Memorandum submitted by the Palestinian
Grassroots Anti-Apartheid Wall Campaign
1. THE PALESTINIAN
GRASSROOTS ANTI-APARTHEID
WALL CAMPAIGN
1.1 The Palestinian Grassroots Anti-Apartheid
Wall Campaign is a coalition of Palestinian non governmental organisations
and popular committees that mobilise and coordinate efforts on
a local, national and international level. These efforts are focused
upon stopping and dismantling the Apartheid Wall, and resisting
Israeli occupation and colonization.
1.2 A call for a coordinated, popular, and
grassroots effort to tear down the Wall came out of Jerusalem
on 2 October 2002, from the office of the Palestinian Environmental
NGOs Network (PENGON). From this moment the Anti-Apartheid Wall
Campaign was born. The Campaign initiated its work on three levels:
acting as the voice of communities locally; mobilization and coordination
nationally; and additionally as part of the global struggle against
colonization, war and racism.
1.3 Since its inception the Campaign has
been the main national grassroots body mobilizing and organizing
resistance against the Apartheid Wall. The Campaign is works as
an independent body with its own board, and coordinates the work
of 54 popular committees in communities which are being destroyed
by the Wall.
2. SUMMARY OF
EVIDENCE
2.1 The response of the UK, World Bank and
EC to the January elections has been disastrous for Palestine,
creating economic hardship and supporting Israeli policies in
breach of international law.
2.2 The appropriate response to the election
of Hamas would have been for the international community to respect
democratic elections instead of creating double standards whereby
Israeli governments are committing unpunished all sorts of war
crimes while the new Palestinian "government"[206]
has not even been given the chance to govern.
2.3 Any "development" under the
current situation entrenches the occupation and puts the donor
community itself in contradiction with the decision of the International
Court of Justice. Genuine "development" will only be
possible after a complete removal of the occupation from Palestinian
territory. As long as the occupation continues to keep its grip
on the borders, land and movement, all investment into infrastructures
and the improvement of economic conditions will either be to no
avail or help to render the current situation more sustainable.
2.4 The election of Hamas has not radically
altered the real challenge to the international community, which
is to ensure the respect of international law and to support the
Palestinians in their efforts to end the occupation. Then development
can take place.
3. DETAILED EVIDENCE
3.1 What are the implications of the Hamas
election victory? How effectively have the UK, World Bank and
EC responded to the new reality?
3.1.1 Before the January elections we argued
that the new PNA would need to make crucial decisions about levels
of cooperation with the Bank and the USA. We argued that:
If it is to be representative of the Palestinian
people, then it will be necessary for the Authority, and civil
society, to stand up against the agenda of the Bank and refuse
to be involved in projects which serve directly, or indirectly
to support the Apartheid Wall and the settlements. While the PNA
has deployed a strong rhetorical criticism of the Occupation and
its continued expansion in this period of calm, it will be vital
to ensure that "development" and new realities do not
compromise the goals which unite the Palestinian liberation struggle.
The articulation of a clear national strategy and vision of "development",
in which consensus is built with NGOs and the popular movements
within Palestinian society, is necessitated by the threats posed
by the World Bank and its policy "experts" in Washington.
Palestinian Grassroots Anti Apartheid Wall Campaign—"Against
the Bantu State"
3.1.2 The election of Hamas in January was
in part a response to the failure of the previous PNA to robustly
defend the interests of the Palestinian people in the way that
we describe above. The previous leadership of the PNA was coerced
into accepting a "peace process" and a narrative of
"development" which has ultimately supported the occupation.
3.1.3 The first question one needs to pose
is: why did the international community react at all to the Palestinian
elections? The elections were a transparent, fair and democratic
vote notwithstanding the obstacles to the process caused by the
Israeli occupation. The newly elected party of government does
not support all points of the Oslo agreement. However, no Israeli
government has ever respected those agreements and yet in over
twelve years there has been no similar punitive reaction by the
international community.
3.1.4 For 60 years, successive Israeli governments
have violated international law and human rights, committed war
crimes and breached the decisions of the International Court of
Justice and UN resolutions. Yet the only reaction deemed necessary
was the expansion of cooperation agreements. The new Hamas government
has not yet committed any crime. None of the people in government
are proven war criminals, unlike Israeli prime ministers have
been.
