Memorandum submitted by Saferworld
PROSPECTS FOR
SUSTAINABLE PEACE
IN UGANDA
A. SUMMARY
1. Saferworld works with a range of civil
society, government and international partners to respond to security
and development challenges arising from conflict and armed violence
in the Horn of Africa region. This briefing is informed by our
ongoing work to address the proliferation of small arms and promote
conflict-sensitive development assistance in Uganda.
2. Conflict, insecurity and high levels
of armed violence, fuelled by decades of political, social and
economic marginalisation, have had a devastating impact on communities
across northern Uganda. The ongoing peace talks in Juba between
the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and the Government of Uganda
(GoU) represent a window of opportunity to return peace to a region
scarred by twenty years of brutal conflict. However, the Juba
talks represent only one component of what should be a wider peace-building
framework. The long-term sustainability of any future peace agreement
will largely depend upon whether the GoU and the international
community can create the conditions that support and protect peace
and reconciliation efforts already being undertaken by local communities.
This requires efforts to be made in addressing the structural
causes of conflict in the North and elsewhere in the country.
3. This briefing identifies key priorities
for the international community in relation to security provision,
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) and small
arms control to support peace, recovery and development in the
North (1). In addition, this briefing paper outlines challenges
for securing peace and recovery of the North in relation to ongoing
insecurity in the Karamoja region and the marginalisation and
under-development of communities across the districts of northern
Uganda. The briefing concludes by offering some concrete guidelines
for the international community to ensure that all future aid—development,
humanitarian and transition programmes—is delivered in a
way that both responds to and has a positive impact upon conflict.
B. KEY QUESTIONS
- How is the UK Government working to
promote restructuring of security provision and strengthening
of non-military approaches to security in Northern Uganda?
- How is the international community seeking
to encourage the GoU to continue the process of down-sizing the
military and undertake overall reform of the security sector in
line with GoU policy on Defence Transformation?
- What plans does the UK Government have
to support the implementation of a comprehensive programme of
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) in the North?
- What representations has the UK Government
been made to the GoU on insecurity in the Karamoja region to ensure
it does not undermine the Juba peace process?
- What is the UK Government doing to promote
the implementation of the GoU's draft National Plan for Recovery
and Development of Northern Uganda (PRDP)?
- Is the UK government confident that
the PRDP will contribute to peacebuilding in the North and will
not inadvertently exacerbate future conflict?
- How is the Government seeking to ensure
that the potential gains made through the PRDP process feed into
longer-term development strategies in Uganda, such as Uganda Poverty
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP)?
- What mechanisms are in place to ensure
that the UK's programmes in Uganda address the linkages between
conflict, armed violence and development?
- Are the UK Government's decisions about
budget support to Uganda informed by an analysis of its impact
on conflict in the country?
C. TOWARDS A
COMPREHENSIVE AND
INCLUSIVE PEACE
4. Over the past two decades, the conflict
between the LRA and the GoU has had devastating consequences for
the Acholi population and, in recent times, has affected communities
living in neighbouring districts and across the border in South
Sudan. A future peace agreement between the two primary actors
in the conflict must address the root causes of the conflict in
a comprehensive manner, as well as responding to the immediate
impact of conflict and the challenges of post-conflict recovery.
In addition, efforts must be made to secure an inclusive peace
that responds to the grievances of those communities who have
been affected by the violence primarily in Acholi but also in
neighbouring districts in Uganda and South Sudan.
5. There is currently no fixed date for
the Juba peace process to produce a peace agreement and no guarantees
that the final agreement will form the basis for a lasting resolution
of the conflict between the LRA and the GoU. The international
community should extend its full support to securing a sustainable
and inclusive peace by supporting all parties to reach an agreement
that addresses the root causes of the conflict.
CREATING AN
ENVIRONMENT FOR
PEACE IN
NORTHERN UGANDA
Security provision
6. In the interim period, the international
community, including the UK Government, can take a number of steps
to build the foundations for a future peace agreement to take
hold. The international community should ensure through dialogue
and development assistance that the GoU can effectively deliver
upon its responsibility to provide security to all its citizens.
