House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development Written Evidence

Memorandum submitted by Christian Aid

2005-06: AN OVERVIEW

Christian Aid has worked in the Middle East for more than 50 years. In that time, together with our partners, we have witnessed poverty, insecurity and conflict. Today we face unsustainable levels of all three which threaten the whole region and beyond. At the heart of all this lies the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Christian Aid believes that a two-state solution would help both impoverishment and insecurity to be effectively addressed. We are also clear that this solution requires recognition of each other's existence by both parties and a rejection of all violence.

Palestinians will remember 2006 with bitterness. In the first eight months of the year, 335 Palestinians have lost their lives to the conflict with Israel—251 were civilians; 64 of them children. [11]Without aid and despite temporary funding measures, many Palestinian Authority (PA) public sector workers have gone unpaid for six months, and essential services, such as healthcare and education, are being severely compromised.

It is the year in which Palestinians sought to embrace democracy again, only to see their government of choice isolated once more—not just by Israel this time, but by most of the international community. The newly elected PA is dominated by Hamas who, so far, has refused to recognise the state of Israel or renounce the use of violence. It is also the year that some thought would bring improvements after five years of bloody conflict during the second intifada.

In 2005, Israel evacuated settlers from Gaza and redeployed troops to the perimeter of the Strip, albeit unilaterally and without coordination. But elsewhere illegal Israeli settlement expansion has continued apace: on 4 September 2006, another 690 settlement housing units were announced for the West Bank and East Jerusalem. With approximately 400,000 Israeli settlers already living in illegal settlements, the Quartet's proposed viable Palestinian state is illusory to most Palestinians, who see their land continually fragmented into Israeli-controlled zones.

Israeli closures continue to prevent meaningful planning or access to markets. Price inflation of basic necessities, such as fuel, challenges the poorest, while medical and food supplies are in constant jeopardy because of the frequent closures that Israel imposes in the name of security.

Recent World Food Programme assessments indicate that 51% of Palestinians are unable to cover their families' daily food requirements without external assistance. This is a 14% increase in the past year. [12]It is hard to imagine how a state without defined borders, with restricted access to internal and external markets, without control of its international borders, and without sustained international support can even begin to tackle such humanitarian issues.

"If the international community cannot... take some action, [it] must not be surprised if the people of the planet disbelieve that they are seriously committed to the promotion of human rights," UN special rapporteur in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), John Dugard told the UN Human Rights Council in September 2006. [13]

1. A bleak future

1.1 Both Israelis and Palestinians have been ill-served by the international community. Unilateralism and ethnic and religious nationalism have thrived but, unsurprisingly, this has not taken any peace process forward. The war on terror has obscured the political landscape through community alienation and vilification and ensured an entrenchment of positions that perpetuate militarism and conflict. In this climate, poverty and hatred are the only winners.

1.2 The fragmentation of the OPT by Israel is only one of a number of obstacles to the development of a viable Palestinian state. The international community has made formulaic statements, but has yet to offer any sustained actions designed to influence Israeli policies or protect Palestinian territorial contiguity and rights. Apart from the humanitarian consequences of such a dereliction of duty, it contravenes, undermines and therefore devalues international law.

1.3 A viable Palestinian state seems as far away as ever, while Israel appears to use security as the only benchmark of its own viability. Until viability is unpacked and given meaning, the same disastrous pattern of poverty and conflict that we face today will be with us long into the future.

1.4 In 2003 development agencies, including Christian Aid, gave evidence to the International Development Select Committee. They described in detail how Israeli occupation and Palestinian Authority corruption had a negative impact on the daily lives of Palestinians. Christian Aid warned that:

1.4.1 Under tighter Israeli occupation, aid has become a lifeline—but it is a lifeline that does not provide a long-term solution... No amount of aid will resolve the political conflict over the Israeli occupation or bring about the peace which Israelis and Palestinians so desperately need. The solution to Palestinian poverty is an end to occupation and an agreement which recognises the right of Israelis and Palestinians alike to live in peace and security. [14]