3.1.5 The response of the UK, World Bank
and EC to the January election violates the most fundamental principles
of non-intervention in internal affairs and respect for democratic
choices. For the first time in history an occupied people has
been put under sanctions. It violates the most fundamental human
rights such as the right to food, education and health care, all
of which have been seriously affected by the sanctions. It has
further infringed upon the UN sanctioned right to resist military
occupation. Palestinians not only are deprived of this right,
they are even deprived of their right to vote if this expresses
their willingness to resist occupation.
3.1.6 At a political level, the response
of the international community has effectively contributed to
sharpen the internal Palestinian tensions, as it has undermined
the democratic Palestinian decision making process. Discontent
and economic hardship risk exacerbating the tensions between the
Fatah and Hamas factions, destabilising Palestine. The sanctions
regime coupled with the arrest of Palestinian legislators and
members of the government has prevented the Palestinian government
from functioning. Sanctions have help to effectively prevent Palestinians
from engaging in meaningful opposition to the ongoing violations
of international law and human rights, including the construction
of the Wall. In this way, sanctions have actively supported the
above-mentioned Israeli violations.
3.1.7 At an economic level, sanctions have
been disastrous for what was left of the Palestinian economy.
As the Committee will be aware, under Oslo much of the administration
of the West Bank and Gaza that was transferred from Occupation
forces to the PA, exempting the former from their obligations
under the IV Geneva convention. Sanctions now mean that the PA
is effectively paralyzed. Social infrastructure is breaking down
and the remnants of Palestinian economy are unable to function.
3.1.8 Further, this economic coercion highlights
the extent to which the foreign donors are prepared to go to attempt
to shape the development of Palestine, regardless of the wishes
of the Palestinian people, and to use their economic power to
undermine Palestinian resistance to the ongoing illegal occupation.
3.1.9 If the aim of the international community
was peace built on respect for international law and human rights,
their response was a complete failure. It seems that the intentions
of the international community are to promote Palestinian passive
acceptance of Israeli plans at any cost rather than peace. Palestinians
want peace, but not at the cost of surrendering their land and
rights.
3.1.10 The appropriate response to the election
of Hamas would have been for the international community to look
again at the circumstances which make necessary the election of
a group who are uncompromisingly opposed to the occupation. It
is time for the international community to respect the democratically
expressed wishes of the Palestinian people, and take action to
end the occupation.
3.2 How best can development be achieved in
this context?
3.2.1 Unfortunately, there is no possibility
of "development" in the sense that is implied under
the current circumstances. Genuine development will only be possible
after a complete removal of the occupation from Palestinian territory.
As long as the occupation continues to keep its grip on the borders,
land and movement, all investment into infrastructures and the
improvement of economic conditions will either be to no avail
or help to render the current situation more sustainable.
3.2.2 The International Court of Justice
in its decision of 9 July 2005 (endorsed by the UNGA with resolution
(A/ES-10/L.18/Rev.1) refers to the IV Geneva convention and states
that all parties are "not to recognize the illegal situation
created by the construction of the wall and not to render any
aid or assistance in maintaining the situation created by it".
3.2.3 To understand why "development"
in the current circumstances is potentially counter-productive,
if not illegal, consider the example of the Jordan Valley in the
context of comments made by figures within the Occupation Forces:
they have felt little reason to conceal Israel's actions within
the rhetoric of "self-defence".
3.2.4 In 2005 Israeli Justice Minister Tzipi
Livni noted to a conference in Caesarea that "One does not
have to be a genius to see that the fence will have implications
for the future border." [207]The
Occupation's High Court, when considering the Wall in Qalqiliya,
stated: "We were completely unconvinced that there is a decisive
military-security reason for placing the route of the fence where
it currently runs." [208]Defence
Minister Mofaz has outlined the intentions of the Occupation Forces
in re-defining the borders of Israel. He stated the future borders
would encompass "the settlement blocs, including the Jordan
Valley" adding that: "Israel is taking a step to shape
a new reality. Disengagement will continue after Gaza. Together
with the Fence in Judea and Samaria [West Bank] it will bring
a strategic achievement, enforce real negotiations and coexistence
in defensible borders." [209]Mofaz
also noted the Wall's role in maintaining the demographics of
Israel in which Palestinians are a minority. In 2005 the Israeli
government announced plans to increase the number of settlers
in the Jordan Valley by 50% over the following year. By now the
Jordan Valley is effectively cut off from the rest of the West
Bank and annexed by the Occupation.
