Appendix 1: Government response
This response addresses the Committee's recommendations
thematically rather than in the order in which they appear in
the report.
The scale of need — Overall levels of aid
to Burma
[Recommendation 1; Paragraph 19] We recognise
the huge challenges facing donors in assisting IDPs within Burma
and commend DFID for being one of only four donors to run a staffed
development programme within the country.
[Recommendation 6; Paragraph 32] Funding of aid
work in Burma is not a case of 'business as usual'. The risk of
funding reaching an illegal and repressive military junta must
be absolutely minimised. Political and humanitarian 'space' to
carry out the process of poverty reduction and humanitarian assistance
is highly constrained. Capacity amongst partner organisations
to spend aid money effectively is low. The co-ordination of aid
efforts is difficult and is currently done poorly. Overall, operating
conditions for aid agencies in Burma remain very challenging.
We respect DFID's determination to minimise the risk of any of
its funds finding their way into the exchequer of a brutal and
illegitimate regime.
Burma's people have suffered from 60 years of civil
war and 45 years of military rule. Poverty is widespread across
the country, with at least a third of the Burmese population living
below the poverty line—less than a third of a dollar a day
(at the market exchange rate). Many people are highly vulnerable.
This includes the internally displaced people on whom the IDC
report focuses. It also includes: the country's 18 million children—of
whom half do not complete primary school; the 340,000 people living
with HIV and those at high risk of exposure to the virus (especially
sex workers, the clients of sex-workers and their families, men
who have sex with men, and injecting drug users); the approximately
5 million people living in remote and border regions and ceasefire
areas where there are often few economic opportunities and limited
access to health and education services; and the 15 million landless
rural-poor. The recent protests have graphically demonstrated
the desperation that socio-economic decline has created in people
across the country.
Reaching these people, in the complex operating environment
of Burma is—as the Committee noted—difficult. But
it is not impossible. All of DFID's work is carried out within
the parameters set by the European Common Position on Burma. DFID
has developed an approach with robust mechanisms for regular monitoring.
Over the last four years, DFID has shown that it can work with
the UN, International NGOs, and Burmese local NGOs to help improve
the lives of poor people. For example, our support for work on
HIV and AIDS contributed to the distribution of 48 million condoms
and 1.1 million clean needles in 2005—four times more condoms
than in 2000, and four times more needles than in 2003. In 2005,
we worked with local NGOs to reach a total population of 190,000
IDPs from inside the country. Our support for one international
NGO has helped almost 100,000 poor farmers to buy low-cost high-quality
foot pumps. These foot pumps have allowed them to increase their
family incomes by an average of around $190 a year—money
that they spend on extra food (so their families can occasionally
eat meat and fish), improvement to their farms, and keeping their
children in school.
[Recommendation 5; Paragraph 30] It is our strong
belief that overall aid levels to Burma need to be significantly
boosted.
[Recommendation 7; Paragraph 32] Whilst there
is a need to address the significant constraints, we believe more
aid could and should be spent in Burma by DFID. The current UK
contribution of £8.8 million represents significant under-spending
compared to countries with similar poverty levels and human rights
records. DFID has quadrupled its aid budget for Burma in the last
six years and we recommend that this trajectory should continue,
with a further quadrupling by 2013. We also believe that the UK
Government should encourage other countries to provide greater
support for work within Burma. This would give Burma the opportunity
to make at least some progress towards the Millennium Development
Goals by the 2015 deadline.
We agree that in view of humanitarian needs, overall
aid levels to Burma need to rise and in that context, there is
a case for continuing to increase DFID support to Burma. Following
the increases in DFID's aid budget mentioned by the Committee,
DFID is currently the third largest OECD donor to Burma—after
Japan and the European Commission. DFID has allocated an additional
£1 million to meet the urgent new humanitarian needs in Burma
and ensure that vulnerable people do not suffer because of the
actions of the regime. Within limits dictated by the complex and
risky operating environment and the limitations on the capacity
of potential partners to absorb funds, we will be considering
an increase in funding for our programme in Burma following the
Comprehensive Spending Review settlement in October.
We also agree that it is important to encourage other
donors to do more to help address Burma's humanitarian situation.
We are already doing so, particularly through our leadership of
the development of well co-ordinated multi-donor mechanisms to
provide support for work on health (the six-donor Three Diseases
Fund) and education (UNICEF's five-donor primary education programme).
