| 1. | We recognise the huge challenges facing donors in assisting IDPs within Burma and commend DFID for being one of only four donors to run a staffed development programme within the country. (Paragraph 19)
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| 2. | Providing funding to community-based organisations (CBOs), who often manage their own clinics, schools and projects, is a way for donors to assist IDPs without channelling funds through the military regime. Such groups can go beyond emergency assistance to carry out crucial sustainable development work at grassroots level. We recommend that DFID increase substantially the funding it gives to CBOs within Burma. Capacity-building and training of such groups is a crucial complementary strategy if funding is to be used effectively. Funding CBOs provides donors with the means to support human rights and democracy work within Burma. (Paragraphs 22-23)
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| 3. | We recommend that DFID begin appropriate funding of exile groups who carry out crucial work both inside and outside Burma to support IDPs and other vulnerable groups. Support to such groups would have the simultaneous benefit of supporting and raising awareness about the plight of IDPs, and of building capacity for a future democratic transition. We believe that the exiled trade union movement and women's groups are particularly worthy of support. (Paragraph 26)
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| 4. | We are deeply concerned by the closure of two ICRC field offices in Burma in March 2007 and the damaging effect this will have on the international community's ability to document abuses perpetrated against IDPs and other vulnerable groups in Burma. We call on the UK Government to continue to make representations to the Burmese authorities on this issue at the highest level. (Paragraph 29)
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| 5. | It is our strong belief that overall aid levels to Burma need to be significantly boosted. (Paragraph 30)
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| 6. | Funding of aid work in Burma is not a case of 'business as usual'. The risk of funding reaching an illegal and repressive military junta must be absolutely minimised. Political and humanitarian 'space' to carry out the process of poverty reduction and humanitarian assistance is highly constrained. Capacity amongst partner organisations to spend aid money effectively is low. The co-ordination of aid efforts is difficult and is currently done poorly. Overall, operating conditions for aid agencies in Burma remain very challenging. We respect DFID's determination to minimise the risk of any of its funds finding their way into the exchequer of a brutal and illegitimate regime. (Paragraph 32)
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| 7. | Whilst there is a need to address the significant constraints, we believe more aid could and should be spent in Burma by DFID. The current UK contribution of £8.8 million represents significant under-spending compared to countries with similar poverty levels and human rights records. DFID has quadrupled its aid budget for Burma in the last six years and we recommend that this trajectory should continue, with a further quadrupling by 2013. We also believe that the UK Government should encourage other countries to provide greater support for work within Burma. This would give Burma the opportunity to make at least some progress towards the Millennium Development Goals by the 2015 deadline. (Paragraph 32)
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| 8. | Whilst we welcome the increase in staff capacity within Burma from three to 10 officials, we are concerned that if DFID fully relocates management of its Burma programme from Bangkok to Rangoon, it will impair DFID's ability to engage with activities on the Thai-Burma border and fulfil its proper part in a co-ordination role. We emphasise the importance of DFID working independently and we therefore recommend that DFID retain at least two senior, full-time members of staff within the British Embassy in Bangkok. This will help in providing an external perspective on displacement issues within Burma and in supporting refugees, cross-border assistance and non-governmental organisations based in Thailand. (Paragraph 36)
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| 9. | It is clear to us that NGOs working from inside Burma can reach IDPs who would not otherwise receive assistance. Their work is crucial to providing basic social services such as education and health to vulnerable populations, and we believe that they deserve increased support from donors. (Paragraph 41)
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| 10. | Ideally, a situation would exist where two complementary approaches, in-country and cross-border, ensured even coverage in assistance to IDPs across Burma. But unfortunately this complementarity remains elusive at present. A key reason for this is the difficulty experienced by organisations in communicating and hence co-ordinating their work. (Paragraph 42)
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| 11. | It is clear to us that DFID's office relocation from Bangkok to Rangoon is likely to impair its ability to fulfil its proper part in a co-ordination role, as we stated above (see paragraphs 35-36). We also believe that DFID is not currently fulfilling its responsibility as a lead donor to tackle the problems of co-ordination. (Paragraph 43)
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| 12. | We agree that the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), rather than any of the main bilateral donors, should take the principal role in co-ordinating aid assistance but believe that DFID should engage more wholeheartedly in helping to co-ordinate assistance to IDPs. We welcome the appointment of a UN OCHA Co-ordinator for Burma and believe that international NGOs should support his work. We recommend that DFID support UN OCHA to carry out an urgent mapping exercise of which IDPs are receiving assistance and where gaps exist between in-country and cross-border assistance. (Paragraph 45)
