8. Supplementary memorandum submitted
by the Home Office
1. The current state of progress in developing
practical co-operation between member states in the JHA field,
and future options in this area.
1A. What benefits have accrued so far
from practical co-operation between law enforcement and judicial
authorities? What are the lessons of practical co-operation for
European policy and legislation, and how effective is Eurojust
in spreading best practice?
Practical cooperation has led to the successful
investigation and prosecution of various cases.
For example, Eurojust's significant contribution
to an illegal immigration case involving Turkish organised crime
groups smuggling large numbers of Turkish Kurds into the UK. Eurojust
and Europol helped co-ordinate amongst other things a common arrest
date with the UK, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands.
This resulted in 26 arrests across the UK and Belgium during the
Another example is that of a case involving
the trafficking in human beings. Lithuanian women and girls were
trafficked to the UK and sold to Albanian organised crime groups
for prostitution. Eurojust facilitated Mutual Legal Assistance
requests, the initiation and coordination of investigations and
prosecutions and the execution of an urgent European Arrest Warrant.
The cases resulted in the start of an investigation in Lithuania
against the organisers, a number of convictions in the UK including
sentences of 18 and 21 years and the transfer for prosecution
to Lithuania of a Lithuanian arrested in the UK.
Eurojust's role is not specifically to promote
best practice but many of its activities are beneficial in this
respect. For example, Eurojust's programme of strategic meetings
on serious organised crime enable information to be disseminated
on practical problems as well as best practice in prosecuting
specific forms of crime. In 2005, the programme included strategic
meetings on terrorism, drug trafficking, human trafficking and
immigration crime and money laundering. Eurojust also holds an
annual strategic meeting on the operation of the European Arrest
Warrant (EAW). This also supports Eurojust's responsibility under
Article 17(7) of the EAW Framework Decision for collating information
about cases in which Member States do not observe the time limits
laid down for execution of an EAW. Eurojust has also established
specialist teams to provide a centre of expertise in specific
fields such as terrorism and plan its strategic meetings. The
Government believes these activities have played a valuable part
in promoting closer and more effective co-operation between practitioners
across the EU.
Practical co-operation is also undertaken through
the European Judicial Network (EJN). The EJN contact points in
each EU Member State play a fundamental and practical role in
the area of judicial co-operation in criminal matters, with the
purpose of facilitating judicial co-operation between Member States,
particularly in order to combat forms of serious crime. The EJN
is also tasked with providing the legal and practical information
necessary for the local authorities within an EU Member State
to prepare an effective request for judicial co-operation.
1B. In which arm does the UK government
want to advance more practical co-operation measures? What benefits
does the government see from practical co-operation over legislative
The main areas in which the UK Government would
support further practical cooperation are:
in the development of Eurojust and
in immigration and border control,
including through bilateral work and through Frontex;
on matters of asylum between EU Member
States with the aim of reducing asylum shopping;
on criminal procedural rights; and
on intellectual property rights.
The Government sees practical cooperation as
a means of tackling real cases, such the Eurojust examples given
Practical co-operation between Member States
has the effect of approximating practise. Proposed legislation
can then draw on the experience of practical cooperation to ensure
that Member States' needs are met.
The Government would support the further development
of Eurojust and the EJN as facilitators of judicial co-operation
between Member States where necessary. Practical co-operation
through Eurojust and the EJN is a fast, effective and easily arranged
means of dealing with issues which may otherwise require time
consuming and resource intensive negotiations. However there is
a place for both legislative and practical approaches in dealing
with judicial co-operation matters.
The UK undertakes a great deal of practical
co-operation measures in the field of immigration and border control,
including through bilateral work with other Member States and
through EU-wide mechanisms such as Frontex. Concrete operations
in which expertise and support are exchanged are extremely effective
ways of bringing about rapid and tangible improvements. For example:
A bilateral study visit exchange
between UK National Document Forgery Unit and Bulgarian Border
Police led to a project to set up an equivalent unit in Bulgaria
to strengthen their border control through increased capacity
to detect forged documents.
Acting as junior partner with the
Danish on an EU Twinning Project with Turkey in order to develop
their Asylum and Migration systemsincluded a sponsored
study tour to the UK and Ireland to share experience on a wide
raft of operational and policy areas, and training seminars on
areas such as human resources/organisational issues and expulsion.