We will continue to encourage others to do more.
At the same time, we will continue to press the Burmese
authorities to respect the principles of humanitarian support
and improve access for independent, neutral humanitarian agencies
to vulnerable populations in Eastern Burma.
If Burma displayed a strong commitment to democracy
and poverty reduction, an economic package involving the UN, International
Financial Institutions and bilateral donors could be offered.
This could include the establishment of a multi-donor Trust Fund
to support health, education and other key sectors; support for
debt relief; financial and technical support for democratic elections;
an investment conference to attract foreign direct investment;
trade measures to facilitate Burma's entry into the global trading
system, support for civil society including the development of
a free media as well as continued humanitarian relief.
Co-ordination and communication
[Recommendation 10; Paragraph 42] Ideally, a situation
would exist where two complementary approaches, in-country and
cross-border, ensured even coverage in assistance to IDPs across
Burma. But unfortunately this complementarity remains elusive
at present. A key reason for this is the difficulty experienced
by organisations in communicating and hence co-ordinating their
work.
We agree that improved co-ordination of assistance
to Burma is essential and needs to involve both in-country and
cross-border groups. Donors need to work together to develop shared
analysis and approaches and ensure that the risks and opportunities
to effectively allocate and use aid in response to overall needs
are fully understood.
Co-ordination of support to IDPs is particularly
difficult. Because of the continuing conflict, both community-based
organisations working within Burma and cross-border groups have
to maintain the security of their operations to protect their
staff and their access to target populations, and to minimise
the risk of attacks on recipients of aid. Building trust between
organisations working from inside Burma and those working cross-border
is therefore a slow and difficult process. However there has been
gradual progress over the last year. DFID has funded a forum for
a range of community-based organisations working with IDPs from
inside the country. Over the last six months, the UN has facilitated
three focused sectoral discussions between NGOs and agencies working
from inside the country and cross-border, and in January 2007
the "Responding to Infectious Diseases in the Border Regions
of South & Southeast Asia" conference provided a useful
forum for discussion.
Co-ordination
[Recommendation 12; Paragraph 45] We agree that
the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN
OCHA), rather than any of the main bilateral donors, should take
the principal role in co-ordinating aid assistance but believe
that DFID should engage more wholeheartedly in helping to co-ordinate
assistance to IDPs. We welcome the appointment of a UN OCHA Co-ordinator
for Burma and believe that international NGOs should support his
work. We recommend that DFID support UN OCHA to carry out an urgent
mapping exercise of which IDPs are receiving assistance and where
gaps exist between in-country and cross-border assistance.
We agree that UN OCHA and the UN Humanitarian Co-ordinator
should lead efforts to improve co-ordination of aid assistance
to IDPs. We strongly advocated the decision to appoint a Humanitarian
Co-ordinator for Burma and have warmly welcomed OCHA's expanded
engagement in Burma, including the visit that OCHA's Deputy Emergency
Relief Co-ordinator Margareta Wahlstrom made to Burma in April
2007. We welcome the current OCHA mapping exercise of IDPs, their
needs and the responses. OCHA is currently working to establish
an Information Management Unit for Burma which will act as a central
collection point for information on needs, responses and gaps
across Burma. DFID is intending to support this initiative.
DFID has taken a lead role in seeking to improve
overall donor co-ordination on Burma, helping to bring together
donors with a focus on support inside the country and those with
a focus on support to and across the Thai border. For example,
DFID has been providing funding for a staff member working in
the office of the UN Resident Humanitarian and Co-ordinator. This
support has contributed to the establishment of an informal monthly
donor co-ordination meeting in Bangkok (which we will continue
to attend monthly from Rangoon once programme management responsibility
has moved). DFID has also given strong support to a study being
led by the European Commission to collect information on the current
interventions and systems and procedures of the donor community
in Burma. This work will lead to specific recommendations to the
donor community on how to improve co-ordination. We have emphasised
that improving the coordination of assistance to conflict affected
people should be included as an issue for discussion by the donors.
[Recommendation 25; Paragraph 85] We reiterate
that we welcome the appointment of a UN Office for the Co-ordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) Co-ordinator for Burma. We anticipate
that this step will help strengthen co-ordination of international
humanitarian assistance to refugees at the Thai-Burma border.
