Memorandum submitted by the Peace Way
Foundation: Burma Issues
CROSS BORDER HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE INTO
BURMA: OPENING UP THE ONLY CHANNEL FOR AID TO REACH INTERNALLY
DISPLACED PEOPLE AND ETHNIC COMMUNITIES
1. SUMMARY AND
INTRODUCTION
1.1 A key paradox of the situation in Burma
is that the Burmese military junta is simultaneously the sole
conduit for humanitarian aid within the country, as well as being
a primary root cause of the humanitarian problem. Populations
in the border areas are in a particularly vulnerable situation,
however, due to restrictions from the military junta, aid agencies
working from within Burma cannot access these people. Consequently
the only way humanitarian aid can reach these vulnerable populations
is through cross border work.
1.2 Burma Issues has prepared this document
to present the situation as we see it. From our extensive experience
working with communities inside Burma's civil war zones we are
confident to say that there is space to carry out humanitarian
activities that will improve people's human security. However
the opportunity to explore these spaces has been limited, and
one reason is donors' unwillingness to fund cross border work.
Consequently we welcome the decision by DFID to explore the possibility
of cross border work.
1.3 In this document we focus on work with
communities inside Burma rather than refugees, looking at both
Internally Displaced People and ethnic communities. We discuss
the current situation inside Burma and restrictions in terms of
delivering aid to internally displaced people (IDPs) and communities
in the ethnic areas of Burma. We look at the humanitarian crisis
in the ethnic areas of Burma, and how work is currently being
undertaken by community based organizations (CBOs) to provide
assistance.
1.4 We discuss the types of assistance can
be delivered and their importance and strengths: relief or aid
work, education and capacity building, moral support and de-isolisation
work, documentation and preserving traditional culture. We also
address concerns and risks in delivering cross-border aid.
1.5 Lastly, we look at how DFID can get
involved, and how its involvement could make a real difference.
1.6 About Burma Issues
1.6.1 Burma Issues was formed in 1990 as
a private-non-profit organisation devoted to peacefully addressing
Burma's struggle for human rights and democratic rule. Burma Issues
is unique in that we focus on the marginalized communities living
in the war zone of Burma as our target group for building a peace
based on justice for everyone. Our approach is based on concepts
of empowerment of these marginalized communities, including community
organising, international advocacy campaigns and extensive documentation.
In 2002 we were able to register as a non-governmental organisation
with the Royal Thai Government under The Peace Way Foundation.
1.6.2 As an organisation we have been working
with grassroots communities for over 16 years and have gained
extensive insight and experience during this time into the sorts
of support and aid that can be delivered effectively cross border.
We have also, over time, built up a level trust and mutual respect
within the communities within which we work, which enables us
to understand the intricacies of the situation, learn from grassroots
people's experiences and perspectives and understand how to best
to approach assistance.
2. SITUATION
INSIDE BURMA
2.1 Central Burma
2.1.1 The current humanitarian situation
in Burma is frightening and the prospects for improvement are
grim. A quarter of the Burmese population lives below the dollar-a-day
poverty line and the already fragile social network is being increasingly
undermined. The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) spend
only 0.5% of their GDP on education and 0.2% on health care. [41]Consequently,
HIV/AIDS and other highly infectious, yet preventable, diseases
like hepatitis A, typhoid, diarrhea, malaria and tuberculosis
have spread throughout the country. Currently 71% of the population
is at risk of malaria infection, the country has the highest rate
of tuberculosis worldwide. There is a very real possibility that
these diseases will reach epidemic proportions, if they have not
already.
2.1.2 Despite the deteriorating humanitarian
situation, the junta has been consistently more interested in
financing military projects, than social services. While international
aid agencies and local community based organisations (CBOs) can
limitedly operate within Burma, they confront a humanitarian crisis
and a political system that serves to enrich and consolidate military
power at the expense of human security. A paradoxical situation
emerges whereby the resources and legitimacy that international
humanitarian aid brings to the country are manipulated for the
benefit of the very regime that perpetuates the crisis. The SPDC's
disregard for humanitarian issues ensures that international assistance
remains a stopgap measure. Also, the junta's continuing actions
vis-a"-vis the populace creates new humanitarian problems.
The humanitarian assistance that does actually come into the country
reaches only a small minority of those in need.
