sympathies lay with
East Pakistan and Indian military intervention was decisive in securing the
independence of East Pakistan as the new state of Bangladesh. Mujib became
the first Prime Minister and introduced a secular and democratic constitution.
However, by the mid-1970s the
country was facing growing economic difficulties. In December 1974, the
government declared a state of emergency and a month later enacted a new
constitution that replaced parliamentary rule with an executive presidency and
provided for the introduction of one-party rule. Junior army officers assassinated
Mujib and almost his entire family in August 1975. Following two further coups
the Army, under Gen. Zia ur Rahman, took control. Zia became President in 1977
and set up his own political party, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP). Zia
was assassinated by junior army officers in May 1981 and his Vice-President was
in turn overthrown by Lt-Gen. Ershad in 1982. Ershad suspended the constitution
and re-imposed martial law, founded his own political party (the Jatiya Party)
and proclaimed himself President. It was not until 1986 that the Jatiya Party
held and won (ostensibly undemocratic) parliamentary and presidential elections
and martial law was lifted. Ershad was forced to step down in December 1990
when he lost army support after massive student protests. Since then the arm's
role in national politics has been much reduced.
At the 1991 general election the
BNP under Begum Zia (Gen. Zia's widow) won a surprise victory. However, the
opposition AL refused to accept the result, demanded fresh elections and, in
concert with other opposition parties, boycotted parliament and instigated a
programme of street protests and strikes (hartals) in an attempt to bring down
the government. This failed. Subsequent
elections in February 1996 were seriously flawed and saw the BNP return to
government. Opposition agitation brought the economy close to collapse. The
government resigned in March and fresh elections set for June. These elections,
conducted peacefully and with a high voter turnout, resulted in victory for the
AL under Sheikh Hasina (Mujib's daughter). At the time the election was taken
to be an encouraging sign that democracy was taking firmer root in Bangladesh,
but relations between government and opposition quickly deteriorated. By
mid-1997 the BNP had in turn walked out of parliament and organised street
protests, perpetuating the cycle of political deadlock which contributes to
political uncertainty and violence and retards economic development. The AL saw
out its term and lost the 2001 elections to the BNP in alliance with three
other parties, including Jamaat-e Islami. The
government's term of office expires in October 2006, at which time a caretaker
government will administer the country and oversee national elections. Ahead of
polling the rivalry between the BNP and the AL has intensified. Assuming the election takes place, the
losing side is highly likely to contest the result.
Following Independence
from Britain in 1948 politics in Sri
Lanka has been dominated by two parties - the United National Party (UNP)
and the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) - and the Tamil question. Tensions
between the mainly Buddhist Sinhala majority (74% of the population) and the
mainly Hindu Tamil minority (17%) have grown steadily. Tamil separatism was
fuelled by discriminatory education and language policies and by
government-encouraged Sinhala settlement in areas they regarded as
traditionally Tamil. The hitherto fragmented Tamil parties came together as the
Tamil United Liberation Front and, under increasing pressure from militants,
espoused the objective of a separate Tamil homeland (Eelam) in the north and
east. A new Constitution in 1978 attempted to address some Tamil concerns, but
in practice power remained centralised in Colombo. In 1983 an attack on troops
by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) followed by severe anti-Tamil
rioting during marked the country's slide into a protracted civil war
that has killed some 65,000 people and displaced hundreds of thousands
more. A separate uprising in the South
by mainly Sinhalese youth supporting the Marxist JVP during 1987-89 was
bloodily suppressed with thousands of fatalities.
The UNP contested the
1999 presidential elections on a platform of no concessions to Tamils but was
defeated, forcing a volte-face in party policy. In 2001 the party was returned
to government on a policy of a negotiated settlement with the LTTE and in
February 2002 a formal cease-fire was signed was signed - the first lengthy
cessation of hostilities since the beginning of the conflict. However,
President Kumaratunga did all she could to frustrate the UNP government and in
March 2004 called fresh parliamentary elections at which the UNP failed to
achieve a majority. Mahinda Rajapakse of the SLFP became Prime Minister and in
November 2005 was elected President by the narrowest of margins. Rajapakse
called for immediate talks with the LTTE and has shown some flexibility: he has
retained the Norwegians as facilitators (over the objections of his chauvinist
Sinhalese election partners) and whilst repeatedly rejecting the possibility of
eelam has stopped short of rejecting
a federal solution. However, talks on reviewing the implementation of the
cease-fire have broken down, attitudes appear to be hardening and fighting has
escalated. It remains to be seen whether or not this presages a return to
full-scale hostilities.
From
1846-1951 Nepal was ruled by the
Rana dynasty of hereditary prime ministers, which did little to modernise the
country and appropriated most of Nepal's limited resources for themselves. By
the 1950's two factors contrived to bring an end to the Ranas. The emergence of
an independent India encouraged agitation by the Nepal Congress Party for
political concessions and increasing tensions amongst marginalised sections of
the Rana family based on jealousy over patronage for state jobs proved
destabilising. With Indian encouragement - New Delhi wanted a friendly
government in Nepal as a check on Chinese influence - a rebellion saw the
figurehead King return in 1951.
Throughout the 1950s Nepal experienced alternating bouts of royal direct
rule and multiparty democratic politics. In 1959 the first democratic elections
for a national assembly were held and won by the Nepal
Congress Party, a moderate socialist group. In 1960 the King decided to
replace party politics, dismissed the government and in 1962 introduced the
'partyless' Panchayat (assembly) system of government - with the retention of
much authority by the King himself. By 1990 the Panchayat system was seen to
have failed and the main democratic, communist and left wing political forces
united to wage a mass movement against it. Amidst increasing unrest the King
eventually agreed to consider a multiparty democracy under a constitutional
monarchy. A new constitution consolidated parliamentary government and vested
sole executive authority with the King in only very limited circumstances.