1.5 The situation today is far worse, so we need to repeat these comments again today with even greater urgency. World Bank director in the OPT, A. David Craig, warns that: "We are now facing a severe economic crisis in Gaza and the West Bank—one that risks reversing the combined efforts of the past 13 years towards a sustainable economy." The same report predicted that, if current trends continue, poverty rates will rise to 74% by 2008. [15]

2. Isolation and the suspension of aid to the Palestinian Authority

2.1 Prior to Palestinian elections, Bernard Sabella, from Christian Aid partner the Middle East Council of Churches, told us during a visit to Jerusalem in 2005: "What everyone expects and prays for is a sort of national consensus on major political issues. We are in need of unity and we are in need of a Palestinian position which is supported by all." He warned that "the weakening of the PA would have dire circumstances for all of us."

2.2 In January 2006, Hamas won control of the PA after free and fair elections. This was swiftly followed by the suspension of EU aid, following Hamas' refusal to accept three principles (or conditions) laid down by the Quartet: committing to non-violence, recognising Israel's right to exist and accepting existing agreements.

2.3 As a direct result of this isolation, Palestinians are facing worsening economic and political conditions. For example, at a House of Commons meeting in June 2006, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that 78% of Gazans are now without an income—in part because of the PA's inability to pay teachers, nurses and other public sector workers. Sixty-four per cent of Palestinians are living below the poverty line in 2006—compared to 54% in 2005[16] and 20% in 1998. This means that the majority of the Palestinian population now exist on less than £1.10 a day.

2.4 Christian Aid partner Medical Relief Societies told us in May 2006 that people have started referring to "luxury" diseases such as diabetes, cancer and kidney failure. These conditions all require costly medicine and treatment such as insulin, chemotherapy and dialysis, which were either running out or unavailable due to lack of funds to the Palestinian Ministry of Health.

2.5 According to signed agreements, Israel should remit to the PA taxes and customs levied in Israel on goods destined for the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, Israel has suspended this transfer of tax revenues, which have, at times, made up two-thirds of the total PA revenue. Some reports suggest that in 2005, this amounted to some US$740 million—approximately 13% of the PA's gross disposable income. [17]The suspension has therefore greatly contributed to the economic malaise in the OPT.

2.6 The temporary funding mechanism for Palestinian basic needs, agreed by the Quartet and the European Council, does not address the root causes of poverty, serving instead as an inadequate band aid. Indeed this development of a parallel funding structure through the Palestinian president's office undermines those ministries that have, since 1993, been delivering public services.

2.7 As the PA struggles to function and provide vital services—including law enforcement—crime and political division thrive. Christian Aid partner the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, based in Gaza, regularly expresses its concern over the continuation of internal violence, including the use of weapons in personal and family disputes, which aggravates the current state of security chaos in the OPT. In July and August 2006, 25 people were killed in Palestinian factional violence. [18]

2.8 In September 2006, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) told the UN in New York that: "Strangulation of commerce and trade had ruined the economy, brought the institutions of government to a near-meltdown, and badly shaken the society. Those pressure tactics had not resulted in a desire for compromise on the part of the government or the people, but rather, had created mass despair, anger, and a sense of hopelessness and abandonment." [19]

2.9 The Palestinian humanitarian situation continues to teeter on the brink of crisis. For many families living in abject poverty and insecurity, that threshold has already been crossed. For them, the international community has chosen to contribute to what they believe amounts to collective punishment.

RECOMMENDATIONS

— In the short term, international aid should be given to PA institutions responsible for delivering essential humanitarian services, including healthcare and education, to prevent poverty levels rising further.

— Movement must be made on the Quartet's conditions by all parties concerned. In particular:

— Hamas-led PA should immediately recognise the state of Israel and renounce violence as a method of achieving political ends.

— The Quartet governments should develop a dialogue with the PA and work with them to continue along the democratic path including establishing law and order and transparent government.

— In line with its obligations under the Oslo Accords and Paris Protocol, Israel should immediately transfer Palestinian tax revenues to the PA and allow Palestinians free access to markets.