3.2.5 To ensure this new de facto status
of the Jordan Valley, Israel has used a series of restrictions
and abuses. As a grassroots group providing advocacy to Palestinians,
we can report that ad hoc regulations imposed by Occupation forces
over September 2006 include:
— Palestinians are now banned from
staying away from their villages overnight.
— Farmers are now banned from grazing
their animals more than 100 metres from their homes.
— Travel is forbidden during Jewish
holidays.
— Children over the age of one are
banned from passing the Tayaser checkpoint without documentation
to prove that they are from the Jordan Valley area. This restriction
hits families particularly hard. In many married couples, husband
and wife come from different areas of the Jordan Valley, or from
the west in Tubas or Jenin.
— Occupation forces at Tayaser are
also checking the mobile phones of everyone having to pass, going
through address books, call logs and text messages. Searches are
highly intrusive and cause delays to anyone that has to move.
3.2.6 In an largely agricultural economy
which relies on having to transport produce between farms, villages
and towns, the impact of restrictions such as these is devastating.
Clearly, the development of Palestinian agriculture is impossible
under such circumstances.
3.2.7 Moreover, most infrastructure development
will inevitably support the occupation. To illustrate, in the
Jordan Valley it is well documented that waste from the illegal
Israeli settlements is polluting the water supplies. This is an
environmental disaster, with potentially devastating consequences
for agriculture in the valley. However, any development of sewage
infrastructure that addressed the problem of settler's sewage
would merely serve to make the settlements more sustainable, making
their ultimate removal less likely in the long term. Israel controls
80% of the water resources of the Occupied Territories and also
gets one-third of its water requirements from the Jordan River.
Eighty percent of the water from the West Bank's sole groundwater
aquifer goes to Israel. If infrastructure was developed without
first rectifying this situation, the permanent occupation of Palestine's
water supplies would be guaranteed. The occupation must be ended
before there can be any development.
3.2.8 The recent World Bank report, An Update
on Palestinian Movement, Access and Trade in the West Bank and
Gaza, effectively describes the damage that is being done to Palestinian
people and trade by the ongoing occupation. However, it is also
an example of the way in the narrative of "development"
for Palestine is used to create justifications for the entrenching
of the Occupation. It states that "economic recovery cannot
be divorced from the dismantling of today's closure system"[210]
and yet it goes on to describe not how the system may be dismantled,
but how it may be made more efficient. Measures proposed include:
— The continuation of "preferential
treatment" for Israeli trucks in the Hebron area once the
Apartheid wall is finalised, allowing Israeli vehicles to use
roads closed to Palestinian traffic. Without this, the report
argues, "a trade management system with drawbacks similar
to Gaza is likely to emerge." (WB p 9) Apartheid roads are
increasingly used to restrict Palestinian movement. On 7 September
2006, the Occupation announced the construction of a new "Israelis
only" roads which will carve through the West Bank. [211]500
km of such roads are planned.
— A "secure perimeter" around
the Karni crossing point (WB p 8), which would annex yet more
Palestinian land.
— The introduction of new scanning
technologies to allow high levels of "security" and
commercial efficiency. (WB p 5) The "scanning technologies"
are highly intrusive, and there have been questions raised over
possible health side effects. [212]Scanning
technologies introduced so far have, as described in the Bank
report, been used for scanning empty trucks returning from export,
rather than full trucks. The result of he installation of these
new mechanisms is thus additional disruption wreaked on Palestinian
trade by Israel and further isolation of the population.
— Reconstruction of Gaza's airport
with enhanced "security solutions" to facilitate export
of agricultural products and to permit the travel of investors
to and from Gaza, which would almost certainly be administered
by Israel and guarantee further Israeli military control of Palestinian
soil.
