Examination of Witnesses (Questions 140-159)
MR WILLIAM
BELL, MR
HENRY GRUNWALD
QC, DR FLORESCA
KARANASOU AND
MR ADAM
LEACH
31 OCTOBER 2006
Q140 Richard Burden: Can we move
to another issue, that of being able to move around in relation
to Gaza. One of the important aspects of the Palestinian economy
in Gaza, one of the ways that the Palestinian people could presumably
fend for themselves a little bit is to fish off the coast of Gaza.
Why are they not allowed to do that?
Mr Grunwald: I believe that restrictions
may have been lifted in recent days. That is the information that
was given to me, that some fishing is allowed. If restrictions
have been in place, and I know they have for some time, then again
it will have been for security reasons.
Q141 Richard Burden: Could you perhaps
get that information for us and let us know what restrictions
were in place and what has been lifted and how long it has been
lifted for?
Mr Grunwald: Of course, yes[6]
Q142 Joan Ruddock: I was puzzled about
the idea that the border has to be closed constantly because of
security. The whole point of the information you gave us was that
this material was discovered. Having been to Erez myself, it is
a rigorous process; it takes a long time. Of course there need
to be checks but checks are there in order to find problems and
to eliminate the danger of those problems. With effective checking,
it seems to me that is not a reason for them closing for long
periods of time, sometimes many days at a time, because of that.
When we have a crisis at the airports and we know that there are
terrorists threatening British airports, we do not actually say
that people must stop flying. We just have them wait longer in
queues but they keep going and we keep testing and we find the
problems. I find it rather difficult to accept your argument that
this does not appear to be punishment when border crossings are
closed for considerable periods of time.
Mr Grunwald: The suggestion of
punishment is a very serious allegation to make.
Q143 Joan Ruddock: Indeed, but it
feels like that to the people.
Mr Grunwald: It is one which really
is not borne out by any examination of why these checks at the
borders are necessary. Remember, we are talking not only about
goods that come through formal entry points; we are talking about
tunnels which are constantly being discovered in the area of the
crossings and other parts of the borders. If, from time to time,
operations are necessary to prevent anyone from entering or leaving,
then I can only assure you that I am told that those are decisions
that are not lightly made. They are made for operational security
reasons in order to try to prevent whatever it is might be smuggled
in or whatever it is that might be smuggled is intended for. It
is a serious allegation to make that this is done to punish those
who wish to cross. Obligations in relation to the borders and
the crossings were placed on both sides by various agreements.
I am afraid that the Israelis would say, as I understand it, that
others have not really lived up to their sides of these agreements,
which, had they been lived up to and had they been put into effect,
would prevent an awful lot of the tension that exists at these
crossing points.
Mr Bell: I hope I am not speaking
out of turn here but I will speak anyway. This discussion is critical
in the sense that it is talking about discussing Gaza's lifeline
with the outside world, but it also addresses a critical point
of the Palestinian territorial integrity. Oslo very clearly referred
to the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem as one territorial
unit. One of the grave impacts of these closures and one of the
things that has not happened is that those areas have become ever
more distant from each other and ever more fragmented. Whilst
the peripheral crossings between Gaza and Israel and indeed Gaza
and Egypt via Rafah are absolutely critical in terms of commerce
and basic movement of both people and goods, I think one of the
issues of real concern also that the Committee needs to be aware
of is that there are over 500 obstacles to movement that exist
within the West Bank. I take the period since January 2006. An
average of 508 different types of obstacles, which the Committee
I am sure will come across in their travels next week, exist throughout
the West Bank. By that I do not mean the actual perimeter of the
West Bank, ie the crossing between the West Bank and Israel; I
mean from one part to the other. I know that my colleague from
the Quakers and the EAPPI[7]
talked a lot more about that in their submission[8],
but that, in terms of development and frustration of the development
of a viable economy, is absolutely critical. It is less difficult
to understand the security paradigm, if you like, in terms of
crossings from the West Bank or Palestinian territory into Israel
but actually what you are talking about here is from one Palestinian
village to another.
