Examination of Witnesses (Questions 280-299)
RT HON
HILARY BENN
MP, MR MARTIN
DINHAM, MR
DAVID HALLAM
AND MR
PETER GOODERHAM
14 DECEMBER 2006
Q280 Richard Burden: No, with officials.
The view taken was if people had been elected in their position
as elected people, whether they were Hamas, Fatah or anything
else, you had the relationship with the institution to which they
were elected, not with the political party. That was the logic
applied to local government. If you apply it to local government,
why not to the national parliament?
Mr Gooderham: With respect, I
do not think it was the logic that was applied. There were only
two occasions last year when representatives of the Government
had any contact with Hamas representatives and that was at a pretty
low level. There was not any other contact before that and there
has not been since, I think, June 2005. I am not quite sure what
your question is.
Q281 Richard Burden: Why did you
have those contacts?
Mr Gooderham: Because we have
taken the view that we do not have contact with an organisation
which has carried out terrorist attacks.
Q282 Richard Burden: Except on two
occasions?
Mr Gooderham: We had some limited
contacts and we concluded at that point that that was as far as
we wanted to take it. That was the extent of the contact we had.
As I understood it, you were trying to draw a comparison between
municipal authorities and that is not a comparison that we make
ourselves. We did not see a distinction between the two.
Hilary Benn: It is also fair to
say that the parties that will need to negotiate in order to try
and reach agreement are national governments, not municipal governments,
and therefore I think that is a different set of circumstances
and I have tried to set that out.
Q283 Mr Singh: We have a ceasefire
now. Have you made any assessment of the likely impact of that
ceasefire? Does it change anything in terms of our position, for
example? Is there any opportunity to change our position on funding
the Hamas government?
Hilary Benn: Currently, no, because
we have set out the Quartet principles. The ceasefire is holding
in reasonable measure, I would describe it as, although when I
visited the Mayor of Sderot on Monday morning he pointed out through
the window where one of the Qassam rockets had landed in the previous
week, a week or so after the ceasefire had begun. It is better
than it was. The closures remain and that has a very serious impact
on people's lives, as does the lack of the clearance revenues.
I did talk to President Abbas about his efforts to try and form
a government of national unity. So far, he has not been able to
do that. Whether he will be successful in the future I do not
know but I think that would be a really positive step if that
could take place. If it is a government of national unity that
would express support for the Quartet principles, there would
be a different set of circumstances and, to be honest, I long
for that occasion to come about. We need to move from the position
that all of us currently are in because how is this going to change?
Q284 Mr Singh: Is there any evidence
that Hamas has used any aid monies to fund terrorism?
Hilary Benn: There have been allegations
made in the past and certainly for the money that we have responsibility
for we have put in place a whole series of stringent measures
to make sure that that is not the case. There have been complaints
in the past about European Community funding. They have been investigated
and, certainly as far as I am aware, none of those investigations
has substantiated that charge. Is there a problem of corruption
more generally? Yes, of course there is.
Mr Hallam: In answer to a slightly
different question which is does Hamas fund terrorism? Yes. That
means that money that has gone to Hamas has been used to fund
terrorism, which is why we are extremely careful to make sure
that none of our money goes to Hamas.
Q285 John Bercow: Secretary of State,
you naturally support the British Government's foreign policy,
not least because you share collective responsibility for it,
but that fact notwithstanding would you not accept that in practice
that foreign policy is undermining your development objectives
in the West Bank and Gaza?
Hilary Benn: No, I would not accept
that.
Q286 John Bercow: In the circumstances
of being manifestly unable to deliver the Department's Country
Assistance Plan, if that does not constitute an undermining, a
limitation or a constraint, would you care to tell the Committee
how you would characterise it instead?
Hilary Benn: The fact that we
are not currently able to undertake the kind of development programme
that I and all of us would like is not a consequence of British
Government foreign policy. That is why I do not accept the premise
of the original question. It is a consequence of the failure of
the political process in the Middle East. I will just say, with
all the force I can try and command, that in the end the ingredient
that has to be there that is not there currently is that the parties
to the conflict are prepared to sit down and use compromise and
negotiation in order to solve it. If there are those who think
that if only the international community did something different,
made more effort, that on its own could solve the problem I would
simply say I do not agree.
