Select Committee on International Development Written Evidence


Memorandum submitted by David Hall, Director, PSIRU and Emanuele Lobina, Senior Research Fellow, University of Greenwich

1.  INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

  This paper is about how the international community can support the governments, public institutions, citizens and workers of developing countries in extending and improving water and sanitation services. It is based on extensive empirical research over the last decade on water services in transition and developing countries.1

  The starting point for the development of water services is the present realities, which need to be recognised and understood in terms of their historical development. The provision and extension of water services is a major economic activity, which requires the use of capital, labour and the natural resource of water itself. It is therefore necessary to examine the constraints and possibilities for mobilising these resources. Finally, the development of water services is driven by political objectives of achieving greater social and economic development, and so political mechanisms and processes are also essential aspects of the service.

  This submission is therefore divided into five sections, on history, labour, capital, natural resources, and politics. Each of the last four sections ends with a discussion of how international support can assist countries in their attempts to develop universal water systems.

    —    The first section examines the historical development of water services in high income countries, based on public finance, especially through the growth of municipal borrowing capacity and national taxation, the different development in middle and low income countries before and after independence, and the failures of the recent privatisation experiment.

  The following three sections look at the economics of providing public water supplies, through the three classical factors of production—labour, capital and natural resources.

    —    Labour is required to build, maintain, operate and manage the system and its finances. There is a need for training programmes to develop a competent workforce at all levels, for greater recognition of the importance of workers relationships with communities, for involvement of workers in reform processes, and for adequate levels of pay. Donors need to re-develop policies for supporting training and capacity-building.

    —    Capital is needed to build new systems for capturing, treating and distributing water. The needs must be assessed locally and through democratic mechanisms, and then public finance mechanisms need to be used to raise this finance, through central or local governments. Donors can help build capacity for taxation and borrowing, and provide matching financial support for water services, and assist northern investors in southern water services.

    —    The natural resource of water itself needs to be captured at the same time as conserving and allocating its use, and protecting the environment. Public mechanisms for evaluation and decision-making are needed, and should be supported by donors.

  The final section looks at political processes.

    —    The existence of public water supplies depends on a political commitment to deliver clean water to all, and on public authorities with capacity to deliver services. Political activity is positively important in order to strengthen this commitment and improve public accountability and transparency. Donors can assist this by avoiding imposing external policy conditionalities, and by offering public-public partnerships to support capacity-building.

  The policies proposed for international support are summarised in a table in the concluding section.

Historical development of water services

1.1.  Dominance of the public sector

  Any realistic attempt to develop water services in middle and low income countries must focus on how to develop public sector water services. Despite all the attention that has been given to water privatization in the last 15 years, the water services of the world remain overwhelmingly provided by the public sector. In middle and low income countries, 90% of the largest cities—those with population over one million—were served by a public sector operator in mid-2006. This dominance of the public sector is growing, as the private companies retreat from many of the concessions and leases in developing countries. In rural areas, where there is little profitable business for the private companies, the percentage of water services provided by the public sector is even closer to 100%. The overall proportion operated by the public sector is thus at least 95%. The data is very similar in high income countries—France and the UK are exceptions, not the norm.2

  The history of the development of water and sanitation systems in the high income countries of the north shows a common pattern. In Europe, urban water systems began developing in 17th or 18th centuries as a limited service to affluent customers and as a public assistance for fire control. As cities grew in the 19th centuries, the demand for water consumption grew and the public health issues became more acute. While the initial systems were usually started by private companies, during the 19th century the utilities were fairly soon taken over by municipalities in nearly all European countries, including the UK. Only in France did the old 19th century private operators survive, which is why the only large water companies in the world are French: Suez (formerly Lyonnaise des Eaux) and Veolia (earlier Vivendi and the Compagnie Générale des Eaux) since 1853. If anything, the process of municipalisation was more rapid in the USA than in Europe: by 1897, 82% of the largest cities were served by municipal operations.

  Municipalisation was seen as a way to overcome the systemic inefficiencies of the private contractors: "During the 19th century, the previously private systems came under public ownership and public provision because of the inefficiency, costs and corruption connected to them".3 This was linked to the growth of municipal socialism (or `gas and water socialism'), which drove the development of local public services in northern countries.4 This ideology saw the public sector as a mechanism to fulfil a set of economic and political objectives—economic development, public health and improvement of social conditions for the urban poor. The municipalities developed financial mechanisms, superior to the private sector, including borrowing long-term money from local savers, at low interest rates because of the security of their flow of income from taxes. In the USA, for example, this capacity was a crucial part of the process: "The central issue was the ability of cities to incur debt to fund major projects and to sustain the high costs of operation. As the 19th century unfolded, city finances underwent changes in scope and complexity that ultimately made the development of public water supply systems achievable."5 France and the UK are the only two OECD countries whose water operations are run by private companies, but in both cases the cost of extending the networks was met through public finance mechanisms. While it remains possible for people to hypothesise or imagine that such private water companies might be vehicles for investment to extend water systems, there is no historical record of this happening—not even in France6 or the UK. In some countries, water charges continue to be collected through property taxes rather than metered payments—in the UK the majority of households continue to pay annual charges based on the value of their property, rather than metered consumption of water.

  Despite the dominant role of municipalities, central governments have played a significant role in financing water systems. This has sometimes involved paying directly for the water supply service, so that there is virtually no role for charges (eg Ireland); distributing some part of central tax revenue to support local authority spending on water and other services (eg Canada); providing cheap loan finance for local authorities to use for capital investment (eg USA); or collecting part of water charges centrally and redistributing it to authorities which need to invest (eg France). In Europe, the EU itself plays a major role in public financing of water systems in poorer states, and through low interest loans from its public sector development instrument, the European Investment Bank (see section 4).

