Appendix: Government response
The Securitisation of Development
[Paragraph 11] The idea of human security —
linking the spheres of security and development — should
form one of the building blocks for policies towards weak and
failing states. However, it is important that "northern"
security assumptions should not be allowed to distort or undermine
efforts to promote security and poverty reduction in Africa in
line with DFID's Public Service Agreement and the MDGs.
We agree. DFID's Security and Development Strategy
focuses on improving security for the benefit of poor people in
developing countries. We address insecurity, lawlessness and
violent conflict because they are among the biggest obstacles
to the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. We believe
reducing poverty and inequality is also good for international
security, in terms of reduced levels of threat from international
crime and terrorism.
Sierra Leone
[Paragraph 15] DFID may need to give more thought
to the wider 'public relations' impact of the shift away from
highly visible support to less visible assistance in post-conflict
countries, especially in those where it is the largest bilateral
donor. If peace is to be viable, it is important that people perceive
both immediate and sustained benefits from it.
We agree that peace should both bring and be seen
to bring tangible benefits to deliver a peace dividend. This
is essential to prevent recurring conflict. In selecting which
activities to support in post-conflict countries DFID's aim is
to pick those which will have the biggest positive impact. In
some cases these will not always be the ones which are most visible
to the public, though they will nonetheless reap benefits from
them in time, like more accountable, effective and professional
governance. Where our work is less visible we nevertheless are
trying to demonstrate the impact through our recently strengthened
information and communications work.
Uganda
[Paragraph 23] We accept that the continuing conflict
in northern Uganda is not the fault of the Government of Uganda.
Nevertheless the Government of Uganda has responsibilities to
its population in the north which hitherto it has failed to fulfil.
Instead of meeting its responsibilities, the Government of Uganda
has been relying on donors to provide core functions such as health
and education. This is costing donors US$200 million per year
— money which could make a huge development impact if the
conflict was resolved and the resources were spent on post-war
reconstruction and on resettling displaced people in their villages.
We agree that the Government of Uganda has not done
enough to both protect its citizens in the North and ensure the
adequate provision of essential social services such as health
and education. However throughout the conflict the Government
has continued to provide health and education services in the
North with per capita expenditure broadly comparable to elsewhere
in the country. One problem has been that the conflict has created
greater demands for essential services than elsewhere in the country
and the Government has until recently not responded to this by
providing additional funding. It has also been difficult to recruit
and retain appropriately qualified personnel. Essential services
have relied heavily on additional support from humanitarian agencies.
The recent creation of a Joint Monitoring Committee for the North
has provided a forum for more effective Government, UN and donor
collaboration. The Government is now giving greater attention
to the North and allocating additional resources, including for
civilian policing.
Engaging with fragile states
[Paragraph 37] The
evidence we received in hearings and on our visits leads us to
believe that CPCA [conflict-prone and conflict-affected] states
are precisely where a large part of development assistance should
be focused, and we support DFID in this regard. However, this
new approach entails significant risks for DFID — some programmes
may not achieve the desired results, others will take much longer
than anticipated. DFID cannot work alone in this; it must ensure
it has the support of other government departments. The human
security approach discussed in Chapter One explicitly demands
greater coherence across the whole of Government.
We agree. We recognise that our policies must work
together with those of other government departments in conflict-prone
and conflict-affected (CPCA) states. One important element in
doing this is ensuring that we base our policies on a common analysis.
This is why, for example, our new Country Governance Analysis
(CGA — a new governance assessment tool announced in the
White Paper) — which will be at the heart of DFID's country
planning processes — will be done in partnership with other
government departments, especially the FCO.
Building-up effective and accountable states
[Paragraph 41]. We agree with recent changes
in HMG's approach to conditionality, away from policy conditionality,
but the situation in Sierra Leone demonstrates that DFID can only
exert limited leverage on the Government to make the changes needed
to reduce corruption, facilitate effective governance and promote
development in Sierra Leone. This indicates the importance for
DFID teams of prioritising their strategic planning when operating
in a post-conflict country — the need constantly to re-evaluate
the appropriateness of policies and adjust their operations accordingly.
DFID needs to give more thought to the timing and sequencing of
the type of aid it employs in countries recently emerged from
conflict if it wishes to create more effective states.