Q287 John Bercow: I think there is
some concern and anxiety that the Government's approach to development
and humanitarian assistance in the Territories, however well-
intentioned and whatever the level of resources historically or
currently committed, could not accurately be described at the
moment as coherent. Therefore, what I would like to ask you is
what are the lines of communication between DFID, the FCO, Number
10 and the Treasury? Let me put it to you in a slightly different
way, if I may, because I think it is very important to try to
establish what is happening and then to evaluate what is the merit
or demerit of the overall approach. There is a view that says
that increasingly in the course of your Government's second term—and
now, more particularly, in the course of its third term—foreign
policy is being very much more heavily driven by Number 10 than
it is by the Foreign Office. The outstanding record in many ways
of DFID notwithstanding, in the course of this Parliament DFID
in this matter in particular is in danger of becoming but a bit
part player.
Hilary Benn: To be honest, I do
not recognise the characterisation of the situation that you have
just put forward. I do not think that is the case at all. What
are we trying to do? We are trying to do the right thing in difficult
circumstances. I make no apology at all for the fact that as circumstances
change—we have just been discussing in some detail what
happened earlier this year—we try to find another way of
continuing to provide support to the Palestinian people, notwithstanding
that change. I think that is the right and sensible thing to do.
I know some people argue—it seems to me more of a debating
point than a practical one—that the international community
is just subsidising the occupation. Unless they are arguing we
should all say, "Right folks, we are going. We are off"
I do not think that is either practical or right in those circumstances.
It is certainly the case that 10 Downing Street, and in particular
the Prime Minister, take a very close interest in what is happening
in the Middle East. The fact that he is going back there again
in the near future is evidence of that. I happen to think that
is a really good thing.
Q288 John Bercow: Lastly, I listened
very carefully when Mr Gooderham made the point in response to
Mr Burden that the stance of the British Government was not to
talk to or negotiate with terrorists. Mr Burden pointed out that
on two occasions at least there had been such contact and I think
Mr Gooderham used the qualifying adjective "limited".
On the basis of that limited contact it was decided that it should
be limited at that point and thus far no further. On the other
hand, Secretary of State, you yourself talked about the importance
of compromise and readiness to engage, give and take and so on.
Therefore, can I just put it to you that, whilst I absolutely
understand the stance of the Israeli Government and to some extent
the stance of the British Government towards Hamas, is it not
always a good idea to have a plan B? If the expectation of your
current policy is that it will secure a change in the stance of
Hamas, I understand that rationale, but it might not happen or
there might be a change for the worse because Hamas thinks it
is being ostracised or provoked. Therefore, can I just put it
to you in the most courteous possible way that some people might
think that your policy is reminiscent of that of Mr Micawber,
that something will turn up. What if it does not?
Hilary Benn: That is a first for
me. You make a very fair point. If you are asking me are we sure
that this is going to work and things are going to change, the
honest answer is I do not know. You do not know and frankly nor
do any of us. There are certain principles that we are trying
to adhere to and I think it is far from unreasonable, if you accept
that the only way this is going to change is by a process of negotiation
and to negotiate with someone you have to recognise them; you
have to say, "I am not trying to overthrow you by violence.
I am committed to a peace process", to say, "We expect
that of both parties to the conflict" and to say that to
Hamas. In the end, Hamas has to make the choice as to whether
they are going to make a journey over time that parallels what
the PLO did over 30 years or not. I cannot answer that question.
Only they can, but I think it is right to have a principle to
say, "That really has to be the starting point." What
do I hope? I said in answer to Mr Singh's earlier question that
a government of national unity might provide that way forward.
President Abbas has worked really hard to try and bring that about.
Currently, that has not been successful. It does not mean we should
not go on trying, does it?
