Memorandum submitted by the United Nations
World Food Programme
WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP) OPERATIONAL BACKGROUND
1. WFP started small scale programmes in
the occupied Palestinian territory in 1993, at the invitation
of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), to support vulnerable
non refugee communities in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. These
programmes continued until 2002 when the Israeli "Defensive
Shield" operation led to a dramatic change in the food security
of the population. WFP's response was a large-scale emergency
food assistance operation (EMOP) which ran from 2002-03 supporting
443,000 food-insecure Palestinian citizens.
2. The increased closure measures and land/asset
destruction witnessed through the following years led to a continuation
of this style of operation for a further two years (2003-05) with
a slight increase in caseload up to 480,000 beneficiaries in 2004-05.
3. The challenges faced with the PNA in
this period were:
— Lack of accountability/transparent
tracking of donor funds.
— Entitlement attitude of the PNA-
expectation that funds would continue to flow regardless of their
actions made targeting difficult.
— Weakness of the PNA assessment, management
and logistics skills that weakened the joint programmes.
4. In 2005 there were several positive steps
offering hope for greater foreign investment and development:
— Internal reforms of the new President
(Abu Mazen) gave hope for greater transparency and possibilities
for development suggesting a more favourable political climate.
— Israeli unilateral disengagement
from Gaza in August 2005.
— Finalisation of a draft Medium Term
Development Plan—led by the PNA—which gave the United
Nations a framework through which to focus on more sustainable
programming solutions.
5. Based on this backdrop, WFP formulated
a Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation (PRRO) to respond to
the situation for the two years 2005-07. This operation—which
was expanded by 25% to 600,000 beneficiaries in July 2006—looked
to change the focus:
— Strengthening Food for Work and Food
for Training programmes—under which food is used as an incentive
for individuals to engage in community work or training projects—with
the aim of achieving sustainable development objectives and aligning
the programme with the Mid Term Development Plan.
— More comprehensive monitoring of
the programme based on the new objectives.
— Systematic institutional support
for the PNA ministries of Agriculture (MOA) and Social Affairs
(MoSA) to strengthen their capacity in assessment of food needs
and management of food aid programmes.
— Enlargement of the programme with
the Ministries.
— A plan to hand-over the Institutional
Feeding Programme, under which food is distributed to hospitals,
orphanages and disabled centres, to the MoSA.
IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE PROTRACTED
RELIEF AND
RECOVERY OPERATION
(PRRO):
GAZA DISENGAGEMENT
6. The Protracted Relief and Recovery Operation
(PRRO) started in September 2005 and the first few months ran
relatively smoothly with beneficiary targeting and selection minimally
affected by the run-up to the Palestinian Legislative Council
(PLC) elections. However quite quickly it became clear that the
security environment was on a serious decline in Gaza as rival
factions sparred to fill the power vacuum left by the occupying
forces. The internal violence that ensued had a heavy toll especially
in the case of Gaza's economy. The settler greenhouses and their
infrastructure, which had been taken over by the PNA through an
intermediary mechanism, promised to provide much needed jobs and
a steady source of income for the Gaza economy, however they were
quickly destroyed by looting.
7. As the security situation deteriorated
in Gaza, there was a dramatic rise in kidnappings in Gaza which
(by December 2005) quickly chased off many investors and aid agencies,
which were unable to operate in such a hostile environment.
8. There was much optimism that the Palestinian
Legislative Council elections would bring some stability—however
the victory of Hamas was an unexpected twist in the fate of the
region and it brought significant changes to the political, donor
and security environment throughout the occupied Palestinian territory.
WEST BANK
AND GAZA
STRIP—POST
HAMAS VICTORY
9. The Hamas victory sent the region into
turmoil. Hamas inherited a bankrupt and opaque PNA.
10. USAID had openly warned the population
that it would cut off funds to the government, should Hamas win,
but few inside the occupied Palestinian territory really believed
it would happen. When Hamas did win, the biggest donor nations
quickly suspended all payments to the PNA. Other donors also had
their hands tied in the absence of any clear policy.
IMPACT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL
DONOR RESPONSE
11. The new donor environment posed a number
of challenges to WFP's programme:
— The PRRO had been set up to support
and strengthen the PNA, whereas the donor environment was now
working to effectively weaken and undermine the PNA.
— WFP was reliant on the PNA to implement
around 50% of the programmes—having recently increased the
level of involvement of the PNA.
— Cooperation with the PNA municipalities
was integral to the strengthening of the Food for Work and Food
for Training programmes in line with development objectives.
— WFP and other agencies rely heavily
on the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics to provide information
that can be used to make assessments.
— Local suppliers of food aid (50%
of WFP annual tonnage) became subject to donor screening, leading
to additional delays in the procurement process.
12. Hamas' task of governance was already
difficult, for example:
— Hamas government took on an extremely
weak, bankrupt and opaque PNA.
— PNA security forces were split into
factions, but loyal to Fateh over Hamas. Senior commanders were
appointed on the basis of their allegiance/connections to the
leadership.