We note that neither UN OCHA nor the Humanitarian
Co-ordinator for Burma will have formal responsibility for the
co-ordination of aid to refugees in Thailand. UNHCR hold responsibility
for the co-ordination of assistance to refugees in Thailand.
Communication
[Recommendation 13; Paragraph 48] We believe that
DFID should do more to share information about its assistance
to IDPs, and more to encourage other organisations to do the same.
We accept the importance of maintaining the security of the work
being done, but believe it would be possible for DFID to enhance
communication by organising more 'closed door' meetings with trusted
partners.
We agree that improving communications about assistance
to IDPs is important. As a result of the ongoing conflict, improving
communications is sensitive and potentially dangerous and has
to be based on building mutual understanding and trust. As much
of our work with IDPs is through local community-based organisations,
it is essential that DFID respects their concerns about security.
We have encouraged them to discuss the details of their work directly
with other key interlocutors and helped them to produce better
communications tools, for example maps of their work. We believe
that the ongoing UN OCHA study will provide a valuable starting
point for further strengthening communications. We have also supported
broader fora—including a Wilton Park seminar on humanitarian
assistance in Burma in autumn 2006, which included a session on
support to displaced people and brought together representatives
from organisations working from Thailand with those from organisations
based inside Burma. And we have had regular bilateral meetings
with a range of NGOs, community-based organisations and lobby
groups to explain our general approach to providing support to
reduce poverty in Burma. Over the next year, we will do more to
meet a broader range of organisations on a regular basis.
A comparative advantage?
[Recommendation 17; Paragraph 67] DFID's view
that its funds "will add little extra value" to cross-border
assistance is divergent from what some other witnesses told us.
[Recommendation 18; Paragraph 70] We believe that
DFID's policy change to allow its funds to be spent cross-border,
but with no extra funds currently committed, has exacerbated the
existing problems in engaging productively with agencies carrying
out cross-border work and has unsurprisingly been perceived by
them as an empty gesture. As we have stated previously, there
is an urgent need for DFID, working closely with the UN Office
for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), to establish
comprehensively the needs of IDPs who can only be reached by cross-border
work, particularly in relation to the control of infectious diseases.
DFID must not hide behind its argument that is has a 'comparative
advantage' in working in-country. At the same time UN OCHA must
also address the failure of a significant number of bilateral
donors to properly fund in-country work, which has hindered an
effective, comprehensive approach. Cross-border assistance to
Burmese IDPs could be extended if more financial resources were
available. We recommend that DFID contribute to providing effective
relief to IDPs in eastern Burma and that it should commit funds
for cross-border assistance as part of an overall rise in aid
to Burma. We believe that, as a high priority, DFID should maximise
relief to IDPs in eastern Burma.
We agree it is essential that sufficient humanitarian
assistance reaches internally displaced people and other conflict
affected people living in Eastern Burma. Currently about 20% of
DFID's support is provided to that 5% of the Burmese population
living as refugees in Thailand, or living in or near conflict/cease-fire
areas along Burma's borders.
We recognise the importance of both cross-border
and in-country mechanisms for support to IDPs. The two mechanisms
should not be seen as being in competition; rather they are complementary
ways of reaching slightly different groups of very vulnerable
people. There should not be seen as being competition between
the two mechanisms; and implementers should do more to share information
and coordinate. Donors' responses should be guided by an objective
assessment of the situation on the ground. According to available
estimates around 100,000 IDPs are living in areas of current conflict
where only cross-border aid can reach them. Around 200,000-250,000
IDPs are estimated to be living in areas where they can only be
reached by groups providing assistance from inside the country;
and a further 100,000-150,000 people live in areas where it may
be possible for both cross-border groups and in-country groups
to reach them.
At the moment, more donors are providing support
through cross-border mechanisms than are funding in-country work
to reach IDPs: it is estimated that around US$7 million will be
provided cross border in 2007 compared to around US$1 million
through community based organisations working from inside the
country. We believe that, because of the knowledge and relationships
we have developed, we are currently better placed than other donors
to manage the risks associated with support to the in-country
groups, who represent at least 50% of total IDPs.