We agree. It is precisely because conditionality
has limited leverage to impose reform that DFID has moved away
from it. In post-conflict countries, as in all fragile states,
ensuring the mechanisms DFID uses to deliver development assistance
are appropriate is vital. Lessons learned from one context will
not necessarily be relevant to another. In fragile states, we
deliver assistance in a wide variety of ways and evaluate impact
regularly, rather than applying a standard model. In Sierra Leone
for example, Poverty Reduction Budget Support (PRBS) is only single
year, not multi-annual as in other places, precisely to enable
us to gauge its impact and appropriateness. DFID is initiating
work in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's
(OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) Fragile States Group
on state-building which will focus in part on sequencing and prioritisation
of development assistance.
[Paragraph 45] We
recognise that there are difficult policy dilemmas for donors
working in countries emerging from conflict, and that 'good enough'
government is often a worthwhile achievement. DFID should ensure
that it is not excusing wrongful acts as aberrations in an otherwise
successful development partnership.
We agree. DFID does not excuse wrongful acts under
any circumstances. Our response is determined by judgements on
whether there is a substantive breach of the core partnership
principles articulated in DFID's 2005 conditionality policy.
These principles, reaffirmed in the 2006 White Paper, are shared
commitments to poverty reduction, human rights and other international
obligations, and sound financial management. Our ability to make
judgements against these core partnership principles will be enhanced
by our CGA tool, which will assess long-term trends in the standard
of governance in a country. We are integrating it into DFID Country
Assistance Plans, which are the basis for our work at country
level.
The conflict cycle
[Paragraph 53] Questions about the distribution
of humanitarian assistance should be based on need, rather than
the particular theoretical stage of a conflict. Such funding should
be wound down as needs decrease. ECHO should ensure that key facilities
such as the Panzi Hospital are not closed prematurely. Conflict-related
services, such as the unit for women victims of sexual violence,
will be needed for years to come. Similarly the signing of peace
accords should not take international attention and funding away
from the process of their implementation. While the cyclical approach
is a useful tool, a more integrated approach to the whole of conflict
would produce better outcomes.
We agree that humanitarian assistance should be based
on need. Ensuring that mechanisms for donor funding support a
gradual shift from humanitarian to development approaches is an
important issue in the DRC and other countries. We agree that
it is important that we avoid sudden funding crises for implementing
partners. In the specific case of Panzi hospital, ECHO are fully
aware of the need to avoid a sudden shortfall in funding and,
having recently received further information from Panzi, are considering
their position.
We agree that a cyclical approach to conflict which
looks at conflict management, reconstruction and development separately
is useful but limited. That is why we use analytical tools such
as Strategic Conflict Assessments.
Conflict assessments
[Paragraph 54] We believe that DFID should pay
greater attention to local knowledge and local points of view
in their SCA [Strategic Conflict Assessment] tool. While we recognise
that conflict theories can help inform analysis, we would expect
DFID to acknowledge the distinctive character of each conflict
and to listen to local people.
We agree. The Strategic Conflict Assessment (SCA)
does show the distinctive character of all conflicts, and should
reflect local perceptions and understanding of conflict situations.
The first part of an SCA considers economic, security, political
and social factors of conflict — both structural (pervasive,
long-standing factors) and proximate (potential triggers for violence).
The second part of the analysis covers local and international
responses to the conflict. The final section consists of an analysis
of strategies and options for the future.
A 2005 internal review of SCAs highlighted that the
analysis tends to reflect the background of the individuals conducting
the assessment. It also highlighted that implementation of the
recommendations was more likely when SCAs were generated and owned
by DFID country offices. As a result of the recommendation, SCA
teams are now multidisciplinary, combine technical with regional
and country specific expertise, and use external and local consultants.
UK Banks and resource-backed loans
[Paragraph 56] Conflict assessments should be
a precondition for engaging in CPCA [conflict-prone and conflict-affected]
states and mandatory for all donors. There is no reason why donors
should not share the results of such assessments, rather than
duplicating efforts. Conflict assessment is a necessary but not
a sufficient guarantor of effective development assistance —
measures need to be put in place to ensure that the analysis informs
policy. The whole of HMG should make use of the analysis resulting
from the conflict assessment — it should not be restricted
to DFID. In addition, there should be independent evaluations
of how well conflict assessments are done.