— Investment in checkpoints within
the West Bank.
3.2.9 The Bank advises that Palestinians
should put aside concerns about national liberation and defer
"final status" issues to some unspecified future date.
[213]The
thrust of the report is to imply that if the ongoing Occupation
can be made less painful to Palestinians, there can be some degree
of "normalisation".
3.2.10 The report refers to "closure"—the
euphemistic term for the system of checkpoints, flying checkpoints
and of course the Apartheid wall which the Zionist government
uses to prevent Palestinians from going about their business,
barring farmers from accessing their land, sick people from receiving
medical care and students from getting to university. In order
to end closure, the report suggests the following:
Israeli perceptions of Palestinian intent are
critical in shaping a willingness to relax closure. The Bank's
view remains that the PA must do all it can to counter Palestinian
violence against Israelis if it is to achieve a reciprocating
response from GOI in the closure sphere. (WB p 4)
3.2.11 The bank moves on specifically to
deal with the role of the "closures" in defending the
illegal Israeli settlements:
Given that a principle function of today's movement
restrictions inside the West Bank is to protect Israeli settlers
at a time of intense Palestinian hostility to their presence,
it would be harder to ensure settlers' security in a landscape
free from all movement restrictions. (WB p 4)
3.2.12 In establishing what this means,
it is worth considering some actual instances of "intense
hostility". On 26 October 2006, STW reported that in Farta
village, east Qalqiliya, a gang of 50 settlers mainly from the
nearby settlement of Jilad had attacked farmers, firing bullets
into the air to intimidate them before physically attacking them
with clubs, stones and sharp tools, resulting in hand-to-hand
fighting. Five farmers were injured and one, Basel Ibrahim Salah
had to be taken to hospital in a critical condition after being
hit in the head with a sharp object. Later in the day, Occupation
forces arrived, forcing farmers to leave the land and return to
the village. Three farmers, Ahhmad Abdula Hassan, Bahjat Salman
and Hamoud Bashir Dawoud, were arrested, accused of attacking
the settlers. When the farmers had been driven back to the village,
settlers stole eight of the 10 sacks of olives that had been harvested
earlier in the day. The remaining two were found destroyed.
3.2.13 These were Palestinian farmers who
were attacked while working on their own lands. The settlers who
attacked them came from a settlement illegally constructed on
occupied Palestinian land. Assaults such as these happen escalate
during the olive harvest but form by now a feature in daily life
of Palestinian farmers: these are the actions that the policy
of "closure" seeks to defend. [214]
3.2.14 The Bank goes on to describe the
"ideal" trade conditions it envisages for exports from
Palestine in the near term:
On March 14, however, three trucks left Rafah
carrying Palestinian goods for exhibition at a trade show in Cairo.
This exceptional arrangement, based on transferring Palestinian
goods onto Egyptian trucks on the Gazan side of Rafah, offers
a practical example of how goods can be exported from Rafah in
the near-term. In that case, Egyptian trucks entered the Rafah
facility, picked up the Palestinian cargo and documentation, and
exited the border facility under the supervision of EU inspectors.
Cameras installed in advance allowed transmission of the operation
to Israeli security authorities at nearby Kerem Shalom. These
or similar procedures should now become a regular feature of Rafah.
(WB, p 14-15)
3.2.15 So in "the near term",
Palestinian trade is to depend on constant surveillance by EU
inspectors and the Israeli security personnel. No mention is made
on the fact that Israel reduces EU inspectors to mere puppets
and thus is able to impose choking closings of the border that
keep the Palestinian people at the whim of the Occupation. This
can hardly be considered an "ideal" trade condition.
