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Memorandum submitted by Department for International Development
Contents
1. Summary 2. The particular needs of IDPs in Burma and refugees in Thailand. 3. How different ethnic groups are affected by displacement. 4. The likely trends in the region in terms of displacement, and development and humanitarian needs. 5. The challenges faced in delivering aid and assistance to these groups. 6. How donors can assist IDPs in Burma and refugees in Thailand most effectively. 7. The advantages and disadvantages of cross-border assistance compared to other ways of assisting IDPs in Burma. 8. The impact of DFID's policies towards Burma's IDPs and refugees.
1. Over the last fifty years, conflict and human rights abuses have led to large-scale population displacement inside Burma and of Burmese refugees to neighbouring countries. In addition to these most visible sections of the displaced population, large numbers of civilians have fled their homes as a result of inappropriate Government policies and infrastructure developments, as a result of natural resource extraction, and because of widespread livelihoods insecurity in Burma. 2. The humanitarian situation is of serious concern across the country. Burma is facing a generalised HIV epidemic. More than seven out of ten people live in areas where they are at risk from malaria. 97,000 new tuberculosis cases are detected each year. Multi-drug resistant tuberculosis is found in 4% of new patients and 15.5% of previously treated patients. It is estimated that half of Burmese children do not complete primary school, with significantly higher numbers dropping out in remote and conflict affected areas. In 1997, one in four people in Burma were living below the minimum subsistence level, with the poorest of the poor living mostly in rural areas. Burma's education and public health systems are chronically under-funded. According to a recent assessment by the United Nations Development Programme over one third of the population is below the basic poverty line ($0.34/day at market exchange rate), and 10% is living in extreme poverty (unable to meet basic food needs - $0.25/day at market exchange rate). 3. DFID has developed programmes which are starting to address this poverty. For example, in HIV/AIDS, DFID-funded projects or interventions have helped to achieve: · 48 million condoms distributed in 2005 (four times the total in 2000) · 160,000 people received voluntary and confidential testing in 2005 (only 800 did so in year 2002) · 1.1 million clean needles distributed in 2005 (four times the total in 2003) · The inclusion of injecting drug users, HIV positive people, and commercial sex workers in a participatory process to develop the Government's own HIV national strategy. · The HIV national strategy identified the need to work with injecting drug users, commercial sex workers and men who have sex with men - official recognition of their existence and their vulnerability to HIV.
4. DFID has very recently changed its policy towards IDPs and refugees. In response to criticism that serious consideration was not being given to the legitimacy of cross-border support, we carried out a review to look again at both cross-border and in-country means of supporting IDPs. As a result of our policy we have a balanced allocation of our resources which reflects the placement of other donors' funds and our own comparative advantage in building relationships inside Burma. 5. DFID has increased the ability of community-based groups inside Burma to deliver emergency relief, health and education programmes and a limited protection role for IDPs. Governments tend not to support these organisations because few donors have a presence inside Burma, or they lack the capacity to engage in the regular and detailed engagement inside eastern Burma which is needed. DFID has developed a relationship with community based organisations working inside Burma and last year channelled support to IDPs through them - at the same time providing training to increase their ability to deliver aid. As a result, this year the groups will be able to provide support to a greater number of IDPs. 6. DFID has increased the breadth of the support we provide to IDPs and other conflict-affected people. We have increased the amount of aid available to community-based groups inside Burma (£400,000 in 2007/08) to deliver their emergency relief, health and education programmes. We have also removed a restriction on the use of our funds provided for assistance to refugees (£1.8m over three years) so that they can be used for either cross-border or refugee assistance, as their relative needs and funding dictates. This will mean the continued provision of food, shelter and a range of other necessities to refugee camps on the Thai-Burma border and of emergency relief to a sub-set of the most vulnerable IDPs in hiding in the areas of on-going armed conflict across the border. The protection work carried out by the International Committee of the Red Cross is a further important component to this coverage, and we will continue to lobby the Burmese Authorities hard fully to reopen access for them in eastern Burma. Finally, we continue to ensure that the development programmes DFID funds are responsive to the needs of IDPs. As Three Diseases Funded projects are developed, DFID and our partner donors will work hard to ensure that IDPs suffering from tuberculosis, malaria or HIV/AIDS are able to benefit from international assistance. 