House of Commons - International Development

Select Committee on International Development First Report

4 Key issues for DFID

70. There are a number of key issues that have arisen for DFID during 2005-06 that are important to discuss in this report. These issues have varying degrees of prominence within DFID's Departmental Report, but all remain as current concerns for the Department.

Language training for DFID staff

71. In previous evidence sessions on the Departmental Report we have sought to probe DFID's choice of its partner countries. Identifying what DFID sees as its comparative advantage over other donors has never been easy and at times has seemed to amount to little more than a collection of historic links and the widespread, or official, use of the English language. But with DFID's move into Mozambique and the DRC even those factors seem not to apply. In DFID's 2003 DR, reference was made to the use of direct budget support as buying donors a "voice" in dealing with the governments of partner countries.[83] One of the arguments in favour of budget support is the ability which it gives DFID to engage in policy discussions with governments at a high level.

72. It therefore came as a surprise to us when we visited Mozambique in February 2006 to discover that the language training offered to DFID staff fell far short of that which the FCO provided for its officials in the same postings. The comments which follow should not be read as implying any criticism of the DFID staff in the two countries which concern us here (DRC and Mozambique). In both countries we met DFID staff who were managing to communicate well with relatively little language training. But it was clear to all that the level of language skill was not always up to the task of conducting discussions with ministers and senior officials on the details of the policies which DFID might wish to influence.

73. When we put these points to DFID, Sue Owen, Director General for Corporate Performance, described the FCO, which can offer up to two years of language training before a posting, dependent on job position and country location, as having "a Rolls Royce service and it would be great if we could do that".[84] But she added, "It is pretty difficult when you are under the constraints we are under".

74. We understand the pressure on DFID's administration budget but that makes it all the more surprising that, in the case of the DRC, DFID has chosen to engage in a French-speaking fragile state. In the case of Mozambique it has decided to make a Portuguese-speaking country one of its largest bilateral partners in Africa. These are DFID's decisions and having made them we expect DFID to equip its staff to do their jobs properly. That means providing a level of language training appropriate to the task. It means resourcing language training from central budgets, and not using up the whole of the DFID Country Programme's training budget on language training.

75. We have not explored these issues in detail but, from what we saw in the cases of Mozambique and the DRC, the head of the DFID country team and the majority of the sector advisers need to have a level of Portuguese or French equal to that which the FCO would expect to have in post. If such provision is to be made then DFID will need to look at the length of its staff postings to ensure it gets a reasonable return on the higher investment in language training. We welcome the Permanent Secretary's willingness to discuss this with the Treasury and his acceptance that, as with the FCO, DFID will need a staff margin to allow for people to undertake extended language training.[85] We recommend that DFID ensures that key staff in posts such as Mozambique and DRC have a level of language skill equal to that which the FCO would expect to have in post. This requirement will have implications for assessing what duration of staff posting is cost-efficient. We look forward to hearing the outcome of the Permanent Secretary's discussions with his Treasury colleagues concerning language training for DFID staff.

The role of China

76. China's increasing activities in Africa have implications for DFID's China programme, its programmes in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) and its work with other donors. A report on 'The Impact of China on sub-Saharan Africa' commissioned by DFID-China and published in April 2006 identified six policy challenges for SSA — for example, threats to its manufacturing sector, resource booms followed by economic mismanagement and the overall lack of SSA capacity to respond strategically to China.[86] The report poses the possibility that China needs to think about engaging with donors on good governance in SSA in order to maintain the rule of law which Chinese investors require if they wish to secure long-term access to SSA resources and markets.

77. The Permanent Secretary told the Committee that, "China is undoubtedly a force for the good and a challenge as well in Africa". He told us that he would be discussing some of these issues in Beijing in September 2006 and was trying to engage the OECD DAC in the dialogue with China.[87] However, he went on to say, "[Having discussions with the Chinese about good donorship] is proving tough [...] The Chinese have said they are not ready for dialogue yet".[88] The Director General for Regional Programmes followed up this statement: "[China] have not signed on [to the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative] yet and our attempts to get them to engage in some of these international fora is hard [...] They do not want to share much information."[89] We recommend that DFID engages with other donors to identify and pursue matters of interest regarding China's operations in Africa. A pragmatic approach would be to focus on the mutual interest in commerce as a way in to dialogue with China on governance issues in Africa.

Gender and education

78. 2005 saw the first MDG target — seeking to eliminate gender disparities in primary education — being comprehensively missed by the global community. Around 60% of those children unable to go to school are girls, and on current rates of progress it will take more than 100 years before all girls in Africa go to primary school.[90] Missing this first target compromises chances of meeting the 2015 MDG target of eliminating gender disparities at both primary and secondary levels; on current trends, nearly half of all countries will fail to attain gender equality in enrolments even by 2015.

79. Yet, beyond stating that the target remains off-track, DFID makes no mention of this failure to meet the first MDG target deadline in its Departmental Report.[91] In its written evidence, DFID told us that it "gives priority to supporting primary education for all children, especially girls, in countries that are off-track for reaching the education goal."[92] Nemat Shafik of DFID told us that the Department is focusing its efforts on areas where the disparities are most extreme.[93] We welcome this approach. However, the DR puts forward few concrete policies specifically addressing the failed target, or the resources to underpin them. Promoting the removal of primary school tuition fees is the only substantive policy approach mentioned in the DR — other pledges are vague, such as "raising the profile of girls' education in PRBS, poverty reduction strategies, sector dialogue and through the Education for All Fast Track Initiative."[94]

80. Furthermore, the DR lacks information on wider gender mainstreaming measures across DFID's work, which are central to securing the scaling-up of resources and action necessary to achieve gender equality in education. One World Action's submission highlighted the need for more effective gender mainstreaming within DFID.[95] The Permanent Secretary was up-front about the fact that, "We need to do better [...] I am not going to pretend that we have the answer [to gender mainstreaming] yet."[96] DFID is due to publish a gender action plan in November 2006. We are concerned that the Departmental Report fails to set out concrete and time-bound policies for meeting the first failed MDG target seeking gender equality in primary education. We are also disappointed at progress on gender mainstreaming within DFID. We expect to see detailed policies relating to both these areas in DFID's forthcoming Gender Action Plan.