3. Obstacles to movement: physical occupation

3.1 "Our borders are closed and we feel trapped. What kind of future do we have?" asked Naila Ayesh, director of Christian Aid partner the Women's Affairs Centre in Gaza in July 2006. This is the question that dominates all Palestinian lives, whether they live in the West Bank, Gaza Strip or East Jerusalem.

3.2 Movement within the OPT continues to be a constant source of frustration for Palestinians. For example, since January 2006, an average of 508 manned and unmanned physical obstacles—such as armed permanent checkpoints, flying checkpoints, earth mounds and walls, locked metal gates, concrete road blocks, trenches and fences—have been imposed on the West Bank. [20]The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) also impose curfews as a method of population control whenever it considers security to be at risk. These obstacles effectively cut the West Bank into distinct areas, with restricted movement between them. As a result, travel between Palestinian population centres has become severely limited.

3.3 Gaza has effectively been sealed off despite the agreement brokered by US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in November 2005 between Israel and the PA which intended to provide access for people and goods to the outside world. Palestinians cannot travel between there and the West Bank, whether for education, work or family visits. The Karni crossing—the main point of entry and departure for humanitarian supplies and commercial goods—was closed for 42% of the time between January and August 2006. Other crossings, including the Rafah crossing to Egypt and the Nahal Oz energy pipelines, are subject to similar Israeli-imposed closures.

3.4 In July 2006, during Operation Summer Rain, the Israeli military action that followed the capture of an Israeli soldier, closures meant that essential food, including humanitarian relief, and critical fuel supplies fell below the population's minimum requirements. Estimated daily needs of diesel in Gaza are 700,000 litres. In July 2006 the average volume of daily imports through Nahal Oz was only 205,307 litres. [21]

3.5 Christian Aid partner the Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC) explained to us how closures in Gaza have meant that farmers cannot rely on exports to market their produce and have to sell them internally below the cost of production.

3.6 As is now well-documented, Israel's construction of the separation barrier is sealing off the West Bank. Once it is completed, access will only be through Israeli military checkpoints and armed gates. Rarely following the Green Line, which marks the division between the West Bank and Israel, the wall has cut communities off from each other and from their land.

3.7 As we reported in our 2003 submission to this committee, "No other single event or development, our partners report, is creating such conflict or such acute poverty—heightening the sense of crisis, despair and powerlessness, and stripping Palestinians of their land and livelihoods." [22]This is as true today as it was then. The only difference is that more of it has now been built.

3.8 In East Jerusalem, the separation barrier cuts through Palestinian communities within the city itself, and separates them from other parts of the OPT. Palestinian East Jerusalem has traditionally been the centre of the West Bank's political, commercial, religious and cultural activities, with Palestinians operating as one cohesive social and economic unit. Separation from the rest of the West Bank is affecting the economy, weakening the social fabric and isolating East Jerusalemites from Palestinians in the remainder of the OPT. Christian Aid partner B'Tselem—an Israeli human rights organisation—describes it thus: "The barrier cuts East Jerusalem off from the rest of the West Bank, obstructing access to the city's hospitals and other services, separating families and disrupting normal social life." [23]

3.9 Since Israel's occupation of the eastern part of Jerusalem in 1967, Palestinian access to Jerusalem from the West Bank has been increasingly restricted. They have been banned entry from the West Bank and Gaza without a permit since 1993. Settlements and bypass roads have further restricted access in Jerusalem, while the separation barrier has exacerbated the situation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

— The UK government must take a lead and use its influence with the Israeli government to see that construction of the separation barrier is halted and existing sections in the West Bank dismantled.

— The UK government should also use its influence to pressure the Israeli government for an immediate freeze on settlement construction in line with its obligations under international law.

— Land confiscated from Palestinians should be returned immediately, and compensation provided for damage to homes, agriculture and infrastructure.