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| 13. | We believe that DFID should do more to share information about its assistance to IDPs, and more to encourage other organisations to do the same. We accept the importance of maintaining the security of the work being done, but believe it would be possible for DFID to enhance communication by organising more 'closed door' meetings with trusted partners. (Paragraph 48)
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| 14. | Whilst we welcome the Three Diseases Fund, and believe that DFID deserves credit for helping to develop it, in its current form it will not reach sufficient numbers of IDPs or other vulnerable groups living in border and conflict areas. We recommend that DFID build on its leadership role in helping to develop the Fund by supporting the creation of a complementary mechanism that makes funding available to organisations providing healthcare in the border areas. (Paragraph 52)
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| 15. | The UK Government needs to tread very carefully before beginning any kind of dialogue with the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). However, we believe limited engagement on specific poverty and humanitarian issues should begin and that the most sensible approach would be for DFID to do this as part of a group of international actors, under the banner of the UN. (Paragraph 55)
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| 16. | Cross-border aid may not be considered to be a neutral form of assistance and it is highly dangerous. However it is the only way to reach IDPs in several of Burma's conflict-affected states and we believe that it can provide a cost-efficient and flexible way of delivering emergency relief where no other options exist, but it must be continually and robustly reviewed. Such funding must not detract from the key humanitarian objective of ending conflict. (Paragraph 62)
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| 17. | DFID's view that its funds "will add little extra value" to cross-border assistance is divergent from what some other witnesses told us. (Paragraph 67)
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| 18. | We believe that DFID's policy change to allow its funds to be spent cross-border, but with no extra funds currently committed, has exacerbated the existing problems in engaging productively with agencies carrying out cross-border work and has unsurprisingly been perceived by them as an empty gesture. As we have stated previously, there is an urgent need for DFID, working closely with the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), to establish comprehensively the needs of IDPs who can only be reached by cross-border work, particularly in relation to the control of infectious diseases. DFID must not hide behind its argument that is has a 'comparative advantage' in working in-country. At the same time UN OCHA must also address the failure of a significant number of bilateral donors to properly fund in-country work, which has hindered an effective, comprehensive approach. Cross-border assistance to Burmese IDPs could be extended if more financial resources were available. We recommend that DFID contribute to providing effective relief to IDPs in eastern Burma and that it should commit funds for cross-border assistance as part of an overall rise in aid to Burma We believe that, as a high priority, DFID should maximise relief to IDPs in eastern Burma. (Paragraph 70)
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| 19. | We believe that, in addition to funding cross-border work, DFID should help to ensure that assistance is focused on the most vulnerable IDPs, including Shan populations and women. Women's sexual and reproductive health needs to be prioritised. Cross-border health assistance and clinics in IDP areas both require extra financial resources. We recommend that education, especially for girls, should be another priority for DFID and that it should fund cross-border assistance to teachers and schools in IDP areas. (Paragraph 73)
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| 20. | Rape is used as a weapon of war by the Burmese Army and we call on the UK Government to make high-level representations about this atrocity to the Burmese regime. We reiterate our recommendation below (see paragraph 26) that DFID should fund women's groups working on and across the border who document rape and other human rights abuses, and provide women's health and education services. The Shan Women's Action Network (SWAN) is one group particularly worthy of support. (Paragraph 74)
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| 21. | We recommend that DFID scale up its funding of cross-border assistance over the Chinese border. The Department should also look at the options for starting to fund assistance over the Indian border. Support to the Chin backpack health worker programme, operating over the Indian border, would be one step towards assisting the many IDPs facing dire poverty in Chin state. (Paragraph 76)
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| 22. | We were astonished to hear that DFID has visited the refugee camps it funds so infrequently. We believe that funding TBBC directly might improve communication and encourage stronger engagement on DFID's behalf. We therefore recommend that DFID reassess the continued value of funding TBBC indirectly via Christian Aid. (Paragraph 82)
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| 23. | Although we accept that the FCO has played a valuable role in visiting refugees, allowing DFID and the FCO to have an interchangeable presence at the camps is not the most effective way of overseeing the delivery of aid. We were struck by the lack of developmental analysis of the Ban Mai Nai Soi Camp and believe strong DFID engagement is needed to rectify this. We recommend that DFID carries out a developmental analysis of the camps; this is essential both to meet refugees' needs appropriately and to provide value for donors' funds. (Paragraph 83)