We agree that work in CPCA states should be informed
by an assessment of the causes and likelihood of violent conflict,
done jointly with other donors where possible. DFID SCAs are
increasingly conducted with other government departments, the
UN or with the World Bank. DFID's mandatory assessment tool is
the new Country Governance Analysis, which will look at conflict
dynamics, and where appropriate would include an SCA. We agree
that the conduct and implementation of the recommendations of
SCAs should be regularly reviewed. However, there are occasions
when the sensitivity of information makes it inappropriate to
open the entire document to public review.
Policy coherence across the Government
[Paragraph 64] We welcome the continuation of
the Conflict Prevention Pools, which are a small but important
part of the Government's approach to conflict. They provide an
important channel for inter-departmental cooperation in CPCA states,
itself a prerequisite for greater effectiveness of HMG actions
in difficult environments. However, because the Pools fund relatively
small departmental projects they do not by themselves demonstrate
a joined-up approach. Policy coherence is desirable but it is
important to be clear about the policy around which coherence
is sought.
We agree that the while the Conflict Prevention Pools
do not in themselves demonstrate policy coherence, they have been
very useful in delivering a joined-up approach to conflict. Both
Pools fall under the joint 2005-08 conflict prevention Public
Service Agreement which is shared by the FCO, MOD and DFID; the
Africa Pool portfolio is built around a strategy jointly agreed
by DFID, FCO and MOD ministers; and the Global Pool comprises
15 regional and thematic strategies, each of which is agreed jointly
between the three departments. One very positive outcome of the
Pools is that they have encouraged broader joint working between
the three departments; for example, joined-up GCPP working led
to the establishment of a single HMG office in Sri Lanka. Other
examples of joined up approaches include joint units such as the
DFID/FCO Sudan Unit and the Post Conflict Reconstruction Unit.
The Secretary of State for International Development
is now legally obliged by the 2006 International Development (Reporting
and Transparency) Act to report to Parliament each year on the
extent to which UK Government policies across the board —
including on conflict — have supported development outcomes,
or otherwise. DFID will meet this obligation by including the
necessary text in its own annual Departmental Report, which is
being published in May 2007.
[Paragraph 65] We agree that DFID should not commit
its resources to "winning hearts and minds", but we
understand why it is often necessary for peacekeeping troops to
implement quick impact projects to win support from local people.
As an exercise in joined-up government, military commanders should
consult DFID, and other development agencies, about their proposals
for quick impact projects, to try to ensure that they deliver
development as well as security benefits.
We agree that providing funding and resources for
these projects should not curtail DFID's other activities, but
that DFID should work with and advise military commanders about
their proposals for quick impact projects, as we do in Afghanistan
and Iraq.
We believe that both development and 'hearts and
minds' objectives can be realised through an approach that puts
the interests of the majority of the local population at its heart.
Development is not only a product of improved security, but also
a condition for it.
The importance of Security Sector Reform (SSR)
[Paragraph 71] The debate on the eligibility of
funding security sector reform through ODA [Official Development
Assistance] is not going to go away. It is important that the
Government monitors and contributes to this debate. The Government
will need to take a position on whether or not ODA-eligible expenditure
can be extended further. While DFID has a clear policy which seeks
to ensure that 90% of its funding goes to the poorest states,
and the Pools facilitate expenditure on non-ODA eligible items,
other EU members, and the European Commission, do not have such
restrictions or the equivalent of the Pools. Given the importance
of security sector reform in CPCA [conflict-prone and conflict-affected]
states this is a matter of some urgency. We believe the definition
of ODA should not be expanded to include military expenditure.
We agree. Security is necessary for sustainable
development. As set out in the 2006 White Paper, we are committed
to do more to support security sector reform through our aid programmes
and the Conflict Prevention Pools. We believe that helping developing
countries build effective and accountable institutions to provide
security and justice for the poor can legitimately be attributed
as ODA. But we do not believe that the ODA definition should
be extended to include military expenditure. Internationally
this would risk diverting substantial development spend away from
reducing poverty.
Challenging impunity, transitional justice
[Paragraph 80] Grievances matter because if they
are not properly addressed they risk precipitating a return to
conflict. It is a necessary, but not sufficient, step to address
only the crimes committed by high level officials and rebel leaders.
While this approach, exemplified in the Special Court of Sierra
Leone, sends a message of challenging impunity, too often it only
scratches the surface. Abuses and crimes carried out at a lower
level also need to be addressed in a manner which recognises the
impact of the conflict on communities, families and individuals.