Q289 Ann McKechin: You have talked
a lot about the wider principles but, as has often been referred
to when we have visited Palestine, the facts on the ground have
radically changed position from the time when the Quartet principles
were established. Some would be arguing that the Palestinian Fatah
made a very long journey towards those principles and they got
very little back in return. We wonder now about a Hamas government
in the Palestinian Authority. Coming back to John Bercow's comment
about a plan B, the facts on the ground have changed. Is it not
time not only for the UK but the international community to recognise
that and to engage in at least some form of dialogue with Hamas
about how we are going to start a new journey for all sides to
move towards a situation where we can start meaningful negotiations?
Are we having any dialogue with Hamas at any level about that
journey?
Hilary Benn: The answer, as Peter
Gooderham just indicated, is no, that is not the case. In order
to have a dialogue with somebody else, you really do have to say,
"We are not trying to overthrow you by violence. We do recognise
you and we are committed to a peace process." That is what
the Quartet principles are. Although the circumstances have changed,
I think they are good principles. How do we move forward? It would
be really helpful if, one, there could be movement on the revenues
if we are looking for a list of things where it would be good
to have some progress which might change the political context,
because at the moment the political context is where it is and,
unless it changes, how are we going to see any movement? If Israel
were prepared to make the payment of those revenues into the Temporary
International Mechanism, it would produce $65 million a month
that currently is not available to meet all of the needs in the
Occupied Territories. Secondly, if Karni could begin to shift.
It is a bit of a bizarre experience to go to Karni, this incredibly
long wall with these openings. The doors open; the goods go in
and they shut. I did not see another living soul on the other
side of Karni while I was there but if Karni could begin to operate
now as it has operated at some point during its existence—
Q290 Ann McKechin: I really do not
know of any other case where, before we started formal negotiations,
we have had utterly no dialogue with the parties we want to start
the negotiations with. This seems to me to be a situation which
we would not practise in other conflict areas but yet you seem
to be applying a different set of principles or practices in this
case here. This is what concerns me because, if you look at our
own country and Northern Ireland, we were having dialogue with
Sinn Fein and the IRA many long years before we went out in the
open to say we were talking to them. Are you saying at no level
is the international community or members of the Quartet going
to have any degree of dialogue with Hamas, either through intermediaries
or through other sources before we are going to start recognising
them and having formal negotiations? Is that realistic?
Hilary Benn: The Quartet principles
are as we set them out. In the end, it is not about dialogue with
us. This will only be solved if there is a dialogue with Israel.
Therefore, if you put the question to the Government of Israel
they will have a very firm view about who they are willing to
talk to and on what basis. They would say, not unreasonably, "If
we are going to have a negotiation with you, it would be extremely
helpful if, one, you would recognise that we exist and we have
the right to exist, two, that you are not committed to overthrowing
us by violence and, three, that you are up for picking up the
peace process such as it has been in order to move forward."
That in the end is where this is going to move and I just think
it is not unreasonable to say, if you could support those principles,
let us get to work.
Mr Gooderham: President Abbas
has been negotiating intensively with Hamas for the last six months.
He could tell you just how frustrating that process has been.
We are expecting him to make a speech in the next couple of days
where he will set out what he thinks is the way forward. He supports
the three principles which is very important. There is a sort
of sense that somehow this is something the international community
has imposed on the Palestinians, that it is some unreasonable
and unfair set of demands. These are principles which the previous
Palestinian Authority were fully signed up to.
Q291 Ann McKechin: Where is the dialogue
at the intermediate stage to try and get to that point? We have
a bit of a journey before we get there. We do not have a plan
B at the moment about how we are going to get there if President
Abbas, who we have been putting a lot of hope and expectation
on for many months, unfortunately has been unable to deliver.
Hilary Benn: That is the case.
It is not for the want of trying. In that sense, he is in the
right position to seek to do that. We should give him every support
that we can. The other point I was trying to make was that, if
we could see some progress on a number of the issues that cause
particular difficulty at the moment—I would add to that
list movement on closures—we might begin to see the political
context changing. At the moment, his difficulty is what does he
say to the people who elected him and whom he represents about
what prospects there are for moving forward, because at the moment
it is quite hard to see what they are.