2.1.3 One obstacle to international aid
work is the corruption of the state bureaucracy. The junta requires
that aid money and in-kind provisions be channeled through state
agencies, a process that takes it through several departments
and the hands of several state or local politicians. In this process,
government and military leaders take "their quota" from
the total amount of aid finances and resources that pass through
their departments. Organisations cannot control the amount of
financing or goods actually reaching the people. An example of
this occurred in the delivery of aid to victims of a cyclone that
hit the Arakan coast on 19 May 2004. In this case aid money and
resources were sent through SPDC-backed agencies. The military
forced victims to sign documents stating that they had received
20,000 kyat, when only 14,000 had been delivered and provisions
of rice, cooking pots and blankets were similarly exaggerated.
[42]
2.2 Border/Ethnic Areas
2.2.1 While the entire country is facing
a humanitarian crisis, the situation in the border areas is especially
horrific. Internal displacement continues to be an epidemic, with
more than half a million Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in
eastern Burma alone. In November 2005 the State Peace and Development
Council launched an offensive in northern Karen State, which is
still ongoing today. From this offensive more than 30,000 people
have been forced to flee their homes. The army has destroyed rice
stores, burnt down entire villages and planted landmines around
villages and on pathways. Food scarcity continues to plague both
villagers and IDPs.
2.2.2 In addition IDPs and villagers face
serious health issues, especially during the wet season (May to
August). Malaria is prevalent, as are skin diseases, dysentery
and malnutrition. Villagers, as a result of military attacks and
increased militarization of their homelands are also likely to
be injured by a landmine or through soldier violence. Access to
medical services is virtually non-existent. As a result people
often die from preventable and curable diseases and treatable
injuries.
2.2.3 The Burmese army continues to oppress
the ethnic people through indirect tactics. While extra judicial
killings still take place, the army concentrates their efforts
on destroying survival structures. The military destroys food
sources, forces people to undertake labour intensive projects,
demolishes houses; forcibly relocate entire villages and employs
land confiscation. While not directly killing people, these tactics
slowly and systematically erodes their livelihoods, the people's
spirits and eventually their ability to survive.
2.2.3 However, this is not a new phenomenon.
For the past 30 years the Burmese army has used military force
against civilians, allegedly to quell armed insurgency. Since
the late 1980s offensives in Burma's ethnic areas have intensified
becoming nearly an annual event. As a result villagers have been
displaced numerous times because of the actions of Burma's military
junta. Consequently, the villagers' ability to feed their families,
provide education and health services or even ensure their safety
has been undermined time and time again. Their ability and desire
to resist the Burmese army has been worn down, leaving them particularly
vulnerable. As a Karen colleague said, "they have nothing
left—they have had to leave their homes, property, land,
even family members behind. They simply have nothing left."
3. WHAT HUMANITARIAN
EFFORTS ARE
CURRENTLY BEING
UNDERTAKEN?
3.1 Currently the Burmese regime prevents
all non-governmental organisations and United Nations agencies
inside Burma giving humanitarian aid to the villagers in these
areas. The junta prohibits organisations traveling to these areas
and documenting human rights violations and the humanitarian crisis.
It is impossible to bypass these regulations.
3.2 There are some community-based organisations
(CBOs) that work cross-border from Thailand. A portion of these
groups bring emergency relief to villagers, while other groups
work with communities in the effort to empower communities and
to increase the village's ability to be self-sufficient. However,
these efforts are only a tiny amount of what is needed. The SPDC
deems all these efforts illegal and if the Burmese army catches
workers they will be killed.
3.3 Currently between 2% and 5% of Burma's
population is living outside the country, as refugees and migrant
workers. [43]This
figure is alarming, however, the vast majority of villagers choose
to stay near their villages and fields rather than attempting
to seek asylum in Thailand or other countries, despite the horrendous
situation they face. Simply put, it is their home and they do
not want to leave.
4. WHAT SPACE
IS AVAILABLE
FOR CROSS
BORDER HUMANITARIAN
EFFORTS?
4.1 Cross border work benefits marginalized
communities inside ethnic areas of Burma in a number of ways.
Efforts that are currently being undertaken only reach a small
portion of those in need, and there is the space to expand these
activities.
4.1.1 Relief or aid work
There are a number of CBOs that deliver immediate
relief to communities within the war zones of Burma by providing
food, medical care and supplies, shelter and clothing. These organisations
fill an immediate need and can provide the critical support needed
by many.
4.1.2 Capacity building and education
Whilst providing immediate aid is of course
vital, it is also equally, if not more important to ensure that
sustainable solutions are found to the situation faced by villagers
inside. CBOs can and do provide the knowledge and skills required
to enable grassroots people understand how they help themselves.