Elections took place in 1991, again won by the Nepal Congress Party.
In 1992 Nepal was gripped by an economic crisis and the
radical left stepped up their political agitation. Local land reform movements
were violently suppressed by the government. In February 1996 the Communist
Party of Nepal (Maoist) declared a 'people's war' with the objective of
proclaiming a democratic republic. As clashes between the Maoists and police
increased the Royal Nepal Army was deployed and the conflict escalated further
until almost all Nepal's districts were affected. In June 2001 the Crown Prince
killed the King and Queen and nine members of the royal household and Prince
Gyanendra, the King's younger brother, inherited the throne. The Maoist
rebellion escalated, and in October 2002 the king deposed the government and
assumed direct control. A week later he re-appointed another government. In the
face of unstable governments and a Maoist siege of the Kathmandu Valley in
August 2004, popular support for the monarchy began to wane. In February 2005
Gyanendra declared a state of emergency and took executive control once again.
In April 2006 strikes and street protests in Kathmandu - in which the Maoists
were a leading force - forced the king to reinstate parliament. A seven-party
coalition resumed control of the government, reconvened parliament and stripped
the king of most of his powers. It also declared a cease-fire and commenced
peace talks with the Maoists. The Maoists have
agreed to take part in an interim government ahead of elections to a
constituent assembly that will draft a new constitution and have agreed to
'marshal' - but not decommission - their weapons providing that the Nepalese
Army does the same ahead of constituent-assembly elections. The government
wants to hold these elections before April 2007.
When British rule over India ended in 1947 India succeeded
Britain as the de facto protector of the Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan. Under the India-Bhutan Treaty
of Friendship of 1949 India took control of Bhutanese external affairs but
guaranteed that it would not interfere in its internal administration. Two
years later India formally recognised Bhutan's independence. King Jigme Dorji
Wangchuck (enthroned 1952) was the prime mover in Bhutan's slow transition from
an autocratic to a constitutional monarchy. Amongst his reforms were the
establishment of the National Assembly, land reform and the abolition of
slavery and serfdom. Modernisation continued through the 1960s, interrupted
only by a period of instability caused by the assassination of the reformist
Prime Minister by the Army. In 1968 sovereign power was invested with the
National Assembly and the following year the king renounced his veto power over
National Assembly bills. The current monarch, Jigme Singye Wangchuck, has
continued his father's modernising measures, distributing a draft of Bhutan's
first constitution and initiating public
discussions on the document. In December 2005 the king announced that he
would abdicate in 2008 in favour of his son.
The other issue dominating Bhutanese civic life is the
Nepali refugee problem. There are up to 100,000 refugees in camps in Nepal who
were forced out of Bhutan in the early 1990s by Bhutanese cultural and
political chauvinism. After years of negotiations in 2000 Bhutan agreed in
principle to allow certain classes of the refugees to return to Bhutan. However
none has yet been allowed to do so.
Maldives gained
full independence from the UK as a Sultanate in 1965 and in a national
referendum in 1968 Maldivians abolished the sultanate and established a
republic under the presidency of Ibrahim Nasir. During the 1970s the economy
worsened and Nasir's autocratic rule abruptly ended in 1978 when he fled to
Singapore, along with millions of dollars from the state treasury. Maumoon
Gayoom, elected to replace him, has been in power ever since. He was re-elected
for a record 6th term in October 2003 with over 90% of the 'vote'.
In 2004 President Gayoom
announced that he would introduce democracy to Maldives. Political parties were
permitted, media freedom expanded and a 'roadmap' for adoption of a new,
reformed constitution set out. Multi-party elections were envisaged for 2008.
The opposition (with the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) in the
vanguard) initially refused to co-operate
and called for public protests to remove Gayoom from power. The government
arrested a number of protesters including the MDP's chairperson. Progress in the Special Majlis on the reform
agenda and a new constitution was slow and drew complaints from all quarters.
In 2006, the government and MDP held informal discussions about the possible
way forward. These discusssions, hosted
at the British High Commissioner's residence in Colombo, 'Westminster House',
led to the release from house arrest of the MDP's chairperson and agreement for
the government and the MDP to hold formal talks about reform in the country.
ANNEX
Kashmir - A Brief
History
There was no agreement between Mountbatten and Nehru and Jinnah in 1947
regarding the future of the Princely States following Partition; it remained
with each ruler to decide whether to accede to either India or to Pakistan. The
Hindu Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir State was undecided, but in October 1947, when faced with a Pakistani-supported uprising in the west
of his state, he acceded to India in return for Indian military assistance.
India offered to hold a plebiscite (referendum) to ratify the Maharaja's
decision. An inconclusive war between India and Pakistan followed in 1948,
since which time Kashmir has been divided by a cease-fire line, known since
1972 as the Line of Control (LoC).The Pakistani-administered portion is almost
exclusively Muslim. About one-third of
Indian-administered Kashmir's population is Hindu, Buddhist or Sikh. India
claims there is no territorial dispute over Kashmir, and that it legally
acceded to India. Pakistan, created as a homeland for the subcontinent's
Muslims and to be formed of contiguous Muslim-majority areas, claims that
Kashmir, with its Muslim majority, was rightfully a part of Pakistan. Since
1948 India and Pakistan have fought two further wars over Kashmir (1965
and 1999, Kargil) and threatened a fourth in 2001-02.
Regular, and heavy, exchanges of artillery fire across the LoC ended in
November 2003 when a cease-fire was agreed.
Pakistan claims that Kashmir is a question of
self-determination: Kashmiris were denied the plebiscite which India itself
first offered; and which was later endorsed by UN resolutions. India argues
this was overtaken by an elected constituent assembly in the 1950s, which drew
up a Kashmir constitution providing for autonomy under the Indian Constitution.