Q144 Chairman: I think, in the context
of Gaza, in one of the submissions somebody did say that the border
crossing was closed most of the time and if the Israeli authorities
are controlling the airport and controlling the sea access, effectively
living in Gaza is like living in an open air prison. Obviously
in the long term that is unsustainable, not least because you
cannot have an economy in that situation any more than you can
have an economy in a prison.
Mr Leach: May I add to the amplification
of the answer to this question about restrictions on Gaza? I would
like to draw the Committee's explicit attention to the points
that Oxfam makes in our submission on page 13[9]
under "International Trade" and the structural obstacles
to security, the economic obstacles, that exist. It is not just
about closures, which you might say are a temporary thing, although
they have been in place for prolonged periods and therefore are
not temporary, but I think just as worrying are the structural
arrangements for impeding the export of Palestinian goods from
Gaza, which of course is having direct impacts on household security.
These impediments are well set out, so I will not cite them here,
but I do want to draw attention to them because I think, again
rather like the earlier point about not deflecting attention and
addressing your invocation, Chairman, to be practical, we need
to see real advances in changes in the arrangements by which people
can make a living. Part of that is restriction of movement but
it is also that freedom of movement.
Q145 John Bercow: Evidence from the Board
of Deputies says that the Government of Israel is committed to
providing humanitarian assistance to Palestinians in the West
Bank and in Gaza. I wonder if Mr Grunwald could tell the Committee
how much such assistance has been provided by the Government of
Israel since January of this year?
Mr Grunwald: Let me preface that
answer in this way: I cannot speak for the Government of Israel;
I speak for the British Jewish community. There have been several
questions that have cropped up today which might be better if
they were directed at somebody who is here to represent Israel
rather than the British Jewish community. Having said that, again
our understanding is that there have been and will be many projects
which will be of tremendous humanitarian assistance—potential
humanitarian assistance—to the West Bank that the Israeli
Government either has been involved in or would be prepared to
be involved in if it had a partner with whom it could act and
talk. I understand that there are, for example, in the planning
stage, projects for desalination plants which would be of tremendous
benefit not just to the Palestinians but to Israel and, indeed,
to the whole area. I am quite sure that Israel would like nothing
more than to proceed with those in partnership with a proper Palestinian
Authority with whom it could do business for the benefit of all
in the area.
Q146 John Bercow: I am interested
in that reply, and the Committee will either accept or reject
the slap on its collective wrist for the misdirection of questions.
I understand the point that you are making but I wonder if, just
coming at it again from a slightly different angle, I can probe
you on something which I have been told, and the veracity of which
I have not yet established, and that is whether the Government
of Israel has offered, as it is reputed to have done, to supply
goods in kind rather than in cash and had that offer rejected.
Again, if we are focused in this Committee not on what might be
considered a foreign policy analysis of the issues which would
fall within the aegis of the Foreign Affairs Select Committee
but upon the humanitarian consequences of the present situation,
I am bound to say that I should have thought that such an offer
would be worthwhile and its rejection would, at the very least,
be questionable.
Mr Grunwald: I refer again (and
this sounds like something from—I do not know if it is an
American series or Prime Minister's question time): "I refer
to the answer I gave before".
Q147 Chairman: I take the point,
but the answer you gave before related to, as you put it, some
of the revenue that was effectively the Palestinian Authority's
revenue. What Mr Bercow is saying is that a direct offer from
the Israeli Government, from its own resources, in kind, has that
or would that help? There is a difference.
Mr Grunwald: There is a difference,
although the principle behind any refusal may be the same. I am
happy to make a specific inquiry and come back to you with an
answer on that as well.[10]
John Bercow: I am very interested in
that point so I would be most grateful for that, although if other
colleagues on the panel particularly want to respond to that question
here I would be very interested to hear. I have to say, Chairman,
I do regard it as quite an important matter if an offer of direct
provision of services or goods is made and is rejected. It does,
at the very least, open up the question as to how sincere is the
motivation of those doing the rejecting and how anxious they are,
actually, to receive the goods.