  The formal structure of water operations has changed in recent decades. Even in countries where there has been no privatization, water services are increasingly carried out by corporatised bodies, rather than by a municipal department, for example in the Netherlands. Under the Dutch system, however, decisions of public authorities are key at every stage—and the Netherlands has recently legislated to make privatisation of water services illegal. Regulation is given great emphasis in discussions of water governance, but it has had little role in the development of water systems in high income countries, except in the USA where regulatory systems are extensively used in public services. In Europe it has played almost no role at all, with regulatory functions being carried out by the public authorities themselves as part of their role as owners. No other country in Europe uses a system of regulation like that of England and Wales under OFWAT.

1.2.  Developing countries: independence and colonial legacy

  Water supply in developing countries has a different history. In the colonial period, whilst the imperial countries were extending public networks in European cities, water supply in the colonies was focused on a colonial elite. The restrictions were economic as well as political. Even where systems were extended, requiring the local population to pay charges based on full cost recovery, without benefit of cross-subsidy, meant the service was unaffordable to the great majority, as in the case of Kampala, Uganda.7 These elite systems left a physical legacy of incomplete networks.8 Colonialism also left a socio-economic legacy of more unequal societies, which both makes the problem more acute and makes the requirement for redistributive public finance greater.

  After independence, it was possible to start developing the physical and social infrastructure of public services for all. The commitment to water supply and other public services was thus closely associated with the process of building independent states with political accountability to their citizens for the first time. But development in non-industrialized countries has continued to be strongly affected by the economic and political demands of international agencies and donors, and water services are a clear example of this.9 The patterns of water privatisation in Africa closely reflect the patterns of colonialism: British, Portuguese and German operators are almost exclusively present in countries which were formerly part of the British or Portuguese empires, or part of the German empire before the first world war, while French operators dominate former French colonies. It is not surprising if this privatisation process is resented as a reintroduction of colonial relations.

  In many developing countries central government has played a greater role in the water systems than in the north. Driven by independence rather than industrialisation, these countries had neither strong municipalities nor a strong local middle class, and so central state ownership of water providers is more common than in the north. In Sri Lanka, a country with an excellent developmental record on health and education, water has been primarily the responsibility of a central government parastatal. Policies and conditionalities of the international agencies have nevertheless insisted on making municipalities responsible for services. The IMF and World Bank conditions of the early 1990s forced Argentina into breaking up and privatising its previously national system, and there have been continuing pressures on Sri Lanka to do likewise.

1.3.  Privatisation: a failed experiment

  In the 1980s and 1990s the World Bank and donor agencies promoted a strategy to develop water systems in developing countries through privatisation. This was expected to deliver finance for investments, efficiency improvements, and better governance than they believed possible through the public sector in developing countries. It was expected that multinational companies would be attracted by a large new profitable market, and that the process would be welcomed by populations disillusioned with the corruption and efficiency which the World Bank associated with the public sector.

  This experiment has now clearly failed, on all counts.

  The private contracts have failed to deliver investment in new infrastructure as promised. After 15 years, only about 600,000 households have been connected as a result of investment by private water operators in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and east Asia (outside China)—representing less than 1% of the people who need to be connected in those regions to meet the MDGs.10 This may be compared with the results of the "decade of water" in the 1980s, which is usually referred to as a failure, yet reduced the overall percentage of people living without safe water supply from 56% in 1980 to 31% by 1990,11 results far better than the privatisation experiment has delivered. The fortunes of international water supply companies have collapsed dramatically, due to a failure to make adequate profits in developing countries. Since 2003 the multinational companies have halted and reversed their expansion. Suez, the company with the largest presence in developing countries, announced in January 2003 that it intended to reduce its presence in developing countries by one third, and only make future investments that were financed by the business itself, free from currency risk, and achieved a target rate of return.12 All the multinationals have been attempting to sell water operations since 2002, but found difficulties in finding buyers. In 2006, the Suez group itself was the subject of two takeover bids from companies interested in its electricity and gas business: either buyer would sell off the international water business.

  One key reason for this was that developing countries could not support the rate of return required by international equity capital. A World Bank study showed that returns on infrastructure investment in developing countries, including water, fell far short of the cost of capital.13 International equity finance is very unlikely to be a significant source of capital for investment in infrastructure in future.

  The failure to achieve an adequate return on capital was partly due to a remarkable degree of public campaigns against water privatisation, a global phenomenon. The uprising which led to the termination of the private water contract in Cochabamba (Bolivia) in 2000, was the first and most dramatic of a series of reversals: in 2004 another uprising in El Alto, the poor suburb of La Paz, led to the termination of Suez' concession in that city. Suez' concession in Manila (Philippines) had become the subject of a bitter dispute with the regulator, and by 2006 had been 84% renationalised. In Africa, contracts were terminated in Gambia, Mali, Chad, Nkonkobe (South Africa) and Dar-es-Salaam (Tanzania).14

  The private companies have also failed to show greater efficiency than public sector operations.15 Empirical evidence from studies in all continents shows that ownership does not appear to make any significant difference to efficiency. It is no longer possible to assume that the public sector is less efficient than the private sector, as summarised by a World Bank research paper: "...  in general, there is no statistically significant difference between the efficiency performance of public and private operators in this sector... For utilities, it seems that in general ownership often does not matter as much as sometimes argued. Most cross-country papers on utilities find no statistically significant difference in efficiency scores between public and private providers."16 An IMF policy paper on public-private partnerships (PPPs) in 2004 agreed, stating that: "It cannot be taken for granted that PPPs are more efficient than public investment and government supply of services ... . While there is an extensive literature on this subject, the theory is ambiguous and the empirical evidence is mixed. ..."17