Such work ensures that people are empowered to forge a way of
life that works for them in the longer term and that they are
engaged in determining their own future. The sort of capacity
building and education includes:
— Providing education and educational
materials for children;
— Teacher training and development
of model schools that can be used as a blueprint for education
practices within the area;
— Self-reliance programmes, such
as organic farming;
— Village or community organising
projects, which work with communities to help them understand
general political, economic and social principles and to install
their own traditional administration bodies. Such projects include
participation of community members from all levels and give people
the confidence to participate in building up their nation in a
bottom-up approach;
— Documentation of events, human
rights violations, experiences etc (see point 4.1.4 below); and
— Landmine awareness and mapping.
4.1.3 Moral support and de-isolation work
Communication within the ethnic border areas
of Burma is extremely limited and as a result grassroots people
have no way of connecting with other communities to share experiences.
There is often no realisation that abuses experienced by one group
are being experienced by many others across the region. Feelings
of isolation and separation from the rest of the world can be
addressed during the course of any activity inside Burma: the
very act of CBO workers coming to spend time and energy with grassroots
people, and explaining the wider context helps villages to feel
connected to a wider community and to feel supported and understood.
This could be enhanced through project work, whereby CBO workers
visiting communities at culturally significant times such as New
Year. The purpose would not necessarily be to provide specific
aid or capacity building, but simply to be there and share the
event. Such projects would go a long way to creating greater mutual
understanding, respect and trust (that will help to strengthen
future projects or programmes), as well as helping to underline
the importance of maintaining cultural traditions.
4.1.4 Documentation
Documentation has a three-fold purpose, firstly
to ensure that the beneficiaries participate in developing the
solutions and project work done in the area, secondly to ensure
their voices are heard at a regional and international level and
thirdly to ensure that the situation and events are recorded for
analysis. Documentation includes:
— Strategies of internally displaced
people;
— People's stories, experiences
and perspectives;
— Human rights violations;
— Collecting news and information
on the situation and key developments; and
— SPDC activities, militarization
and development.
4.1.5 Cultural preservation
CBOs play a role in promoting the preservation
of traditional culture within the ethnic areas of Burma. It can
be seen that a strategy undertaken by the SPDC has been to attempt
to "Burmanize" ethnic people by preventing the practicing
of cultural traditions eg preventing ethnic languages from being
taught in schools and banning teaching materials in ethnic languages.
In addition much of the tradition of passing on stories and culture
within the ethnic areas of Burma is oral so there is a risk that
many traditions will pass away with the older generation.
Cultural preservation is vital to a people's
sense of identity, confidence and empowerment. At a future time
of peace, if many traditions and cultural references have been
lost, the process of re-building will become even more of a challenge
for the grassroots people. CBO work can help to raise awareness
of the importance of making positive steps to preserving cultural
heritage and provide the necessary capacity. Such steps may involve
documenting oral history and village history, educating children
in their ethnic language and culture, as well maintaining cultural
and traditional medicines practices.
5. STRENGTHS
RELATING TO
CROSS BORDER
WORK
5.1 The types of support outlined above
are only executable on a cross-border basis. They provide help
straight to the grassroots people that are most affected by the
civil war, and help that is not simply emergency relief, but help
that is sustainable and empowers the people to determine their
own future in a non-violent way.
5.2 This empowerment and capacity strengthens
the people and will send a key message to the SPDC that despite
their actions, civilians are not being broken down and continue
to live and work towards a future time of peace and justice.
5.3 It is currently very difficult to get
funding for cross-border activities, as many donors feel uncomfortable
with the realm of the work. DFID support could give other donors
the confidence to get involved.
6. CONCERNS RELATING
TO CROSS
BORDER WORK
6.1 Security is a major concern in providing
cross border assistance for marginalised communities in Burma.
Both CBO staff and beneficiaries' lives are at risk by working
within the civil war zone, and whilst risk mitigation strategies
are carefully considered, it is impossible to eradicate the threat.
6.2 In relation to security, CBOs are sometimes
required to cooperate with armed groups within Burma in order
to carry out their work. It is important to ensure that whilst
these groups are cooperated with for security, independence is
maintained when it comes to the aims, objectives and activities
of the individual CBOs. This is something that can and is done
by CBOs that currently operate inside, and must continue.
6.3 The situation inside the ethnic areas
of Burma is very complex and the intricacies of each State are
often unique to that State. It is therefore important to recognise
that there is no single blanket approach to projects that will
work for all groups. Planning takes time and needs to involve
as many parties as possible to ensure that appropriate solutions
are developed for each area.
6.4 When looking at activities on a cross-border
basis, monitoring and evaluating can be a challenge as traditional
methods are often not viable. However, we are confident that DFID
has experience in other situations around the world that help
to provide insight as to how to develop the methods used, and
that they could work together with CBOs/NGOs to strengthen monitoring
and evaluation capacity in the area.