4. EU trade relationships with Israel and the Palestinians

4.1 The humanitarian and development situation in the OPT is not only affected by the financial assistance that the UK and EU choose to give, but also by the way that the EU decides to manage its bilateral relations with the two parties in pursuit of policy objectives, such as the free exchange of goods and services; cross-border cooperation; and peace, stability and respect for human rights and international humanitarian law. Such objectives are pursued through bilateral agreements between the parties which constitute the backbone of the operative side of the UK and EU's external relations or foreign policy.

4.2 The way bilateral agreements with the two parties are managed and the way they operate in relation to the violations of international humanitarian law and human rights have direct and indirect effects on the humanitarian situation on the ground. Under EC law, the EU is obligated to not agree to finance or otherwise assist in implementing any action or measure that violates a rule of general international law. Furthermore, if it is aware of any violations, the EU must act to prevent the implementation of any action or measure it finances or otherwise assists. Finally, it must not accept or acquiesce to serious breaches of international law, and may not aid or assist in maintaining the situations resulting from them.

4.3 Respecting and upholding this general principle is essential if the EU wants to achieve development. If the UK and EU choose to accommodate third-state violations of international humanitarian law that can negatively impact on development, they are both contributing to a worsening humanitarian situation and working against their own policy objectives.

4.4 The EC-PLO (on behalf of the PA) Agreement provides the framework for increased Palestinian exports to the EC and aims to stimulate institution and state building and provide a foundation for viable economic life and self reliance. All agreements between the EU and the PA are currently de facto suspended but the EU-PA-association agreement has long been prevented from operating, primarily by the Israeli government's restrictions on mobility.

4.5 In addition, all trade must pass through Israeli ports, as Israel has destroyed the Palestinian air and sea ports that would have allowed Palestinians to export independently of Israel. The destroyed ports were built with Israel's permission and funded by the EU and its member states.

4.6 Christian Aid has provided extensive documentation that the government of Israel's internationally unlawful settlement policies are one of the root causes of the Palestinian people's poverty and development problems. Nevertheless, the UK and the EU's management of the association agreement with Israel has for a long time accommodated—even bordering on acquiesced to—Israel's settlement policies.

4.7 Israel has insisted on implementing and applying all its agreements with the EU—including the EU-Israel association agreement—by treating the settlements as part of the territory of the state of Israel and insisting that the EU accepts this practice. This is in contravention of both international humanitarian law and the agreement itself.

4.8 In the case of the EU-Israel association agreement, Israeli customs authorities have certified settlement products as "made in Israel". This has led, over an extended period of time, to a situation where the EU has found itself unable to prevent the illegal import of products from settlements under duty preferences reserved for products coming from Israel. In February 2005, the EU, after long negotiations, agreed to a so-called "technical arrangement" with Israel. This enabled Israel to continue to treat the settlements as part of the state, by labelling their produce as "made in Israel" but with an added postcode of origin.

4.9 Israel continues to apply the agreement in contravention of international humanitarian law. By making no attempt to put an end to Israel's misapplication, the EU and UK have actually accommodated Israel's insistence on continuing its internationally unlawful settlement-related practice under the EU-Israel agreement.

RECOMMENDATIONS

— The UK government should review all bilateral and EU contractual relations with the actors in the region to ensure that there is no room for any of those actors to implement their sides of their relationships through: acts of terrorism; the establishment of settlements and related infrastructure; torture; house demolitions; the construction of the separation barrier; or any other violation of international humanitarian law and human rights law.

— The UK government should propose at the GAERC meeting in Brussels on 11-12 December that all EU contractual relations with the two parties be reviewed, including the Association Agreements and the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument.

— The UK should, in alignment with other European states, support EU Council positions that uphold the general principle that the EU must respect international law in the exercise of its powers.

5. A viable Palestinian state and development

5.1 Any sovereign state must be able to control its own borders, internal movement, air space, natural resources and territorial waters. While these are all important criteria for establishing economic viability, they are also critical elements that enable a state to exercise political and social control and organisation. Citizens of a viable state must be able to move freely in order to access education, medical care and employment, and for family and social visits.