Q292 Hugh Bayley: When the Committee
was last in the Occupied Territories three or four years ago,
we met the Minister of Finance and we saw that some very important
measures had been introduced to improve transparency and accountability
for funds used by the Palestinian Authority. It was not that the
Ministry of Finance's reach was complete. The Office of the President
was still largely beyond his control but most of the finances
provided by the international community were properly accounted
for. Now, according to the IMF, "Government finances have
become increasingly fragmented and public finance reforms implemented
in recent years have been compromised." That of course includes
the reforms which DFID had worked so hard with the Palestinian
Authority to achieve. How is DFID ensuring that the goal of building
up the institutional capacity of the Palestinian Authority is
maintained?
Hilary Benn: The honest answer
is in current circumstances it is really difficult to do that.
We had been providing that support. Salaam Fayyad in particular
had a very good reputation internationally because people knew
that he was serious about handling the money properly and trying
to reform the system. That is why he had a lot of support from
the international community and he made some very important changes
in the way in which the money was handled. Currently, we cannot
do that because of the discussion that we have just been having.
Q293 Joan Ruddock: I was simply going
to make the point that surely the Secretary of State could understand
how from the Palestinian people's point of view the conditions
of the Quartet would appear to be totally taking Israel's side.
That is where the difficulty lies. If, as Ann McKechin suggested,
we could have some dialogue or parts of the international community,
perhaps particularly the United Nations, could have dialogue with
Hamas they might be able to act as a bridge. At the moment, we
are completely cutting off dialogue and it seems to me a real
dereliction of our international duties and responsibilities to
be doing that. We have all felt that it is a matter of constantly
thinking something will come up but we have had a very long period
of time in which nothing has come up.
Hilary Benn: I accept entirely
that nothing has come up and there is a stalemate currently. I
tried to indicate, in answer to Ann McKechin's earlier question
steps, that I think could be taken to try and change things but
I would not accept the argument that the Quartet principles are
taking Israel's side.
Joan Ruddock: As a perception.
Hilary Benn: You are quite right
to correct me. You are right that that is people's perception.
Of course it is. I heard that a great deal from those I spoke
to, Palestinian civil society and others. President Abbas supports
the principles. I do not know that there is a perception that
he is taking Israel's side. They are reasonable principles in
the circumstances for the reasons that I set out earlier, but
I am not under any illusions about how frustrated and desperate
people feel. They feel absolutely desperate and, in those circumstances,
people want to have some sense that there is some hope and things
can change. I think we have to be honest about what either side
needs to do if there is going to be progress. That is the foundation
on which the principles are based. It is not about punishing anyone
or trying to subvert the political process. It is not going to
change or move if you are not prepared to do those three things
as a starting point for the negotiation that all of us want to
see.
Chairman: Quentin Davies agrees with
that but has some questions nevertheless.
Q294 Mr Davies: I do not know whether
this will come as any comfort to you but I think the Government
have been absolutely right in your foreign policy in this matter
and indeed the whole European Union has been. This is strictly
speaking an EU policy which we are very much part of, which has
been to boycott Hamas and to suspend direct budget support for
all the reasons that you have just given. I think it is very important
to do so, both to maintain the integrity of our position internationally
on terrorist organisations and indeed to do our best to bring
about the circumstances in which there might be a political settlement
in the Middle East. I want to ask you two questions. We have taken
this strong line about financial dealings with Hamas and keeping
money away from the Palestinian Authority so long as the Hamas
government refuses to accept the three Quartet conditions—the
problem could be solved overnight if they just accepted those
conditions. Enormous relief of suffering could be brought about
to the people of Palestine. If the Government and our EU partners
are all agreed, as happily we are, that in the present circumstances
the money must be cut off, is it not reasonable for the Israelis
on exactly the same basis also to cut off the indirect tax revenues
which they collect from Palestine? They have not of course appropriated
those revenues for their own use but have put them into a trustee
fund. They say that they cannot pay that money through the TIM
without the consent of some valid Palestinian Authority. Since
the valid Palestinian Authority in the form both of President
Abbas and the Palestinian administration do not give that consent,
I do not see how we can reasonably suggest to the Israelis that
they should pass over that money. The Israelis are basing their
policies, as I see it, on exactly the same principles as are animating
the policy of the European Union.