Seconding a UK Immigration Officer
to a Frontex coordinated operation in Malta to share nationality/identity
interviewing techniques to aid the documentation procedure and
increase return of illegal migrants.
As the UK is not a member of Schengen, legislative
solutions regarding border control are not normally open to us,
nor do we regard legislation as necessarily the best way to raise
standards in every case.
Illegal immigration is an area where the UK
particularly sees value in pursuing the practical co-operation
agenda. The Global Approach to Migration agreed under the UK Presidency
highlights a number of key areas where Member States, in co-operation
with Frontex and Europol, can work together on an operational
basis to combat illegal migration. The delivery of this agenda
is a priority for the UK and we want to continue to enhance operational
cooperation both within the between Member States and in our co-operation
with third countries (Africa).
The Government would like to see continued cooperation
on matters of asylum between European states and considers that
the avenue of practical co-operation is the most likely way for
states to learn best practice from one another, to share information
and to improve their asylum systems with the aim of reducing asylum
shopping across the EU. The Commission Communication on practical
cooperation on asylum (COM (2006)67 and Add 1) promotes a variety
of measures to increase cooperation between European states.
The Government is cautious over proposals for
additional, legislative measures relating to asylum at this stage.
A thorough evaluation of the first phase of CEAS legislation,
alongside an assessment of the application of provisions in practice,
should take place before a second phase of legislation is considered.
Additional legislative measures (if they are required) should
be based upon a gap analysis of the first phase review.
The Government believes that the proper implementation
and enforcement of the existing minimum standards asylum Directives,
alongside increased practical co-operation between Member States
on asylum issues, will increase convergence in practices and reduce
Criminal Procedural Rights
We believe Europe already has enough legislation
in this area in the form of the European Convention on Human Rights
(ECHR) and the related jurisprudence. The real need is to enhance
compliance with the ECHR across the EU, and that is what measures
proposed in a draft Resolution presented by the UK and five other
Member States are intended to do. The Resolution, proposed as
an alternative to a Framework Decision on criminal procedural
rights, sets out a range of practical measures based on recognised
good practice Member States could take, mainly related to access
to information, access to legal assistance and to interpreters.
Intellectual Property Rights
The statement on combating Intellectual Property
Rights piracy and counterfeiting issued at the G8 St Petersburg
Summit in July endorsed the following: "To continue the anti-piracy
and anti-counterfeiting activities, we consider it necessary to
enhance cooperation in that area among the G8 and other countries,
as well as competent international organisations,... We see enhanced
cooperation (both national and internationally) as the key to
substantially reducing the global trade in pirated and counterfeit
products and to taking effective measures against trans-national
networks supporting such trade."
1C. What should be the role of Europol,
Interpol and Eurojust in facilitating practical cooperation?
Interpol is, and should continue to be, a principal
channel for the secure exchange on a 24/7 basis of information
on criminals and criminality which can be used to support the
member countries' own law enforcement operations. The Europol
Director and the Secretary-General of Interpol have agreed a broad
range of co-operation measures including information exchange
subject to data protection and other safeguards.
Europol has, and should continue to have, an
important role to play as an intelligence agency in preventing
and combating organised crime affecting the EU Member States.
The Europol National Units also increasingly act as a channel
of communication between the Member States on criminal matters,
but without prejudice to sharing information with Interpol where
this affects other member countries.
Eurojust's value lies in supporting and coordinating
national investigative and judicial authorities. Its role, as
set out in the Eurojust Decision, is to promote and improve Member
States' co-ordination of investigations and prosecutions of serious
cross-border crime, in particular where it is organised and concerns
two or more Member States; to improve co-operation between Member
States, in particular facilitating mutual legal assistance and
extradition requests; and to support Member States in making investigations
and prosecutions more effective. Eurojust does not have powers
to investigate and prosecute cases in its own right, although
it can act pro-actively by requesting a Member State to undertake
an investigation or prosecution. These powers can be exercised
by Eurojust acting as a College collectively or by the National
Members individually. The Eurojust College exercised these powers
under Article 7 of the Eurojust Decision for the first time in
2005 when Spain was requested to investigate an alleged fraud
because the UK could not establish jurisdiction to prosecute the
Eurojust concluded a co-operation agreement
with Europol in 2004 to facilitate exchanges of information and
there are regular meetings between the organisations. A joint
evaluation in 2005 made a number of recommendations to improve
co-operation further between the bodies.