In this way peacebuilding will have greater local ownership and
more chance of lasting.
We agree. This is why the UK helps countries to
address high level impunity, and promotes reconciliation and access
to justice more generally. For example, in Rwanda, we supported
the National Unity and Reconciliation Commission, and we helped
people affected by the genocide, both through measures to support
genocide survivors and measures to ensure the large numbers detained
(over 130,000) were held and judged with a minimum of respect
for their human rights. We also fund the work of NGOs, such as
the International Center for Transitional Justice, which supports
social reconciliation, as well as prosecutions and reparations
to help victims.
We also help countries to rebuild their justice systems
after violent conflict, so that citizens' grievances can be promptly
addressed and the rule of law re-introduced. In Sierra Leone,
DRC, Iraq, Somalia, Southern Sudan, the Balkans and many other
places, the UK has or is supporting police reform and community
policing, the training of judges and lawyers, and schemes to bring
security and justice to local communities.
Governance: the role and timing of elections
[Paragraph 87] We agree with the ODI [Overseas
Development Institute] that the building up of institutions for
democratic accountability should play a larger role in donor governments'
support for electoral processes. It would also bring an end to
the practice of adopting 'donor darlings' based on personalities
rather than conduct and the strength of institutions. This would
allow for peaceful transition between rulers and eliminate the
perpetuation of one person rule or elites.
We agree. As the Secretary of State set out recently,
democracy is about more than having a vote - it is a set of values
and institutions. Many of our electoral support programmes already
strengthen institutions of democratic accountability - from Electoral
Commissions to civil society organisations and the media. We
strongly agree that institutions that can mediate political competition
without violence, and that are sufficiently robust to hold powerful
individuals and groups to account, are a crucial foundation for
sustained development.
[Paragraph 92] Institution-building in post-conflict
societies is a crucial part of improving governance. Democratic
elections are essential for creating a legitimate government.
The establishment of a democratic system is a long-term project,
which must be owned by the people. Donors should not suppose that
one free multi-party election will entrench democracy. Long-term
aid will continue to be needed in post-conflict states to build
and strengthen accountable institutions and to nurture a democratic
culture.
We agree. DFID recognises the importance of staying
engaged in the long-term, and providing sustained support for
institution-building in post-conflict and other fragile states.
For this reason, we are agreeing more long-term partnership agreements
with partner governments where possible. We agree that establishing
and deepening democracy goes beyond the electoral process, and
as set out in the 2006 DFID White Paper, we are committed to help
make public institutions more capable, accountable and responsive
in the long term.
For example, we have always seen the elections in
DRC as a critical step towards peace, but one of many steps that
are needed. We are providing support for democratisation and
accountability in DRC over the next five years, exactly the type
of support proposed in the Committee's recommendation.
The regional dimension of conflict
[Paragraph 95] We accept that DFID may not be
able to place conflict advisers in all conflict settings; consequently
the role of regional advisers is even more significant. DFID therefore
needs to ensure that regional advisers are visible, and communicating
regularly with all branches of the UK Government.
The presence of Regional Conflict Advisers in Africa
and Latin America is key to the UK's conflict prevention work
in those regions. Two of these are funded by DFID and three by
the FCO. All five work jointly to, and are in frequent contact
with, all three participating departments.
We are also considering where it might be appropriate
for conflict advisers to cover regional issues in other parts
of the world.
[Paragraph 96] Conflicts, the effects of conflict,
and the people who wage them, do not always recognize state borders.
The building up of trans-national capacities in Africa through
the Africa Conflict Prevention Pools is, in our view, the right
approach in that it promises to facilitate greater regional ownership
of peacebuilding policies. But donors should also give serious
consideration to carrying out, if possible jointly, regional conflict
analyses as part of their approach to conflict, so that they do
not solely succeed in moving problems from one state to the next.
We agree. Our Country Governance Analysis will consider
regional governance and conflict trends. Where appropriate the
analysis will be carried out with other donors, and it will always
be shared with other donors. In addition, we will undertake further
regional conflict analyses in a number of places, many of which
will be carried out jointly with or shared with other partners.