  The failure of the privatization experiment confirmed that the public sector must be the important vehicle for expansion in the future, as in the past. The World Bank's infrastructure policy review in July 2003 noted that private finance had accounted for less than 10% of total investment in water in developing countries in the previous decade, and concluded that: "the Bank will need to more strongly promote sustainable public sector investment and service delivery".18 The recent history of water services has been marked by the development of public sector water services in many countries, often associated with political programmes or emerging from social movements resisting privatisation. As shown by a Brookings institute study in Latin America, public sector operators in that region have been just as successful at extending their services as private water companies. There are already many effective public sector water services in developing countries—nine of the 16 Asian cities with public sector operators studied by the ADB (see table above) have better leakage rates than Thames Water in the UK, for example, and all but one had achieved better coverage than the privatised cities of Jakarta and Manila.19

2.  LABOUR: WORKERS, TRAINING AND COMMUNITIES

  Every economic activity involves labour. Even in a capital intensive service like water, the contribution of workers is essential, at all levels. Many investments in water installations have become useless because there is no provision for employing people to maintain and operate them. Yet during the last 15 to 20 years workers in the water sector have been seen, by the mainstream policy institutions, as a problem—a cost which employers should minimise by reducing the number of employees or keeping their wages as low as possible. Private companies were expected to help solve this problem by dismissing more employees than the public sector organisations (as happened, quite brutally, in some privatisations). The IMF has often imposed ceilings on public sector wages.

  Labour needs to be recognised again as a key factor of production, and "public service workers... need to be put at the heart of expanding services for all." (Oxfam 2006). Workers do not generally avoid doing their jobs, and often do more than they are strictly paid to do -as pointed out by Francis Fukuyama.20 The knowledge and commitment of workers, and the capacity of their unions to participate in restructuring and improvements, should be seen as key strengths. Water services need a properly paid, trained and stable workforce.

  In all sectors, workers need to be properly paid, trained and supported to be productive. Henry Ford doubled the wages of car workers in the early 20st century in order to make them more productive. In water services in developing countries, key workers responsible for the crucial tasks of maintenance, connections and collection of bills are often so low paid that they have a greater incentive to be inefficient and extract extra payments and bribes. Creating decent levels of pay is a pre-condition for delivering an efficient and effective service, and so a number of successful improvements to public sector services—for example in Phnom Penh and Kampala—have involved deliberate sharp increases in pay levels, so that workers no longer had to resort to other ways of supplementing their income.21

  The number of workers also needs to be related to the services that must be delivered. This becomes especially important given the ambitious expansion targets of the MDGs for water. While there has been much discussion of the finance needed to achieve these targets, there has been very little written about how much labour is needed to achieve these goals—the official UN report on the water MDGs in 2005, for example, said almost nothing about labour.22

  A report by Brian Matthew in 2005 has attempted to estimate the requirement for new staff in achieving the MDGs in water, on the assumption that the need is to develop "training, capacity building, and motivation" for existing workforces, calculated by reference to the numbers actually used in two projects, and then scaling this up to a global level. The total estimate is that 161,000 extra workers are needed globally.23 For a global estimate, this figure is remarkably low: it implies that 10,000 people can be connected per extra worker employed. One explanation is that the estimate explicitly recognises that there are existing organisations and workforces already existing in the water sector throughout the world. One key function of the extra staff is to increase the productivity of the much larger existing workforce.

  The importance of training, which is central to the preceding estimate, is obvious. Competent water operators include a systematic and general programme of training and development for all employees to ensure that they can make an efficient contribution to the operation.24 Comprehensive projects supporting water development not only invest in infrastructure but also make provision for training the whole workforce to a high level.25

  Donor policies since 1990 have had a damaging effect on training. In the 1980s the World Bank treated training as an important part of its water programme, and was developing regional centres for training and courses where professionals and others could be trained and refreshed and exchanged experiences. This policy was abandoned in the 1990s, and the Bank and other donors—including the UK, France and Finland—cut back on their aid for training water workers in developing countries. One aid official explained that training had become "unfashionable". Technical institutions in countries such as Kenya and Tanzania, which were formerly flourishing as training centres, have become run-down as donor resources dried up.

  In public services, labour has an additional contribution, because of their interface with the public. Studies of service delivery in India and Pakistan noted the strength of the commitment of workers, even in very unfavourable circumstances, to making the service work better, and the central importance of the relations between workers and communities in improving a service.26 The same point was noted a decade ago; an important feature of improvements in public service delivery in Ceara, Brazil, in the 1990s, was the commitment and involvement of the workers. This was constantly reinforced by the government's repeated public demonstrations of admiration and respect for what they were doing.27

  Aid agencies and development banks urgently need to reinvent clear and positive policies on the role of workers in their programs and policies. These policies need to include:

    —    A recognition that labour is an important economic input into the process of extending and operating water and sanitation services.

    —    Inclusion of training requirements in all projects.

    —    Developing a general commitment to provide ongoing flows of training of water workers at all levels so that public sector organizations have a sufficient pool of trained staff, and sufficient annual funding, to sustain a well-trained permanent workforce.