2. The current state of progress in mutual
recognition, including the development of minimum standards, across
the EU, and whether further steps in this direction are desirable.
The Government endorses the view expressed in
the 2004 Hague Programme that the groundwork for judicial co-operation
on the basis of mutual recognition is well advanced. The Programme
placed a continued emphasis on mutual recognition as the cornerstone
for judicial co-operation in the EU and indicated that the comprehensive
programme of measures to implement the principle of mutual recognition
of judicial decisions in criminal matters should be completed.
The Government believes that practical co-operation
between Member States in the fight against serious cross-border
organised crime is essential and is often far more effective than
harmonising legislation. Some limited approximation may be necessary
in order to enhance the effectiveness of mutual recognition but
any proposals should be founded upon a firm need, assessed on
the basis of good evidence. The current Intellectual Property
initiative is a good example of a JHA legislative proposal that
in the Government's view is not evidence based and which distracts
from the need to examine ways in which Member States can co-operate
far more effectively at the operational level.
2A. In which areas is mutual recognition
currently employed (for example recognition of judicial judgements
in other member states)?
The mutual recognition of judicial decisions
currently operates under the European Arrest Warrant (EAW), which
came into force in the UK on 1 January 2004 for extradition and
surrender between Member States. In addition, Member States are
in the process of implementing the 2003 Framework Decision on
the execution of orders freezing property or evidence and the
2005 Framework Decision on financial penalties. The Council also
adopted in October 2006 the Framework Decision on confiscation
orders and is currently preparing the European Evidence Warrant
(EEW) for adoption. Negotiations on the Framework Decisions on
the taking account of convictions and the enforcement of custodial
sentences are underway. The Commission has also issued a proposal
for a Framework Decision on the mutual recognition of non-custodial
pre-trial supervision orders.
2B. How has the principle, including
minimum standards and protocols, worked in these areas? Is it
an effective approach, including in terms of cost? What are the
limitations of mutual recognition as a cornerstone of co-operation,
for example in cases such as the European Arrest Warrant where
there are controversies over dual criminality? What have been
the successes, and how might these be built on?
The EAW has worked very well since it came into
operation in January 2004. In 2005, 43 persons were returned to
the UK under the EAW regime and 77 persons were surrendered to
other EAW states. The time taken to complete an extradition case
from arrest to surrender has been substantially reduced under
the EAW procedure which invariably impacts on costs as less resources
are needed than under the earlier lengthier procedure. For example,
in 2003 the average time taken to complete contested cases was
16 months; under the EAW procedure straightforward cases can be
completed within three to four weeks.
Mutual recognition provides a balanced approach
to judicial co-operation. It provides for enhanced and faster
co-operation whilst respecting individual rights and Member States'
distinct and diverse legal systems. We have built on the success
of the EAW by using the EAW model for subsequent mutual recognition
instruments which are in the process of either being implemented
in the Member Statesfreezing of evidence, mutual recognition
of finesor being adopted in the Council, such as the EEW.
We would also hope that the experience gained from using the EAW
will feed into future negotiations.We have recognised certain
limitations to the application of the mutual recognition principle
and appropriate safeguards have been incorporated into individual
instruments addressing issues such as territoriality and double
jeopardy. We have also included a general requirement to respect
fundamental rights as enshrined in the European Convention on
We do not accept that we should make judicial
co-operation conditional in all circumstances on dual criminality.
As a general principle, if people break our laws we should be
able to co-operate within the EU to ensure that they do not evade
2C. What is the UK government's position
on mutual recognition as opposed to practical co-operation?
In the Government's view these are complementary
programmes, providing the operational and legal frameworks required
to ensure that there is effective co-operation in the EU for tackling
cross-border crime including terrorism and serious, organised
3. The current state of progress in and appetite
for harmonising criminal justice systems across the EU, and whether
further steps in this direction are desirable.