We believe that UN OCHA's on-going assessment of
humanitarian needs in Eastern Burma is crucial. It will provide
an independent analysis of the needs of IDPs and of the delivery
mechanisms available to address these needs. We will use OCHA's
assessment to inform future spending decisions on support to IDPs—including
consideration of additional support both from inside the country
and cross-border to address unmet needs. We will also encourage
other donors to do the same.
Mechanisms for support
[Recommendation 2; Paragraphs 22-23] Providing
funding to community-based organisations (CBOs), who often manage
their own clinics, schools and projects, is a way for donors to
assist IDPs without channelling funds through the military regime.
Such groups can go beyond emergency assistance to carry out crucial
sustainable development work at grassroots level. We recommend
that DFID increase substantially the funding it gives to CBOs
within Burma. Capacity-building and training of such groups is
a crucial complementary strategy if funding is to be used effectively.
Funding CBOs provides donors with the means to support human rights
and democracy work within Burma.
We agree with the Committee's recommendations. We
have gradually increased our support to community based organisations
working with IDPs. In addition to providing aid that directly
benefits displaced communities our support has also included a
strong component of training and capacity building. Community
based organisations working from inside the country are able to
work through their networks (often faith based) in areas close
to ongoing conflict that the UN and INGOs cannot access. We have
allocated £400,000 for support to IDPs through religious
organisations (Christian and Buddhist) within Eastern Burma in
2007.
We are also funding broader efforts to support sustainable
development and capacity building at the grassroots level. For
example we are providing £500,000 over three years for a
project to build the capacity of civil society organisations particularly
in ethnic areas. And we are currently establishing a new fund
(£3 million over three years) to help strengthen the capacity
of communities to address key development issues and build the
foundations needed for a functioning democracy.
[Recommendation 3; Paragraph 26] We recommend
that DFID begin appropriate funding of exile groups who carry
out crucial work both inside and outside Burma to support IDPs
and other vulnerable groups. Support to such groups would have
the simultaneous benefit of supporting and raising awareness about
the plight of IDPs, and of building capacity for a future democratic
transition. We believe that the exiled trade union movement and
women's groups are particularly worthy of support.
The UK government will consider applications for
funding by groups inside and outside Burma working on sustainable
development and democratisation in Burma. Any decision to fund
projects will depend on available resources, the impact of the
proposed projects, consistency with government strategy and what
other sources of funding are available to the applicants. DFID
funding for groups outside the country would need to meet strict
criteria concerning accountability and transparency, and be used
for clear purposes aimed at poverty reduction.
[Recommendation 20; Paragraph 74] Rape is used
as a weapon of war by the Burmese Army and we call on the UK Government
to make high-level representations about this atrocity to the
Burmese regime. We reiterate our recommendation above (see Paragraph
26) that DFID should fund women's groups working on and across
the border who document rape and other human rights abuses, and
provide women's health and education services. The Shan Women's
Action Network (SWAN) is one group particularly worthy of support.
We share the Committee's deep concern about cases
of rape as a weapon of war by some in the Burmese military. We
have helped to ensure that resolutions at the UN General Assembly
have called for an end to rape and sexual violence by armed forces
in Burma. Former FCO Minister Ian McCartney raised the issue with
the Burmese Ambassador on 15 June 2006 and in a letter to the
Burmese Foreign Minister on 5 July 2006. In the last 18 months
Ministers including then Foreign Secretary Jack Straw have met
representatives of Women's Groups including the Shan Women's Action
Network and the Women's League of Chinland. The government will
consider applications to fund projects focussed on the development
of women. As with the reply to Recommendation 3 any decision to
fund projects will depend on available resources, the impact of
the proposed projects, consistency with government strategy and
what other sources of funding are available to the applicants.
DFID funding for groups outside the country would need to meet
strict criteria concerning accountability and transparency, and
be used for clear purposes aimed at poverty reduction.
[Recommendation 9; Paragraph 41] It is clear to
us that NGOs working from inside Burma can reach IDPs who would
not otherwise receive assistance. Their work is crucial to providing
basic social services such as education and health to vulnerable
populations, and we believe that they deserve increased support
from donors.
We agree. International NGOs and UN agencies working
inside Burma are able to provide crucial assistance to a wide
range of vulnerable groups inside Burma, including gaining access
to some IDPs.