3.  CAPITAL: FINANCE FOR INVESTMENT

  Water services depend on an extensive underground physical network of pipes, pumping stations, treatment plants, and reservoirs. As a result, a very high percentage of the cost of water systems is the cost of investments in this network, and so water is a very capital-intensive sector. Extending water services to all requires a lot of capital to finance the new networks, and so it is very expensive. Those still needing connection are poor, and the resources required to connect them cannot be provided by the expenditure of the poor themselves. It is difficult for low and middle income countries to find enough capital, and to afford the cost of interest and repayments on this capital. Further redistribution is therefore desirable, from rich countries to middle and low income countries. The MDG targets make the problem even greater, because they demand achievements in a very short timescale regardless of economic growth. For all these reasons, public finance mechanisms remain the key method for raising capital to finance the extension of water services.

3.1  Demand for investment

  The starting point for any discussion of finance for investment in water must be a local assessment of what extensions and improvements are required. Local assessments should involve a democratic process of public and open debate on the needs and priorities of the city or region or country. Extensions to existing systems may include unofficial settlements and slums as well as official settlements. Millennium development goals are one set of global political objectives, but are only an input from the global institutions—local political objectives should be paramount. The local needs assessment will also enable public authorities to discuss how much can be financed locally: raising finance from national and local savings is easier and less risky than using international sources. Projects driven by external proposals for profitable ventures have often led to costly financial commitments out of line with local needs.28 Local assessments of requirements for investment are usually far lower than those by external actors. The Orangi project in Karachi (Pakistan) successfully campaigned for the rejection of a $70 million project proposed by the Asian Development Bank as unnecessary.29

3.2  Sources of finance: taxes, charges and borrowing

  Ultimately all expenditure on water has to be paid for either through taxation or through user charges. Even if water is distributed free of charge to the users, it is still paid for—through the tax system. Even when capital expenditure is financed by loans or bonds, these loans have to be repaid, with interest, through either taxes or user charges.

  The balance between these sources has implications for what is possible. Charges can get money only from the people directly connected to the system concerned. If charges are strictly applied to recover costs of supplying each household from that household—full cost recovery, or FCR—then money for connecting new users is limited by the incomes of those users themselves. If cross-subsidies are introduced, existing users can also be required to contribute to new connections, but the charges still do not touch the income or wealth of people or businesses in the area, only their consumption of water. Local taxes, such as rates based on property values, or local income tax can widen the base to include these groups, but they still do not touch people elsewhere in the country, let alone other countries. The general revenues of national taxation draw on the largest pool available to countries, the incomes and trade of the economy as a whole. This is most likely to make the necessary investment affordable, because it can be spread across many more people and businesses, and also reflect people's ability to pay.

  If money is raised by the water operation making a surplus, the money comes ultimately from charges. The burden of finance thus falls on the existing body of consumers. In some countries water and sewerage have been financed out of local taxation, such as a form of property tax. Even where there is a separate charge for water, this charge may effectively be a property tax where most homes are not metered—eg in the UK, where most households pay a charge based on the value of their property, not the volume of water consumed, even under the privatised system in England and Wales. Other countries have used cross-subsidies between different services to finance water: for example, the municipal utilities of Italy and Germany have used profits from electricity services to finance water systems.30 Cross-subsidies remain a potentially important mechanism for delivering solidarity financing for infrastructure development, as recently re-emphasised by a World Bank paper: "if the country can't generate the tax revenue to finance well targeted direct subsidies, well targeted inter-user, inter-usage or inter-regional cross-subsidies can deliver."31

3.3  Taxation capacity

  Taxation has to be treated as the fundamental base for financing infrastructure investment, including water, whether as a direct source or as guaranteeing borrowing, as acknowledged in a recent review of infrastructure financing by World Bank economists: "the main responsibility for financing many of the investment needs will fall onto the taxpayers rather than the residential users, at least in capital intensive transport and water and sanitation".32 It is important that public sector accounting and fiscal rules do not limit the financing of investments. In 2004 the IMF proposed altering its rules concerning public sector borrowing to finance investment: "greater importance be attached to safeguarding public investment, especially in infrastructure, and they welcomed the staff's suggestion that appropriate attention be paid to the current fiscal balance, which excludes capital spending and revenues".33 The importance of taxation implies that countries should develop and increase the amount of taxes they raise.

  The IMF and the World Bank recognise this: "in most developing countries the problem is collecting enough revenue to provide essential public infrastructure and human development services. Tax revenue in low-income countries as a share of GDP is about 14 percent, compared with about 19 percent in lower-middle-income countries and 23 percent in upper-middle-income countries... Overall, it appears that there is scope in many countries for raising additional revenues." (World Bank/IMF 2004) Research by IDS (Sussex University) also identifies the capacity to raise taxes as crucial for the state to develop both power and accountability. 34 The basis of taxes, and the effectiveness of the state in collecting them, are crucial elements in the legitimacy of the state and the political interactions between citizens, interest groups and the state. IDS identified problems where dominant elites managed to avoid or reduce tax burdens. Commenting on successful rural schemes in Africa, Brian Mathew of IRC also suggests that the best prospect for long-term financing of such services is local taxation: "....These kinds of support systems require a regular level of funding to work properly, and for long-term sustainability local taxation would seem to be the most workable solution."35

  However, as argued above, the great advantage of using central government financing is that it enables the greatest redistribution, by drawing on taxes paid by everybody in the country and directing it where it is most needed. The poorer the population of a community, the more they need finance from a source which can draw on richer communities. The disadvantage is the lack of local control over this revenue.

