THE ROLE OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE
263. There is much concern about the role of the
Secretary of State in consultations, in particular in relation
to:
- Overturning decisions arrived
at following a long period of consultation;
- Her failure to refer cases to the Independent
Reconfiguration Panel; and
- The timing of her interventions.
The effect is to undermine public confidence in the
consultation process.
264. Richard Stein complained that most referrals
to the Secretary of State concerned objections to the implementation
of the Department's own policies. She was, so to speak, acting
as a judge in her own case:
The position is that there are the referrals to the
Secretary of State, there are the appeals to the Secretary of
State to do something and, unfortunately,
that has no credibility
whatsoever, and most of the things they do not like are driven
by the Secretary of State, so to appeal against their implementation
locally to the Secretary of State will not deliver anything, and
that is a real shame because that is potentially a mechanism...You
do not find that the Secretary of State says, or through the strategic
health authority, if that is the way it would happen, "Oy,
you can't do that. Go back and do it properly".[252]
265. The NHS Confederation thought that in a number
of cases the Secretary of State had made illogical interventions,
presumably for political reasons
A major problem with staffing in a Special Care Baby
Unit led the Trust to decide that it needed to close the Special
Care Baby Unit and consequently the Maternity Unit under emergency
powers. The then Secretary of State intervened to order a review,
which confirmed that the Trust was correct. The Secretary if State
then requested a second review from an independent expert. This
broadly confirmed the results of first. A third review by a government
agency made some suggestions about managing the interim but did
not lead to any substantially different conclusions. Several months
later the Unit did close but in the meantime services had been
very unsafe.[253]
266. Questioned about referrals, the Minister told
us that the threat of referral to the Secretary of State was an
important part of the system:
so by the time it gets up to the Secretary of State,
the Secretary of State will be looking at a whole range of things
that have happened, the overview and scrutiny committee has said,
"We don't mind them doing this but the reason why we are
referring it on is because we think that is wrong" and in
the meantime because of the process the position might be, "Actually,
since the overview and scrutiny committee made that referral the
strategic health authority has worked with the local primary care
trust and addressed that issue, so that particular service is
no longer provided over there where it was objected to, but it
is going to be provided here". The intervention, if you like,
can indirectly work because the process means that people will
try to find an agreement so that when it goes up to the Secretary
of State it may well be that there has been a compromise.[254]
267. A number of proposals were put forward to improve
the situation. Decisions at all levels should be taken transparently.
As Nigel Edwards told us:
There have been some examples where sometimes those
interventions have seemed to run quite counter to both logic and
local opinion and, therefore, I think we should be asking whoever
does intervene to be willing to be held to account for the same
tests about is it fair, is it logical, is it transparent and is
there no spin, which I think were your words, Richard. That seems
to me to be a sensible test to apply.[255]
268. One way to do this would be for the Secretary
of State to refer all cases to the Independent Reconfiguration
Panel and publish their advice, which she does not do at present;
indeed, the Independent Reconfiguration Panel is underused:
the independent reconfiguration panel is an interesting
idea, although, frankly, it seems to be more an idea than anything
else, and it can deal with difficult projects but my understanding
is that it has only dealt with a handful, it is completely up
to the Secretary of State when she refers to it and it is then
up to the Secretary of State what she does with its recommendationsif
there was something that was more properly independent and was
there on a more regular basis and was more robust
.clearly
if it was done properly it would be a good thing.[256]
269. When challenged on why the Secretary of State
sent so few cases to the reconfiguration panel the Minister was
not able to give a clear answer:
Something like 23 referrals have been received from
overview and scrutiny committees and that is out of hundreds of
changes that will have gone on with local NHS services. I think
four have now been referred to the Independent Review Panel. In
making those decisions, the Secretary of State obviously receives
advice from strategic health authorities and from the Department.
I do not feel that system is working badly.[257]
270. We also heard complaints that the Secretary
of State intervenes at too late a stage. Nigel Edwards told us:
I think the point is that there should be a clear
set of rules about at what point you intervene and that where
possible that intervention should come much earlier in the process
than it currently does. It tends to be rather late in the day
and in some cases intervention is already in many ways too late
because staff have started to leave, consultant posts cannot be
filled. I can think of one particular example where, despite the
Secretary of State's intervention, the service effectively fell
apart and all the Secretary of State did in that particular case
was keep a service that was probably dangerous continuing to run,
so it did not actually achieve what he had set out to do in the
first place.[258]
He continued:
If the question is about intervention on whether
the answer is the correct one, many of the interventions have
come too late in the day and could and should be made significantly
earlier. Last minute intervention is generally unhelpful and on
the whole should be discouraged, but it would be hard for us to
argue from where we sit that the Secretary of State does not have
some rights in this.[259]
271. In
theory there is a good system for consulting about important local
proposals for change. In practice, there is much frustration and
disappointment. Too often it seems to the public that decisions
have been made before the consultation takes place. Too often
NHS bodies have sought to avoid consultation under Section 11
about major issues. Unfortunately the Department of Health has
supported those NHS organisations in trying to limit the scope
of Section 11.