Further, it will be interesting to see exactly what is meant by
the "near term", given the current level of investment
in Apartheid infrastructure, including for example the 512 km
of planned "Israelis only" roads in the West Bank. The
World Bank has also welcomed the construction of the Apartheid
Wall, on the basis that it addresses the "security"
requirements of the Occupation and any concerns they might have
over using Palestinian labour. [215]
3.2.16 In the interview that accompanies
the release of the report, Roberts perceptively remarks that economic
stability and prosperity "will not happen unless there is
also a political process which Palestinians believe is leading
them to independence and statehood—and there is little such
belief right now." Palestinians do not believe that the political
process leads to statehood because they live with evidence of
Oslo's failure every day. The World Bank's proposed solution is
a consolidation of Apartheid Israel's vice-like grip on the occupied
territories and the introduction of management solutions in order
to run the open-air prison in Gaza and the West Bank more efficiently.
Palestinians' defence of their occupied land—inadequately
and maliciously characterised as "violence"—is
portrayed as the main obstacle to economic recovery, despite all
the evidence presented by the Bank itself that this is not the
case.
3.2.17 It is worth looking at the "development"
that has been carried out, and the way in which it has supported
the occupation:
— The construction of 24 clinics in
the West Bank to serve 50,000 people. [216]Costing
$26 million the construction of such clinics is necessary because
Palestinians do not have the freedom of movement to access their
economic and social service centres. While the concept of providing
high-quality and local health clinics is not opposed, the fundamental
question remains as to whether such health services are being
provided in order to alleviate the presence of the Wall and the
Occupation.
— A World Bank coordinated hospital
for Qalqiliya. The town has suffered the most intense ghettoization
since the Apartheid Wall was finished here in 2003. The hospital
again highlights how aid and assistance is being developed around
the presence of the Wall.
— The Bank, supporting the drive for
Palestinian exports, has launched an "agri-business development"
project in the WBGS with fixed capital investments and technical
support. [217]Up
to $30 million has already been approved for the project which
will coordinate mass export production in Gaza for external markets,
and is likely to draw upon intensive farming techniques for agriculture
in the West Bank (given that only small pockets of arable land
are left in the West Bank after Israeli expansion which includes
the current annexation of the Jordan Valley). The example of Gaza
shows how this kind of development creates nothing more but further
dependency on the Occupation. While Gazans keep completely depended
on food imports, their exports are dependent on the goodwill of
the Occupation that allows the European observers to open the
border.
3.2.18 International donors' attempts to
fund development effectively subsidise the Israeli Occupation.
As of May 2004, "donors had spent an estimated $22,616,811
on Wall projects designed to moderate the negative effects of
the barrier on surrounding Palestinian communities." [218]This
clearly contradicts the obligations of the international community
laid out by the verdict on the illegality of the Wall given by
the International Court of Justice. In 2002 the World Bank noted
that assistance since the Intifada was aimed at maintaining "medium-term
developmental activity where feasible and providing emergency
assistance designed to sustain Palestinian institutions and mitigate
poverty".[219]
In fact almost half of the Bank's commitments were geared towards
the provision of emergency projects, enabling Israel to avoid
its financial responsibilities as an occupying power and continue
to reap the financial gain of donor aid. [220]
3.2.19 In the wake of the Hamas election
victory, and with funding withdrawn, it has become more apparent
than ever that funding was only ever provided on the condition
that Palestinians offered no resistance to the occupation. The
feeling among many is that the international community offered
funds to buy the passivity of Palestinians in the face of ongoing
aggression, and now that a government has been elected who explicitly
support the Palestinian right to resist, the funding has been
withdrawn.
3.2.20 The World Bank report Development
Under Adversity noted that "infrastructure development, economic
growth, and the peace process can powerfully reinforce each other."
[221]This
was the thinking behind the massive injection of funding during
the "peace process" which resulted in a few years of
"calm" before the outbreak of the Al Aqsa Intifada.
The so-called "peace process" is experienced by Palestinians
as an attempt to buy time for the Occupation to further steal
and colonize their land and to prevent them from resisting a violent
and illegal occupation which has been ongoing for over fifty years.
The international community does nothing to remove the Israelis
from Palestinian land. As such, development to the extent to which
it supports the "peace process", while providing some
short term relief, is ultimately hostile to Palestinian interests.