3A. How do proposals for harmonisation
of criminal law across member states substantially differ from
Mutual recognition is founded upon trust and
confidence in other Member States' criminal justice systems in
acknowledgment of the diversity of systems across the EU. It envisages
the application of judicial decisions of one Member State having
the force of law in other Member States where the domestic provisions
may be significantly different in character. Harmonisation, conversely,
envisages a gradual process of homogenisation so that all Member
States will over time have broadly similar criminal law and criminal
justice systems. Mutual recognition currently focuses on serious
cross-border cases while harmonisation would in principle affect
wholly domestic cases and would require changes to the UK's constitutional
law and legal arrangements. Mutual recognition provides a more
flexible approach by allowing Member States to respect and accept
the differences in legal systems. Judicial decisions can be recognised
without the need for wholesale changes to Member States' domestic
The Government accepts that it may be necessary
to establish some minimum standards in limited specific areas
of the criminal law in order to enhance the effectiveness of mutual
recognition, but these should not be regarded as a precondition
for effective mutual recognition. Certainly, wholesale harmonisation
of the criminal law more generally would be an unwarranted disruption
to Member States' criminal justice systems. It would also be a
major distraction from the practical work required to provide
an area of security, freedom, and justice for EU citizens and
would inevitably entail breaches of the principles of proportionality
3B. What are the implications for the
UK in harmonising criminal law and systems?
In theory, harmonisation could enhance and improve
co-operation within a harmonised area, because every State would
be applying the same law. However, harmonisation would almost
certainly require major changes to our domestic arrangements,
in view of the fundamental differences that currently exist between
common law systems on the one hand, and civil law systems on the
other. The UK has always been a strong proponent of mutual recognition
and continues to support mutual recognition as an alternative
There are some areas in which harmonisation
of offences would cause the UK some concern. The draft proposal
for a Framework Decision on combating racism and xenophobia, for
example, highlighted some significant differences between our
approach and that adopted by many other Member States. Regarding
penalties, the risk is that draft legislation will move on from
the current preference for minimum maximum penalties to provision
which deals more directly with sentencing and impinges on the
proper exercise of judicial discretion.
The Government has ensured that the Hague Programme
acknowledges diversity and the need to respect the principles
of proportionality and subsidiarity and we have negotiated hard
on individual instruments for language that allows the UK to contribute
positively to the fight against organised crime and terrorism
at EU level without compromising the integrity of our system.
Of relevance here is the UK's support for the Council in the case
currently before the European Court of Justice concerning a Framework
Decision on maritime pollution, in which the Commission is seeking
to unacceptably extend Community competence in criminal law.
3C. Would particular areas benefit from
harmonisation on issues such as migration, serious crime cases
and terrorism, rather than practical co-operation or mutual recognition?
The Government does not believe that there should
be wholesale harmonisation of law and procedures at EU level and
that any harmonisation must be justifiable under Articles 29 and
31 of the Treaty on European Union. The Government has however
accepted that some minimum levels of approximation of criminal
law are desirable and appropriate, in line with paragraph 48 of
the Tampere Conclusions and section 3 of the Hague Programme,
in order to provide a common EU approach to tackling certain types
of serious crime. This has resulted in the adoption of a series
of Framework Decisions requiring Member States to create common
minimum offences and penalties to combat terrorism, drug trafficking,
cybercrime, trafficking in human beings, corruption in the private
sector, counterfeiting and fraud, sexual exploitation of children
and money laundering.
4. The process of decision-making on JHA issues
at EU level: in particular, the extent to which current difficulties
in reaching agreement derive from "third pillar" voting
procedure and might be remedied by implementation of the passerelle
clauses in previous treaties.
4A. What implications might use of the
passerelle have for the UK's legal and judicial systems? What
alternative action might improve decision-making? How can transparency
and accountability at European level best be extended?
The Commission Communication on the mid-term
review of the Hague Programme has been useful for supporting discussion
about whether the current institutional and decision-making arrangements
can be improved upon.
The JHA Council has achieved results of real
substance and shown that unanimity need be no bar to fast and
decisive action. The European Arrest Warrant was agreed quickly,
and agencies such as Eurojust are delivering concrete results.
The UK has stated on other occasions that concerns
which featured in the debate on the draft Constitutional Treatysuch
as the consequences of extension of external competence and the
need for safeguards such as the emergency brakeremain as
valid now as they were then.
The EU should be focusing on implementation,
maximising the effectiveness of agreed legislation, and delivering
on practical instruments, such as the second generation Schengen
Information System, the Visa lnformation System and the decision
on exchange of information from criminal records.