Chairman: If I can be even more frank,
from the Chair, the concern one has is that the situation is deteriorating,
the international community is diverting increasing amounts of
resources, somewhat ineffectually but at least trying to do it,
and, to put it at its bluntest, the Government of Israel is not
contributing at all. I think that does stand out as a rather stark
contrast. What I am saying is it would be good to have some indication
of what the Government of Israel's position is on that, and whether
they are trying or would try to or wish to, would help the understanding
of the situation. As you will appreciate, it does look very stark.
Q148 John Bercow: At this stage we
do not have an answer to this question, but I do think we need
an answer, to be honest, from Mr Grunwald and, possibly, from
other witnesses.
Mr Leach: If I may, I think we
would like to come back on that question because I think it is
an important one in terms of Israel's obligations under the Geneva
Conventions for supporting the needs of the civilian population.
Q149 Chairman: That gets us into
another area, which I might pursue briefly. One of the difficulties
is that the Palestinian Authority itself is a slightly odd body.
In the article we had from Mandy Turner she said that: ".
. . the main problem of the Palestinian Authority was that it
was not set up to deliver democracy to the Palestinians but to
deliver security to Israel." We are left with a situation
where, in any case, the Palestinian Authority is now controlled
by Hamas but the Government of Israel and, at the moment, the
international community will not recognise it, for reasons we
know. The problem we are then left with is where is the civil
society, which is the normal fallback position in any developing
situation, whether it is for development or building democracy,
or what have you; strengthening civil society is one of the standards.
One of the problems we have is that DFID does have a civil society
programme and does give support. We have had evidence from NGO
Monitor[11]
that is concerned that money is going, effectively, to civil society
organisations that (and I quote): "DFID funds are... filtering
through to radical Palestinian NGOs whose primary goals are to
demonise Israel". That is their perspective. I think the
question we are really asking is where are the moderate democratic
civil society organisations or how can the international institutions
work to try and create these? Apparently, on the information we
have, they do not really exist.
Mr Bell: Can I kick off on that
one? I think it is perhaps important, before one goes any further,
to define what one means by a "radical" organisation.
I would suggest, being very familiar with NGO Monitor, that "radical"
can mean organisations that are critical (and I agree sometimes
very strongly) of Israel. We, as Christian Aid, as a partner organisation,
engage a great deal with civil society. Many of the organisations
with which we engage, both Palestinian and Israeli, are indeed
critical of Israel. The reason that they are critical of Israel
is because they see that the actions of the Israeli Government—successive
Israeli Governments—have been to undermine and frustrate
Palestinian development and the development of a viable Palestinian
economy. That has been as a result of Israel's settlement programme,
the route of the separation barrier, or wall, through the West
Bank and frequent closures and frustration of movement within
the territories. It is understandable, in that context, that civil
societies, be they health developers or educational organisations
or agricultural organisations, and indeed human rights organisations,
are going to point to Israel, in terms of its policies (not as
a state per se but its policies) as part of the problem—indeed,
as many of them will also be extremely critical of the Palestinian
Authority in terms of it having been part of the problem. In a
sense, it comes back to what is the responsibility of outside
actors, such as DFID. The responsibility has to be to build up
and strengthen both Palestinian civil society and the government—civil
society in terms of that arm of Palestinian society that will
hold to account the actual government that they have. At the moment
Palestinian civil society and certainly those who are less engaged
in civil society-type activities—what I mean is those who
are not involved in actual organisations—will look at the
situation in terms of democracy, and democracy, I think we all
accept, does not just mean turning up at the ballot box and having
a free and fair election, although, obviously, that is an important
component. As we said in our evidence, democratic principles go
far beyond that; it talks about accountability and the non-use
of violence as a way of solving problems. The Palestinian government
has got some way to go in those areas. If the Palestinian population
can look at the situation in the West Bank and in East Jerusalem
and see their lives being made more and more difficult as a result
of Israeli land acquisitions for the expansion of territories
and an international community that is prepared to allow that
to go ahead with impunity and not hold Israel to account under
its obligations in the Geneva Convention then they are going to
question democracy as a way forward for them as a people. So I
think DFID has a very important role to play in terms of civil
society, and the way in which it engages in a democratic future,
which needs to go far beyond purely elections.