— Enormous numbers of new PNA employees
were recruited by Fateh prior to the elections to try to gain
additional votes—these people remained on the payroll.
— Employment policy of the PNA in general
was based more on providing a social system for supporting many
poor families rather than performing a certain role.
— The additional suspension of aid
coupled with Israel's parallel steps to freeze VAT transfers,
increase closures, limit access of Hamas ministers between West
Bank and Gaza and increase military operations, made their task
even harder. The outbreak of avian influenza dealt a final blow
to Gaza's population making the impact of the suspension even
more acute.
13. The situation completely crippled the
effectiveness of the new government, affecting all sectors: health,
education, water & sanitation, food, security and the economy
as a whole. The PNA with no money to pay staff or security forces
faced enormous challenges to assume their role as a government-
the impacts of this were severe for the population (in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip).
IMPACTS ON
THE GROUND
14. Government services—provided to
all citizens by the PNA became quickly crippled by the reduced
cash flow. The lack of funds to run day to day services, pay employees
and maintain running costs affected not only the 160,000 employees
but their families and extended families reliant on assistance.
This further affected the cash flow throughout the economy as
external companies lost businesses with the PNA affecting their
income. The security environment for WFP's operations also showed
a marked decline as a deteriorating economic, humanitarian and
security environment—augmented by widespread numbers of
unpaid security forces led to the increasing emergence of private
family militias, ready to use the rule of the gun to provide for
their needs. Any hopes for investment or development were crushed.
APPROACH OF
DONORS TO
THE UN: WEAKNESSES
15. While donors spoke publicly of supporting
"emergency", "humanitarian" projects and assisting
the most needy, this was not matched by concrete commitments.
Even pledged funds took a very long time to materialize due to
complex legal systems of states' anti-terror laws making any programming
decisions extremely difficult and limiting WFP's ability to respond
to the changing needs in real time. That said, some donors maintained
their support to WFP (EU, ECHO, France and Norway), on purely
humanitarian grounds, and WFP was able to avoid a pipeline break
at this critical time. WFP was fortunate that it had the advantage
of access to an internal mechanism that allows it to advance urgently
needed funds to a particular operation and avoid any break in
the supply to beneficiaries.
16. Donors started to exert pressure to
control operations:
— There was significant donor pressure
to replace WFP's PNA partners with "acceptable" NGO
partners to access funds.
— WFP was forced to stop all Food for
Work and Food for Training programmes implemented with US donations
due to legal risk that any development impact could be seen as
supporting the Hamas government.
— There was reportedly pressure on
the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) to assume greater
responsibilities (to cover non refugees) risking a serious mandate
creep which would have affected WFP programmes.
— There was pressure on WFP to provide
cash assistance—as well as food—to needy households,
outside of WFP's mandate in the occupied Palestinian territory.
17. The Temporary Intermediary Mechanism
(TIM) was a welcome step in-as-much as it offered to soften the
stringent funding policies and offered some support to the most
vital sectors. However:
— The TIM was negotiated based on needs
decided at the HQ level rather than the field level—there
was no clear picture of how it could be implemented which has
made implementation slow and arduous.
— The TIM was not well framed/coordinated
into the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) framework thus it
risked competing with the CAP, taking funds from agencies providing
important humanitarian services.
— The concept of "essential"
versus "non essential" services looked at addressing
the immediate needs of the population however it neglected to
put measures into place to reduce the impact of the sanctions
on the Palestinian economy at a macro (industry) and micro (household)
level threatening future food security levels.
— The payment of cash allowances to
the Social Hardship Cases—the most vulnerable sector of
Palestinian society—is a good step but risks to be too late.
SUMMARY & CONCLUSIONS:
SHORT TERM
IMPACTS
— The cut of funding to the PNA and
increased closures witnessed in 2006 have resulted in a 14% rise
in food insecurity from 37% to 51% over a 10 month period (August
2005-June 2006).
— Food insecurity in Gaza rose dramatically
due to closures, cut of funding and avian influenza, reaching
a high of 70% of the population affected by food insecurity by
June 06. The fishing and agricultural sectors are suffering heavily
and there are practically no employees able to attend work.
— As of 28 September the PNA Ministries
remain on strike which is starting to hinder the implementation
of WFP's programmes.
— The loss of income for poor families
over an extended period is resulting in use of negative coping
strategies (sale of assets, debt, cutting expenses on health,
food and education). This has health and nutritional implications
for the longer term and is likely to result in a general increase
in poverty levels.
MEDIUM TO
LONG TERM
IMPACTS
— West Bank closures/construction of
the barrier are resulting in rising levels of economic isolation
and market fragmentation linked to a change from macro, rural-
urban trade to micro, rural—rural or urban- urban trade.
Some traditional products are unable to survive in the new economic
climate resulting in a loss of livelihood.
— Economic recovery in the occupied
Palestinian territory must be the precursor for development. Without
this the prospects for development are very slim.
October 2006
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