3.2.21 However, it ultimately failed in
its goal of subduing Palestinians who rejected their "development"
in cantons. Showcase projects such as the Buds of Peace industrial
estate being constructed near Tulkarem were burnt down during
the Intifada. Popular currents of Palestinian society refused
to be ghettoized and the sources of cheap labour for the profit
of foreign and Occupation investment. [222]
3.3 Recommendations
3.3.1 The most immediate barrier to Palestinian
economic development is the occupation, and in particular the
Apartheid Wall. The following recommendations would have an immediate
impact on the Palestinian economy, far above and beyond any long
term schemes for aiding and developing the Palestinian economy:
— Dismantle parts already built.
— Return all lands confiscated for
the Wall.
— Compensate for all losses.
— End the policy of closures and land
confiscations.
The Committee should recommend that the British
government apply the utmost pressure to Israel to abide by their
international commitments and end their illegal occupation.
3.3.2 "Development" under the
current circumstances, for example the proposed "Peace Conduit"
(the Red Sea—Dead Sea canal development) which is aimed
in part at fostering co-operating between Israel, Palestine and
Jordan, is a response to the current de facto theft of land and
water resources at the hand of Israel and thus provides legitimacy
and sustainability for these violations. The Committee should
recommend that this kind of development is hostile to long term
peace in the area.
3.3.3 In the current climate, "development"
of the type that we have described supports and maintains the
occupation. Real development can only happen in the context of
peace, which will follow from an end to the illegal occupation
of Palestine.
3.3.4 Funding from international donors
are not to substitute the Palestinian tax money stolen by Israel
since the election. In 2005, the PNA received $60 million a month
in tax and customs revenues, $30 million from donors and another
$30 million from taxes raised domestically. The Israeli government
is stealing some $50-55 million per month in terms of withheld
revenues. The international committee must exert the utmost pressure
on Israel to ensure that this money is returned.
3.3.5 In the meantime, international donors
should support Palestinian institutions, organizations and popular
committees, in order that they should be able to face the challenges
of the Occupation and to effectively oppose the colonization,
theft and annexation of their land.
3.3.6 There can be no development until
there is peace, and there will be no peace while Israel continues
it daily onslaught against our people. The committee must push
for an end to the occupation and apartheid in Palestine, so that
development can proceed.
November 2006
206 We are using the term "government" here
to indicated the elected executive representatives in the Palestinian
elections last January. However, it needs to be pointed out that
nearly all criteria that define a "government" are missing
in the case of Palestine. Without sovereignty and statehood, without
a territory, without authority to govern, the function, role and
responsibility of this organ cannot be compared with state governments. Back
207
Reported by various Israeli and Palestinian media. Back
208
Ibid. Back
209
Mofaz interview with Yedioth Aharonot newspaper, 29/09/04. Back
210
World Bank, An Update on Palestinian Movement, Access and Trade
in the West Bank and Gaza, p 3. Back
211
Stop The Wall, Israel Announce New Apartheid Road, 14 September
2006, www.stopthewall.org Back
212
Anti Apartheid Wall Campaign, Do-It-Yourself Apartheid in Palestine
(La Citta Del Sol, 2005). Back
213
World Bank, "Money Won't Fix Things Here"-Interview
with Nigel Roberts, World Bank Country Director for the West Bank
and Gaza. Back
214
The Settlements and Apartheid Wall are the subject of numerous
UN declarations and and ICJ ruling declaring their illegality. Back
215
See Office of the Special Envoy for Disengagement (2005), Periodic
Report: 17 October and also World Bank (2005), The Palestinian
Economy and the Prospects for its Recovery: Economic Monitoring
Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, Number 1, December
2005. Back
216
Ibid. with funding from the EC, Ireland, Australia and
US with the UNDP managing. Back
217
Ibid. with funding from US and Australia. Back
218
Palestinian National Authority, The Annexation and Expansion
Wall: Impacts and Mitigation Measures (Ramallah, 31 May 2004),
p 2. Back
219
World Bank, West Bank, (2002) p 20. Back
220
Ibid. Around 40% of World Bank commitments in 2002 were
made towards emergency projects. Back
221
Mody, A. (1999) "Infrastructure for Growth" in Development
Under Adversity, p 193. Back
222
The Erez Industrial Estate, which has functioned to various degrees
in the last decade, has also been attacked numerous times. Back
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