3.4  National government finance

  Since taxation is the key source of income which underpins public borrowing, and since central government has the broadest and most equitable tax base, it is not surprising that central government plays an important role in many countries. In the USA, for example, there exists a "revolving fund" of money borrowed by the federal government at the lowest interest rates, which municipalities can use for investments and then repay over a number of years, so the money returns to the fund and can then be borrowed again by other municipalities. European states continue to support capital investment by subsidies from central taxation: even in the privatised parts of the UK, about 9% of capital investment by the private companies comes from government subsidy. In France, both municipal and private systems can draw on funds held by regional authorities, the Agences de l'Eau, which impose a special tax on water consumers. This kind of mechanism is also operated at international level by the European Union itself , which collects taxes from all across Europe to support a "cohesion fund" for redistribution to poorer member states: one of its main functions is to finance the heavy cost of investments in water services required by new member states. This central support for infrastructure and other measures has a major effect on economic growth; in Greece, GDP in 1999 was 9.9% higher than it would have been without the central cohesion funds, in Portugal 8.5% higher.36

  In some developing countries water has been developed as a central government responsibility, and so water services are mainly provided through state-owned entities, and financial support is provided by governments. Examples include Sri Lanka, Uganda, and Honduras. In countries where water is provided by municipalities, the income of municipalities is invariably supported by central government transferring significant amounts of taxation to support local tax revenues. Funding is also provided from central government taxation to support local government expenditure through various mechanisms. This may be of greatest importance in smaller towns and cities, and in peri-urban and slum areas, where the local tax base is of limited capacity. The examples from Central America and Venezuela show the potential importance of this support.37

3.5  Borrowing

  Money can be borrowed within a country, from banks or from a local capital market where savings are invested. This is the traditional form of borrowing for public services throughout the world. Government and public sector bonds are a major part of investment activity in developed countries. This kind of borrowing is already widespread in developing and transition countries. It is certain to become more important as a source of financing, because of the risks in international financing of essential services, which were highlighted by the case of Argentina. When the economy collapsed, the "dollarisation clauses", which guaranteed to protect the dollar value of companies' income, were unenforceable. Developing countries should also want to avoid borrowing internationally because of the risk of changes in exchange rates creating unsupportable burdens—and investing money in foreign currency reserves to protect themselves against this risk is an inefficient use of national resources: "because countries may be accumulating low yielding foreign assets such as US securities at the expense of investing in the local economy."38

  Organisations which are owned or supported by governments, such as nationalised industries or banks, also borrow money. These include public sector financial agencies which are dedicated to providing loan finance for municipal investors. An example from a developing country is the Local Water Utilities Administration, which acts as development bank, technical support agency and informal regulator in the Philippines, which helps the positive performance of the Philippine Water Districts.39

  It is possible to borrow local savings for investment in public infrastructure such as water even in low income countries. This has been done by a number of cities in India, including Ahmedabad, which successfully issued a large bond. In order to borrow money, capital market mechanisms must be set up to provide security for people investing their savings. USAID has been supporting the development of these institutions.40 The private companies themselves have withdrawn equity finance and identified local savings as a potential source, and tried to tap these through bonds and loans—but at a much greater cost than direct municipal or government bonds. In Jakarta (Indonesia), Suez had originally borrowed $56 million from Europe to finance its investment, but in 2005 it issued a bond in Indonesia, on which Suez is paying only 12% interest, which it used to repay the European loan. But their contract with the Indonesian regulator includes a guarantee of a 22% rate of return on capital. The cost to Indonesians is thus nearly twice as great as if the Jakarta city council or the government issued a bond, and charged users only the interest of 12% on that bond.41

  There are a number of cases of local communities developing a self-help approach to extending water systems, especially in slums and peri-urban areas. A community however has more limited financial powers than a municipality or local government. Without powers of taxation, it will not be able to rely on the resources of people other than the users. For long-term sustainability, support from local or national government finance is necessary.42

3.6  International support

    "What is the global public finance equivalent of ending apartheid?"

    —Mike Moore, director of water and forestry service, South Africa, 2003.

  International financial support may be useful in providing additional capital to finance investment. Development banks should be the main source of international finance for public infrastructure investment.

  A few cities in middle income countries have obtained international credit ratings for their bonds—for example Bogota (Colombia) and Seoul and Taegu (South Korea). There are two reasons why this is not likely to prove a successful short-term route for raising international finance. One is the desire by investors to spread risk. The second reason is of capacity: it places extra demands on municipalities. Intermediate bodies are therefore necessary, so that international investors can make a single investment that is then spread across a range of cities, and the intermediate body is responsible for assessing the credit-worthiness of different water operators or municipalities. One such intermediate body is the national government, which has the further advantage from an investor's point of view that it can provide a guarantee for the investments based on a recognisable security, the government's income from taxation. Most governments in developing countries have the capacity to borrow from international investors, and have obtained international credit ratings for this. Another possibility is to create regional funds which bring together water bonds issued by public authorities in a given region. Northern governments could reduce the risk both for investors and southern governments, for example by providing protection against currency risk, or by providing tax relief for funds investing in such bonds.

  Through a combination of taxes and user charges, many middle income countries may be able to cover much of the costs of operating water services at the level required by the MDGs. But the UN study on the MDGs estimates that for low income countries to achieve the MDGs, even after a massive increase in public expenditure by the countries, requires international support equivalent to over 60% of the costs. This is a measure of the financial solidarity required to achieve the MDGs. In effect, rich countries must provide two dollars for every one dollar paid by citizens in low income countries. Without this, the MDGs will not be achieved at the accelerated rate specified, and the poor will continue to lack clean water and sanitation. This support should be as similar as possible to a tax levied on the richer countries by the poorer countries. One possible form would be to provide a matching "water solidarity charge", in the form of a long-term obligation to match income from water charges and rates with double the amount from northern aid budgets.