5.2 While the Israeli occupation is the underlying cause of poverty in the OPT, the absence of good governance has exacerbated impoverishment by exposing Palestinians to endemic corruption and ineffective political representation. Christian Aid has presented its findings in support of these statements in a number of reports. [24]

5.3 Occupation is the main obstacle that Palestinians face on a daily basis and that undermines the viability of a Palestinian state. The apparatus that supports and perpetuates occupation—the settlements, the separation barrier and the closures—prevent Palestinians from going about their daily business and denies them their rights and access to their cultural and historical legacies.

5.4 Palestinians also need to address their own internal divisions. A viable state cannot function with competing security forces. Internal political stability and the development of democratic principles are essential if the state is to deliver services for its people—not least the poorest. Investors will require transparent government and social and political cohesion, as well as an end to Israeli occupation, before they consider the OPT as a viable, let alone attractive, market.

5.5 Insecurity thrives in situations where poverty, injustice and lawlessness are prevalent. The current impasse between Israel and the Palestinians fuels insecurity while genuine viability offers the best hope for future generations on both sides.

5.6 International Humanitarian Law—including the Fourth Geneva Convention and Hague Regulations— and Human Rights Law were established to protect civilians in times of conflict and peace, and to guide conflict resolution. Most international legal opinion considers that Israel's policies and actions in the OPT are unlawful but, thus far, no state has taken responsibility for their legal and moral obligation to hold Israel to account.

5.7 The wider political consequences of all the above are that prospects for a two-state solution with East Jerusalem as its capital are rapidly diminishing. Levels of settlement activity, including around East Jerusalem, make it harder to determine what is Palestinian and how it is linked to the West Bank, let alone the Gaza Strip.

RECOMMENDATIONS

— A viable Palestinian state alongside a viable Israeli state, that protects the rights and security of Palestinians and Israelis, needs to be explicitly defined by the Quartet.

— The Fourth Geneva Convention, along with other International laws, should be enforced as an impartial way to resolve this conflict and protect its reputation for future conflict resolution elsewhere.

6. The de-development of Palestinian civil society

6.1 Palestinians often describe how occupation has led to the fragmentation of civil society, especially among young people. More than 45% of the OPT's population are below the age of 15, [25]and it is they who are most affected by violence, unemployment, discrimination, exclusion and restricted access to social services such as health and education. Young Palestinians are also often abused as tools for political violence.

6.2 This long-term consequence of the occupation has meant that Palestinian youth face huge difficulties in assuming positions of responsibility that foster critical leadership within their society. This is coupled with the fact that the dire economic situation in the OPT means that young people often have no choice but to be financially responsible for their families.

6.3 In addition, the movement and travel restrictions mean that Palestinian youth have had no engagement with Israelis on a personal level other than as military occupiers. Having only experienced oppression, their views and opinions are often negative towards Israel. Furthermore, Palestinians who formerly worked in Israel and tried to maintain friendships there have been prevented from doing so, which will also have a detrimental effect on attitudes. This does not bode well for future peace-making prospects.

6.4 Palestinians have embraced democratic elections, but they have seen a negative reaction from the international community to their choice. In addition to free and fair elections, democracy also embraces accountable governance, the rule of law and negotiation over violence. With that in mind, civil society groups, including Christian Aid partners, warn that it is difficult to build support for democracy and human rights when their own government's capacity to rule is severely compromised and Israel can violate the rights of Palestinians without any censure from the international community.

6.5 Building independent executive, legislative and judicial government bodies is essential. Much of what was developed with international aid has been systematically destroyed over the past few years. Long-term institutional support is therefore essential in terms of resources and effective training. And, while reform and support to the PA are essential, so too is assistance to civil society, to enable it to act as part of a viable state that holds its governing bodies to account.

RECOMMENDATIONS

— The UK government's development assistance to the Palestinians must be seen in its political context to avoid repeating the failure of previous peace initiatives. Aid will be ineffective unless the underlying causes of economic and political crisis are addressed, that is, Israeli occupation.