[Recommendation 16; Paragraph 62] Cross-border
aid may not be considered to be a neutral form of assistance and
it is highly dangerous. However it is the only way to reach IDPs
in several of Burma's conflict-affected states and we believe
that it can provide a cost-efficient and flexible way of delivering
emergency relief where no other options exist, but it must be
continually and robustly reviewed. Such funding must not detract
from the key humanitarian objective of ending conflict.
We agree. Cross border teams, travelling with soldiers
from the ethnic armed groups, are the only groups able to work
in conflict areas. Cross border assistance is therefore the only
way of reaching the roughly 100,000 IDPs living in these areas
(about 20% of all IDPs). In addition cross-border assistance may
be able to reach an additional 100,000-150,000 displaced people
living near conflict areas. However, cross-border aid is certainly
not an easy option. It is dangerous, it is not neutral and it
is extremely difficult to monitor. But where no other options
exist, these risks have to be balanced against the needs of IDPs.
[Recommendation 19; Paragraph 73] We believe that,
in addition to funding cross-border work, DFID should help to
ensure that assistance is focused on the most vulnerable IDPs,
including Shan populations and women. Women's sexual and reproductive
health needs to be prioritised. Cross-border health assistance
and clinics in IDP areas both require extra financial resources.
We recommend that education, especially for girls, should be another
priority for DFID and that it should fund cross-border assistance
to teachers and schools in IDP areas.
As noted above, we believe that UN OCHA's on-going
assessment of humanitarian needs in Eastern Burma is crucial.
It will provide an independent analysis of the needs of IDPs and
of the delivery mechanisms available to address these needs. We
will use OCHA's assessment to inform future spending decisions
on support to IDPs—including consideration of additional
support both from inside the country and cross-border to address
unmet needs in areas such as health and education.
[Recommendation 21; Paragraph 76] We recommend
that DFID scale up its funding of cross-border assistance over
the Chinese border. The Department should also look at the options
for starting to fund assistance over the Indian border. Support
to the Chin backpack health worker programme, operating over the
Indian border, would be one step towards assisting the many IDPs
facing dire poverty in Chin state.
We have supported cross-border primary health care
assistance from China to ceasefire areas in the Shan and Kachin
States of Burma for several years (current funding of £1.35
million over 4 years). Over the last three years we have also
started to support work on health and education in these areas
through International and National NGOs—including with funding
from the Three Diseases Fund. In Chin State we are providing livelihoods
assistance through UNDP—which is able to work in all townships
in Chin state and through Three Diseases Fund support. DFID staff
have travelled to these areas from inside the country to monitor
both cross border and in-country work. We are not convinced that
there is a strong case for a large-scale increase in cross-border
work in these areas because support from inside the country is
able to achieve greater coverage and is likely to be more sustainable.
But we do believe that additional support on some specific technical
issues may best be provided cross border. We will continue to
look carefully at the range of options for scaling up our support.
[Recommendation 14; Paragraph 52] Whilst we welcome
the Three Diseases Fund, and believe that DFID deserves credit
for helping to develop it, in its current form it will not reach
sufficient numbers of IDPs or other vulnerable groups living in
border and conflict areas. We recommend that DFID build on its
leadership role in helping to develop the Fund by supporting the
creation of a complementary mechanism that makes funding available
to organisations providing healthcare in the border areas.
We welcome the Committee's support for the Three
Diseases Fund, which we believe is a positive example of close
donor co-operation and coordination. It is not true to say that
funding from the 3D Fund is unlikely to reach the border areas.
The great majority of the people living in these areas can in
fact be reached by support from international NGOs or local NGOs.
The extensive work on mapping of services carried out by UNAIDS
shows a gradual increase in the area covered by HIV services—including
in the border areas and in ceasefire areas. Furthermore, allocations
of recently approved Three Diseases Fund support provide significant
amounts to Burma's border areas.
Our primary focus will be to increase the reach of
the 3D Fund's support from inside the country in order to maximise
the overall public health impact of international support. But
as a small proportion of the Burmese population (around 0.2%)
can probably only be reached cross border, we will also work with
our donor partners to identify creative ways of providing support
to these people. For example we recently helped to bring together
Norway and USAID to support a border based malaria project. Given
the scale of the operation, we do not consider that a specific
funding mechanism would be appropriate.
Dialogue with the regime
[Recommendation 15; Paragraph 55] The UK Government
needs to tread very carefully before beginning any kind of dialogue
with the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). However,
we believe limited engagement on specific poverty and humanitarian
issues should begin and that the most sensible approach would
be for DFID to do this as part of a group of international actors,
under the banner of the UN.