Hilary Benn: I am grateful for
your comfort, if I may say so, Mr Davies, in the first instance.
Secondly,—
John Barrett: I would be worried about
it.
Q295 Mr Davies: If you listen to
Liberal Democrats you ought to be worried!
Hilary Benn: Secondly, yes, I
think it is a fair point, that as far as Israel and those revenues
are concerned they have the same reservations that we had in relation
to the Hamas-led PA. However, I agree that there is a bit of ambiguity
about the position of President Abbas as to how he would like
that money to be paid. I think he would prefer it, if it is not
going to be given to the PA, to be given to the President's Office.
I would just say pragmatically, and that is why I made the point
to Ms McKechin, that the best chance of getting that money released
for the benefit of the Palestinian people is to put it through
the TIM, and I think if the Government of Israel were to go to
President Abbas and say, "We might think about doing this",
genuinely it would be interesting to see what he would say in
response to that.
Q296 Mr Davies: But surely it is
open to President Abbas to take that initiative today, and then,
of course, he will have put the Israelis in a position in which
it is very difficult for them not to pay that money over. Equally,
you can see that they would have no legal position to stand on
at all, or any moral position, if, acting as trustees for that
money, they then pay it over without the consent of the beneficiary
of that money for whom they are currently holding it.
Hilary Benn: I just hope genuinely
that they would have a conversation about it because I simply
say that I think that offers the best hope of moving forward in
the current circumstances, and that is why when I met Foreign
Minister Livni I made that suggestion to her.
Q297 Mr Davies: I have no idea what
she came back to say but I think it is blindingly obvious that
President Abbas has not said that up till now, and if you can
persuade him to say that I think you might contribute to a solution
to that problem for the benefit of the Palestinian people who
are suffering and whom we are all genuinely concerned about here.
I wonder if I can put to you another point and here I do want
to question the position you have just set out today. You said
that you would be very much in favour of the creation of a government
of national unity and, of course, that is the position, as far
as I know, of the Israeli Government and of the American Government
as well as of the European Union at the present time. You say
it would be a very positive step. You actually said that you longed
for that, I think you have told the Committee this afternoon,
and those are strong words from you, Secretary of State. I have
the feeling that that may be the wrong approach, tempting and
attractive as it is in the short term, because we do need, if
we are ever going to have peace, to get Hamas to recognise the
three Quartet conditions. If we are ever going to have peace they
are going to have to recognise Israel, they are going to have
to face reality, they are going to have to accept the existing
agreements, and they are going to have to renounce violence. It
is difficult psychologically and politically for them to do that,
as we know, but surely by throwing them back into opposition we
ensure that they never have any incentive to do that. From a position
of opposition they will always maintain this very extreme position,
whereas if they continue to exercise the responsibilities of office,
and you yourself have said this afternoon that office carries
with it some responsibilities, they will have to respond to reality
and to recognise reality. They have at the moment, so long as
they are the government, to give account to the Palestinian people
as to why the security situation has not improved and why the
economic situation is getting worse and worse, and they have got
an election to fight. That surely is the greatest incentive on
them to recognise reality. So I put it to you that simply shifting
the responsibility off Hamas, allowing them to get back into irresponsible
opposition, is the wrong way forward and sometimes, in order to
get the right long-term solution, you have to be tough in the
short term in this life.
Hilary Benn: I think in your terms,
Mr Davies, we have been tough in the short term in sticking to
the Quartet principles. What I think I said was that in longing
for a government of national unity I wanted it to be a government
of national unity that supported the Quartet principle because
that would represent—
Q298 Mr Davies: But it would not
be a Hamas government and the whole point about the government
of national unity is that the Hamas government, which is democratically
elected and which has a mandate, would be replaced by some other
government which might contain people who were sympathetic to
Hamas but they would explicitly not be Hamas representatives there,
nor would they have a democratic mandate of the kind that the
present Hamas government do have. I put it to you therefore that
that is the wrong way forward. I do not expect you to carry out
a revolution in your policy this afternoon, but I do take this
opportunity to suggest via you to the Government that the course
on which we are currently embarked is actually the wrong one and
it would be much better to make sure that the Hamas government
continue to live with the consequence of their own recalcitrance
and continue to have to face the electorate with those consequences,
and that is the only way of getting Hamas to recognise Israel
and give up violence, which is what we all want.