4.  NATURAL RESOURCES

  The third factor of production is natural resources. The key natural resource involved in water services is, obviously, water itself. The public sector and the public domain again have important roles to play. Some of the oldest democratic bodies were developed to decide the fair allocation of water. Water resources management is now recognised as an important element of public policy on water resources generally, in order to conserve limited aquifers and protect the needs of the natural environment. Reducing high leakage rates can make available far more of the water which is already being captured in reservoirs, and so increase supply without any further need for new sources. Reducing unnecessary consumption by industry and business, and more efficient household consumption, can also enable societies to manage with existing supplies.

  Cities and towns need to capture reliable sources of large amounts of water to support their unnaturally concentrated populations. The aqueducts, dams and wells necessary for this capture of water involve large amounts of capital investment, but these projects are unlikely to be economic for the private sector, as noted by David Grey of the World Bank.43 The construction of dams and reservoirs has a major impact both on the environment and on the livelihoods of local inhabitants. A bold attempt at multi-stakeholder governance, the World Commission on Dams, produced a set of recommendations designed to provide public procedures and rules for determining whether a dam should be constructed. The recommendations were however rejected by the World Bank, the principle financier of dams worldwide.

5.  POLITICS AND PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS

5.1  Political solidarity

  Politics is central to the provision of public services, including water. Demands for improved and extended water services from communities, consumers, environmentalists and others are political demands. National and local policies to develop water are part of political programmes. The Millennium Development Goals are themselves statements of political commitment to providing water supply to hundreds of millions of people. This solidarity principle is not present in policies which seek only to expand business opportunities in these or other sectors, because the market can only result in the provision of services which are profitable.44 The development of water and other public services is linked to economic growth: the development of services like water, electricity, healthcare and education is essential to enable countries to grow economically.45 These services are also central to social development: they enable people to have better quality of life, longer life, and greater freedom to develop their own capacities and potential.46 Countries which give political priority to public services have higher rates of coverage than others on the same level of national income.47

  The World Bank and other donors have argued that interference by politicians has led to inefficient management and inadequate finances dependent on subsidies which are given as a mechanism to win votes rather than provide services. These are real problems, but they arise from politics by patronage, whereby services are just used as instruments to reward cronies. The use of conditionalities by donors, insisting on contracts for private companies in exchange for grants and loans, reinforce this kind of patronage politics rather than doing anything to eliminate it. The World Bank has also placed great emphasis on the problem of corruption in developing countries, and argued that reducing the role of politics is a necessary step to fighting corruption. However, rather than eliminate political involvement altogether, what is needed is the active engagement of a different kind of politics, based on accountability, openness and transparency. There has been a recent growth in such political activity on water issues, and the campaigns have often become key issues in elections48. This kind of political activity should be seen as a starting point of a solution.

5.2  Corruption, accountability, and civil society

  There are well known problems with corruption involving governments and public services in both north and south.49, 50 In water, as in other sectors, corruption is closely associated with issuing contracts to the private sector.51 A study of corruption in water services in India found that contractor cartels were operating in every case studied, and that politicians and staff are bribed with a share of the profits.52 Solutions to corruption involve developing greater public accountability and staff commitment (see below), as well as reducing contracting procedures.53

  In many cases people experience an inefficient bureaucracy which they have no effective way of controlling or improving. These problems of state institutions have been used as arguments in favour of privatisation, and explain why privatisation had some initial appeal. But the experience of privatisation itself has removed any illusion that privatised services might somehow be more responsive and accountable.

  Political responses have emerged which provide ways of re-inventing the public sector to create better services. One example is in Brazil, where a number of cities, of which the best known is Porto Alegre, developed systems known as participative budgeting, where the annual spending programmes for all services, including water and sanitation, are subject to a completely public process of debate and decision-making. In the state of Kerala (India), the state devolved 40% of its income to local elected councils, which go through a similar process of public budgeting, reinforced by a general right to information by which all documents are publicly available. Participatory systems have financial advantages: DMAE has succeeded in financing considerable extensions of service coverage in a decade and all at a low cost for consumers.54

  On a smaller scale, there are now a number of examples where water services have been restructured and improved by local political processes, where community organisation transforms previously moribund local authorities.55 These initiatives involve interaction between community groups, political organisations and various elements of the state. This is different from the idea of "community involvement" as promoted by the World Bank and others for the last two decades. Social organisations and their activities are closely bound up with politics and the state.56

5.3  International support: public public partnerships and public space

  Water institutions need to have political standing, public legitimacy, legal powers, financial resources, and a sustainable labour force. Established water operators in the north and the south have developed these capacities. Many in the south have not yet been able to do so.

  Public public partnerships (PUPs) are a mechanism for providing support for capacity-building for these operators. The UN SGAB has adopted a similar notion of Water Operator Partnerships (WOPs) on a non-profit basis as a major instrument to implement the policy of strengthening water institutions in the south. The objectives of PUPs should be to help deal with problems of lack of managerial, technical and financial management capacity of public sector water operators. Experience with PUPs so far in water falls into two main categories:

    —    International partnerships, of which the best known are the "Baltic sea" partnerships in the 1990s.

    —    National partnerships. These include initiatives within countries, such as the support provided by SANAA in Honduras for rural water services, or transnational initiatives such as the support provided by Brazilian association ASSEMAE to Cochabamba.57

  Official donor encouragement is needed to realize the potential of public partnerships. Without a positive effort, the potential of the public sector to support development will remain largely under-utilised. The notion of global public-public partnerships between OECD and southern cities on a mass scale is numerically feasible. Of the OECD cities, about 78 are run by public utilities, and there are a total of 314 cities outside the OECD area. This implies each OECD public utility adopting four others.