We agree. The recent protests have emphasised the
need for a process that will work towards genuine reconciliation
with all political and ethnic parties in Burma—and allows
all people to peacefully express their views. In dialogue with
the regime the UK Government strongly emphasises the importance
of bringing about positive political change, an improvement in
human rights, and an operating environment in which the international
community, including international humanitarian agencies, can
have confidence. However, working with the UN and other donors
we have initiated dialogues with the Burmese authorities around
the areas of health and primary education. We feel that these
dialogues have been productive in creating greater shared understanding
of challenges and areas of concern and contributing to some small
improvements in the technical policy framework (particularly in
the context of the national strategies for HIV, TB and malaria).
We are also interested in determining whether there may be an
opportunity to develop a UN led donor dialogue with the authorities
on the broader humanitarian situation.
[Recommendation 4; Paragraph 29] We are deeply
concerned by the closure of two ICRC [International Committee
of the Red Cross] field offices in Burma in March 2007 and the
damaging effect this will have on the international community's
ability to document abuses perpetrated against IDPs and other
vulnerable groups in Burma. We call on the UK Government to continue
to make representations to the Burmese authorities on this issue
at the highest level.
We share the deep concerns of the ICRC over the large-scale
violations of international humanitarian law committed by the
Burmese government against civilians. The UK Government released
a statement on 29 June condemning the Burmese government's failure
to cooperate with the ICRC in its efforts to alleviate the suffering
of the ordinary people of Burma and to assist mine victims and
prisoners. We are continuing to press for access for ICRC to those
monks and civilians detained during the recent protests.
DFID office relocation
[Recommendation 8; Paragraph 36] Whilst we welcome
the increase in staff capacity within Burma from three to 10 officials,
we are concerned that if DFID fully relocates management of its
Burma programme from Bangkok to Rangoon, it will impair DFID's
ability to engage with activities on the Thai-Burma border and
fulfil its proper part in a co-ordination role. We emphasise the
importance of DFID working independently and we therefore recommend
that DFID retain at least two senior, full-time members of staff
within the British Embassy in Bangkok. This will help in providing
an external perspective on displacement issues within Burma and
in supporting refugees, cross-border assistance and non-governmental
organisations based in Thailand.
[Recommendation 11; Paragraph 43] It is clear
to us that DFID's office relocation from Bangkok to Rangoon is
likely to impair its ability to fulfil its proper part in a co-ordination
role, as we stated above (see paragraphs 35-36). We also believe
that DFID is not currently fulfilling its responsibility as a
lead donor to tackle the problems of co-ordination.
[Recommendation 24; Paragraph 84] Our concern
about DFID's lack of engagement with the camps on the Thai-Burma
border is heightened by the decision to relocate the management
of DFID's Burma programme from Bangkok to Rangoon. We reiterate
the concern we expressed earlier about DFID's office relocation
from Bangkok to Rangoon and repeat our recommendation that at
least two senior, full-time members of DFID staff should be retained
within the British Embassy in Bangkok (see paragraph 36). This
staff presence will be crucial to enhancing DFID engagement with
the camps, carrying out a developmental analysis of the camps'
administration, co-ordinating assistance to refugees with the
FCO and supporting NGOs based in Thailand.
[Recommendation 32; Paragraph 95] We are concerned
that the relocation of DFID staff from Bangkok to Rangoon will
risk DFID being isolated from negotiations concerning refugees
in Thailand. This adds further weight to the case we have made
for retaining at least two senior, full time DFID staff members
within the Bangkok Embassy to provide support to refugee issues
and NGOs based in Thailand.
In May 2004 DFID decided to close its office in Bangkok
to enable DFID to focus human and financial resources away from
middle-income countries (like Thailand) towards fragile states
and other low-income countries. This will involve an increase
from three staff to ten staff. We believe that this change will
help to drive forward DFID's White Paper commitments to do more
in fragile states—DFID is one of the few donors to have
a presence in Burma and having more staff will strengthen our
capacity to understand what works in-country. It will allow us
to maximise co-ordination between the FCO and DFID effort in Burma.