Managing natural resource wealth
[Paragraph 102] In our view, the Government needs,
as a matter of urgency, to take forward the Commission for Africa's
recommendation of a definition of conflict resources, and an Expert
Panel in the UN Security Council. Without an agreed definition
the international community's approach will continue to be piecemeal,
ad hoc and inconsistent. An internationally agreed definition
of conflict resources would make it unnecessary to have a 'Kimberley
Process' for every resource.
DFID is working with other government departments,
especially the FCO, to agree the most effective way to address
the illegal trade in resources that are used to fund conflict.
This includes consideration of whether a definition of conflict
resources would be of use in addressing the trade, and is one
of a range of options that are currently being considered to fulfil
our White Paper commitment to 'promote international standards
on the management of natural resource revenues in countries affected
by conflict'. A definition would not in itself provide the controls
on illegal trade put in place for diamonds by the Kimberley Process,
and its usefulness therefore needs to be considered in a broader
context.
We agree that an Expert Panel in the UN could be
useful to monitor the links between natural resources and conflict.
DFID and the FCO are currently considering the role that an Expert
Panel might play in the UN system, and how we can best support
its establishment.
The UN panel on the illegal exploitation of resources
in the DRC
[Paragraph 109] We believe that the Joint Working
Group guidelines have contributed to major improvements in the
operation of the UK's National Contact Point.
We welcomed the input from the Joint Working Group
(a group including businesses and NGOs, established by the All
Party Parliamentary Group on the Great Lakes region of Africa).
Their recommendations were very useful and fitted closely with
the Government's plans for how the National Contact Point (NCP)
would operate.
[Paragraph 116] We are surprised and disappointed
that the DTI did not contact Afrimex about their activities or
investigate the activities of Alfred Knight in relation to the
DRC. We believe the DTI could do more to promote the EITI [Extractive
Industries Transparency Initiative] and to resolve issues surrounding
conflict resources.
The UK NCP went to a great deal of trouble to obtain
information from the UN on companies the UN Panel considered to
be in the higher categories of misconduct. Alfred Knight (a company
that analyses mineral deposits for its clients) was one of the
companies whose activities the UN Panel had considered and consequently
categorised as "resolved". Consequently the UK NCP
did not request information from the UN. Subsequently an NGO
report (from RAID - Rights & Accountability in Development)
cited a connection between two German companies (KHA International
and Masingiro GmbH), that were alleged to have invested in a sampling
laboratory run by Alfred Knight. We passed this information to
the German NCP.
In January 2005 the Director of DTI's Trade Operations
advised RAID that Companies Investigation Branch (part of the
regulatory arm of DTI) had declined to act in the case of Alfred
Knight. Furthermore, RAID was advised that the NCP would need
reasons for considering a complaint against Alfred Knight. RAID
was told in May 2006 that, in the absence of evidence on allegations
that Alfred Knight had breached the OECD Guidelines, the NCP was
minded to close this case. Having heard nothing further from
RAID, the NCP wrote to RAID on 31 July 2006 confirming that the
case was closed; but offered to reopen the case should any organisation
submit evidence subsequently. There has been no further communication
since then.
Afrimex is a company that has some trade in the mineral
coltan, mined in the DRC. The UN Panel investigated the activities
of Afrimex and considered the case "resolved". Afrimex
gave oral and later robust written evidence to the IDC. No organisation
has provided evidence to the NCP to justify a complaint or an
investigation into alleged activities that may be in breach of
the OECD Guidelines. If such a complaint, backed by evidence,
was forthcoming the NCP would consider the case on its merits,
in line with the complaints process recently circulated to stakeholders
by the NCP.
FCO, DFID and DTI already work on a range of issues
related to Corporate Social Responsibility. Further work to promote
the EITI will be undertaken by the revamped NCP in conjunction
with its work to promote the OECD Guidelines.
[Paragraph 117] There is a serious deficiency
in the manner in which the Government approaches the actions of
UK companies abroad, and in particular in CPCA [conflict-prone
and conflict-affected] countries. The Government does not send
out a strong message to UK companies about the significance it
attaches to OECD Guidelines. Given the number of UK companies
originally listed by the UN and, given the human rights abuses
which we know accompanied the war, and continue to be perpetrated,
the Government response should have been more thorough. The Government
needs to demonstrate that it takes the OECD guidelines seriously,
in practice as well as in theory, by drawing up practical measures
to ensure their implementation.