7. DFID is helping to ensure greater coordination of international assistance to IDPs. We have been a strong advocate for a process led by the United Nations, including funding a position with explicit aid-coordination objectives in the UN Humanitarian Coordinator's Office in Rangoon. We have tried to ensure that the organisations we fund contribute to the coordination process organised by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. And we have, with the European Commission, led an ongoing process to increase the information-sharing, coordination and complementarity amongst donors. As a result of these initiatives we intend that donors and NGOs will be better able to assess displaced people's needs, and to coordinate their interventions and donor funding to ensure that assistance reaches as many of those needs as possible. The particular needs of IDPs in Burma and refugees in Thailand Internally Displaced People 8. Whilst 'IDP' can serve as a useful descriptor, it conceals a much more complex situation. Perhaps 100,000 people have been forcibly displaced in eastern Burma since 2004; yet according to the most authoritative figures (from the Thailand Burma Border Consortium) there were a total of 500,000 IDPs in eastern Burma in late-2006, in a variety of different situations - including 287,000 people in ceasefire areas, 95,000 in areas directly affected by armed conflict, and 118,000 people in Government-controlled relocation sites. Even these figures do not include the large numbers of people who have achieved sustainable solutions to their plight, especially those living on the margins of urban areas. A recent report by the Back Pack Health Workers Team found that of 2000 IDP households they surveyed, 10% had suffered forced displacement and one third had been subjected at some time to forced labour. Human rights abuses, extreme poverty and a way of life without a sustainable solution are extremely common and should be calculated in the millions. 9. According to the Back Pack Health Workers Team's recent survey (Chronic Emergency: Health and Human Rights in Eastern Burma (September 2006)), mortality rates among IDPs in eastern Burma are the highest in Asia. Infant mortality was found to be 9.1% and child mortality for under-fives was reported as 22.1%. The biggest killer is malaria, which infects 12% of the population. Of the 2000 households surveyed, one third had been subjected at some time to forced labour, and 10% had suffered forced displacement; a quarter of respondents had had food confiscated or destroyed by the Burma Army. Families forced to flee their homelands were reportedly 2.4 times more likely to have a child die, while those who had had their food destroyed were 50% more likely to suffer a death in the household. 10. In response to displacement pressures, IDPs may adopt one or more of the following strategies: i) hide in - or close to - zones of on-going armed conflict and forced relocation, often remaining mobile for years; ii) move to a relocation site if one is provided; iii) move to relatively more secure villages, towns or peri-urban areas, including 'behind the front lines' in war zones, in ceasefire zones, and in Government-controlled locations; iv) seek refuge in a neighbouring country. Often, IDPs are living inter-mixed with communities who are not - or have not recently been - displaced. The broader humanitarian situation across the country also remains of serious concern. 11. IDPs fleeing armed conflict are vulnerable to a range of well-documented violations, including forced labour, looting and the destruction of property, rape, torture and murder. In addition, large numbers of civilians have fled their homes as a result of the expansion of Burma Army bases, natural resource extraction or large-scale development projects (including gas pipeline and dam construction) or inappropriate Government livelihoods policies. These IDPs are vulnerable to land confiscation and destruction of livelihoods, and also face a range of problems during migration, when women and children especially are vulnerable to human trafficking and other abuses. 