— UK government assistance should achieve a balance between support to the PA and civil society.

7. Disengagement and disorder

7.1 Since August 2005, Gazans have been able to travel freely within the Gaza Strip. The settlers have left and the military checkpoints that divided the Strip into three parts have been dismantled. Political leaders in European capitals heralded this Israeli move as a much-needed breakthrough towards peace. However, most Palestinians condemned the unilateral move as uncoordinated and an attempt to consolidate settlements in the remainder of the OPT.

7.2 The unilateral withdrawal aimed to establish that the Gaza Strip was no longer occupied, thereby relieving Israel of its duties as the occupying power. In reality, Israel has retained effective control of the Gaza Strip and consequently has never ceased its occupation. [26]

7.3 According to Christian Aid partner Al Haq, a human rights organisation based in the West Bank, Israel retains control of the civil population registry. Israel continues to control Gaza's land borders, air space and territorial sea and border crossings, regulating the entry and exit of people, goods and services. External freedom of movement has actually worsened since the withdrawal, and there has been a severe breakdown in law and order, resulting in a proliferation of armed groups that are not accountable to the PA.

7.4 Gaza's only domestic power plant was destroyed by Israeli air strikes on 28 June 2006, leaving the entire Gazan population with only intermittent power. Today, more than two months later, Gazans are still receiving as little as six to eight hours of electricity per day, and are largely dependent on insufficient, costly generators which are reliant on sporadic fuel supplies. [27]

7.5 The lack of electricity has critically affected Gaza's water supplies and sewage systems, as both depend on electricity to power the pumps. Sporadic access to water supplies means that ordinary Gazans are unable to meet their everyday needs related to drinking water, personal hygiene and washing clothes.

7.6 As Sara Roy points out in the London Review of Books, disengagement has not solved frustrations in Gaza and in some cases has exacerbated them:

7.6.1 In 2004, a Harvard study concluded that by 2010 the increase in Gaza's population would require the "creation of some 250,000 new jobs... to maintain current employment rates at 60%, and the establishment of an additional 2,000 classrooms and 100 primary healthcare clinics annually to bring access to education and public health services at par with the West Bank."

7.6.2 The Disengagement Plan stated that Israel would reduce the number of Palestinians working in Israel and exclude them altogether by the end of 2007. The same Harvard study predicted that within a few years Gaza's labour force will be "entirely unskilled and increasingly illiterate". Between 1997 and 2004, the number of teachers per student declined by 30%, with 80 students per class in government schools and 40% in UNRWA schools. Test scores for Palestinian children are well below the pass level, and the majority of eight-year-olds fail to advance to the next grade. [28]

7.7 The disengagement plan has not, so far, established connections between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. The Oslo agreement stated that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were "one territorial unit", but that has never assumed any real meaning. Gaza's population is effectively imprisoned and the West Bank, east Jerusalem and Gaza Strip are being driven apart rather than developed as a sovereign state.

RECOMMENDATIONS

— The UK government must ensure that the conditions for Palestinian economic development are not obstructed including: establishment of a safe passage between the West Bank and Gaza Strip; treatment of the OPT as a single sovereign unit; ensure access to markets is not obstructed.

October 2006

11 Source: Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (figures relate to period 1 January 2006 to 6 September 2006). Back

12 World Food Programme website 2006, www.wfp.org Back

13 Reuters Foundation press release, 26 September 2006. Back

14 Christian Aid submission to IDSC, September 2003. Back

15 "World Bank sees worst year for Palestinian economy"-Reliefweb, 14 September 2006, www.reliefweb.int Back

16 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, Expenditure and Consumption Survey, Press Release July 2005. Back

17 The Jerusalem Fund, Palestine Center Information Brief No 135, 18 April 2006. Back

18 UNOCHA The Humanitarian Monitor, No 4, August 2006. Back

19 UNRWA's noon briefing, UN headquarters, 7 September 2006. Back

20 UNOCHA Humanitarian Update, June/July 2006. Back

21 Ibid. Back