Q150 Chairman: I can accept that
entirely, and I have read NGO Monitor's evidence in full and I
did not agree with all of it or indeed where they were coming
from. Nevertheless, they make one or two quite acerbic points
which need to be addressed, one of which you may discount. They
say, first of all, that occasionally (and they identify Christian
Aid explicitly) they lack sensitivity in the complexities of the
situation and that, in addition to that (and this is a quote)
"...lack the necessary language and access to work independently.
Instead, they rely on local teams to show them around and to `find'
the right people to `confirm' particular versions of events."
The question which then arises—whether it is Christian Aid,
Oxfam or DFID for that matter—is: what steps are you taking
to ensure that the people you are working with on the ground are
people who have what you might call a constructive engagement
in civil society rather than (to put it in the language of the
Israeli Government) potential agents of terror? In other words,
how rigorous are you in trying to ensure that the people you are
working with, who may be frustrated, dissatisfied and attacking
the policies, nevertheless, have a positive, civic objective as
opposed to being potentially or actually engaged in planning acts
of terror? It is a serious point, and for us if DFID money is
going into organisations of that kind it is important that we
know that the checks are there.
Mr Bell: Christian Aid is rigorous
in the sense that it approaches partnership, not just in the question
of the Palestinian Territories and the Middle East but worldwide.
Partnership is there in order to promote change in order to address
the issue of poverty, and, indeed, the causes of poverty. We are
satisfied that the partnerships that we hold with Palestinian
and Israeli organisations, although we would not pretend, as we
would not anywhere else in the world, that we would agree with
every single word uttered by those organisations, or indeed always
share their analysis (as an independent organisation we are capable
of coming to our own conclusions and developing our own analysis—having
said that, of course, we are rooted in the experiences of those
partnerships) we are satisfied that the partnerships we are engaged
with and that we support are there to promote change for the benefit
of all.
Mr Leach: I want to make a number
of remarks which I hope address your question accurately. The
first is the assumption behind the question that civil society
somehow is a substitute or can step in when institutions do not
function; I think we just have to be careful about that. To repeat
the point that I have already made, so I will not repeat at length,
however imperfect or short-term the Palestinian Authority was
in conception it, nevertheless, was an established set of institutions
designed to engage with ordinary people—people, in other
words, in civil society. Turning to the issue about civil society
I think there are questions about the scope for involvement because
of the circumstances. If we are precise about what we mean by
"civil society" then we should talk about civil society
organisations, and then we can tell you at greater length about
the practical difficulties which civil society organisations in
the Palestinian context are facing, and I would agree with Christian
Aid's points about the need for DFID to support efforts to foster
a framework in which such organisations can exist. Turning to
your subsequent question about how can we be sure, I think it
is important to explain why we are there. This is not a conventional
development situation and it is important that we talk about this,
as we have tried to do this morning, in terms of the political
circumstances and recognise the full significance of that. Speaking
for Oxfam, we have worked in the situation now, as I said at the
outset, for a long time. Your question suggests that somehow we
have to make windows into men's hearts, which is not something
that we will do with very much ease or with very much certainty.
We employ people from Israel, from the West Bank, in Gaza; most
of our staff in that situation are therefore from the region.
We are clear with people that they, in working for an international
organisation and working as civil society representatives, have
obligations to ordinary people. That is and must be their foremost
concern and our commitment. I also want to give evidence that
we work with civil society in both societies. It is an important
point to add here, in talking about working with civil society
organisations, that we do not limit it just to working with Palestinian
organisations but that the Committee understands we are working
with people in Israeli society too, because of a fundamental commitment
in development practice to listen to ordinary people.
Q151 Chairman: A final comment on
that point: DFID tell us that in spite of the funding for civil
society, which implies a difference of view as to what they think
the role of civil society is, a moderate, democratic and secular
political alternative to Hamas and Fatah has not emerged. You,
obviously, Mr Leach, have said: "Anyway, civil society is
not there as a substitute for the Authority", but is it actually
realistic to assume that a viable Palestinian secular society,
civic society, can function—allowing for the difficulties?