Use of the passerelle could have the following
consequences, although they are not automatic: the use of qualified
majority voting (QMV); co-decision with the European Parliament;
the application of external Community competence; extended jurisdiction
of the European Court of Justice; and possibility of infraction
proceedings where the Commission was not satisfied with the implementation
of a specific measure in a Member State.
Use of the passerelle would not in itself have
direct implications for the UK's legal and judicial systems. But
the potential implications of, for example, QMV in the area of
criminal law, is one of the reasons the UK has flagged the issue
of safeguards, in particular the emergency brake in the draft
Decision making could be made more effective
by ensuring that new proposals are properly evaluated before being
published, in order to ensure there is a need for the proposal
and it is clear what problem it will remedy. The UK welcomed the
Commission Communication on evaluation for this reason.
4B. How significant is the recent trend
towards internal agreements between groups of member states outside
the framework of the EU, for instance the Schengen countries,
or the Prum convention? To what extent is this due to unanimity
or difficulties in decision making? What are the implications
for the UK and for EU fragmentation?
Bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements between
EU Member States outside EU structures are not new (for example
the Schengen agreements date back to 1985) so it is not clear
that there is a recent trend towards such arrangements. The Government
is open to consideration of ways to improve decision making but
there is no evidence to suggest that mechanisms that have been
in place for many years are suddenly causing Member States to
seek alternative ways of co-operating.
Seeking co-operation arrangements outside EU
structures can be due to range of reasons, including geography
and the identification of a shared threat or goal that affects
particular countries but not the majority of Member States. For
example the establishment of juxtaposed immigration controls between
the UK, France and Belgium was a response to a particular border
control issue affecting these three countries and the outcome
has been very positive for the UK.
The Prüm Treaty is an example of a group
of Member States seeking to improve their ability to co-operate
even further. There is no indication that Prüm or other bi-lateral
or multi-lateral agreements represent a move to EU fragmentation.
Indeed the stated intention of the Prüm signatories is to
offer it up as the basis for an EU measure once it has been implemented
and tested by the signatories.
The Government believes that the ability to
continue to reach agreement on practical co-operation measures
outside EU structures provides necessary and valuable flexibility
to supplement EU measures. It does not mean that EU structures
are being bypassed or that the EU is fragmenting.
4C(i) What are the current developments
in the area of common border controls and visa arrangements?
The development of common border controls in
the Schengen area principally is through the Schengen Border Code
(SBC), a new version of which came into force on 16 October. The
accompanying border guards handbook is available on the CIRCA
(Communication on Information Resource Centre Administration)
website. The SBC brings together the existing principles implemented
by Schengen states regarding land, air and maritime borders into
a single legal act. There is discussion at EU working group level
of a Community Visa Code which seeks to bring together the existing
principles implemented by Schengen states regarding common visa
policy. There are also discussions on a common Schengen visa information
system (VIS) and the Schengen common visa list. As a non-Schengen
state these measures also do not apply to the UK. However, we
take a close interest as we believe a strong Schengen border is
in our interests as is a strong UK border in the interests of
the EU as a whole.
4C(ii) What implications does the proposed
new policy on illegal migration have for the UK and our role in
Following on from the Global Approach to Migration
produced in December 2005, the "Communication from the Commission
on Policy priorities in the fight against illegal immigration
of third-country nationals", which is not yet common policy,
sets on a comprehensive approach taken in the fight against illegal
immigration. It was necessary to stock take ongoing measures,
in the light of the difficult humanitarian situations with the
EU's backing not lest that in The Canaries, Malta and Lampedusa
as a result of illegal immigration. The Communication outlines
priorities for future work which may include legislation on illegal
working to reduce pull factors. The UK recognises that there must
be a concerted efforts from all Member States in fighting illegal
immigration and supports the Commission's approach in this area
particularly towards more effective use of funding through FRONTEX
and greater use of technology at borders. We will continue to
actively participate in the development of many of the various
dossiers under this wide heading.
4C(iii) Will the proposed changes to
the short-stay visa arrangements in relation to the eastern neighbours
of the EU open up new channels for illegal migration further westward
in the EU?
The Schengen states are currently in negotiations
with a number of Eastern European countries on EU visa facilitation
agreements. The countries concerned include: Ukraine, Russia,
Moldova, with short-stay visa facilitation agreements being discussed
for the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, the Republic of
Albania, the Republic of Montenegro, the Republic of Serbia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina.