  Northern states and development banks should at the least refrain from imposing their own preferred political and technical options on developing countries. Apart from ending policy conditionalities, donors should in general intervene less in political activities—such as funding approved NGOs—except to support initiatives which help encourage a public space for debate and decision-making.

6.  CONCLUSION

  The extension of water and sanitation services must, in reality, be done through the public sector. This requires political activity, with transparent and accountable procedures, to create the political demand and win political power to introduce social solidarity policies. It needs political and public sector institutions capable of raising the necessary taxation and borrowing, and of delivering the services. These institutions must be able to draw on a sustainable supply of trained and committed labour, and affordable long-term capital, and must be able to exert the political authority to mange water resources.

  International support should cease to be seen as part of trade policy aiming to generate contracts for the benefit of northern firms, whether water companies, construction companies or consultants. It should instead be directed at supporting these political and economic factors which are crucial to the functioning of public sector services. It should avoid using conditionalities to impose policies developed externally, and instead provide aid to develop the provision of substantial training, to support the development of public finance instruments and policies, and to provide financial support for this public finance, directly and indirectly.

  It should not intervene to influence and control government policies, but should encourage the creation of open public political space to enable the public development of policies. It should offer support from existing public sector institutions to help strengthen and develop the necessary public sector institutions in developing countries.


Factor
International support

Economic factors
Labour and efficiency
Training
Public-public partnerships (PUPs)
Capital
Public finance technical assistance
Guarantees and matching aid
International pooling mechanisms
Natural Resources
Assessments based on public interest
Political factors
Political and institutional capacity
No conditionalities
Support for public space
Public-public partnerships (PUPs)


References

  1  The reports of the PSIRU (Public Services International Research Unit) on water are all available on the unit's website at www.psiru.org . This also includes links to some of the main journal publications of the authors. This submission is based on a longer report which has been prepared for Public Services International www.world-psi.org.

  2  For a more detailed discussion of this data see Emanuele Lobina and David Hall "The comparative advantage of the public sector in the development of urban water supply". Progress In Development Studies (forthcoming, 2007).

  3  Petri S Juuti & Tapio S Katko (eds), Water, Time and European Cities:History matters for the Futures 2005. http://www.watertime.net/Docs/WP3/WTEC.pdf

  4  Kate Foss-Mollan. Hard Water: Politics and Water Supply in Milwaukee, 1870-1995. Purdue University Press 2001.

  5  Melosi 2001.

  6  C Pézon, "Water supply regulation in France from 1848 to 2001: a jurisprudence based analysis", Annual conference of ISNIE 2003.

  7  Public Service for a chosen few? Water and sanitation service provision in Kampala, Uganda, under colonial rule. David Nilsson, RKTF Sweden, paper presented to the IWHA conference, December 2005, Paris.

  8  Rethinking urban metabolism: Water, space and the modern City. Matthew Gandy. City Vol 8 No 3, December 2004.

  9  Michelle Mycoo, Shifting Paradigms in Water Provisioning Policies: A Trinidad Case Study. International Journal of Water Resources Development Publisher: Routledge, part of the Taylor & Francis Group Issue: Volume 21, Number 3 / September, 2005 Pages: 509-523.

  10  See PSIRU Pipe Dreams March 2006 www.psiru.org

  11  UNDP, (1990). "Human development report, concept and measurement of human development." UNDP, New York. USA. Quoted in Brian Mathew. Ensuring Sustained Beneficial Outcomes for Water and Sanitation Programmes in the Developing World. IRC Occasional Paper Series 40; p 12 http://www.irc.nl/page/27612

  12  SUEZ introduces its 2003-04 action plan: refocus, reduce debt, increase profitability Paris, 9 January 2003 www.suez.com

  13Estache and Pinglo: Are Returns To Private Infrastructure In Developing Countries Consistent With Risks Since The Asian Crisis? World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3373, August 2004.

  14  See PSIRU Pipe Dreams March 2006 www.psiru.org

  15  For more detail on this issue see "The relative efficiency of public and private sector water" www.psiru.org/reports/2005-10-W-effic.doc

  16  Infrastructure performance and reform in developing and transition economies: evidence from a survey of productivity measures. A Estache, S Perelman, L Trujillo World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3514, February 2005. http://wdsbeta.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2005/03/06/000090341—20050306101429/Rendered/PDF/wps3514.pdf

  17  Ibid para 25.

  18  See "Public solutions for private problems?—responding to the shortfall in water infrastructure investment 2003". www.psiru.org/reports/2003-09-W-strats.doc

  19  Many examples of public sector operations are collected in a review published by TNI "Reclaiming Public Water" at http://www.tni.org/books/publicwater.htm

  20  Francis Fukuyama "State Building" 2004.

  21  Public Services Work 2003 www.psiru.org/reportsindex.asp

  22  UN Millennium Project 2005. Health, Dignity, and Development: What Will it Take? Task Force on Water and Sanitation.

  23  Brian Mathew. Ensuring Sustained Beneficial Outcomes for Water and Sanitation Programmes in the Developing World. IRC Occasional Paper Series 40 http://www.irc.nl/page/27612

  24  eg DMAE. Also note Suez/Veolia training programmes.