Following the 1972 Simla Accord the two countries accepted the principle of a
bilateral settlement of the issue. Discussions have been held periodically between
India and Pakistan since their 1972 Simla Agreement,
most recently under the auspices of the Composite Dialogue, against the
backdrop of slowly improving India-Pakistan relations since the lows of
2002. But mutual mistrust
persists. Pakistan continues to stress
the urgency of negotiating an agreement on the status of Kashmir, whilst India
is unlikely to want to make concessions under the cloud of militancy and
violence.
In 1987 Muslim
political parties in Kashmir alleged that elections in Indian-administered
Kashmir were rigged. Some parties formed militant wings and in 1988 a campaign
of militant violence began (started by the pro-independence Jammu and Kashmir
Liberation Front) in the Vale of Kashmir.
This was supported 'morally, politically and diplomatically' - and in
materiel terms - by Pakistan and pro-Pakistan militant groups. Indian security
forces responded with a counter-insurgency campaign: at least 40,000 people
have been killed and over 200,000 injured since the militancy began (some claim
much higher figures of 90,000 dead).
There have also been several major terrorist atrocities elsewhere in India
which may be linked to this.
ANNEX
South Asia: Political Structures
The (written)
Constitution declares that India is a 'sovereign,
socialist, secular, democratic republic' made
up of 28 states and seven union territories. The Constitution provides
for a system of parliamentary and cabinet government both at the centre and in
the states and defines the division of most
powers between the centre and the states. The centre takes precedence in
relation to residual powers. The Indian Parliament consists of an indirectly
elected President (currently Abdul Kalaml, elected for a 5 year term as the
constitutional head of the executive) and two Houses. The presidency is largely
a ceremonial post but the president is responsible for determining when to dissolve
parliament and hold new elections and for whom to invite to form a government
or a coalition. The Lower House - Lok
Sabha (House of the People) - is directly elected on the basis of universal
adult suffrage and the Upper House - Rajya
Sabha (Council of States) - indirectly elected by the members of state
legislative assemblies. The authority to initiate financial legislation is
vested exclusively in the Lok Sabha. Real national executive power lies with
Council of Ministers (Cabinet) led by the Prime Minister who is designated by
legislators of the political party or coalition commanding a parliamentary
majority in the Lok Sabha.
At the state level, some legislatures are bicameral. The
states' chief ministers are responsible to the legislatures in the same way the
Prime Minister is responsible to Parliament. Each state also has a governor,
appointed by the President, who may assume certain broad powers when directed
by the central government. The central government exerts greater control over
the union territories than over the states, although some territories have
gained more power to administer their own affairs. Some states are trying to
revitalise the traditional village panchayats
(councils) to promote popular participation.
The President of Pakistan
is a constitutional Head of State, who is normally elected for five years by an
electoral college comprising the federal legislature and the four provincial
assemblies. The former consists of a lower and upper house. The total number of
seats in the National Assembly is 342 including 60 reserved for women and 10
for minorities. Pakistan comprises four provinces; Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan
and the North West Frontier Province each with an appointed Governor and
provincial government, the federal capital of Islamabad and the Federally
Administered Tribal Areas.
The People's Republic of
Bangladesh is a parliamentary
democracy. The Prime Minister is the chief executive and the head of the
Council of Ministers (the cabinet). The PM has the power to dissolve the
unicameral parliament consisting of 300 members directly elected by
geographical constituencies. The unicameral legislature is elected for a
five-year term. A constitutional amendment of September 1991 reduced the powers
of the President who, whilst chief of state, now holds a largely
ceremonial post and is elected by the legislature every 5 years. However, during the transition between elected
governments, when for three-month period an unelected caretaker administration
organises and conducts elections, the president becomes the effective chief
executive and commander-in-chief of the armed forces.
In the Democratic
Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka the
President is the executive head of state and of government and commander-in-chief.
Elected for a period of six years by
universal adult suffrage, the President appoints and heads a cabinet of
ministers, is responsible to Parliament and may
dissolve parliament any time after 12 months after the last legislative
election. The President may be removed from office by a two-thirds vote
of Parliament with the concurrence of the Supreme Court. The Prime Minister is the President's deputy and
leader of the ruling parliamentary party. Sri Lanka has a 225 member unicameral
legislature whose members are directly elected for six years by a system of
modified proportional representation. Under the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka
Accord significant authority was devolved to the provinces whose councils are
directly elected for 5-year terms. The leader of the council majority serves as
provincial chief minister; the President appoints a provincial governor. The
councils possess limited powers in education, health, rural development, social
services, agriculture, security and local taxation.
Nepal currently has a transitional government with King Gyanendra as the
official head of state. It has a bicameral parliament comprised of the National
Assembly (the upper house) and the House of Representatives (the lower house).
The 205 members of the latter are elected for five-year terms from
single-member constituencies. The House of Representatives was dissolved in May
2002. The king ruled directly as chairman of the Council of Ministers from 1
February 2005 until 24 April 2006 when he restored parliament and handed over
power to seven political parties. The upper house is currently dormant.
The king is head of
state of the Kingdom of Bhutan.
Legislative power lies with the National Assembly, judicial power with the
judiciary, and executive power is vested in the Council of Ministers. The
unicameral National Assembly has 150 members, 100 of whom are directly elected
by universal suffrage for a three-year term. Six members are royal advisory
councillors (elected by the National Assembly), the clergy nominates ten, the
government chooses 33 and one represents the army. The position of Prime
Minister rotates annually among the five ministers who win the largest numbers
of votes in the National Assembly. Bhutan is in the process of becoming a
constitutional monarchy.
Maldives has a
presidential system of government. The
present constitution which came into force in January 1998 establishes the
President as Head of State, Head of Government, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed
Forces and of the Police of Maldives, Head of the Judiciary, and supreme
authority to propagate the tenets of Islam.
The presidential term is five years.
A single presidential candidate is selected by vote in the Special
Majlis (constituent assembly) from all those nominated, that candidate is then
put forward to a public vote.
