The Juba Peace Talks
11. The Juba process has been characterised by a
series of highs and lows with a near collapse between December
2006 and March 2007.[15]
The success of these talks is dependent on the commitment of the
parties, primarily the Government of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance
Army, to completing them. In the past this has been questionable,[16]
and as yet the LRA has not assembled in the designated area at
Ri Kwangba.[17] While
the forthcoming Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting in Kampala
in November 2007 may help to ensure continued commitment, in the
meantime donors such as the UK can play a role in encouraging
the Government of Uganda to continue to participate in good faith.
The LRA, which stands to lose the most, should also be made aware
of the consequences of not fulfilling its obligations. As a way
of achieving this Nick Grono suggested:
"We can do things like look at the funding
sources for the LRA, perhaps a UN expert panel can be looking
at those issues, and some planning around what will happen if
the peace process falls apart and you have to have the disincentives
to pulling out of the process, and I think it is a critically
important role for this [the UK] Government to play."[18]
12. Other participants to the talks include the UN
Special Envoy, Joaquim Chissano, as well as observers from Kenya
and Tanzania, and the Chief Mediator, Lt Gen Dr Riek Machar of
the Government of South Sudan. There is an international fund,
the Juba Initiative Fund, managed by the UN Office for the Coordination
of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), which is responsible for the operational
costs of the Cessation of Hostilities Monitoring Team as well
as the hire of the venue, food and accommodation for the participants.
The UK Government has contributed US$480,000 to this US$4.8 million
Fund.[19]
13. We are pleased that the Juba peace process
is continuing and has made progress, despite setbacks. The international
community must continue to support this fragile process through
the Juba Initiative Fund and by encouraging all parties to remain
committed to a non-military solution.
14. The agenda at the Juba peace talks covers five
items:
- cessation of hostilities,
- comprehensive solutions,
- accountability and reconciliation,
- disarmament, demobilisation, reintegration (DDR),
and,
- formal ceasefire.
An outline agreement has now been reached on the
third stage—accountability and reconciliation. The nature
of the conflict is such that this is an area of great concern
with atrocities and grave human rights abuses committed by both
sides. Approximately 25,000 children have been abducted by the
LRA since 1986 and many have been forced to commit atrocities,
even against their own communities. In addition to widespread
abduction there has been disfigurement and mutilation, forced
marriage and sexual slavery.[20]
Added to the violence committed by the LRA, the Government of
Uganda's decision to move 1.7 million people into IDP camps has
also had severe humanitarian consequences which we outlined in
our previous report.[21]
Moreover, concerns have been raised about the conduct of the Uganda
People's Defence Force (UPDF) in and around the camps.[22]
These factors, combined with the disruption to normal life, mean
that the choice of accountability mechanisms will be crucial in
ensuring grievances are properly dealt with and a real reconciliation
is possible.
15. As part of accountability and reconciliation
a discussion about whether and how best to combine traditional
and national justice mechanisms is currently taking place in Uganda.
It is likely that there will be a strong element of traditional
justice mechanisms, such as, but not restricted to, Mato Oput—the
Acholi reconciliation process whereby the victims ask forgiveness
in a traditional healing ceremony after full accountability has
been established. However those individuals who are alleged to
bear particular responsibility for the most serious crimes will
be dealt with by the formal courts.
16. It is important that these discussions take account
of the wishes of the victims of the conflict who should be the
primary beneficiaries of any settlement or reparations. And, where
traditional or alternative justice mechanisms are used these should
include women and children. There is evidence to suggest that
some form of punishment, rather than simply forgiveness, reconciliation
and reintegration will be requested.[23]
The UK can give support to such processes by ensuring that local
leaders tasked with consulting people across the north are given
the necessary support. Furthermore, we have been made aware of
concerns about the lack of independence and accessibility of the
justice institutions in Uganda which would have the potential
to fuel alienation and perceptions of impunity.[24]
17. Justice and accountability are crucial elements
for any lasting peace. The victims of the conflict, and especially
women and children, must be included in discussions about accountability
and in any traditional justice mechanisms adopted. The UK Government,
along with other donors, can help to ensure that a wide consultation
takes place on these matters so that grievances are fully dealt
with at an early stage. The Ugandan legal system must demonstrate
the capacity to process and fairly adjudicate on allegations of
gross human rights violations arising from the conflict. We recommend
that the UK Government raise concerns about the independence and
accessibility of the Ugandan judiciary with the Government of
Uganda.