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| 24. | Our concern about DFID's lack of engagement with the camps on the Thai-Burma border is heightened by the decision to relocate the management of DFID's Burma programme from Bangkok to Rangoon. We reiterate the concern we expressed earlier about DFID's office relocation from Bangkok to Rangoon and repeat our recommendation that at least two senior, full-time members of DFID staff should be retained within the British Embassy in Bangkok (see paragraph 36). This staff presence will be crucial to enhancing DFID engagement with the camps, carrying out a developmental analysis of the camps' administration, co-ordinating assistance to refugees with the FCO and supporting NGOs based in Thailand. (Paragraph 84)
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| 25. | We reiterate that we welcome the appointment of a UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) Co-ordinator for Burma. We anticipate that this step will help strengthen co-ordination of international humanitarian assistance to refugees at the Thai-Burma border. (Paragraph 85)
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| 26. | We believe that opening up official employment opportunities for refugees in Thailand would be mutually beneficial to refugees and the Thai economy. We recommend that DFID and the FCO increase their engagement with the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and NGOs in negotiations with the Royal Thai Government on expanding employment opportunities. (Paragraph 88)
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| 27. | We were disappointed to witness the total gender imbalance in the various refugee vocational and training schemes, with women confined to crafts which are likely to have much less income earning potential. This is unacceptable. DFID should engage proactively with all organisations involved in training to ensure that this disparity is robustly addressed. (Paragraph 89)
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| 28. | We recommend that DFID and the FCO seek the agreement of the Royal Thai Government (RTG) to increase formal education opportunities, especially at tertiary level. Restrictions on refugees' freedom to leave the camps, and for teachers and educators to enter the camps, are a key factor in limiting educational opportunities. DFID and the FCO should negotiate with the RTG for more flexibility in entering and leaving the camps, so that refugees' education and employment opportunities can be improved. (Paragraph 90)
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| 29. | We recommend that the UK Government take steps to ensure that resettlement of refugees through the Home Office's Gateway Protection Programme does not create a sudden diminution in capacity amongst the camp populations and leave camps with gaps in their skilled workforce. The UK Government must also advocate on this issue in co-ordination with other governments, particularly the USA. DFID should actively engage with the Royal Thai Government in the policy debate on resettlement issues to contribute to a developmental analysis of refugees' needs. (Paragraph 92)
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| 30. | What started as a temporary refugee influx on the Thai-Burma border has become a long-term humanitarian problem. The Thailand-Burma Border Consortium and the NGOs working under the Committee for the Co-ordination of Services to Displaced Persons in Thailand umbrella deserve credit for the food, shelter and health services they provide within the camps. But we believe they cannot be—and cannot reasonably be expected to be—responsible for or involved in all refugee needs, especially training, employment, policy development and resettlement strategies. (Paragraph 93)
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| 31. | We believe a strategic reassessment is required of the appropriate mechanism for dealing with the long-term interests of refugees. A clear delineation is needed between TBBC and other NGOs' work in providing food and basic services to refugees on the one hand, and the UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR), Royal Thai Government and third country governments' sustainable solutions for the refugee crisis, including employment and resettlement, on the other. (Paragraph 94)
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| 32. | We are concerned that the relocation of DFID staff from Bangkok to Rangoon will risk DFID being isolated from negotiations concerning refugees in Thailand. This adds further weight to the case we have made for retaining at least two senior, full-time DFID staff members within the Bangkok Embassy to provide support to refugee issues and NGOs based in Thailand. (Paragraph 95)
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| 33. | We recommend that the UK Government begin a dialogue with the Government of India about the status of and the assistance given to Burmese refugees in India and we reiterate our recommendation that DFID look at the options for starting to fund assistance to Burmese refugees over the border with India. (Paragraph 97)
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| 34. | We recommend that the UK Government, at the highest levels, regularly raise the subject of India's engagement in Burma with the Government of India. India's uncritical relationship with the regime, and its appetite for arming and investing in the country, risks perpetuating Burma's illegal and brutal regime. (Paragraph 99)
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| 35. | We were extremely alarmed to hear that Russia has agreed to build a nuclear research reactor for Burma. We call on the UK Government, together with the international community, to bring pressure to bear on the Russian Government not to proceed with the reactor and to acknowledge the hardships the initiative would impose on the Burmese people. (Paragraph 100)
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