Mr Grunwald: Mr Chairman, can
I just come in on that very briefly. We have had meetings with
various organisations and people from both sides. I would commend
to you—and I do not know if you will have time for this
in your trip to Israel—an organisation called One Voice,
which may be known to some round this table, which is a grassroots
organisation working with individual Israelis and Palestinians
who sign up, effectively, just to talk to each other and get to
know each other. That, of course, is the foundation of what could
turn into proper civil society within a Palestinian State. I would
suggest that if you could find time in your trip next week to
meet them that might be very productive in terms of an organisation
that you might want to recommend that DFID should look on favourably.
There are others in many areas; there is an organisation called
Playing for Peace involving basketball players from Israel and
Palestinian—anything which brings people from both sides
together in a positive way. These are organisations which we would
suggest ought to be supported and promoted.
Chairman: Clearly there is a difference
of view between the roles of civil society. I think, frankly,
you are right. My instincts are you cannot use civil society as
a substitute for government, which makes me wonder whether DFID
are on the wrong track.
Q152 Richard Burden: Can we return
to movement and access issues, but this time looking at the West
Bank? The Quaker Peace and Social Witness evidence states very
clearly that the situation with regard to movement and access
in the Occupied Territories, both Gaza and the West Bank, has
not improved. Mr Bell for Christian Aid mentioned a little earlier
on that there are over 500 checkpoints and obstacles to movement
within the West Bank, and in fact the United Nations OCHA record
that is up 40% in the last year. Again, I am a little struck by
the apparent contradiction in evidence there because when I was
asking you some questions earlier on, Mr Grunwald, you said that
your evidence saying that Israel has continued to implement the
measures it set out in the post-Sharm El-Sheikh agreement, the
humanitarian plan, applied to both the West Bank and Gaza. We
have discussed Gaza and access in and out of there but I wonder
if you could let us know what, in practical terms, Israel has
been doing to implement those provisions, both in terms of access
from the West Bank into Israel and, also, access within different
parts of the West Bank.
Mr Grunwald: I am not sure that
I will be able to go into a tremendous amount of detail over and
above what we provided in the submission that we made. In terms
of movement, I suppose you are really asking me, are you not,
questions to do with the separation barrier? Is that what underlies
your question?
Q153 Richard Burden: No, it is actually
the other way round. Your evidence is stating that Israel is continuing
to implement the provisions of the Sharm El-Sheikh plan. I am
not saying what are they doing; it actually goes contrary to that;
I am saying that that evidence must be based on some acknowledgement
that Israel is doing something in the West Bank to implement that
plan. I am just asking what are they going to implement in the
West Bank?
Mr Grunwald: Again, my understanding
is that wherever security makes it possible restrictions on movement
are eased. Infrastructure has been built to try to ensure that
access can take place if there have been instances of villages,
or parts of villages, that have been cut off; infrastructure has
been built to ensure that access can be maintained from one part
of a village to another or to lands where work is being done.
However, any of the movements to ensure that Palestinians can
freely move within the areas (I am sorry to come back to it—although
I should not apologise for doing it) are all dependent on the
security situation. I would suggest that since there has been
a reduction in tension between parts of the West Bank and Israel
proper as a result of the reduction in successful terror attacks
that have come from the West Bank into Israel proper, that in
fact there has been improvement in movement within the West Bank
simply because there is less Israeli reaction to successful terror
attacks than there was in the past. I do not know that I can be
more specific than that.
Q154 Richard Burden: How does that
square with the fact that the obstacles have gone up not down?
Have the number of terror attacks in the last year gone up or
have they gone down in the West Bank?
Mr Grunwald: I think you know
very well they have gone down.
Q155 Richard Burden: But the obstacles
have gone up.
Mr Grunwald: They have gone down,
and I am sure everyone hopes they will continue to go down, partly
because the restrictions that have been imposed are for security
reasons.
Q156 Richard Burden: In relation
to Jerusalem, is it true that if you are a Palestinian with a
West Bank identity card the only way you can travel into Jerusalem
at all these days is if you actually work for an international
organisation?
Mr Grunwald: I am not in a position
to give you an answer to that.[12]
Q157 Richard Burden: If I can turn to
the Quaker Peace and Social Witness, Christian Aid and Oxfam,
you have all been fairly critical about movement and access through
Israeli checkpoints. What do you think should happen? How could
movement and access through checkpoints be improved?