12. The most acute needs of IDPs are: i) protection from human rights abuses; ii) food and livelihoods security; iii) access to health services, (especially for women and children, and the elderly); iv) access to education; v) access to land, and to labour markets; vi) appropriate land and identity documentation (especially for IDPs in relocation sites, and relatively secure villages and peri-urban areas). Refugees 13. As of the end of December 2006, 151,300 refugees were officially resident in 10 camps (one Shan, four Karenni and five Karen) along the Thai-Burma border, and a further 15,000 live in or near the camps and are unregistered. An additional 20,000 people are located in nine New Mon State Party, Shan State Army and Karen National Union-controlled settlements just across the border. These include Mon refugees who were forcibly repatriated in 1996, following a ceasefire between the Government and the New Mon State Party. 14. Previously, refugees in Thailand could leave their village-like camps quite easily, to forage for supplementary food and building materials, in Thailand and adjacent rebel-held areas of Burma. However, over the last decade, as the amount of insurgent-controlled territory in Burma has declined, the camps have become much larger in size, and more tightly controlled by the Thai authorities. Today, the refugees are largely dependant on international humanitarian aid. 15. With the exception of the 20,000 or so people living in IDP/'refugee' camps across the border, the basic needs of the refugees are being met by the international NGOs on the Thai-Burma border. But these NGOs are officially prevented from supporting newly arrived - and thus non-registered - refugees, the number of whom may increase, as opportunities for third country resettlement increase. Refugees also often find it very difficult to access economic and social opportunities. 16. Sexual abuse and rape, in the context of domestic abuse, and perpetrated by Thai soldiers and villagers remain primary protection concerns in the refugee camps. How different ethnic groups are affected by displacement 17. Different ethic groups are affected by different forms of displacement. Displacement in and from Burma is not only caused by armed conflict in the east of the country. While the most acutely vulnerable IDPs do live in those few areas of Burma still affected by significant levels of armed conflict, patterns of forced migration are more complex and widespread - the product of decades of mis-governance by the militarized state. Three inter-linked types of forced migration in Burma can be identified, and tend to affect the following ethnic groups: · Displacement caused by armed conflict: either as a direct consequence of fighting and counter-insurgency operations (The Burma Army's 'Four Cuts' campaign), or because armed conflict has directly undermined human and food security. Displacement of this sort is often linked to severe human rights abuses. It most affects Karen people across Karen State and in eastern Tenasserim Division, Mon people in southern Mon State, Karenni people in southern and eastern Karenni State, Shan people in southern Shan State, and Chin people in parts of Chin State[1] and Chin and Naga Sagaing Division[2]. Armed conflict-induced displacement also affects Rakhine people in some isolated parts of Arakan State[3].
· Displacement caused by military occupation and/or 'development' activities: due to land confiscation by the Burma Army or other armed groups, including in the context of natural resource extraction (e.g. logging and mining); displacement due to small- and large-scale infrastructure construction (e.g. roads, bridges, airports); also forced migration as a product of forced labour and other abuses. This form of displacement is related to the use of force, but does not occur in the context of outright armed conflict. Although no quantitative data is available, all of the ethnic minorities (Karen, Karenni, Mon, Shan) living in the border states and divisions are affected by militarization- and/or 'development'-induced displacement and Kachin people in Kachin States, as well as a number of urban areas. In Northern Rakhine State there are 725,000 Rohinga Sunni Muslims in a stateless-like situation. Of these, 234,000 took refuge in Bangladesh in 1991/92 and have subsequently returned to Burma. One by-product of opium eradication in Wa ceasefire areas has been the forcible relocation of between 50-125,000 Wa villagers since 1999, from opium growing areas in northern Wa, to the United Wa State Army's Southern Command area on the Thailand border. Thousands of local Shan, Lahu and Akha villagers were forcibly displaced by the new arrivals.
· Displacement caused by loss of livelihood: this is the primary form of internal and external migration in and from Burma. The main causes are Government policies and practices which impact disproportionately against the poor (such as the requirement that farmers follow an ill-advised and strictly pre-determined crop cycle), limited availability of productive land, and poor access to markets, resulting in food insecurity; lack of education and health services. Livelihoods vulnerability-induced displacement occurs across the country, including of Bamar people in the central dry zone, and especially in and from remote townships.