Trade — coordinating with EU member states

81. DFID has a joint target with DTI to secure agreement to a significant reduction in trade barriers, leading to improved trading opportunities for developing countries by 2005. This target has not been met despite the ambitious aims for a development-focused round in the WTO. It is our view that, given Doha's billing as a 'development round', DFID should have taken the lead on meeting the joint target, rather than the DTI. There appears to be little appetite on the part of the major powers for agreeing ambitious openings in agriculture, where most distortions remain, or Non-Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) which would enable other aspects of the Hong Kong agreement to be put into effect.

82. A limited development package was agreed in Hong Kong, but this was arguably not a generous offer on the part of the developed countries — in fact the EU already offers much of what was contained in the package. Our recent report on the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial took the view that, despite the UK Government's intention to secure a development round, it was unable to influence its EU partners to adopt a sufficiently pro-development stance in international trade.[97] The DAC Peer Review comments that DFID's enthusiasm for certain initiatives is not always shared by other partners.[98] In a context where the European Commission negotiates on behalf of Member states, it is important that Member states share a common position. This should not be left until the last minute in the event that the Doha Round is restarted.

83. We were disappointed with the outcome of the Hong Kong Ministerial and more so with the decision in July to postpone indefinitely the Doha Round. The UK Government has not met the 2005 target that it set for itself despite its efforts in this regard. In the light of the suspension of the Doha Round the Government should revise this target and, in the first instance, work towards ensuring that its partners in the EU share the same objectives in relation to developing countries in the event that the Doha Round is restarted.

Economic Partnership Agreements

84. DFID's Departmental Report states that "more open markets pose particular challenges for countries which have benefited to date from preferential access to developed country markets — for example the Africa Caribbean Pacific (ACP) group."[99]

85. According to the agreed timelines, 2006 will be the year in which the first draft texts of the Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) will be produced, and in which a "formal and comprehensive review" will be carried out of the EPA negotiations.[100] Moreover the non-LDC[101] ACP countries have committed to make known in 2006 whether they will be in a position to sign an EPA, or whether they will refer to Article 37.6 of the Cotonou Agreement. In this article the EU has committed to "examine all alternative possibilities, in order to provide these countries with a new framework for trade which is equivalent to their existing situation and in conformity with WTO rules."

86. While all parties agree that EPAs should, first and foremost, be tools for development of the ACP states, the EU and ACP approaches are not the same. The ACP would like to see, in parallel, greater emphasis on development measures accompanying and linked to the trade negotiations. Some ACP and EU officials and politicians, as well as representatives of civil society, have increasingly questioned the development dimension of EPAs, and a large coalition of North and South non-governmental organisations has even campaigned to 'Stop EPA'.

87. In April, African trade ministers collectively expressed their "profound disappointment at the stance taken by negotiators of the European Commission in so far as it does not adequately address the development concerns that must be the basis of relations with Africa."[102]

88. Our predecessors recommended that there should be evidence that EPAs will produce the desired poverty outcomes prior to any final agreement on these. The UK Government response stated that it was working to ensure that analysis of poverty impacts and the Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs) will feed into policies on the EPAs.[103] In a Westminster Hall debate in June 2006, the Government said that SIAs were being conducted but that the results were confidential to the ACP grouping and that neither the Government nor the Commission had seen the results.[104] This begs the question of how the Government and the Commission will ensure that EPAs produce a positive impact on poverty. The Government has said that it supports the conclusions of the European Council which called for SIAs to be conducted at an appropriate time.[105]

89. In October the General Affairs Council agreed to provide €2 billion for Aid for Trade, in addition to the current European Development Fund, to support the Economic Partnership Agreements.[106] We welcome this initiative as a positive contribution to helping ACP states with supply side constraints which can prevent them from taking advantage of improved market access.

90. The UK Government has said that it supports the conclusions of the European Council which called for Sustainability Impact Assessments (SIAs) to be conducted at an appropriate time. We agree with this conclusion but remain concerned that a comprehensive and effective Review cannot be undertaken until potential developmental impacts are known. It would be irresponsible of the EU not to meet the ongoing concerns of the Africa Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of states about the lack of a development perspective in the EPAs. The EU should not wait until the last minute to do so. Measures must be put in place now, as part of the Review process. If concerns about the lack of a development perspective are not met, the EU must be prepared to think about, and discuss openly, alternatives to the EPAs.

83 DFID Departmental Report 2003, p.108 Back

84 Q 38 [Sue Owen] Back

85 Q 39 [Sir Suma Chakrabarti] Back

86 Raphael Kaplinsky, Dorothy McCormick and Mike Morris, Impact of China on sub-Saharan Africa , April 2006. Available online at http://www.ids.ac.uk/ids/global/Asiandriversbackgroundpapers.html Back

87 Q 34 [Sir Suma Chakrabarti] Back

88 Ibid. Back

89 Q 34 [Nemat Shafik] Back

90 Global Campaign for Education, Girls Can't Wait (2005), p.2 Back

92 Ev 31 Back

93 Q 12 [Nemat Shafik] Back

94 DFID Departmental Report 2006, p.30 Back

95 Ev 36 Back