Without a foundation of security other efforts to secure peace
and development risk being undermined. Key issues that the international
community should therefore seek to address in this regard include:
the strengthening of civilian security provision by the police
and reduced military intervention; and an effective DDR process
that is consciously linked to efforts to address civilian gun
possession and longer-term small arms control. The international
community should also ensure that insecurity in neighbouring regions
threatening a successful transition to peace, mostly significantly
the Karamoja region, is addressed as part of the post-conflict
recovery process and that these initiatives are placed within
a national development strategy.
7. The international community should support
the GoU to uphold its commitment to make the transition from military
to civilian security provision and should channel assistance to
the restructuring of the Uganda Police Force (UPF). It is imperative
that the GoU and the international community address the immediate
insecurity challenges for communities in the north. However, immediate
responses must not undermine long-term processes of security sector
reform. For example, the recruitment of former militia to the
police force, while strengthening the state's ability to provide
security in the short term, must be carefully monitored to ensure
that it doesn't become a cause of future insecurity and conflict.
A related issue, in this regard, is the sustainability of longer-term
funding through the GoU budget, rather than bilateral assistance,
for increased numbers of security personnel and for their effective
training.
8. Closely linked to the establishment of
more effective, civilian-led security provision by the Uganda
Police Force is the issue of Defence Transformation, and a decreased
role for the military. The objectives outlined in the GoU's White
Paper on Defence Transformation 2004, setting out the steps towards
transformation of the Defence Sector, were welcome commitments.
There are concerns however that progress on the implementation
of these objectives has not been forthcoming. The ongoing peace
talks present a good opportunity for the international community
to push the GoU to begin to implement its own plans on national
defence transformation.
9. The international community should urge
the GoU to continue the Defence Review process and fully implement
the recommendations outlined in the White Paper on Defence Transformation,
offering appropriate assistance where necessary. In addition,
the GoU should be encouraged to disclose expenditure in the Classified
Budget to respond to concerns that budget support is being channelled
into military expenditure.
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
and the control of small arms and light weapons
10. The presence of arms within communities
in the North and in neighbouring regions also presents a significant
challenge to securing peace and development, as the presence of
small arms can feed feelings of fear, insecurity and mi-trust
and speed the resort to violence. Disarmament, Demobilisation
and Reintegration (DDR) programmes for ex-combatants are therefore
a key component of the terms of a future peace agreement and the
process through which to support the transition from conflict
to peace.
11. In a post-conflict context it is crucial,
however, to address weapons possession not just by ex-combatants
but also by civilians and other groups that fall outside of the
formal DDR process. To support the DDR process and to contribute
to overall peace and security, the international community must
ensure that due consideration is given to longer-term small arms
control, including the wider issue of uncontrolled civilian ownership
of small arms, in the North and in neighbouring regions. DDR programmes
should be designed with a clear vision of how they will link to
other immediate and longer term arms control initiatives.
12. Recognition must also be made that arms
possession and misuse are a symptom of deeper root causes of conflict
and insecurity. As such, measures to address these root causes
should accompany technical disarmament and arms management responses.
The international community should, therefore, promote a DDR process
that consciously links with efforts to improve security by the
Uganda Police Force and with broader long-term small arms initiatives,
such as Uganda National Action Plan for Arms Management and Disarmament.
Conflict in Karamoja
13. The international community should support
efforts to bring peace, security and development to districts
across the north of Uganda, including in West Nile and Karamoja.
The current situation in Karamoja, fuelled by many of the same
root causes as the conflict in Acholi, threatens to spill over
into other districts, derailing prospects for peace and recovery
of the North. Insecurity in the Karamoja region, fuelled by a
lack of access to natural resources and exacerbated by the easy
availability of illegal SALW, has led to the death of hundreds
of people and has generated a large numbers of internally displaced
people (IDP) in north-eastern Uganda. The GoU's attempts to forcibly
disarm these communities, the use of excessive force by some members
of the UPDF and lack of effective measures to guarantee security
of pastoralist communities, in the absence of civilian security
structures, has increased tensions between local communities and
the GoU.