Legislative authority is exercised by the People's Majlis,
consisting of 50 members. Members are
elected on a personal basis from local constituencies. Each of the 20 atolls and Malé (the capital)
elect two members and the President appoints eight members. Political parties were legally permitted in
2005.
ANNEX
UK/India Joint Declaration (Sept 2004)
India-UK: Towards a New and Dynamic Partnership - A Joint
Declaration (20/09/04)
The British Prime Minister The Rt. Hon Tony Blair MP and the
Indian Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh today signed a joint declaration, in
which they set out plans to strengthen and deepen the bilateral relationship
between the two countries, through a comprehensive strategic partnership.
1. We, the Prime Ministers of India and the UK, believe that the relationship
between our two countries is now the strongest it has ever been. Building on
the achievements of the 2002 New Delhi Declaration, we commit ourselves and our
Governments to strengthening and deepening the comprehensive partnership that
exists between our countries - to benefit our peoples, and to create a safer
and more prosperous world.
2. People are at the heart of our relationship. Almost 1.5 million people of
Indian origin live in Britain today. Their cultural values contribute
significantly towards making Britain the vibrant, dynamic society that it is
today. They are a vital bond between our countries.
3. Both our societies value, and encourage, cultural and ethnic diversity.
4. Both our countries have a long and proud historical tradition, and yet are
countries looking forward, adapting to the challenges, and trying to shape the
outcome of the 21st century.
5. The flow of people between our countries is huge. 500,000 Indians visit
Britain each year. 400,000 Britons visit India. These people-to-people links flourish
in many areas - education, health, development, science and technology,
including in the frontier technologies, investment, trade and tourism.
6. India and the UK are natural economic partners. As India emerges as a global
power, trade and investment relations are becoming more diverse. Bilateral
trade grew by over 20% last year. We want this rapid growth to continue. But
the real partnership lies in the strength of investment in both directions. The
UK is the second largest investor into India. India was the 8th largest
investor in the UK in 2003. It is one of the fastest growing, investing in the
UK's knowledge economy. The UK provides an important bridge into the European
market, attracting over 60% of India's investment in Europe.
7. Shared democratic values and a commitment to human rights, justice and the
rule of law underpin our relationship. We share a global vision of peace,
security and shared prosperity, based on sustainable development. We have shared
interests in combating key global challenges - terrorism, poverty, HIV/AIDS,
environmental degradation, climate change, drugs, international crime, illegal
migration and trafficking in people. We will step up our bilateral co-operation
on these issues.
8. However, we must also urgently strengthen the multilateral system to meet
these global challenges. We will co-operate closely on this and the UK will
continue to work for India's Permanent Membership of the UN Security Council.
9. We can achieve even more together than we already do. We now intend to take our
relationship to a new level. We see the relationship between our two countries
as among our top international priorities. As Heads of Government, we will work
for a long-term comprehensive strategic partnership for the 21st century of
shared values and interests. In particular we will strengthen our links in the
following areas.
Foreign and Defence Policy
10. Heads of Government and foreign ministers will exchange
visits annually to reinforce and extend our bilateral co-operation in the
fields we have identified for joint action.
11. We will reinforce our strategic
partnership, and enhance our defence co-operation, in the pursuit of a more
peaceful and secure world. We will build upon, and expand, programmes of joint
military training and exercises. We will explore the co-production of defence
equipment. We will work towards the objective of non-proliferation of weapons
of mass destruction and the means of their delivery.
Security Challenges
12. Both our countries are deeply committed to combating
terrorism in all its forms and manifestations. We will work together to try to
ensure that the global norms against terrorism are upheld by all countries. We
will share our experience and augment our co-operation, including operational
co-operation between police, law enforcement agencies and others in our
criminal justice system. We will enhance our co-operation to counter money
laundering and terrorist financing.
13. The UK will support India to join the Financial Action Task Force. We will
identify specific needs and share best practice in the areas of justice,
judicial co-operation and mutual legal assistance. We will co-operate in the
fight against international, organised and serious crime and new forms of
criminality, including illegal migration, drugs trafficking and trafficking in
people.
Economic and Trade Issues
14. Our economic ties will continue to expand. We will
establish a Ministerially-led Joint Economic and Trade Committee to further
develop a strategic economic relationship, and develop business-led vehicles to
enhance bilateral trade and investment in specific sectors including services
and knowledge-based industries. We will enhance our dialogue on
international trade and investment issues.
15. We will also establish an Indo-British Economic and Financial Dialogue on
bilateral and global issues, on financial systems, and to enhance economic and
financial co-operation.
16. At this important time in the development of the international trade
regime, we will work closely together for a successful conclusion to the WTO's
Doha Round of multilateral trade negotiations.
17. The UK and India agree to expand co-operation in the fields of
civilian nuclear activities, civilian space programmes, and high technology
trade, in accordance with their international obligations.
Science and Technology
18. The UK and India already co-operate closely on science
and technology. We have established a Joint Committee on Science and Technology
and a networking scheme that enables scientists to meet each other, exchange
research ideas and establish links. We will now enhance existing collaboration
and identify new areas for co-operation in fields such as: climate change,
alternative and clean energy technologies, environmental science, commercial
applications of high technology like biotech and bio-informatics,
nano-technology, agriculture, and health research and development. We will
encourage collaborative opportunities in these areas.
Development Partnership
19. We have an important development partnership. The UK is recognised as a leader in
international development. India has made great development progress over the
last two decades and is now establishing itself as a development partner for
other developing countries. Our shared commitment to the UN
Millennium Development Goals provides an opportunity to exchange experience on
aid effectiveness and development practices. Working together, we can
accelerate development and make progress
globally towards the Millennium Goals.