[Paragraph 119] Tools are of little use if they
do not change behaviour. The Government has a responsibility to
make UK companies aware of the OECD guidelines and to offer them
appropriate advice. There is a pressing need for the UK Government
to consider ways to ensure that the approach of the DTI is not
at odds with other aspects of Government policy in CPCA states.
Without such coherence the Government cannot hope to have the
impact it seeks through DFID's new strategy of engagement in fragile
states. We intend to take evidence from DTI ministers on these
important issues.
The Government takes seriously the activities of
UK companies operating abroad. We believe that UK companies often
operate to high standards, including in countries with weak or
weakly enforced social and environmental standards. In various
ways the Government seeks to promote good practice, including
through initiatives such as the UN Global Compact, the Ethical
Trading Initiative, the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,
the Kimberley Process, and Voluntary Principles on Security and
Human Rights. Where UK companies operate irresponsibly we take
this very seriously. The Government believes that the best place
for corporate abuse to be addressed is at the local level, where
the abuse takes place. It is important therefore that we support
countries with weak legislation and regulation in the relevant
areas to strengthen these provisions to enable them to take action
when abuse occurs.
However, there are times that action should be taken
internationally. This includes action through the OECD Guidelines
for Multinational Enterprises. These Guidelines are an important
instrument for the Government. We held extensive consultations
with stakeholders earlier this year, including businesses, NGOs,
legal professionals and others regarding changes to the UK's implementation
of the Guidelines. Following this consultation the Government
announced in the 2006 White Paper, and separately through the
DTI, a series of changes to the implementation of the Guidelines,
including a revamp of the UK's National Contact Point (NCP).
These changes include the expansion of the NCP to include officials
from DFID and FCO as well as DTI, and the establishment of a Cross-Government
Steering Board to oversee the work of the NCP. This Board will
include Independent Members drawn from outside Government. The
Government also drew up new guidance regarding the way in which
the NCP would work and how complaints brought to the NCP would
be dealt with. A new promotional strategy is being developed to
ensure relevant Government offices and agencies are fully aware
of the Guidelines and the Government's responsibility for their
effective implementation.
The Government is also committed to work within the
OECD to make the Guidelines more effective in promoting responsible
business conduct, particularly in countries with weak governance.
The changes made by the Government to the UK's implementation
of the Guidelines have been welcomed by NGOs, business, trade
unions and other stakeholders.
Security Sector Reform
[Paragraph 122] We think that the UN Peacekeeping
Force in the DRC should be providing some oversight of prison
conditions as part of its mandate to "facilitate humanitarian
assistance and human rights monitoring, with particular attention
to vulnerable groups". It should also consider putting in
place effective human rights monitors for prisons.
The Committee rightly highlights the substandard
conditions in the prison they visited in Bukavu. This is typical
of other prisons in DRC. They also rightly identify a role for
MONUC, the UN peacekeeping force, in providing oversight of prison
conditions. However, MONUC is already taking a lead in pressing
for better treatment, monitoring conditions and providing support
to improve conditions. MONUC has led efforts to persuade the
authorities to make appropriate budget provisions to feed prisoners.
MONUC regularly visits all prisons and, in 2004 and 2005 produced
two extensive reports on prison conditions across DRC. ICRC also
provides some support to detainees under its programme in DRC
to which DFID is providing £3 million in 2006.
What is needed in DRC is systemic reform of prisons
as part of wider reform of the justice system. We are pushing
for reform, but in the absence of this, we believe MONUC is playing
a proactive role in monitoring conditions in prisons.
[Paragraph 126] EU work
on the Chain of Payments is an important step in the right direction,
but, given the extent of insecurity in the DRC, it is a drop in
the ocean. If security sector reform is to be successful in the
DRC, a much larger sum of money will need to be found. The newly-elected
Government of the DRC will have primary responsibility for this,
but it cannot achieve this without outside assistance. Security
is the basic precondition for development to take place. In our
view, the UK Government needs to press the EU and its member states
to make security sector reform a priority. The newly-elected government
in the DRC will also need to be encouraged to make this a priority
area.
We agree. Security sector reform (SSR) is a top
priority for achieving sustainable peace in DRC. The UK Government
has been pressing consistently for the EU to take a lead in coordinating
security sector reform in DRC through a joint approach involving
the Commission and the European Council Secretariat. We have
also lobbied hard for SSR to be a top priority in discussions
with all our partners and regularly stress this to the Government.