At the same time senior civil servant oversight of the Burma programme
has been moved to London, closer to Ministers and parliamentarians
and closer to the debate, which takes place in London, about our
aid programme in Burma. The senior official will visit Thailand
regularly to meet with exile groups and cross-border groups.
We will put in place various arrangements to ensure
that the transfer of programme management to Rangoon will not
impair our ability to work independently, prevent us from working
to strengthen co-ordination, or have a negative impact on our
engagement with refugee issues in Thailand. First, we have made
a strong commitment to hold regular meetings with both democracy
campaigners and cross-border groups in Thailand. We will arrange
meetings at least every 3 months with those groups who provide
cross-border support, and with those who lobby for political change
from outside Burma. This will ensure a regular flow of information
and ideas.
Second, we will continue to engage with all donor
co-ordination initiatives both in Bangkok and Rangoon. The flight
from Rangoon to Bangkok only takes one hour. It is much easier
to reach Bangkok than many places inside Burma regularly visited
by DFID staff for project monitoring.
Third, the political section of the Embassy in Bangkok
will continue to work on Burmese refugee and IDP issues. We will
make more explicit DFID and the British Embassy's responsibilities
to ensure we coordinate closely on these issues.
Thailand-Burma Border Consortium: DFID funding
and engagement
[Recommendation 22; Paragraph 82] We were astonished
to hear that DFID has visited the refugee camps it funds so infrequently.
We believe that funding TBBC directly might improve communication
and encourage stronger engagement on DFID's behalf. We therefore
recommend that DFID reassess the continued value of funding TBBC
indirectly via Christian Aid.
Since 2003 seven visits have been made by DFID, fulfilling
all our standard monitoring and supervision requirements, and
including a ministerial visit. We would be content to fund TBBC
directly, but have not done so because TBBC have told us that
they prefer to be funded indirectly through NGOs because they
take on much of the administrative burden. We will raise this
again in early 2008 as part of the preparation of a new funding
package for TBBC.
[Recommendation 23; Paragraph 83] Although we
accept that the FCO has played a valuable role in visiting refugees,
allowing DFID and the FCO to have an interchangeable presence
at the camps is not the most effective way of overseeing the delivery
of aid. We were struck by the lack of developmental analysis of
the Ban Mai Nai Soi Camp and believe strong DFID engagement is
needed to rectify this. We recommend that DFID carries out a developmental
analysis of the camps; this is essential both to meet refugees'
needs appropriately and to provide value for donors' funds.
[Recommendation 27; Paragraph 89] We were disappointed
to witness the total gender imbalance in the various refugee vocational
and training schemes, with women confined to crafts which are
likely to have much less income earning potential. This is unacceptable.
DFID should engage proactively with all organisations involved
in training to ensure that this disparity is robustly addressed.
We agree that it would be useful for DFID to carry
out an independent development assessment of the camps including
a thorough assessment of gender and equality issues. We will do
this, ideally with other donors, in the fourth quarter of 2007,
as part of our preparations for the development of a new funding
package in support of Burmese refugees in Thailand in early 2008.
[Recommendation 26; Paragraph 88] We believe that
opening up official employment opportunities for refugees in Thailand
would be mutually beneficial to refugees and the Thai economy.
We recommend that DFID and the FCO increase their engagement with
the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and NGOs in negotiations with the
Royal Thai Government on expanding employment opportunities.
[Recommendation 28; Paragraph 90] We recommend
that DFID and the FCO seek the agreement of the Royal Thai Government
(RTG) to increase formal education opportunities, especially at
tertiary level. Restrictions on refugees' freedom to leave the
camps, and for teachers and educators to enter the camps, are
a key factor in limiting educational opportunities. DFID and the
FCO should negotiate with the RTG for
more flexibility in entering and leaving the camps, so that
refugees' education and employment opportunities can be improved.
Through the Embassy in Bangkok, and alongside other
donors, we shall continue to raise our concerns over the status
of Burmese refugees and their access to education and employment
opportunities. We shall continue to co-operate closely with the
UNHCR to encourage the Thai authorities to take all practical
steps, consistent with their resources and interests, to offer
the refugees as full a life as is practicable. Donors, including
UK, are working with TBBC, UNHCR and the Royal Thai Government
to develop a medium term strategy that will address the sustainability
of support to the refugee camps.