Dr Karanasou: We do not feel that
the answer to this problem is building terminals, trying to mechanise
the procedure and trying to minimise the contact between Israeli
soldiers and Palestinian civilians. We are aware that a lot of
funding has gone into building infrastructure at some checkpoints,
particularly the ones giving access to Jerusalem, but we do not
feel that that is the answer to the problem. Problems continue
to persist at these checkpoints; people still can only approach
the checkpoints if they have got permits, and getting permits
from the Israeli authorities is highly problematic. It is not
a transparent process; people are denied permits on security grounds
but they have no means of appealing against decisions or knowing
what the reasons behind them are. Also, there are costs involved
in trying to get permits; permits are short-term and they have
to be renewed and they can be withdrawn at any time; permits can
also be overruled by any kind of closure that is declared at any
time. So you may have a permit to enter Jerusalem, go to a checkpoint
and not be able to go through anyway because some other kind of
rule has applied at that time. We feel that the answer lies in
removing this restriction of movement, at least within the Occupied
Territories themselves, and for pressure to be put on the Israeli
Government by the UK Government to implement the ruling of the
International Court of Justice in relation to the barrier. We
feel that this is the answer, not to try to sanitise, perhaps,
the restrictions on movement.
Mr Leach: Can I add to the answer?
We need to ask ourselves two fundamental questions, or at least
I would encourage the Committee to reflect on these. The first
is why do the checkpoints exist and why do they continue to exist?
That takes us directly to the existence of the settlements, and
I think that needs more reflection. The other issue that needs
review is the issue about security. Security is given as the sole
reason for the existence of the restrictions, and security for
Israelis is vital—there is no question about that from us
or from those that we work with. The issue that needs to be considered
is what scope is there for economic development. With respect
to the West Bank, again, I would like to draw the specific attention
of the Committee to what we have said on page 10[13]
about the freedom of movement for goods and the scope for Palestinian
farmers and so on to make arrangements. The fact is that the restrictions
not only create impediments for people temporarily but, again,
they have created a basis on which structural inequity can be
developed. It is clear that Israeli farmers have a competitive
advantage over their Palestinian counterparts. We know, not on
the basis of random interviewing but through a process of sustained
interviews of economic producers both Israeli and Palestinian,
that an Israeli trader, for instance, in Zubadat buys vegetables
without any consultation with Palestinian farmers about prices—he
does not have to, prices are set from outside. So in answer to
the question about restrictions I would like to suggest reflection
be given to what we have advocated in our submission about the
need for support for economic policies which will make a fundamental
difference to the security of both peoples.
Q158 John Bercow: A couple of years ago,
with Christian Aid, a number of us, including Joan and I, went
to Qalqilya and one could not but be struck by the undeniably
damaging impact of Israeli policy, including the separation barrier,
on the prospects of subsistence there. On the other hand (and
this was a point which struck me very forcibly at the time), the
one argument to which I did not think in the course of examining
the issues Israel's critics had any particularly convincing response
was the argument that said that since the construction of the
barrier there had been a very, very sharp reduction in the number
of insurgent attacks and in their severity and consequences. Therefore,
what I am really moved to ask is about the direction of the barrier.
It may be that there are people who think that Israel should,
to coin a term, unilaterally disarm now. That seems to me to be
not only an unrealistic proposition but also an entirely unreasonable
one. Clearly, any society has the right to defend itself. To my
mind, and I should have thought to the minds of quite a lot of
people who are not extremists in the dispute between Israel and
the Palestinians, there should not be a dispute about the entitlement
to construct a barrier thereby to protect yourself if it is done
exclusively upon your own land. I wonder whether Mr Grunwald would
accept that Israel has, in a sense, Chairman, made a rod for its
own back by creating a barrier which manifestly does more than
simply protect existing territory and tends, instead (to use that
rather hackneyed but valid term in this historical dispute), to
create facts on the ground by intruding into territory which,
at the very least, could be described as being the subject of
disputed ownership.