Sustainable Development
20. Both our countries recognise that co-operation is
essential to deliver the progressive global agenda set by the Johannesburg
World Summit on Sustainable Development and the Millennium Declaration. We will
initiate regular high-level dialogue to share
experiences on how we can overcome social, economic and environmental
challenges, and bring real quality of life improvements for people in both our
countries and around the world.
21. Climate change and broader issues of sustainable energy security are high
on our respective agendas. Climate change will be a central theme of the UK's
Presidencies of the G8 and EU next year. We will promote effective co-operation
in our responses to climate change, including
by building on the successful joint
work that has already been carried out by the UK and India on climate change
impacts and modelling. To this end, we will establish a structured dialogue to
exchange views and information and take forward any bilateral co-operation
projects.
Education and Culture
22. There are strong and vibrant academic links between the
UK and India. By 2008, we expect that 25,000 students from the UK and India
will be studying in each other's academic institutions. We will explore ways to
help educational establishments in our countries to establish lasting
partnerships.
23. The cultural influence of the UK, not least through the use of English, has
added to the richness of Indian culture, and Indian writers have enriched
English literature. Now, through the community of Indian origin in the UK, and
directly, Indian culture is becoming an important component of multi-ethnic
Britain. We welcome this and will work to strengthen cultural linkages between
our countries, including in areas like publishing and film production.
Conclusion
24. On this historic occasion we reaffirm our commitment to
strengthen our comprehensive strategic partnership for the benefit of both our
peoples and the international community based on universal values of democracy
and respect for the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms. We
stress our commitment to work towards promoting international peace, stability
and security and the eradication of poverty. We recognise that a
strengthened multilateral system, including a reformed Security Council that
would reflect the changing aspirations of the 21st century, is an important
element of this process. In recognition of our comprehensive strategic
partnership we will hold annual summit meetings alternating in our capitals and
will continue the high level dialogue established through our Personal Envoys.
ANNEX
UK - Pakistan
a Partnership for Peace and Prosperity Joint Statement
The RT Hon
Tony Blair MP & President Pervez Musharraf
6 December
2004
His Excellency General Pervez Musharraf, President of the
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, paid an official visit to the United Kingdom on
5-7 December 2004 at the invitation of the Rt. Hon. Tony Blair, Prime Minister
of the United Kingdom. At the conclusion of their talks, they issued this joint
statement.
1. Pakistan and the UK are bound together by strategic ties. The two
countries already enjoy close and fruitful cooperation in diverse areas within
several institutional frameworks. President Pervez Musharraf and Prime Minister
Tony Blair agreed to broaden the relationship between their countries into a
reenergised partnership for peace and prosperity in the 21st century.
2. Pakistan and the United
Kingdom are close allies in countering terrorism in all its forms and
manifestations. The Prime Minister thanked the President for his courage in
standing firm against terrorism, which is a serious threat to international
stability. The President and the Prime Minister agreed that no terrorism is
acceptable, whatever the cause, and agreed to seek further ways to enhance
bilateral cooperation in combatting terrorism, especially terrorist networks
spanning the UK and Pakistan.
3. The President shared with the
Prime Minister his vision for Enlightened Moderation in the Islamic World. He
also detailed the far-reaching measures taken by Pakistan to eliminate
extremism and militancy in the country. They agreed on the need for a concerted
international effort to tackle the root causes of terrorism and extremism,
including through addressing poverty and injustice, and by providing people
with a greater stake in the democracy and development of their own societies.
They agreed on the need for judicious resolution of conflict, including in the
Middle East and South Asia.
4. The Prime Minister welcomed
President Musharraf's commitment to continuing the process of democratisation
in Pakistan, and Pakistan's readmission to the Councils of the Commonwealth.
They both affirmed their commitment to the Commonwealth Harare principles.
5. The President and the Prime
Minister welcomed the political cooperation which both countries have enjoyed
in the United Nations over the last two years while Pakistan has been a member
of the UN Security Council, and looked forward to continuing to work together
in the United Nations and other multilateral forums.
6. The two leaders also agreed
to work towards the objective of non-proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery. They agreed to initiate a bilateral
strategic dialogue on these issues.
7. The President and the Prime
Minister agreed on the need for a fairer international trading regime,
providing, inter alia, for greater market access in a way which allows
developing countries to reap the substantial benefits of an increasingly open
world economy. They pledged to work closely for a successful conclusion of the
WTO Doha Development Agenda.
8. The President and the Prime
Minister discussed the situation in Iraq and agreed on the need for continued
UN and multinational efforts to bring lasting peace and stability to the
country. They welcomed the communiqué issued at the end of the conference in
Sharm el-Sheikh which underlined the continued commitment of the international
community to support the political process in Iraq.
9. The President and the Prime
Minister reaffirmed their commitment to support Afghanistan's democratic
process and its development. They welcomed President Karzai's election and
recognised that a stable, peaceful and prosperous Afghanistan will have
benefits for the whole region. The Prime Minister commended Pakistan for its
constructive role in the elections, especially the arrangements for refugee
voting in Pakistan.
10. The Prime Minister emphasised
the UK's long-term commitment to Afghanistan. The President reaffirmed his
commitment to cooperation with Afghanistan and its neighbours in the context of
the Good Neighbourly Relations Declaration of December 2002, including the
counter narcotics declaration and action plan agreed this year. Both agreed to
intensify their efforts to clamp down on the growth, processing, trafficking
and abuse of opiates in the region which have such serious effects on our
societies and economies.
11. The Prime Minister praised
President Musharraf's statesmanship in seeking to resolve Pakistan's
outstanding issues with India, and welcomed the progress made by both sides
since January 2004 in the ongoing Composite Dialogue process. The Prime
Minister encouraged further efforts to find a lasting resolution to these
issues, including over Jammu and Kashmir, taking into account the wishes of the
Kashmiris. They agreed that resolution of the Kashmir issue would help to
establish durable peace in the region.