The likely trends in the region in terms of displacement, and development and humanitarian needs 18. Since the 2004 (provisional) Karen National Union ceasefire, large numbers of IDPs in central and southern Karen areas have begun to return from hiding places in the jungle (and from relocation sites, and some refugee camps in Thailand), to build more permanent houses and grow crops. Especially in central Karen State, many IDPs have moved from ceasefire zones into relatively more secure villages and peri-urban areas, influenced by both the Government and armed groups. 19. While the provisional truce seems to be holding in most of southern and central Karen State and Tenasserim Division, since late 2005 the Burma Army has launched attacks against Karen National Union positions and Karen villages in northern Karen areas, where insurgent commanders have always opposed the ceasefire. Between February-September 2006, some 15-20,000 people were displaced in Toungoo and northern Nyaunglebin Districts, and parts of Papun District. In addition, since April, dozens of villages have been forcibly relocated to new settlements in areas more firmly under Government control. 20. These disturbing developments notwithstanding, since the provisional Karen National Union ceasefire, the situation in other Karen areas has begun to stabilize. In parts of Tenasserim Division, and across much of central and southern Karen State, there has been little fighting for two years. 21. As a result, both seasonal and permanent migration is on the increase in Burma. The type of periphery-centre population movement described here often increases following the agreement of ceasefires. During periods of armed conflict, travel in rural areas is usually difficult and dangerous, and control over civilian populations is a priority for combatants on all sides. Following the cessation of hostilities, civilians often exploit the new movement opportunities brought about by relative peace. 22. Chin State and Sagaing Division, however, are likely to see renewed conflict and displacement, as the Burma and Indian Armies cooperate to 'flush out' insurgent groups operating along their common borders. 23. Overall we are not likely to see a significant change in the numbers of IDPs in Burma. The total numbers of IDPs in Eastern Burma, as defined by TBBC, decreased slightly over the past three years. Table Showing TBBC Population Estimates for IDPs in Eastern Burma
Refugees
24. Since late 2005, the Royal Thai Government has reversed long-standing policies, to allow international organisations to work with refugee communities to expand education (including vocational) services, and income generation schemes. These welcome developments may result in refugees gaining legal access to parts of the Thai labor market, and possibly some form of official identification card. These may eventually lead to some options for sustainable local integration. 25. Following various delays, the next few months will see substantial numbers of Karen and Karenni refugees achieving the 'sustainable solution' of resettlement to third countries. Many of those registered for re-settlement are teachers, medics, administrators, and others from elite sectors of the refugee community. Although probably no more than 15,000 will depart by the end of next year, Ellen Sauerbrey, US Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees and Migration was quoted at the end of August as saying that "there will be no cap (for the resettlement of Karen refugees)" to the United States. Development and humanitarian needs 26. There is little reliable verifiable data on poverty and vulnerability in Burma. However, there is undoubtedly widespread poverty and vulnerability throughout Burma and especially in remote and conflict-affected areas. And this situation is likely to continue. Burma is almost certainly not on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goals. In 1997, one in four people in Burma were living below the minimum subsistence level, with the poorest of the poor living mostly in rural areas. A 1997 Government survey found that 70% of household expenditure was on food, an indicator of the vulnerability of poor people in the country. Burma's education and public health systems remain chronically under-funded. The country is facing a generalised HIV Epidemic. More than seven out of ten people live in areas where they are at risk from malaria. 97,000 new tuberculosis cases are detected each year. Multi-drug resistant tuberculosis is found in 4% of new patients and 15.5% of previously treated patients. It is estimated that half of Burmese children do not complete primary school, with significantly higher numbers dropping out in remote and conflict affected areas. 27. The absence of reliable comprehensive data makes it extremely difficult to draw solid judgements about vulnerability in Burma. However it seems likely that poverty may be particularly severe in the remaining areas of Eastern Burma affected by armed conflict; in Chin and Rakhine States and possibly in parts of the central dry zone; and in high-risk groups scattered around the country (such as people in hiding in conflict zones (100,000 people), people living with HIV (300,000 to 600,000 people), injecting drug users (over 60,000 people), commercial sex workers (over 40,000 people), migrant workers, and orphans and street children) who face high levels of vulnerability to a complex range of risk factors (including HIV infection, malaria, forced labour, and police/other brutality). Scaling up efforts to reach all of these groups remains a huge challenge for the international community. 28. DFID has developed programmes which are starting to address this poverty. For example, in HIV/AIDS, DFID-funded projects or interventions have helped to achieve: · 48 million condoms distributed in 2005 (four times the total in 2000) · 160,000 people received voluntary and confidential testing in 2005 (only 800 did so in year 2002) · 1.1 million clean needles distributed in 2005 (four times the total in 2003) · The inclusion of injecting drug users, HIV positive people, and commercial sex workers in a participatory process to develop the Government's own HIV national strategy. · The HIV national strategy identified the need to work with injecting drug users, commercial sex workers and men who have sex with men - official recognition of their existence and their vulnerability to HIV.