The importance of security sector reform is now widely accepted.
The challenge now for the international community is to find
the structures and resources needed to provide effective support
to the reform efforts of the new Government. We remain very active
in pushing for this and we will support the international effort
on security sector reform through our Africa Conflict Prevention
Pool.
Disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration
[Paragraph 129] It seems clear that donors in
Sierra Leone now need to give priority to employment-generation
initiatives, including agricultural schemes, to provide an incentive
for rural-urban migrants to return to rural areas. This will mean
simultaneously tackling some of the local governance grievances
that have led to discontent in rural areas. It may not be appropriate
for DFID to engage in this area directly, but as the largest donor
in Sierra Leone, the Department ought to provide a lead for other
agencies by highlighting the issue and encouraging others to increase
their focus on the issue.
We agree that decentralisation of power from Freetown
to the local level is an important way to tackle the marginalisation
felt by many rural people in the lead up to the conflict. That
is why we are committing £8m with the World Bank to help
decentralise government to locally elected councils, and build
local capacity to deliver services to poor people.
We agree that unemployed youth in Sierra Leone are
a potential source of future conflict. We believe the best way
of getting people into work is by attracting greater investment
into Sierra Leone, reducing the administrative barriers to business
start-up and through much more business-friendly regulations.
DFID's new draft country strategy (covering 2007-2012) has a
much greater emphasis on growth, including improving the business
environment, and delivery of basic services. We are actively
encouraging greater investment in Sierra Leone and were the main
funder of a large investment conference in March this year.
We are not active in the agricultural sector. This
is an area that the European Commission will focus on under our
joint country strategy, which will start in 2008.
Donor coordination
[Paragraph 131] Because fragile states are such
difficult environments in which to work, donor coordination is
particularly important. In the DRC it will be vital for progress.
As the largest bilateral donor, the UK Government must continue
its efforts at donor harmonisation. We consider that the European
Commission is best placed to take the lead on donor coordination
in the DRC.
We agree that donor coordination is both difficult
and important in fragile states, and is a priority for DFID in
DRC. We are working with others to produce a new strategy that
will be shared by the World Bank, United Nations, European Commission,
Belgium and the UK. We have also helped prepare proposals to
strengthen donor coordination that have recently been agreed among
donors. The European Commission are a crucial partner in DRC
and critical to harmonisation efforts, but we do not agree that
they are best placed to lead donor coordination in DRC. The UN
and World Bank jointly chair donor discussions at present and
these arrangements work well.
Women and Peacebuilding
[Paragraph 112] We accept that there are a large
number of issues which the MoD must cover with its personnel before
deployment but, given the disproportionate effect of conflict
on women and girls, discussion of UNSCR [UN Security Council Resolution]
1325 should be a priority. We hope the Government's adoption of
an Action Plan to implement UNSCR 1325 will encourage this. In
addition, since the MoD invests significant resources in training
the military forces of other countries, there should be a greater
awareness of UNSCR 1325 throughout the armed forces.
We agree that the requirements of UNSCR 1325 should
be fully reflected in training provided to the armed forces.
To ensure that they are in line with MOD's commitments under the
national Action Plan for the implementation of UNSCR 1325, the
MOD is conducting an audit of existing training provision, against
both the Resolution itself and the training outcomes identified
in the UN's own training package on the Resolution. The results
of the audit should allow us to show more clearly whether our
training is compliant, while also helping us identify any further
training needs.
Small arms and light weapons (SALW)
[Paragraph 138] Weapons stocks frequently end
up in the hands of someone other than the original purchaser —
as when Siad Barre's weapons stocks in Somalia were distributed
among fighting clans in the 1990s. The Ugandan government may
appear 'responsible' in relation to its development policy but
not necessarily in relation to northern Uganda or the DRC. Arms
sales to a government may encourage it to feel immune from criticism
by its own people and may also encourage arms acquisition by neighbouring
countries. Strong common standards for global trade in conventional
weapons should be an international priority. The Government's
policy on not selling arms to governments if it believes they
will be used to repress the population must be applied robustly.
We agree. Better regulation of the arms trade is
essential to stop the spread of weapons which aggravate violent
conflict, facilitate terrorism and human rights abuses, and undermine
development. That is why the UK is pushing for an international
Arms Trade Treaty which is legally binding, covers all conventional
weapons, and includes monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.