[Recommendation 29; Paragraph 92] We recommend
that the UK Government take steps to ensure that resettlement
of refugees through the Home Office's Gateway Protection Programme
does not create a sudden diminution in capacity amongst the camp
populations and leave camps with gaps in their skilled workforce.
The UK Government must also advocate on this issue in co-ordination
with other governments, particularly the USA. DFID should actively
engage with the Royal Thai Government in the policy debate on
resettlement issues to contribute to a developmental analysis
of refugees' needs.
The British Government considers for resettlement
up to 150 Burmese refugees from Thailand each year under the Gateway
Protection Programme. The UK's criteria for considering cases
are based on protection need rather than skill sets. We consider
that all refugees with a need for protection should have equal
access to the ability to apply for resettlement and are committed
to providing protection to those who need it as identified by
UNHCR. We will continue to work with other donors and resettlement
countries to minimise the impact of the resettlement programme
on the skills sets in the refugee camps.
[Recommendation 30; Paragraph 93] What started
as a temporary refugee influx on the Thai-Burma border has become
a long-term humanitarian problem. The Thailand-Burma Border Consortium
and the NGOs working under the Committee for the Co-ordination
of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand umbrella deserve
credit for the food, shelter and health services they provide
within the camps. But we believe they cannot be—and cannot
reasonably be expected to be—responsible for or involved
in all refugee needs, especially training, employment, policy
development and resettlement strategies.
[Recommendation 31; Paragraph 94] We believe a
strategic reassessment is required of the appropriate mechanism
for dealing with the long-term interests of refugees. A clear
delineation is needed between TBBC and other NGOs' work in providing
food and basic services to refugees on the one hand, and the UN
Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Royal Thai Government and third country
governments' sustainable solutions for the refugee crisis, including
employment and resettlement, on the other.
We agree. As described above, donors, including DFID,
are working with TBBC and the Royal Thai Government to develop
a medium term strategy that will address the sustainability of
support to the refugee camps.
Refugees on other borders
[Recommendation 33; Paragraph 97] We recommend
that the UK Government begin a dialogue with the Government of
India about the status of and the assistance given to Burmese
refugees in India and we reiterate our recommendation that DFID
look at the options for starting to fund assistance to Burmese
refugees over the border with India.
The British Embassy in Delhi will look for opportunities
to raise the situation of Burmese refugees in India with the state
and central governments, both during visits to Mizoram and other
North Eastern states, and as part of the UK's dialogue with the
Government of India on Burma. DFID officials will look further
at the options for assistance to those refugees.
Other states' engagement with Burma
[Recommendation 34; Paragraph 99] We recommend
that the UK Government, at the highest levels, regularly raise
the subject of India's engagement in Burma with the Government
of India. India's uncritical relationship with the regime, and
its appetite for arming and investing in the country, risks perpetuating
Burma's illegal and brutal regime.
The Foreign Secretary raised the crisis in Burma
with the Indian Foreign Minister, during their meeting in London
on 3 October. Other approaches have been made to the Indian Government,
including at senior official level subsequent to the Foreign Secretary's
meeting. In all exchanges, the Indian Government has been encouraged
to lend its efforts to help promote a process of genuine reconciliation
in Burma. The Prime Minister has also undertaken to continue using
his contacts with leaders in the region to encourage them to play
their part with the Burmese leadership.
The EU Troika has also raised its concerns in New
Delhi about the human rights situation in Burma with the Indian
Government in response to a report suggesting that India was planning
to sell Advanced Light Helicopters to the Burmese regime. These
representations will have reinforced with the Indian Government
the seriousness with which the EU, including the UK, views the
situation in Burma. We continue to encourage India to use their
contacts with the regime to deliver strong messages on the need
to restore democracy and respect human rights.
[Recommendation 35; Paragraph 100] We were extremely
alarmed to hear that Russia has agreed to build a nuclear research
reactor for Burma. We call on the UK Government, together with
the international community, to bring pressure to bear on the
Russian Government not to proceed with the reactor and to acknowledge
the hardships the initiative would impose on the Burmese people.
We share the Committee's concern. Following the announcement
of Russia's agreement with Burma to design and build a nuclear
reactor, officials at our Embassy in Moscow raised our concerns
with the Russian Ministry for Foreign Affairs. They have assured
us that any export of materials to Burma will be subject to IAEA
monitoring and safeguards agreements.
Department for International Development
16 October 2007
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