Memorandum submitted by Paul Sztumpf
The submission only makes reference to Karen
State and its border area; it is based on personal observations
and speaking to many Karens.
RECOMMENDATIONS
1. More aid to IDPs is badly needed, to
be delivered in partnership with CBOs, from both inside Burma
and across the Thai/Burma border, but there needs to be far greater
importance placed on good governance. In the long term, the governance
should reach an internationally acceptable standard, in the meantime
it could be improved by better partnership working. If there is
no improvement to governance, then in the long term the aid may
well do more harm than good. There is a need for a comprehensive
assessment of the land-mine problem and the program for clearing
mines in non-combat areas.
THE POLITICS
OF AID
TO IDPS
IN BURMA
2. The humanitarian needs of IDPs in Karen
state and refugees on the Thai border are well documented. Thailand
Burma Border Consortium (TBBC), produce an annual report, Internal
displacement in eastern Burma 2006 survey, which is both relatively
comprehensive and accurate. The information is collected by the
Committee for internally displaced Karen people (CIDKP) which
has links to the Karen National Union (KNU) and the Karen office
of relief and development, which is part of KNU, so the report
is not independent or objective. In my opinion, the lack of objectivity
and independence is only reflected in the conflict analysis and
not the scale of the problem The report also has a major flaw,
in that it does not give any meaningful focus to landmines, this
is because the questionnaire used to compile the report dose not
ask any questions about landmines, one does not have to spend
much time on the border, to realise mines and the injuries from
landmines are a big problem. A visit to Dr Cynthia's clinic, the
Mae Tao Clinic, just outside Mae Sot will illustrate the scale
of the problem.
Cross-border aid to those in need is relatively
poorly documented. This is because of the danger of making such
information public and the fact that for years cross-border aid
has been under funded and totally inadequate. The vacuum left
by this under-funding has been partially filled by very small
NGOs. Apart from TBBC efforts, aid is being distributed by a very
wide array of NGOs, many of them are almost one-man bands. Characteristically,
at times they may be just a few doctors who are sponsored by a
very small number of churches, or schoolteachers helping with
local school programmes. For years there has been a proliferation
of NGO, Humanists, adventurers and Christian missionaries. Most
are well intentioned, but often with their own agenda, targets,
historically, there has been little coordination, although efforts
are being made to improve matters. Almost all are under-funded
and secretive; the border is a dangerous place!
3. Humanitarian aid to refuges in Thailand
is quite different as this is predominantly delivered by TBBC,
which is both well-documented and well-funded. TBBC has conducted
some cross-border aid predominantly through locally-based Community
Based Organisations (CBO), almost all (if not all) cross-border
aid has to have local guides and protectors, more often than not,
armed. These normally have some links to armed groups such as
KNU/KNLA, DKBA, or one of the smaller KNU derivatives.
4. The small NGOs operating on the border
often have limited understanding of the Karen, something they
recognise. To overcome these difficulties most work predominantly
with a local partner, who often has another hat in a local CBO.
This leads to local deals, which empowers those making the deals.
It is difficult to see how this problem could be overcome, given
that many of the small NGOs personnel are on tourist visas. There,
local partners do not officially exist, have no bank accounts,
or personal papers to speak of and have to make deals with the
numerous Thai authorities. There are at least six different agencies
of the Thai government keeping an eye on the situation. In other
words this distorted empowerment and bad governance is due to
lack of DFID (and other international) cross-border aid. The small
NGOs are only stepping in where TBBC cross-border aid is clearly
inadequate and help is so desperately needed, most are only too
aware of their own shortcomings.
5. It would require a step change in both
the amount of resources available to cross-border aid and acceptance
of the legitimate need of IDP in Burma by both the international
community and the Thai government (and Burma government which
is highly unlikely). The FCO and DFID should be working to create
this step change, such a change would be in everyones interest
except those that are being paid off or beneficiary's of the local
deals. Only in those conditions could governance be raised to
an acceptably high standard. The lack of good governance, creates
an atmosphere of mistrust. SPDC thinks aid is being used by armed
resistance groups, the local villagers think they are being used
by both aid organisations and lead members of CBO who are making
a living out of deals, and the CBO keeping a eye on each other.
6. In the meantime, partnership working
would be an acceptable alternative, funding through TBBC, and
distributed through local CBOs such as CIDKP, with enhanced governance
(CIDKP governance has improved in recent years but more is needed).
One holistic governance framework with joint ownership should
be developed.
It should be understood that aid to IDPs in
Burma, as needed as it is, nevertheless has a political effect,
both at a macro and micro level. At the moment, Burma is ruled
by a military dictatorship, with no real constitution. The system
of taxation, forced labour and arbitrarily rule of law is based
on the old style of governing which pre-dating British intervention
in the 1860s with the senior General taking on the role of King.
However there is change in the air, driven by
internal pressure from Burma's democracy movement, the struggle
for their rights by ethnic minorities who make up one third of
the population and international pressure for democratic change.
In Burma there are two proposed different constitutions. One by
the ruling SPDC, which enshrines the military's hold on power
but does introduce an element of democracy. (Even this is viewed
my many in the military as too western and risky.) The other is
proposed by the National Council of the Union of Burma, (NCUB)
is democratic and adopts a federal structure.
7. This constitution is supported by the
KNU. It is most probably true to say that cross-border aid strengthens
those who support the NCUB position.
Naturally the military know this, and that is
why they punish the villagers who get the aid. They are also setting
up different administrative areas in Karen state with varying
government control, which they hope will support the SPDC constitution
and introduce a divide and rule atmosphere.
At a micro level, it empowers those making the
deals with the international NGOs, which are predominantly the
educated Christians. To a large extent this also applies to TBBC,
this is resented by many Karens who are not Christian and is one
of the courses of the DKBA breaking with KNU. Inside the KNU it
stifles democratic development, which is resented by many young
activists. Naturally there are many social-political forces at
play; but aid is one of them.
8. All this is going on against a background
of the very real struggle of the Karen people to keep their identity
and to live as equal citizens in a federal Burma. There is one
thing that unites all Karens on the border; the four guiding principles
of Saw Ba U Gyi, former president of the KNU and a symbol of the
Karen struggle.—One of them is: "for us surrender is
out of the question". The Karen are a strong and proud people
with more integrity than most, their love of food, music and having
their photo taken should not be misinterpreted as weakness. The
Karen will not surrender their identity to the Burmans. You must
understand this, if you are to look at the IDP problem.
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