List of Recommendations
1. We
strongly welcome DFID's advocacy of an increased focus by the
Commission on poverty reduction in low-income countries. The European
Council, however, now needs to make good on the commitments it
made in the 2005 Consensus on Development to prioritise aid to
the poorest countries, and to Africa in particular. We recommend
that the Government look at all options available, including withholding
funds, to encourage the European Union member states to agree
parameters for Commission development activity that allow a dramatic
increase in aid going to those who most need it. (Paragraph 9)
2. We recommend that
the Government encourage a long-term review of Commission development
structures in order to streamline staff and institutions and to
provide clearer lines of accountability. In the short term, we
believe greater clarity could be achieved by disaggregating headline
figures for development assistance for low- and middle-income
countries from those for external assistance to neighbouring,
candidate or potential candidate states. (Paragraph 10)
3. The policy shift
on health and education spending under the European Development
Fund away from programme expenditure towards budget support will
need a parallel shift in the Commission's approach. We welcome
DFID's involvement in developing the Millennium Development Goals
(MDG) Contracts and the clearer links these should offer between
spending and outcomes. We look forward to monitoring the progress
of the MDG Contracts both as a potential framework for the Commission's
new approach to health and education expenditure and, more broadly,
as a possible model for outcome-oriented conditionality for budget
support. (Paragraph 14)
4. For trade to work
as an effective development tool, we believe that opening markets
alone is not sufficient—significant capacity-building in
this area is also essential. We welcome recognition by the WTO
aid for trade task force and the Government that aid for trade
initiatives are complementary to the Doha Round. We are concerned,
however, that without a successful outcome to the Doha Round the
funds available for aid for trade will be minimal, as both the
Round and aid for trade have developed in tandem. We recommend
that the Government make explicit its commitment to ambitious
aid for trade initiatives irrespective of the outcome of the Doha
Round. (Paragraph 17)
5. We welcome the
renewed effort the WTO membership, including the UK, is putting
into securing a deal in the Doha Development Round. Time is, however,
short: the likely window for a deal is now just a few months.
The key difference between July 2006, when the suspension was
announced, and now is greater political will to reach an agreement
rather than a significant change in the 'building blocks' involved
in any deal. Moreover, we believe that it is continued political
will that will be decisive in securing a deal. We encourage the
UK, EU and all negotiators to approach this deal with a determination
to succeed. (Paragraph 20)
6. We understand that
agreement of a development package, separate from or in addition
to an overall deal, is viewed as controversial by the WTO and
some of its members. We agree with the EU Trade Commissioner that
the development package is not an alternative to an overall deal.
We are concerned, however, that hard-fought-for gains for the
world's poorest countries should not be lost because of others'
intransigence. We recommend that the Government give priority
to all options available which safeguard the development outcomes
of the negotiations, even if the Round itself is not concluded
successfully. (Paragraph 23)
7. We believe that
the involvement of business leaders in shaping the EU offer, such
as encouraging concessions on agriculture and on other sticking
points in order to secure broader trade benefits, is crucial.
We recommend that the Government intensify its dialogue with
business leaders about the Round and make every effort to facilitate
their involvement in these negotiations. (Paragraph 25)
8. We recognise that
a deal involves compromise. No-one can expect that all aspects
of a successful outcome to the Doha Round will please all WTO
members. We do believe, however, that it is the WTO membership's
duty to ensure that a deal on agriculture does not favour only
those who shout loudest. We understand the rationale behind getting
the early agreement of 'key players' to any deal but we are concerned
that there is a danger that the EU and US could overcome their
difficulties only to find some developing countries, perhaps outside
the G5, rejecting a deal in which they have played little part.
We recommend that the Government encourage the EU to consult
broadly during the closing stages of the negotiations to ensure
it draws in the views of the full range of G110 countries. (Paragraph
28)
9. We remain concerned
that the EU is abusing its position in the partnership to persuade
the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries that the New
or Singapore Issues are essential for development and by implying
that there may be penalties if they reject them. We believe both
elements of the Commissioner's assurance to us—voluntary
inclusion of the issues and a long implementation period—are
necessary in order to prioritise development outcomes for the
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). We would encourage him
urgently to ensure that the Commission as a whole is taking this
approach across the board. (Paragraph 31)
10. We recommend that
the Government examine EU-ACP communication channels and look
for opportunities to facilitate or improve that communication
in this critical phase of the negotiations. The Government should
ensure that the EPA review which is underway allows the concerns
of ACP states to be aired fully and addressed. The Government
should also encourage the Trade Commissioner to meet ACP Ambassadors
personally to discuss progress in the negotiations. (Paragraph
33)
11. We recognise that
some brinkmanship may be involved in negotiations and that the
period for negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)
has been substantial. We believe, however, that the EU should
now undertake thorough contingency planning so as to be in a position
to request a WTO waiver, as the US has done, should the EPA negotiations
not conclude by the deadline. (Paragraph 35)
12. We recognise the
argument that the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) offer
greater potential to grow regional markets than the Everything
but Arms (EBA) arrangements. We believe that regional groupings
themselves will best be able to assess their capacity to integrate
and the pace at which this should take place. We continue to believe
that the EBA should be a real option, in particular for least
developed ACP countries who should not have to offer reciprocal
market access to the EU until they have graduated from least developed
country status. We were pleased to see that the Government broadly
agreed with our view but we are disappointed that the EU negotiating
position does not reflect this flexibility more explicitly. (Paragraph
37)
13. We endorse the
flexible approach to market access and asymmetrical liberalisation
present in the Commission's current position on the Southern African
Development Community Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA). We
look forward to the successful conclusion of the EPA on that basis.
(Paragraph 39)
14. The essential
building blocks needed to secure fair and effective deals are
clear. Political will is now needed to put those blocks in place.
As the WTO and EPA negotiations enter their final phases, we believe
that progress will be made if they are conducted between equal
partners who are willing to make compromises, conscious of what
is at stake and, above all, committed to making trade work for
the benefit of the poor. (Paragraph 41)
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