  25  See for example Asian Development Bank: Project Completion Report On The Ho Chi Minh City Water Supply And Sanitation Project (Loan 1273[Sf]) In The Socialist Republic Of Viet Nam July 2004 PCR: Vie 25095 http://www.asiandevbank.org/Documents/PCRs/VIE/pcr-vie-25095.pdf

  26  Jennifer Davis: Corruption in Public Service Delivery: Experience from South Asia's Water and Sanitation Sector World Development Vol 32, No 1, pp. 53-71, 2004 www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

  27  Judith Tendler "Good Government in the Tropics". 1997. John Hopkins University Press. p 9,13.

  28  For more details see Pipe Dreams—failure of the private sector to invest in water. Section 3.2. PSIRU March 2006 http://www.psiru.org/reports/2006-03-W-investment.pdf

  29Zaidi, Akbar, From the Lane to the City, WaterAid, London, 2001 http://www.wateraid.org/documents/from—lane—to—city.pdf

  30  For example in Rome: see http://www.watertime.net/docs/WP2/D36—Rome.doc

  31  Infrastructure: A survey of recent and upcoming issues Antonio Estache. The World Bank Infrastructure Vice-Presidency, and Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Vice-Presidency April 2006 (version 2.0).

  32  Infrastructure: A survey of recent and upcoming issues Antonio Estache. The World Bank Infrastructure Vice-Presidency, and Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Vice-Presidency April 2006 (version 2.0).

  33  Public Information Notice (PIN) No 04/45 IMF Executive Board Holds Informal Seminar on Public Investment and Fiscal Policy http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2004/pn0445.htm

  34  Signposts to More Effective States—Responding to Governance Challenges in Developing Countries. IDS University of Sussex June 2005. www.ids.ac.uk/ids/

  35  Brian Mathew. Ensuring Sustained Beneficial Outcomes for Water and Sanitation Programmes in the Developing World. IRC Occasional Paper Series 40 http://www.irc.nl/page/27612

  36  The contribution of structural policies to economic and social cohesion: results and prospects. European Commission. 2006. http://ec.europa.eu/regional—policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/p3221—en.htm

  37  Institutional Arrangements for Rural Communities, Strategic Paper No 1, Case Studies on Decentralization of Water Supply and Sanitation Services in Latin America. Environmental Health Project, prepared for the USAID Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean EHP Project No. 26568; Water and Sanitation: Democratic and innovative reforms in the Global South Olivier Hoedeman and Satoko Kishimoto (chapter in Public Services Yearbook 2005-06

  38  Local Currency Bond Market Developments In Mediterranean, African And Caribbean Countries By Peter Kuenzel. In Economic Report On Partner Countries 2005 A Report By The Development Economics Advisory Service (DEAS) Of The European Investment Bank (EIB) July 2005 p 18.

  39  See Lobina and Hall 1999: http://www.psiru.org/reports/9908--W-U-Pubalt.doc

  40  For more details see "Public Services Work!" Public Services International (PSI) September 2003 http://www.world-psi.org/

  41  Jakarta Water Supply Regulatory Body. (2005). Current Status Restated Cooperation Agreement (RCA) "Water Service Provision in the DKI Jakarta" between PAM JAYA and PT. PALYJA and PT. TPJ http://jakartawater.org/eng/?page—id=85

  42  Building homes, changing official approaches. The work of Urban Poor Organizations and their Federations and their contributions to meeting the Millennium Development Goals in urban areas. Celine d'Cruz and David Satterthwaite. Human Settlements Programme. IIED http://www.iied.org/urban/

  43  David Grey "Water Resources, Growth and Development" A Working Paper for Discussion Prepared by The World Bank for the Panel of Finance Ministers, The UN Commission on Sustainable Development 18 April 2005.

  44  See PSIRU Pipe Dreams March 2006 www.psiru.org

  45  World Bank.

  46  Amartya Sen.

  47  UN Millennium Project 2005. Health, Dignity, and Development: What Will it Take? Task Force on Water and Sanitation. p 69.

  48  Reclaiming Public Water Achievements, Struggles and Visions from Around the World. Edited by Belén Balany«a, Brid Brennan, Olivier Hoedeman, Satoko Kishimoto and Philipp Terhorst. Transnational Institute and Corporate Europe Observatory, January 2005 http://www.tni.org/books/publicwater.htm

  49  Focus: Europe In Crisis: Can A Phoenix Rise From; The Trouble Had Been Brewing For Years—A Culture In Which Fraud And Cronyism Flourished And Nobody Cared. Only This Time, Nothing Could Save The EU's Governing Elite, The Independent (London), 21 March 1999.

  50  Federal News Service 7 February 2006 Tuesday Hearing Of The Readiness And Management Support Subcommittee Of The Senate Armed Services Committee.

  51  The Jakarta Post 1 April 2005 TPJ Appeals Against Verdict, Rp 1b Fine.

  52Jennifer Davis: Corruption in Public Service Delivery: Experience from South Asia's Water and Sanitation Sector World Development Vol 32, No 1, pp 53-71, 2004 www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

  53Jennifer Davis: Corruption in Public Service Delivery: Experience from South Asia's Water andSanitation Sector World Development Vol 32, No 1, pp 53-71, 2004 www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddev

  54  See "Water in Porto Alegre, Brazil—accountable, effective, sustainable and democratic" August 2002 http://www.psiru.org/reports/2002-08-W-dmae.pd

  55  Jonathan Caseley: Blocked drains and open minds: multiple accountability relationships and improved service delivery performance in an Indian city. IDS Working Paper 211. December 2003.

  56  Signposts to More Effective States—Responding to Governance Challenges in Developing Countries. IDS University of Sussex June 2005. www.ids.ac.uk/ids/

  57  Trevett, AF (2001). "The SANAA technician in operation and maintenance program in Honduras." In Institutional Arrangements for Rural Communities, Strategic Paper No 1, Case Studies on Decentralization of Water Supply and Sanitation Services in Latin America. Environmental Health Project, prepared for the USAID Bureau for Latin Americaand the Caribbean EHP Project No 26568/Other LACDEC C USA.

October 2006





 
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