Examination of Witnesses (Questions 32-39)
MR DAVID
HAYES, MR
BRINLEY SALZMANN,
MRS SUSAN
GRIFFITHS AND
MR BARRY
FLETCHER
7 DECEMBER 2006
Q32 Chairman: Good afternoon; you are
very welcome. For the record could I ask you, David, to introduce
yourselves and your colleagues?
Mr Hayes: On my right is Brinley
Salzmann, the Secretary of the Export Group for Aerospace and
Defence. On my left is Barry Fletcher, Independent Export Control
Consultant, and Susan Griffiths from MBDA. I am David Hayes, the
Head of Export Controls for Rolls-Royce and the Chairman of the
Export Group for Aerospace and Defence.
Q33 Chairman: Thank you and thank you
also for your presence this afternoon and for your memorandum.
When you gave evidence to this Committee during the last inquiry
you were complimentary about the Export Control Organisation's
performance. Has it maintained its good performance throughout
2006?
Mr Hayes: Broadly speaking, yes.
Q34 Chairman: There are no serious
weaknesses in the Organisation that you would wish to draw to
our attention?
Mr Salzmann: The only one that
has been raised by our members is the issue of the ECO's website
which has undertaken a fundamental review this year and which
has, in the view of so many companies, been significantly downgraded
in its user friendliness and accessibility.
Q35 Mike Gapes: Can I ask you about
the control of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear
materials? You called for a review of export controls on those
areas. Given that these areas are very sensitive and that the
Government has very strict restrictions on them already, what
is the purpose of a review?
Mr Hayes: The first thing I will
say is that I am not an expert in this field. Our expert in this
field is at the moment sunning himself in Barbados. We will get
you a full reply from NBC UK. Fundamentally the difficulty surrounds
the inclusion of handling, detection and identification in the
definition of relevant risk. That places obstacles in communicating
in technical terms about those capabilities even within the UK,
so between UK companies and UK MOD or UK companies and UK blue
light services. To that extent there is a view that it endangers
our own national security. Perversely it also damages our competitiveness
because it is actually easier now for MOD or a blue light emergency
service in the UK to communicate with a foreign supplier than
it is with a British one.
Q36 Mike Gapes: Does this also relate
to some issues to do with extra-territorial controls and relations
with other governments?
Mr Hayes: If you are asking if
all the governments take different approaches to the export of
NBC related equipment, then yes, there is some evidence in that
regard.
Q37 Mike Gapes: Do they take a more
lenient approach to it?
Mr Hayes: Yes.
Q38 Mike Gapes: That is a cause of
concern by some of our companies which might feel that they are
losing potential markets.
Mr Hayes: It is, particularly
when those markets are very high profile events. A classic example
would be the Beijing Olympics.
Q39 Mike Gapes: Is there not a danger,
even though we have a more restrictive regime, if we move to a
less restrictive regime that we might actually facilitate proliferation
of things that we do not want to proliferate?
Mr Hayes: I think that is the
difference between something being permitted by the legislation
and something being approved by the licensing authority. It is
not a one-stop shop. Something can be permitted by the legislation
and still denied by the licensing authority.
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