Last month UN member states voted overwhelmingly in favour of
a UK-backed Resolution which will open the way to full negotiations
on a treaty.
In parallel with this, under the scope of the UN
Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit
Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons in All Its Aspects (UNPoA),
complimentary work has continued since 2003 on the UK led Transfer
Controls Initiative to develop common guidelines for national
controls on transfers of small arms and light weapons.
In addition, the UK has one of the strictest export
control regimes in the world. All conventional arms export licence
applications (including small arms) are assessed on a case-by-case
basis against the Consolidated EU and National Arms Export Licensing
Criteria. Licence applications are rigorously assessed against
eight criteria covering internal repression, external aggression,
risk of diversion and sustainable development in the destination
country, as well as relevant international commitments and arms
embargoes.
[Paragraph 141] The Government has made good progress
in pushing for an International Arms Trade Treaty. It must build
on this and ensure there is no loss of political momentum on this
important issue in the UN. We also draw the Government's attention
to the recent Reports which the Quadripartite Committee has published
in relation to arms controls. The International Development Committee
is both contributor and signatory to those reports and we hope
that the Government will take on board the recommendations the
Quadripartite Committee makes.
We agree. The UK Government, led by the FCO, will
continue to work with the Resolution co-authors and other supporters
to maintain momentum towards an International Arms Trade Treaty.
We will encourage all countries to submit their views on the
feasibility and scope of a treaty to the UN Secretary General
early next year. The Secretary General will then report back to
the General Assembly in October. We will also continue to work
with countries which are sceptical about the benefits of a treaty
to encourage them to participate in this process. We welcome
the Committee's recommendation regarding the Quadripartite Committee's
reports in relation to arms controls. The Government has responded
in full to the Quadripartite Committee's most recent report (3
August 2006) by way of a Command Paper (Cm 6954).
Regional initiatives - the Africa Peace Facility
[Paragraph 146] In spite of the mismatch between
expectations about what the AU can achieve in Darfur, and inadequate
institutional capacity and financial resources, the APF [Africa
Peace Facility] has encouraged Africans to step forward as peacekeepers.
Given the problems in amassing appropriately sized and effective
UN peacekeeping forces, the APF has made a significant contribution
to building up an African-led peacekeeping force. We hope that
the EU will continue to fund and build up the Africa Peace Facility
and urge further such partnerships to strengthen regional capacities.
We believe that African governments could and should make substantial
additional financial contributions of their own to the AU's peacekeeping
forces.
We agree. The Council of the European Union has
recently agreed that the Africa Peace Facility (APF) should continue
to be funded from the tenth European Development Fund (EDF10)
from 2008-10 and has agreed €300m should be set aside for
this. We also agree that continued and increased financial and
other contributions from AU member states are essential for the
viability of the AU itself and its peacekeeping forces.
The Peacebuilding Commission
[Paragraph 153] We agree that
the operations of the Peacebuilding Commission should be based
on a shared plan between the country in question and the donor
community but we also consider that excluding civil society organisations
runs the risk of downplaying grievances.
We agree. Since the creation of the Peacebuilding
Commission (PBC) in December last year, the UK has repeatedly
argued for meaningful participation by civil society in meetings
of the PBC. Given civil society's important role in peacebuilding,
we believe that regular links between the PBC, national governments
and national civil society will be essential to the PBC's effectiveness.
While national civil society representatives were
invited to speak at the first meetings of the PBC on Sierra Leone
and Burundi on 12-13 October, the PBC has yet to agree formally
on when, where and how they will participate. We hope this will
be resolved by the end of the year. We will also continue to
lobby national governments in both countries and PBC members to
recognise the valuable contribution national civil society can
make to building peace.
[Paragraph 154] While the link between conflict
and development is a relatively new field, it is an area to which
the Government must give priority in order to improve development
outcomes amongst the poorest. Preventing and ending conflicts
and helping to ensure they do not recur will do more to create
a climate for poverty reduction and development in the countries
affected than any amount of costly aid programmes.
The forthcoming DFID Conflict Policy Paper is a reflection
of the importance that the Government gives to this. It will
show how we intend to address violent conflict by placing a greater
emphasis on prevention, making our international response to armed
conflict more effective, and being more "conflict-sensitive"
throughout all our work.
Department for International Development
11 December 2006
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