12. The Prime Minister and the
President agreed to work closely towards achieving the Millennium Development
Goals. The President warmly welcomed the United Kingdom's commitment of up to
£144m over two years in development assistance to help support Pakistan's
long-term development and poverty reduction initiatives. The Prime Minister
acknowledged the turnaround in Pakistan's economy, making it one of fastest
growing economies in the world with an annual growth rate of over 6.5 per cent.
13. The President and the Prime
Minister praised the ongoing work of the Pakistan-Britain Trade and Investment
Forum and the Pakistan-Britain Business Advisory Group in helping to promote
the already close trading links between their countries. The UK is the second
largest foreign investor in Pakistan. They welcomed the success of the two
trade missions which visited Pakistan in September and October 2004 and the
plans for further trade missions in February 2005.
14. The President and the Prime
Minister welcomed the deepening defence relationship between their countries,
including through the success of the annual meetings of the Defence Cooperation
Forum. They agreed on the importance of further evolving the Forum into a
wide-ranging dialogue, including discussions of global and regional security,
and defence equipment. They also agreed to enhance cooperation through both
countries' continued involvement in UN Peacekeeping Operations, to which
Pakistan currently contributes more troops than any other country in the world,
and actively to explore opportunities to learn from each other's experiences,
such as through dialogue, training and peacekeeping exercises between the two
countries.
15. They also reviewed the
constructive work of the Pakistan Britain Joint Judicial Cooperation Working
Group in helping to improve the operations of law enforcement agencies
affecting both countries.
16. The Prime Minister expressed
his appreciation of the ongoing links between Pakistan and the approximately 1
million people of Pakistani heritage living in the UK, and both welcomed the
reopening of the visa issuing service in the British High Commission in
Islamabad and the British Deputy High Commission in Karachi. They agreed on the
need to encourage bona-fide travel between their countries as a means of
fostering strong people-to-people links, but to clamp down on those who try to
cheat the system. To this end the leaders agreed to conclude as soon as
possible a Memorandum of Understanding on immigration issues, re-documentation
and resolution of cases.
17. The President
and the Prime Minister agreed to hold an annual summit-level
meeting
between their countries and to explore new areas of bilateral cooperation.
ANNEX
Visa Operations in India and Pakistan and Regional Statistics
Visa Operations in India
Since February 2003, Visa Facilitation Services (VFS), a
subsidiary of Kuoni Travel, has worked in partnership with the UK visa-issuing
Posts in India. VFS operate eleven visa application centres throughout India
and these are situated in Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai, Kolkata, Jalandhar, Chandigarh,
Ahmedabad, Pune, Hyderabad, Bangalore and Cochin. The four visa-issuing Posts
in India (New Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai and Kolkata) operate on the same basis.
Applicants throughout India can now also apply for their
visas online and then submit their passport, fee and supporting documents to
VFS.
Our visa operation in India has the most developed
commercial partner operation in the world. The entire application process was
outsourced initially and, since then, the basic data input, interview
appointments and scanning of photos have all followed. All four Posts in India
have also now outsourced the collection of fees.
Customers may now submit their applications at the centres,
avoiding the need for a long and often expensive journey to on of the four visa-issuing
Posts. Trained staff at the centres accept, check and forward the applications
to the Visa Sections for a small additional fee. Those applicants required to
attend an interview can make an appointment at their convenience. The
outsourced operation means that visa staff now spend more time on decision
making and less on routine administration.
Since outsourcing, and the introduction of Risk Assessment
Units (RAUs), Entry Clearance Officers have assessed all applications on paper,
to ascertain whether they can be issued without interview. The RAUs were set up
so that more intelligence and fraud work could be undertaken, which informs ECO
decision making.
VFS operate a drop box facility for frequent travellers and
travel agents, therefore saving such applicants even the trip to submit their
applications. New Delhi and Chennai also offer a fast-track Business Express
Programme.
Visa Operations in Pakistan
The High Commission in Islamabad is one of the largest
British diplomatic missions in the world, operating one of the biggest overseas
Visa Sections. Islamabad and the Deputy
High Commission in Karachi together form an integrated service for the whole of
Pakistan. The two Posts received
170,000 applications last year.
Pakistan is fully outsourced with all applications lodged
via 14 regional FedEx offices. FedEx are responsible for all fee taking, data
entry, booking appointments and return of documents.
The majority of applications are decided on paper, except
students who are invited for interview.
Low risk categories, such as those with a history of travel and
compliance, are given priority and fast-tracked through the system. Also included in the fast-track service are
first-time business visitors from companies who are corporate clients of seven
nation-wide travel agents, members recommended by Chambers of Commerce, British
Council students, high ranking government officials, applicants going for
employment and those taking medical examinations. Post established a Risk
Assessment Unit on 21 June 2005 to provide an intelligence lead approach to
strengthening the control.
Reluctant sponsors, abandoned spouses and abducted child
disputes are handled by a specialist team.