272. The Government
has proposed changes to clarify when consultation should take
place. We are not convinced that this will strengthen rather than
weaken the consultation process. Rather than amend the law it
may be better to make the existing legislation work by approaching
it in the spirit of the statutory guidance in Strengthening
Accountability. There is good practice in the NHS.
It should be followed.
273. The Secretary
of State's interventions following extensive local consultations
threatens to undermine public confidence in the consultation procedure
system. We are also concerned that few referrals from Overview
and Scrutiny Committees are subsequently referred by her to the
Independent Reconfiguration Panel. We recommend that the Secretary
of State refer all OSC referrals to the Panel. She should also
seek the advice of the Panel before exercising her extensive powers
to intervene in reconfigurations. The Panel is also available
for advice before formal consultation begins and wide use of this
advisory service should help to make formal consultation more
acceptable.
Patient and public involvement
at a national level
274. Recent years have seen increasing involvement
of patients and the public in national policy making, beginning
with the NHS Plan in 2000, which involved many organised
consumer and patient groups. Most recently, the Your Health,
Your Care, Your Say White Paper was the product of a very
large-scale consultation.
275. By their nature national policies tend to be
broad and far reaching in their scope, and are often controversial,
with a heavy political overlay. Because of this, there may be
a particular danger that consultation is seen merely as window
dressing, as a means of achieving post-hoc justification for decisions
that have already been taken behind closed doors. Professor Davies
described this "cosmetic" type of exercise as giving
consultation "a really bad name".[260]
However, this raises the difficult issue of exactly how much weight
it is desirable to give to the views of patients and the public
in decision-making of this scale. While on the one hand paying
insufficient heed to the views of patients and the public that
have been sought makes a mockery of the consultative process,
on the other hand certain key decisions about public spending
and the direction of national policy may be more appropriately
taken by elected representatives. According to Professor Celia
Davies, her experience of running a citizens' council for NICE,
the national advisory body on the efficacy and cost effectiveness
of different drug treatments, demonstrated that the public in
many cases do not want the responsibility for final decision making,
but simply to have had their views taken account of in that process:
We found that people were really keen to understand
what the issues were and the hard choices that the NHS faced.
They wanted to be assured that they had been heard; they wanted
to see their arguments in the final document. They did not want
to take the final decision; they wanted it to be taken elsewhere.[261]
276. So it seems that national consultation may be
a valuable tool, even when final decision-making needs ultimately
to rest with elected representatives. However, Professor Davies
argued that despite individual "initiatives about which people
become enormously enthusiastic", efforts to ensure involvement
in regional and Department of Health decisions remain "fragmented"
and lack a coherent strategy:
I think that there is still not a clear strategy
or map
there is perhaps over-enthusiasm and under-thinking.[262]
277. According to Ed Mayo, the voluntary sector "has
real life and energy when it comes to engaging in national policy
making" but is sometimes constrained because of a lack of
resources. He described the Long Term Medical Conditions Alliance
as "operating out of a large shoebox".[263]
Proposals for a coalition of voluntary organisations to give a
national voice with which to engage in national policy making
might help address this.
278. It is crucial
that national consultations cannot be open to the accusation of
being 'cosmetic'. However, where patient and public viewpoints
can make a genuine contribution to debate, consultation on national
policy may be valuable both in terms of enhancing accountability
and improving policy making, even if final decisions must ultimately
rest with elected representatives. We have heard that at a national
level patient and public involvement is fragmented and lacking
a coherent strategy; we recommend that the Government should address
this as a priority.
225 The Local Authority (Overview and Scrutiny Committees
Health Scrutiny Functions) Regulations 2002 (SI 2002, No. 3048) Back
226
Ev 233 (HC 278-II) Back
227
Ev 116 (HC 278-III) Back
228
Ev 199 (HC 278-II) Back
229
Traffic Study over A&E decision, Emma Clark, 24 November
2006, www.thisishertfordshire.co.uk ; see also www.westhertshospitals.nhs.uk/consultation Back
230
Written evidence from Volunteering England (PPI 159) [not printed] Back
231
Ev 256-260 (HC 278-II) Back
232
Ev 132 (HC 278-III) Back
233
Ev 133 (HC 278-III) Back
234
Ev 133 (HC 278-III) Back
235
Ev 132 (HC 278-III) Back
236
Q 359 Back
237
Q 358 Back
238
Q 371 Back
239
Q 364 Back
240
Ev 1 (HC 278-II) Back
241
Local Government and Public Involvement in Health Bill [Bill 77
(2006/07)] Back
242
Ev 53 (HC 278-II) Back
243
Q 215 Back
244
Ev 134 (HC 278-II) Back
245
Q 364 Back
246
Ev 233 (HC 278-II) Back
247
Ibid. Back
248
Q 400 Back
249
Ev 233 (HC 278-II) Back
250
Q 72 Back
251
eg. Q 357 Back
252
Q 388 Back
253
Ev 127 (HC 278-III) Back
254
Q 475 Back
255
Q 312 Back
256
Q 388 Back
257
Q 469 Back
258
Q 320 Back
259
Q 321 Back
260
Q 8 Back
261
Q 5 Back
262
Q 7 Back
263
Q 8 Back