Select Committee on Health Written Evidence


Supplementary evidence submitted by the NHS Confederation (PPI 142A)

ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE FROM THE NHS CONFEDERATION

  The Health Select Committee have requested examples from the NHS Confederation of incidents where the Department of Health or politicians have made illogical interventions at a late stage in the process of consultations on reconfiguring services. The NHS Confederation offers these examples to assist the Health Select Committee in determining whether it is a reasonable expectation that the Department of Health or politicians in the department have the right to intervene in this way and whether it should remain one.

EXAMPLE 1:  SPECIAL CARE BABY UNIT

  Work by the paediatricians across two hospitals suggested that the level of medical staffing may make the service unsafe but that it was not cost effective to increase staffing levels because the relatively low level of low birth weight babies would mean that there would be insufficient work to maintain their skills. The second hospital involved had a better unit but still required increased staffing to be safe. It was proposed that combining the units would create an enhanced service that might have reduced to requirement to send babies to more distant units. The research evidence for a relationship between quality and volume of work is often less good than many planners imply but in the case of premature babies the evidence for a volume effect is strong.

  A major problem with staffing in the SCBU led the Trust to decide that it needed to close the SCBU and consequently the Maternity Unit under emergency powers.

  The then Secretary of State intervened to order a review, which confirmed that the Trust was correct. The Secretary if State then requested a second review from an independent expert. This broadly confirmed the results of first. A third review by a government agency made some suggestions about managing the interim but did not lead to any substantially different conclusions. Several months later the Unit did close but in the meantime services had been very unsafe.

EXAMPLE 2:  PROPOSAL TO CENTRALISE SERVICES FROM TWO HOSPITALS TO ONE

  This involved a proposal to close two general hospitals which were both small and beyond the end of their useful life. The most sensible option was to site a new hospital on the same site as a major cancer centre.

  The Secretary of State at that time intervened to change the location to a new area on the grounds that it was socially deprived in a way that the other was not. There were four problems with this:

    —  the new location was very close to another very large teaching hospital and would have had a very adverse affect on it;

    —  the business case for the new hospital depended on retaining the flows of patients from both the hospitals, the new location meant that this was not possible and therefore it was not possible to create a financially viable institution;

    —  it is not clear that providing a hospital was in this instance the appropriate response to deprivation. If the issue is poor health as a result of deprivation then good primary care is what is required; and

    —  the new site was in a constituency of a government MP and the more logical option was not. This, probably unfairly, opened the process to accusations of political bias.

  The net result of this was that the hospital could not be built. Perversely this might not be such a bad outcome but the process by which it has come about is less than desirable.

EXAMPLE 3:  PROMISING TO MAINTAIN SERVICES

  In this example the Secretary of State at that time made a public commitment to maintain an A&E Department at a hospital mid way between two other A&E Departments both less than 10 miles away. This was against the advice of those responsible for planning services.

  Shortly after this the then Secretary of State intervened again following a separate review to approve the building of a PFI hospital to the east which meant that there was now under five miles between the two A&E Departments. This rendered the A&E at the hospital in the middle largely unviable.

NHS Confederation

6 March 2007





 
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