THE AMNESTY COMMISSION
18. In our report on Conflict and Development
we commented on the positive contribution being made by the Amnesty
Commission to helping abducted children and returning soldiers
to reintegrate into society.[25]
To date the Commission has helped bring some 5,000 LRA combatants
out of the bush.[26]
If the peace process is successful there will be increased numbers
of combatants who will need the assistance of the Amnesty Commission.
The International Centre for Transitional Justice reports that
the Commission is already struggling in its current role:
"The Amnesty Commission currently lacks
the logistical capacity to play a broader social role, and in
fact struggles even with the role it has been assigned in terms
of reintegration."[27]
DFID told us it was willing to look at further financial
support for the Amnesty Commission.[28]
We would support a decision by DFID to assist in the reintegration
of more combatants into their communities through additional funding
for the Amnesty Commission.
19. Under the Amnesty Act passed in 2000, many of
those returning have gone through traditional justice mechanisms
such as Mato Oput as a way of helping them to be accepted
back into the community. Such ceremonies have been helpful in
allowing victims to come to terms with those who might have committed
atrocities and have a greater potential for truth-telling than
the Amnesty Commission.[29]
We have been assured that the Amnesty Act would not cover the
four indicted people for whom there are ICC warrants outstanding.[30]
2 ICC, Facts and procedure regarding the situation
in Uganda, October 2005. It is believed that one of the five,
Raska Lukwiya, was subsequently killed in battle. Back
3
For example, Human Rights Watch, Benchmarks for assessing possible
national alternatives to ICC court cases against LRA leaders;
Tim Allen, Defending the ICC, Prospect, May 2007; Richard
Dowden, ICC in the dock, Prospect, May 2007; P. Clarke
& N. Waddell, Dilemmas of justice, Prospect, May 2007;
and, A. Branch, Uganda's civil war and the politics of ICC intervention,
Ethics and International Affairs, Vol 21.2, Summer 2007. Back
4
Ev 19 [DFID] Back
5
Q 14 [Mr Thomas]. The International Criminal Court (ICC) officially
came into existence in July 2002 following the 60th ratification
of the Rome Statute. Its mission is the effective prosecution
and punishment of serious violations of international humanitarian
law - genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. Back
6
Q 12 [Meg Munn], Ev 28 [International Centre for Transitional
Justice] Back
7
Ev 33 [CAFOD et al] Back
8
Ev 22 [International Crisis Group] Back
9
Ev 24 [International Crisis Group]. Of the five permanent UN Security
Council members, the US, China and Russia all have reservations
about the ICC and only the UK and France have ratified the Rome
Statute. Back
10
Ev 29 [ICTJ] Back
11
Lord's Army threatens war over court charges, The Times,
24 May 2007. Back
12
Q 45 [Mr Afako] Back
13
Q 41 [Ms Wierda] Back
14
Q 44 [Mr Grono] Back
15
Ev 18 [DFID] Back
16
Q 46 [Mr Grono] Back
17
Ev 28 [ICTJ] Back
18
Q 46 [Mr Grono] Back
19
Ev 19 [DFID] Back
20
Ev 30 [ICTJ] Back
21
International Development Committee, Sixth Report of Session 2005-06,
Conflict and Development: peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction,
HC 923, paras 16-20. Back
22
Ev 34 [CAFOD et al], Q 8 [Mr Hawthorn] Back
23
Ev 26 [International Crisis Group] Back
24
Phil Clark, Sharing the burden: a comprehensive accountability
and reconciliation strategy in Uganda. Back
25
International Development Committee, Conflict and Development,
paras 82-83. Back
26
Q 19 [DFID] Back
27
Ev 31 [ICTJ] Back
28
Q 19 [Mr Thomas] Back
29
Phil Clark, Sharing the burden: a comprehensive accountability
and reconciliation strategy in Uganda. Back
30
Q 20 [Mr Thomas] Back
