Extension of existing preferences
beyond 2007
34. The December 2007 deadline for concluding the
EPA negotiations is fast approaching. At a meeting in Khartoum
in December 2006, ACP ministers noted that many groupings were
behind schedule in the negotiations and their declaration called
for an urgent high-level meeting to "take stock" of
progress.[48] Subsequently,
when African Union Trade Ministers met in January, they issued
a declaration noting that more time may be needed to conclude
the EPAs and some Ministers made speeches seeking assurance that
existing preferences would remain in place until there was a successful
conclusion.[49] Furthermore,
we have heard from ACP representatives and members of the European
Parliament Committee on Development that progress has been slow
and that there is now little chance that the regional groupings
will be ready to conclude by the deadline.[50]
The review of the EPA negotiations which is underway may highlight
the difficulty that some regional groupings, such as the Pacific,
will have in concluding the negotiations within the set timeframe.
35. The Commissioner told us that any delays in concluding
these Agreements would not come without cost:
"If they [ACP countries] will not reach an agreement
I cannot impose it on them, but the costs of not reaching an agreement
are very sizeable for the ACP [
]. The economic cost is not
going to be in Europe. The economic cost is going to be amongst
the ACP countries themselves." [51]
He also warned that an extension to the negotiating
period, under a WTO waiver, could not be guaranteed. We note that
the US submitted a waiver request in March 2005 for African Growth
and Opportunities Act (AGOA) countries and has requested waiver
extensions for its two other trade preference programmes: the
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act and the Andean Trade Preference
Act.[52] The WTO has
yet to take a decision on these requests. We
recognise that some brinkmanship may be involved in negotiations
and that the period for negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements
(EPAs) has been substantial. We believe, however, that the EU
should now undertake thorough contingency planning so as to be
in a position to request a WTO waiver, as the US has done, should
the EPA negotiations not conclude by the deadline.
36. The EU is obliged under the Cotonou Agreement
to table alternatives to EPAs if these are requested. The existing
Everything but Arms (EBA) initiative, providing duty free access
to EU markets for all exports except arms, is the alternative
for least developed countries. However, we did not hear evidence
from the Commission to suggest that the EBA was a viable alternative.[53]
The Trade Commissioner said that the EPAs would be a more
attractive option for developing countries:
"The point of the Economic Partnership Agreements
is the recognition that trade liberalisation alone is not an answer
or a panacea to development [...]. We need to put in place local
and regional customs union and trade opening arrangements amongst
those countries so that their markets grow, their opportunities
for trade with and amongst ACP countries within those regions
will be increased and that new rules and conditions for investment
will lead to higher inflows of foreign direct investment."[54]
Concern was expressed by some ACP representatives
that the pace of regional integration encouraged by the EU under
the EPAs was beyond what they felt able to deal with. In its response
to our predecessors' 2005 Report, the Government was supportive
of the need to allow developing countries "maximum flexibility"
over arrangements and said that the EU "should make an upfront
offer of EBA access to all ACP countries in each regional group,
with no strings attached".[55]
37. We recognise
the argument that the Economic Partnership Agreements offer greater
potential to grow regional markets than the Everything but Arms
(EBA) arrangements. We believe that regional groupings themselves
will best be able to assess their capacity to integrate and the
pace at which this should take place. We continue to believe that
the EBA should be a real option, in particular for least developed
ACP countries who should not have to offer reciprocal market access
to the EU until they have graduated from least developed country
status. We were pleased to see that the Government broadly agreed
with our view but we are disappointed that the EU negotiating
position does not reflect this flexibility more explicitly.
Southern African Development
Community
38. The Southern African Development Community (SADC)
is one of the regional groupings of the ACP involved in EPA negotiations.
The grouping brings together widely varying economies ranging
from South Africa to Malawi. It is this grouping which therefore
brings into starkest relief the challenges of agreeing arrangements
which bind a whole region. The Government reply to our predecessors'
2005 Report referred to DFID research on asymmetric liberalisationspecial
arrangements which allow countries in the negotiation to liberalise
at different paces and on different timetables and without strict
reciprocity of access to marketswhich highlighted:
"[
] the need to use different scenarios
on product coverage and transition periods for each ACP country
and regional group. This is possible under the current rules in
Article XXIV."[56]
39. We support this approach and believe that each
ACP group should be free to make decisions on the pace, sequencing
and product coverage of market opening. After initial signs that
the Commission would not endorse significant asymmetrical liberalisation
within the SADC grouping, the latest Commission position recognises
that "due to South African competitiveness, especially in
agriculture, it is inevitable to grant a different regime for
the access to the EU market to South Africa and the other EPA
members."[57] The
Commissioner also told us that asymmetry within the regional market
would also be possible.[58]
We endorse
the flexible approach to market access and asymmetrical liberalisation
present in the Commission's current position on the Southern African
Development Community Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). We
look forward to the successful conclusion of the EPA on that basis.
41 International Development Committee, Sixth Report
of Session 2004-05, Fair trade? The European Union's trade
agreements with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries,
HC 68, Conclusions and recommendations. Back
42
They are known as 'Singapore Issues' in reference to four working
groups set up during the WTO Singapore Ministerial Conference (1996).
Back
43
Private meetings of the Committee in Brussels, January 2007 Back
44
Q 57 Back
45
European Commission Staff Working Document, SEC(2006)1427, paragraph
25 (http://ec.europa.eu) Back
46
Informal meetings of the Committee in Brussels, January 2007 Back
47
International Development Committee, Third Special Report of Session
2006-07, DFID Departmental Report: Government Response to the
Committee's First Report of Session 2006-07 HC 328, response
to recommendation paragraph 19 Back
48
Fifth ACP Summit, Khartoum, 7-8 December 2007 (5thacpsummit.gov.sd) Back
49
Conference of Ministers of Trade of the African Union, Third Extraordinary
Session, 15-16 January 2007, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia (www.uneca.org/eca_resources/news/2007/EPA_Addis_Ababa_Ministerial_Declaration.pdf) Back
50
Private meetings of the Committee in Brussels, January 2007 Back
51
Q 59 Back
52
http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news06_e/ctg_chairpersons_e.htm;
and http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Document_Library/Reports_Publications/2006/asset_upload_file236_9455.pdf,
p 28 Back
53
Qq 59-61 Back
54
Q 43 Back
55
UK Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report Of Session
2004-05, Fair trade?: The European Union's trade agreements
with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, Cm 6605, June
2005, responses to recommendation paragraphs 11 and 12 Back
56
Government Response to the Committee's Sixth Report Of Session
2004-05, Fair trade?: The European Union's trade agreements
with African, Caribbean and Pacific countries, Cm 6605, June
2005 Back
57
Commission Communication COM(2006)673 final (http://ec.europa.eu) Back
58
Qq 48-55 Back