The negotiations are ongoing and no final decisions
have yet been made. The objective of the agreements for the EU
is to improve standards across the EU in terms of document security,
cost and processing times.
The UK does not take part in EU visa facilitation
initiatives, which are confined to the Schengen states. We monitor
progress of EU visa facilitation initiatives and consider the
potential of visa facilitation measures with those countries in
line with any agreements between them and Schengen states. For
example, we have recently entered into discussions with Russia
and Ukraine on possible visa facilitation, focussing on improvements
to the visa issuing process rather than increased numbers of visas
Issued. The UK's objectives from such agreements are to align
our processes with Schengen States as far as possible.
4C(iv) What are the implications of enlargement
for JHA issues, including the impact of labour migration and confidence
in new member states' justice systems?
Prior to EU expansion, in May 2004, the Government
committed to monitoring the effects of EU enlargement on the UK's
social welfare system and the labour market. The latest quarterly
Accession Monitoring report, shows the numbers of workers from
the new EU member states registering with the Home Office and
applying for benefits.
The broad picture continues to be that the level
of labour market participation of A8 workers is following a stable
seasonal trend and that Accession workers from A8 states are helping
to fill the gaps in our labour market and support the provision
of public services in communities across the United Kingdom.
Enlargement of the EU has had the following
impact on labour market restrictions for Bulgarian and Romanian
Skilled Romanian and Bulgarian workers
will continue to be able to come here to do jobs that cannot be
filled by resident labour.
Very highly-skilled A2 workers that
qualify for the Highly Skilled Migrant Programme will also be
admitted as now.
Romanian and Bulgarian students studying
in the UK will continue to be able to work part-time.
Access for lower-skilled migrants
will be limited by quota, and restricted to jobs in agriculture
and food processing. The existing schemes in those areas will
now move over to being for Romanians and Bulgarians only. Between
them the schemes will amount to just under 20,000 jobs.
For as long as these transitional restrictions
are in place we will not be opening up any routes for low-skilled
migration for countries from outside the EU. We are not convinced
that such schemes are necessary, with the UK now part of a huge
single labour market. And they are anyway now unlawful: EU law
says that if we are placing restrictions on labour market access
for EU member states we cannot take people from third countries
to do jobs that EU nationals would have been willing and able
The Commission Report of 26 September 2006 noted
that the current Government in Romania has made good progress
in key JHA areas although it recommended further efforts to tackle
corruption, in terms of further investigations and subsequent
judicial proceedings. The Commission report sets out that Romania
has made "positive progress" in the fight against corruption
and that there needs to be a clear political will to demonstrate
the sustainability and irreversibility of this progress. We would
agree with this assessment. Romania has made a concerted effort
in the last few months alone a number of high level officials
have been indicted for corruption.
The Commission Report notes that there needs
to be more progress in Bulgaria and that increased political will
is needed to continue to tackle all levels of corruption and to
increase prosecutions of organised crime networks. Further progress
is needed to ensure full independence of the judiciary and to
tackle financial crime including money-laundering.
The UK has consistently provided support to
both countries on capacity building within the JHA field.
The Commission has proposed post-accession monitoring
mechanisms for both Romania and Bulgaria in a number of areas.
In the JHA field these will take the form of monitoring by way
of robust benchmarks, with the threat of a suspension of mutual
recognition measures (including the European Arrest Warrant) if
these benchmarks are not met. In practice, if this safeguard is
activated, it would enable current Member States to refuse automatic
recognition and enforcement of certain civil and criminal judgments
and arrest warrants in either Bulgaria or Romania. The use of
a monitoring mechanism which was not made use of in earlier
enlargements sends a very strong message to both Governments
on the need for continued reform.
5. What is the current status of the UK protest
in the ECJ about the Commission decision not to allow the UK to
opt in to FRONTEX?
The United Kingdom has been excluded from participating
in Regulation (EC) 2007/2004 (the Frontex Regulation). It has
challenged this exclusion in the European Court of Justice (C-77/05)
on the basis that the UK should be able to opt-in to Schengen-building
measures under Article 5 of our Schengen Protocol. As yet no hearing
date has been set.
1 December 2006