14. The international community should support
the GoU to address the underlying causes of the conflict in the
Karamoja, as part of its efforts to promote and secure peace in
the North. In this regard it will be crucial to adopt voluntary,
rather than forcible, approaches to disarmament, as well as to
address the development needs and grievances of the Karamojong
community.
15. Efforts to address security challenges
through DDR, small arms controls and reform of the security sector
need to be linked to the broader development agenda. A key part
of such an approach should include supporting the National Plan
for the Development and Recovery of Northern Uganda (PRDP) that
covers not only the North (Acholi), but also West Nile and Karamoja
regions. Moreover, ensuring that the security and development
efforts that are focused on the North quickly become part of a
national, all-of-Uganda process will be equally important for
the longer-term peace and prosperity of Uganda.
D. DELIVERING
PEACE AND
DEVELOPMENT—MAKING
AID CONFLICT-SENSITIVE
16. The international community can contribute
to peace, recovery and development in the northern Acholi, West
Nile and Karamoja regions by basing all future assistance—humanitarian,
development and transition programmes—upon solid analysis
of the structural causes of conflict and by acknowledging parallels
between the LRA conflict and conflicts in other parts of Uganda.
17. The PRDP (see paragraph 15 above) is
an important first step to address both the consequences of conflict
in the North and the broader, long-term development challenges
that still lie ahead for the region. As such, the PRDP provides
an opportunity for catalysing support to the North and its effective
implementation should be supported. The modalities for this are
yet to be decided, and it appears that the Juba peace talks include
discussion on the extent of involvement of the LRA in managing
this. It is crucial that the PRDP implementation is much more
than a bargaining chip in the peace talks—the GoU continues
to have the primary responsibility for ensuring the recovery and
development of the North, and should therefore maintain ownership
in the effective implementation of the PRDP. The international
community can play an important role in ensuring that this happens.
18. For long-term peace and stability in
the North, however, it is important to remember that the PRDP
is currently envisaged as a three-year intervention. It is therefore
crucial that the momentum created by the PRDP is carried forward
into existing development frameworks such as the Uganda Poverty
Eradication Action Plan (PEAP) and the donor assistance strategy
supporting this, the Uganda Joint Assistance Strategy (UJAS).
Equally, specific aspects of the PRDP will have to be taken forward
in specific sectoral strategies, all of which benefit from active
donor involvement. There is therefore an opportunity for the international
community—in particular the UK Government—to ensure
that gains made through the PRDP process feed into longer-term
development in Uganda through the more `permanent' strategies
and frameworks.
19. As a country that has suffered from
many conflicts in the past, the North is not the only part of
Uganda that has the potential for renewed future conflict. As
one civil society leader put it: "The conflict in the North
can just as easily happen elsewhere in the country." All
future development assistance to Uganda (in the North and elsewhere)
therefore needs to be based on a thorough understanding of the
existing structural causes of conflict, relating to issues such
as marginalisation and perceived (or real) favouritism in the
political system, and the remnants of past conflicts that have
never undergone comprehensive reconciliation processes.
20. Assistance to the North should also
be done in parallel with programmes addressing the needs of other
communities in Uganda (particularly those still recovering from
past conflicts), in order to avoid further tension between the
North and other communities. The UK Government, drawing on its
own experience of conducting conflict analysis, can play a lead
role in ensuring that the international community in Uganda base
their support on joint analysis of these issues. Macro frameworks
such as the PEAP and the UJAS, as well as sector-wide strategies
(e.g. water, health, education), can then be designed and implemented
in a conflict-sensitive way, contributing to addressing the root
causes of conflict and preventing future conflict. A recent Saferworld
report suggests a set of recommendations to the Government, donors
and civil society of ways they can support and help implement
the PEAP (2).
(1) Throughout this briefing we have used
a limited definition of the North to refer to the Acholi region—the
area most directly affected by the LRA conflict. Other northern
areas, such as West Nile and Karamoja, are referred to by name.
(2) Aid and Conflict in Uganda, Saferworld
March 2007
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