Hilary Benn: With respect, I do
not agree, because we have a stalemate currently. If the current
circumstances persist and at some point there is an election in
the future, and there have been reports that President Abbas has
been thinking about that as an alternative to what he has been
trying to do, I do not know what the consequence would be in terms
of how people would vote. In the end it is for the Palestinian
people to do that. I asked the question of a lot of people during
the course of my visit. Some people said no, they thought support
for Hamas would probably be at about the same level. Some people
said they are beginning to feel some of the consequences of the
failure of what has happened since they were elected and they
might lose some support. I do not know. Only the people will be
able to answer that question at the time. The reason why I think
President Abbas has been absolutely right, and it is his initiative
to try and seek to form a government of national unity, is that
if it could be formed on the basis of support for the Quartet
principles then my view is, and that is why I used the phrase
that I longed for it, that would provide a breakthrough which
would allow us to get out of where everybody is currently stuck.
Mr Davies: Secretary of State, we all
recognise that you, quite understandably and rightly and responsibly
as Secretary of State for International Development, want to find
a way of getting the money paid as efficiently and quickly as
possible to relieve suffering in the West Bank, and indeed in
Gaza. I am simply putting it to you that ultimately the solution
to the grave problems of the Palestinian people, which after all
have gone on now for more than half a century, can only be achieved
through a general settlement, and in order to get a general settlement
we have to make sure that Hamas accepts the role of a responsible
government rather than an irresponsible opposition, and therefore
we should keep them in government. I take some comfort in the
fact that though you said to me, and you had to say it, defending
the present Government policy, that you disagreed with me, the
arguments you then proceeded to adduce had nothing to do with
the analysis I had made. You merely came up with another possibility,
which was that President Abbas might hold an election and that
might produce a Fatah government possibly with a democratic mandate.
That in my view would be a good outcome. I agree with that because
Hamas would then draw the conclusion that their intransigence
had not actually helped them electorally.
Chairman: Could we have questions rather
than your theories, Mr Davies?
Q299 Mr Davies: Can I put to you
a request with a question mark at the end of it, so it is a request
rather than a question, that you do consider the point I have
put to you and take the opportunity to discuss that with the Prime
Minister and Margaret Beckett, because I think it is important
that we should look at all perspectives in this very difficult
situation?
Hilary Benn: I hope you find,
Mr Davies, that I always reflect very seriously on the points
which the Select Committee puts to me, but I said what I said
not because I am sitting here and I have to support what the Government's
policy is; I said it because it is what I think. Mr Gooderham
wants to say something.
Mr Gooderham: I just thought it
might be helpful to clarify from a terminological point of view
what President Abbas has been trying to do with the formation
of a government of national unity, which is to involve Hamas in
that. The whole idea is that there would be a number of Hamas
ministers in that government, and this, if you like, is a way
of trying to ease Hamas from the position it is in at the moment
to a position where at least those ministers that are part of
that government are signed up to the three principles. That is
what he has been trying to do. You are perfectly right, Mr Davies,
to say that there is another option, which is the so-called technocratic
government, where President Abbas would declare that the present
government has been dismissed and a new government has come in
and it is made up of independent figures who are not members of
Hamas and so on. That is an option that he has from time to time
considered and reflected upon but so far he has not taken that
decision. The third option, as the Secretary of State was saying,
is elections and from what we understand that is what President
Abbas is now—
Mr Davies: But, Mr Gooderham, I repeat
the point: if we are going to have a settlement we have to have
Hamas as an organisation accepting Israel and accepting peace.
Chairman: Okay. I think you have made
that clear.
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