Regional Statistics
Visa Applications for
South Asia Posts in 2004/05, 2005/06 and Apr- Aug 2006
Bangladesh
|
|
Rec
|
Iss
|
Ref
|
|
2004/05
|
42,562
|
25,414
|
15,771
|
|
2005/06
|
39,431
|
22,572
|
15,518
|
|
Increase/decrease over 04/05 (%)
|
-7.4%
|
-11.2%
|
-1.6%
|
|
|
Rec
|
Iss
|
Ref
|
|
Apr- Aug 2005
|
18,363
|
12,112
|
5,987
|
|
April - Aug 2006
|
21,480
|
11,326
|
7,309
|
|
Increase/decrease over 2005 (%)
|
17.0%
|
-6.5%
|
22.1%
|
India
|
|
Rec
|
Iss
|
Ref
|
|
2004/05
|
345,592
|
277,962
|
62,271
|
|
2005/06
|
394,356
|
315,439
|
74,717
|
|
Increase/decrease over 04/05 (%)
|
14.1%
|
13.5%
|
20.0%
|
|
|
Rec
|
Iss
|
Ref
|
|
Apr - Aug 2005
|
201,527
|
163,993
|
35,789
|
|
Apr - Aug 2006
|
235,125
|
191,560
|
38,641
|
|
Increase/decrease over 2005 (%)
|
16.7%
|
16.8%
|
8.0%
|
Nepal
|
|
Rec
|
Iss
|
Ref
|
|
2004/05
|
7,098
|
5,135
|
1,878
|
|
2005/06
|
11,365
|
9,228
|
2,074
|
|
Increase/decrease over 04/05 (%)
|
60.1%
|
79.7%
|
10.4%
|
|
|
Rec
|
Iss
|
Ref
|
|
Apr - Aug 2005
|
4,659
|
3,902
|
734
|
|
Apr - Aug 2006
|
7,320
|
5,675
|
1,171
|
|
Increase/decrease over 2005 (%)
|
57.1%
|
45.4%
|
59.5%
|
Pakistan
|
|
Rec
|
Iss
|
Ref
|
|
2004/05
|
190,333
|
111,356
|
73,925
|
|
2005/06
|
172,381
|
105,468
|
63,424
|
|
Increase/decrease over 04/05 (%)
|
-9.4%
|
-5.3%
|
-14.2%
|
|
|
Rec
|
Iss
|
Ref
|
|
Apr - Aug 2005
|
86,566
|
54,436
|
30,900
|
|
Apr - Aug 2006
|
110,257
|
61,612
|
36,715
|
|
Increase/decrease over 05/06 (%)
|
27.4%
|
13.2%
|
18.8%
|
Sri Lanka
|
|
Rec
|
Iss
|
Ref
|
|
2004/05
|
28,941
|
20,482
|
6,871
|
|
2005/06
|
28,215
|
19,539
|
8,108
|
|
Increase/decrease over 04/05 (%)
|
-2.5%
|
-4.6%
|
18.0%
|
|
|
Rec
|
Iss
|
Ref
|
|
Apr - Aug 2005
|
13,186
|
9,483
|
3,340
|
|
Apr - Aug 2006
|
13,944
|
9,573
|
3,769
|
|
Increase/decrease over 2005 (%)
|
5.7%
|
0.9%
|
12.8%
|
· Source: Central Reference System
· Date: 31 August 2006 and 4 September 2006 (for
August 2006 figures)
· Endorsements: All Endorsements
· Please note that these
statistics have not been published and should be used for informational
purposes
ANNEX
CONSULAR ISSUES AND STATISTICS
Crisis Management
Delhi Diwali bombings
On the evening of 29 October
2005 three bombs exploded at market places in New Delhi. The areas were especially crowded with
shoppers preparing for the Diwali holiday.
Over 60 people were killed and several hundred more were injured.
The key challenge for our
consular response was gathering information from a number of locations quickly
when the possibility of further attacks could not be ruled-out.
Consular Response
An Operations room was opened
in the High Commission in Delhi and staff from across the Mission worked
throughout the night to man it. Several
teams were sent to the hospitals where the casualties were being taken in an
attempt to establish whether or not British nationals had been killed or
injured in the attacks.
A dedicated team phoned
hotels and hostels in the area of one of the attacks, as it is particularly
popular with British backpackers. They
went through lists of guests to look for any British nationals who may be
unaccounted for. Staff also dealt with a
number of telephone and e-mail inquiries from members of the public about friends/relatives.
Travel Advice was immediately
amended via the FCO Response Centre.
Follow-up contacts with the
Indian authorities, hospitals and hotels over the Diwali weekend allowed us to
be satisfied that no British nationals had been directly involved.
Mumbai bombings
On 11 July 2006 in Mumbai, a
series of bombs exploded at railway stations or on trains during the evening
rush hour. Over 200 people were killed
and several hundred injured.
The key challenge for our
consular response was in obtaining accurate information on events and possible
casualties given the failure of telecommunications networks and the chaos on
the street making movement around the city almost impossible. The possibility of further attacks was also
a factor.
Consular Response
Staff in Mumbai worked
through the night to check those hospitals to which they knew (via direct
contact with the police commissioner's office and monitoring of media reports)
the casualties were being taken. This was
followed-up with hospital visits the following day which allowed us to be
satisfied that no British nationals had been directly involved in this crisis.
Pakistan
Earthquake
The earthquake struck north of Islamabad in the
morning of Saturday 8 October 2005.
Initial Pakistani figures of numbers killed quickly rose to over 75,000
during the weekend, with another 75,000 injured.
The key challenges for our consular response
included the large number of British nationals resident in Pakistan (80,000); a
potentially large number of calls from the British Pakistani population in the
UK; the need to coordinate with civil protection and humanitarian responses;
and the large area devastated. As the crisis developed, it became clear that
the scale of the consular response required was not as large as it could have
been. We were the first emergency team
on the ground in response to the crisis, helping to save those buried by the
rubble, and we have provided one of the most generous aid responses - over £125
million in DFID funding for relief and reconstruction, and £75 million in
donations from members of the British public.
Consular Response
We deployed a Rapid Deployment Team (RDT)
including consular, press, and technical officers, Red Cross Personnel and
International SoS medical personnel. DfID had chartered an aircraft to send
search and rescue personnel and other aid to Pakistan; the RDT was able to
travel on the same aircraft. UK Search
& Rescue teams were among the first to arrive in country and the first live
rescues took place within 40 minutes of their arrival - 22 hours after the
earthquake.
In Islamabad, the High Commission worked on a
24-hour basis immediately after the earthquake. Post activated its Post Emergency Plan and immediately sent two
officers to Mirpur, the location of the highest concentration of British
Citizens, to assess the risk. A
Consular officer was also deployed to Muzzafarabad and a liaison officer was
embedded in the Crisis Management Centre of the Pakistan Government.