Mr Grunwald: Thank you for that
question, and may I pick up on the language you used about Israel
"making a rod for its own back"? I am not here, let
me say again, to defend either, in one sense, the existence of
the barrier or indeed the route, although I could do one certainly
and make comments on the other, and may well do so in the course
of my answer. The concept of a rod for your own back indicates
that you have created something which is going to cause you an
injury. The whole purpose of the erection of the barrier was to
prevent injury being caused to Israelis, not to inflict it on
them. I speak as a Jew. The idea for a Jew of anyone having to
live behind a wall is an extremely difficult one to stomach. For
centuries Jewish communities around the world fought to get themselves
out from behind walls that were imposed on them for no good reason:
Jews did not spread disease; Jews did not spread the plague—all
the reasons that were given for forcing Jews behind walls. This
Committee must understand that the difficult debate that took
place in Israel when the question of a barrier was first mooted,
the only purpose of it has been to prevent the suicide bombings
and the terror attacks that took place inside Israel. That is
not a "rod for its own back": that was to prevent its
own back from being smitten and it succeeded. It has succeeded
enormously. The number of successful attacks has reduced phenomenally.
The number of deaths caused by terror attacks within Israel has
reduced incredibly. Year by year it has come down: in 2002 there
were 453 victims; last year I think it was down to 45 from terror
attacks within Israel. The number of attempted attacks has not
gone down by the same extent. They continue, and they continue
to this day. A small part of the wall is actually a wall, as you
know, in certain areas it is something between 3 and 5%. People's
views of the barrier have changed. I was very intrigued to note
that only last week the French Foreign Minister, once having been
very opposed to the erection of the barrier, changed his views
on the matter. "Although the wall was a moral and ethical
problem for me, when I realised that terror attacks were reduced
by 80% in the areas where it was erected I understood I did not
have the right to think that way". The fact is that it has
worked.
Q159 Chairman: Mr Grunwald, I think
you have given a perfectly eloquent response on that, but Mr Bercow's
question, and Mr Barrett's follow-up question, is not on the effectiveness
of the wall as a security barrier, but I think it is in our evidence
that the wall is twice as long as the border and built on occupied
territory; in other words why did you not build a wall down the
Green Line?
Mr Grunwald That is a question
which has been asked of the Israelis on many occasions and the
answers that they give are two-fold: one, it is, security; and
two is, the route of the fence is not final. Please God, when
there is peace and, please God, when there is the two-state solution
that we all want then negotiations with a partner who is prepared
to talk will result not only in the changing of the route of the
wall but also, please God, in its dismantling completely.
John Bercow: I was fascinated by that
very considered and thoughtful reply and I appreciate it, but
I do think if I may say so that line of the fence by the Government
of Israel really amounts to a justification for pursuing a policy
which, in a literal sense of the term, is disproportionately draconian
so far as what it is required to achieve, the immediate objective
of protection. Simply to allow yourselves subsequently the opportunity
in the context of a negotiation towards a settlement to say, "We
will now relax it"—I suppose what I was suggesting
to you, in the politest possible terms, was that Israel was in
danger of creating a rod for its own back; not in the sense of
inflicting upon itself immediate physical injury, but in the sense
that you have given ammunition and succour to the enemies of Israel;
because you have, if I can put it this way, opened the Government
of Israel up to public obloquy because people feel that instead
of simply seeking to preserve life and limb, to protection national
security, you have in the process sought to advance a territorial
claim. So far as possible, recognising cast-iron distinctions
do not exist, one should seek to preserve the distinctness and
separateness of the two issues of, security on the one hand, and
ultimate solution on the other. I fear Israel's conduct so far
has been such perhaps as to muddy the waters.
Chairman: Do you want to respond to that?
I think in a sense it was a comment. I think in order to try and
complete the session, we have three or four questions actually
arising out of that relating to the impact of the separation and
the settlements and so forth so I think we can move on to those,
otherwise we might overstay our welcome.
6 Ev 91 Back
7
Ecumenical Accompaniment Programme in Palestine and Israel. Back
8
Ev 109 Back
9
Ev 105 Back
10
Ev 92 Back
11
Ev 157 Back
12
Ev 92 Back
13
Ev 104 Back
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