6.5 Another concern with working cross border
is the governments of the countries where the aid is coming from.
Cross border work continues to be unsanctioned by both the SPDC
and their neighbours. These countries can close their borders
at any time, and have the sovereignty to do so. While this is
a concern, cross border work has been occurring for decades, some
times under extremely tense situations. Continued lobbying from
other governments, UN agencies, international non-governmental
organisations and other interested parties to keep the borders
open and to allow can help to mitigate some of these concerns.
7. HOW DFID CAN
SUPPORT CROSS
BORDER WORK
TO BURMA
7.1 At the most basic level, a key resource
that CBOs need to carry out their work is funding. Most CBOs operate
on a shoe-string budget, and if they could increase their funding
it would mean that organisations would have the financial resources
to expand, which in turn would mean an increase in work (whether
it is capacity building, emergency relief, etc) occurring in Burma's
border areas. Obviously such expansion would not be immediate
and would need to be approached carefully with due planning, from
recruiting and training staff, to building up relationships with
beneficiaries and other parties to implementing activities. While
an increase in funding will ensure that projects have adequate
funding levels, it will take considerable time before the outputs
of having this additional funding are visible.
7.2 Additionally, as DFID is certainly aware,
it is necessary for funding agencies to take time to understand
the context in which these organisations work. Within Thailand
most CBOs are unregistered, and consequently have no legal status.
This is also true of staff, and most CBO staff cannot travel outside
the border areas where they are based. Furthermore CBOs allocate
most of their budget into their projects, often at the expense
of administration and communication, for example, some CBOs do
not have regular access to the Internet or phone lines.
7.3 Consequently, it is important for donors
and CBOs to work together and be committed to working together.
A typical major donor relationship would be hard to maintain with
CBOs, as at this time they may not have the experience or capacity
to meet the demands (in terms of reporting, monitoring, etc) from
large donor agencies. That is not to say that it is impossible,
however firstly both parties need to realize the different expectations
that donor agencies and CBOs have in relation to a funding agreement.
Secondly their needs to be efforts made to bridge these differences,
in a participatory way. These efforts can come from DFID by allocating
some funding to organizational development activities, and working
with funding partners on these issues, for example holding workshops
about DFID's reporting requirements, monitoring and evaluation
techniques, etc. This would help to create a strong donor/CBO
relationship and partnership.
7.4 Another key aspect of the situation
is that unless there is a change in the way that the Burmese junta
runs the country that the humanitarian crisis will continue. Consequently
their needs to be support from the global community for a peace
based on justice for everyone in Burma. Donor organisations can
also help to advocate for change and DFID as the international
aid arm of the British government is uniquely placed to channel
information to policy makers. As CBOs often cannot reach policy
makers directly, donors, such as DFID, can help bridge the divide
and ensure that the voices of the people are heard.
7.5 Lastly the people in Burma's ethnic
areas need long-term support. They are balancing precariously
on the abyss of survival. While all support, regardless of how
big or small is greatly appreciated and needed, to make a real
difference support needs be ongoing and consistent. If a large
quantity of aid was to come into the area for two years and then
dry up, it could have severe negative consequences for the people
and also could damage the relationships between the grassroots
people and the CBOs. Consequently DFID, and other donors, need
to make a long-term commitment to supporting cross border humanitarian
work into Burma.
8. CONCLUSION
8.1 From the information presented here,
it is clear that there is space for cross border work, and that
this work is not just limited to providing emergency relief, but
rather to helping people have the capacity to be self-sufficient
and to participate meaningfully in their future.
8.2 While working cross border enables assistance
that would otherwise be impossible, it also raises some very real
concerns. But these concerns must be outweighed by the fact that
in the current situation, cross border aid is not just an option,
it is the only solution. For the millions of people facing an
urgent and ongoing humanitarian crisis that worsens each year
and is comparable to the worst humanitarian disasters in the world,
cross border aid is their only access to help. Moreover, with
it's role in the international community, DFID involvement in
opening up this channel would give confidence to other key stakeholders
to become involved (whether at the assistance or political level)
which can only strengthen humanitarian efforts even further.
41 Department for International Development (UK Government)
website, November 2005. Back
42
Nine Arakanesse Arrested by MI for Complaining to Prime Minister
Khin Nyunt, Narinjara News, 9 August 2004. Back
43
Burma: State of Human Security, Human Security Alliance
Conference, 9 April 2007, Bangkok. Back
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