Memorandum submitted by the International
Rescue Committee
1. The International Rescue Committee presents
our views on the topic of "Advantages and Disadvantages of
Cross-border Assistance Compared to Other Ways of Assisting IDPs
in Burma". [***]
2. [***]
3. The strongest arguments for providing
cross-border assistance relate to access and need. While the need
for humanitarian assistance throughout Burma is apparent, what
is less apparent is how great the need is in eastern Burma, where
among the 500,000 IDPs living there, roughly 95,000 are in conflict
areas that can only be reached by cross border assistance.[33]
A recent report by the Back Pack Health Worker Team, a
Thai-based Burmese CBO which provides medical assistance to IDPs
in Burma, found that while standard public health indicators in
Burma as a whole are quite poor, health indicators for eastern
Burma are substantially worse and closely resemble countries facing
widespread humanitarian disasters, such as Sierra Leone, Democratic
Republic of Congo; Niger, Angola, and Cambodia shortly after the
ouster of the Khmer Rouge.[34]
4. Despite the expansion of aid programmes
inside Burma in the early 2000s, the conflict affected areas
along the Thai Border have always remained a critical gap.[35]
Unfettered and complete access to these areas from inside Burma
remains unlikely—at least in the near future. Changes in
the military government since the 2004 purge of former military
intelligence chief Khin Nyunt, who began to actively facilitate
broader humanitarian space, are resulting in less access to decision
makers, more intrusive intelligence, and greater pressure on agencies
to work with government-organized NGOs.[36]
The 2005 DFID commissioned study on "Aid Effectiveness in
Burma/Myanmar" notes how the complex political situation
and government policies in Burma have led to mistrust of international
actors inside Burma, resulting in the government placing strict
controls on aid projects, including restricting access to some
of the neediest areas in the country.[37]
5. While the above provides a strong rationale
for a cross-border programme, it remains important to further
examine both the advantages and disadvantages of implementing
cross border work.
6. Advantages:
— Thai-based Burmese CBOs, which have
a long history of providing support inside Burma, are able to
provide direct and timely to assistance to conflict affected
communities inside Burma.
— These organisations have long
standing relationships with the IDP communities built on trust.
Most of the medics and teachers from these organizations are from
the area, sensitive to local conditions and cognizant of cultural
sensitivities. They communicate and deliver services in the local
languages.
— These organisations are able to carry
out cross-border assistance with none of the obstacles or restrictions
imposed by the Burmese government on agencies working in Burma.[38]
— These organisations are able to provide
cost-effective assistance into Burma by purchasing, when
possible, goods in Thailand and carrying them over the border
and by exchanging currencies at market rates rather than Burma's
inflated official exchange rates for goods that need to be purchased
inside Burma.[39]
The CBO approach strengthens Burmese civil
society groups by providing substantive institution capacity
building to more than the organisations who provide cross-border
assistance.
The increasing restrictions and fluctuating
conditions placed on working inside Burma create inconsistency
of service even where access is permitted. The relative stability
of working from Thailand ensures more reliable, consistent service
delivery and creates opportunities for longer [en rule]term planning,
such as providing ongoing trainings to service providers.
[***]
7. Disadvantages
— No direct monitoring and reliance
on proxy visits to IDP programme sites and beneficiaries in
Burma.[40]
— Because the programs are carried
out without the consent of the Burmese government, linking
activities to government-run Burmese institutions such as schools
and clinics would be impossible.
8. [***], IRC feels strongly that the advantages
greatly outweigh the disadvantages and in many instances agencies
working in Burma are faced with the same constraints as agencies
working from the Thai side.
33 Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma: 2006 Survey,
Thailand Burma Border Consortium, pg 2. Back
34
Chronic Emergency: Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma, A
report by Back Pack Health Worker Team, pg. 9, 2006. The most
common cause of death continues to be malaria, with over 12% of
the population at any given time infected with Plasmodium falciparum,
the most dangerous form of malaria. Out of every twelve women
in these areas may lose her life around the time of childbirth,
deaths that are largely preventable. Malnutrition is unacceptably
common, with over 15% of children at any time with evidence of
at least mild malnutrition, rates far higher than their counterparts
who have fled to refugee camps in Thailand. Knowledge of sanitation
and safe drinking water use remains low. Back
35
"Myanmar: New Threats to Humanitarian Aid", Update
Briefing, Asia Briefing No 58, International Crisis Group, 8 December
2006, pg. 4. Back
36
ibid Back
37
Igboemeka, Adaeze; "Aid Effectiveness in Burma/Myanmar: Study
on Development Agency Perceptions" A study commissioned by
the UK Department for International Development-South East Asia,
August 2005, paragraph 12. Back
38
MSF France closed its operations in Mon and Karen State in early
2006 after four years of providing medical assistance there because
"the military authorities had imposed so many travel restrictions
on MSF and applied such pressure on local health authorities not
to cooperate with their teams that it became impossible for MSF
to work in an acceptable manner."; "Prevented from working
the French section of MSF leaves Myanmar", MSF Press Release,
29 March 2006. Back
39
In July 2006, Burma's official exchange rate (Kyat-Dollar) was
K6:$US1, but the regime applied an official rate of K450:$US1
for all funds brought in by UN and INGOs. The unofficial black-market
rate at the time was K1300:$US1. Most agencies reportedly manage
to circumvent the official rates and exchange at the street value.
"Pro-Aid, Pro-Sanctions, Pro-Engagement: Position Paper on
Humanitarian Aid to Burma", The Burma Campaign UK, July 2006,
pg 7. Back
40
Note that travel and other restrictions placed on agencies in
Burma also confound their efforts to monitor programme progress.
One of the reasons for MSF-France leaving Burma was the travel
restrictions placed upon it. (See "Why the French Section
of MSF Has Ended Its Activities in Myanmar", MSF Briefing,
29 March, 2006.) Back
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