In London, emergency call handling arrangements
were put in place, but we did not receive a huge volume of calls.
Sri Lanka hostilities
The latest outbreak over the summer of 2006 of open hostilities between
Government forces and the Tamil Tigers in the North of Sri Lanka, involving mortar
attacks and aerial bombing, called for the evacuation of British passport
holders from Jaffna.
The High Commission in Colombo worked closely with the Sri Lankan
authorities, other diplomatic missions and the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) to arrange for the safe evacuation of British nationals to
Colombo. Over 60 of them and their dependants were evacuated by the ICRC,
civilian ferry and by the Sri Lankan military, assisted by our High
Commission. The High Commission
retained contact with approximately 20 people who remained in the conflict
area, pursuing options for the safe evacuation of any who wanted to leave.
Consular Assistance
Forced
Marriage
A forced
marriage is a marriage conducted without the valid consent of both parties,
where duress is a factor. It is a human
rights abuse and a form of domestic violence and child abuse, where children
are involved.
The High
Commissions in Islamabad, Dhaka and New Delhi handle significant numbers of
British nationals forced into marriage abroad.
In 2005 these posts helped 169 victims of forced marriage, including
children. This pioneering area of
Consular work involves assisting and repatriating young women and men who
request help to escape a forced marriage.
They are usually subjected to emotional and physical pressure from their
families, and female victims may face rape, enforced pregnancy and enforced
abortions. Victims of both sexes may be
kidnapped, abducted and at risk of their lives.
Victims are
often held in remote areas, with their money and passport confiscated, and no
access to a phone. They may be kept
under virtual house arrest. In extreme
cases, Consular staff undertake rescues of victims in these situations, with
the cooperation of the local authorities.
Consular staff
work closely with the Forced Marriage Unit, a joint Foreign &
Commonwealth/Home Office Unit, which assists British nationals facing forced
marriage, and develops Government policy to tackle this human rights abuse. The Unit also undertakes extensive outreach
work around the UK to make potential victims and concerned professionals aware
of the help available, and to try to prevent victims being forced into marriage
abroad.
In
Islamabad the Consular team have pioneered links with NGOs for the support of
victims of Forced Marriages. They also
actively engage with the Police, civil society and NGOs to improve awareness of
the issue locally and regularly collaborate with the media which has drawn
international attention to the problem.
Consular Statistics
BANGLADESH
· Dhaka
Consular Enquiries
|
Consular Assistance
|
|
Personal Callers
6,832
|
Telephone Enquiries
7,084
|
Post,
Email & Fax
12,948
|
Advice & Self Help
139
|
New Detainee Cases
Contacted
12
|
Deaths Requiring Consular Action
2
|
Other Cases
30
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
INDIA
· New Delhi
Consular Enquiries
|
Consular Assistance
|
|
Personal Callers
4,000
|
Telephone Enquiries
16,095
|
Post,
Email & Fax
12,000
|
Advice & Self Help
12
|
New Detainee Cases
Contacted
3
|
Deaths Requiring Consular Action
34
|
Other Cases
362
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
· Mumbai
Consular Enquiries
|
Consular Assistance
|
|
Personal Callers
4,283
|
Telephone Enquiries
148,16
|
Post,
Email & Fax
43,798
|
Advice & Self Help
19
|
New Detainee Cases
Contacted
15
|
Deaths Requiring Consular Action
18
|
Other Cases
12
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
· Chennai
Consular Enquiries
|
Consular Assistance
|
|
Personal Callers
1,811
|
Telephone Enquiries
13,650
|
Post,
Email & Fax
2,875
|
Advice & Self Help
125
|
New Detainee Cases
Contacted
2
|
Deaths Requiring Consular Action
25
|
Other Cases
300
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
· Kolkata
Consular Enquiries
|
Consular Assistance
|
|
Personal Callers
1,592
|
Telephone Enquiries
2,818
|
Post,
Email & Fax
745
|
Advice & Self Help
42
|
New Detainee Cases
Contacted
1
|
Deaths Requiring Consular Action
7
|
Other Cases
9
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
· Goa
Consular Enquiries
|
Consular Assistance
|
|
Personal Callers
1,725
|
Telephone Enquiries
2,404
|
Post,
Email & Fax
200
|
Advice & Self Help
23
|
New Detainee Cases
Contacted
2
|
Deaths Requiring Consular Action
27
|
Other Cases
4
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
NEPAL
· Kathmandu
Consular Enquiries
|
Consular Assistance
|
|
Personal Callers
1,700
|
Telephone Enquiries
1,650
|
Post,
Email & Fax
900
|
Advice & Self Help
900
|
New Detainee Cases
Contacted
1
|
Deaths Requiring Consular Action
2
|
Other Cases
12
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
PAKISTAN
· Islamabad
Consular Enquiries
|
Consular Assistance
|
|
Personal Callers
20,000
|
Telephone Enquiries
15,300
|
Post,
Email & Fax
18,000
|
Advice & Self Help
654
|
New Detainee Cases
Contacted
19
|
Deaths Requiring Consular Action
9
|
Other Cases
149
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
· Karachi
Consular Enquiries
|
Consular Assistance
|
|
Personal Callers
3,625
|
Telephone Enquiries
9,315
|
Post,
Email & Fax
750
|
Advice & Self Help
100
|
New Detainee Cases
Contacted
0
|
Deaths Requiring Consular Action
1
|
Other Cases
150
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
SRI LANKA
· Colombo
Consular Enquiries
|
Consular Assistance
|
|
Personal Callers
1,850
|
Telephone Enquiries
1100
|
Post,
Email & Fax
975
|
Advice & Self Help
26
|
New Detainee Cases
Contacted
5
|
Deaths Requiring Consular Action
6
|
Other Cases
14
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