The challenges faced in delivering aid and assistance to these groups and the advantages and disadvantages of cross-border assistance compared to other ways of assisting IDPs in Burma Remoteness 29. These groups of people are living in some of the most remote areas of Burma, usually mountainous and heavily forested and with extremely poor transport and communications infrastructure. All of these factors make frequent engagement and communication with IDPs difficult. Security 30. Armed conflict continues in eastern Burma as rebel groups sustain their independence struggle against the Burmese Army. This is especially heavy in Karen State, Karenni State and Southern Shan State. But sporadic fighting and banditry also occurs in Mon State, Tenasserim Division and Eastern Bago Division. Many of the areas are land-mined by both sides; and there are quite frequent reports of serious human rights abuses by the Burmese Army. These factors make it extremely difficult to travel to the areas in which the most vulnerable IDPs are currently based. Restrictions on Access 31. The Burmese Authorities have placed restrictions on access to many of the conflict-affected areas. At times, some international organisations have been able to get access - for example, the International committee of the Red Cross, and Medecins Sans Frontiers (Switzerland) - but this is patchy, sporadic and difficult to achieve from within Burma. It is easier for Burmese NGOs to gain access, through their own networks, to some of these areas. 32. From Thailand, the Karen National Union controls access to the areas it holds, with the Karen National Liberation Army providing security for cross-border groups. Their access into Burma remains illegal, as the Royal Thai Government does not condone crossing the border into Burma. 33. Because of the dependence of the cross-border teams on the Karen and other armed groups for security, these groups are essentially limited in their access to areas in which rebel armed groups can escort them. For example, cross-border groups associated with the Karen National Union are not able to access IDP communities in areas controlled by other Karen ceasefire groups - for example the Democratic Karen Buddhist Army (DKBA). 34. Groups working cross-border from Thailand vary in capacity and scope of programmes. In general they have access to a sub-set of the most needy IDPs in hiding in the zones of on-going armed conflict (approximately 70% of the resources from the main cross-border provider benefit these groups) and to some IDPs in 'mixed administration areas' (approximately 20% of resources), with more limited levels reaching relocation sites and ceasefire areas. They also provide aid to other vulnerable groups in conflict zones, who may not be IDPs as such. This mostly takes the form of short-term emergency relief (food and medicines), plus a little education and community development. Cross-border groups engage in a range of human rights documentation and advocacy activities, but can do little to protect IDPs in the war zones. 35. Local civil society networks 'inside' Burma have extensive access to people displaced into or within Government-controlled areas, and also to many people in relocation sites and ceasefire areas. They have much less access to IDPs in zones of on-going armed conflict, although some aid is provided to IDPs in 'mixed administration areas' and to those in hiding on an opportunistic basis. Assistance takes the form of community rehabilitation and development activities, plus some emergency relief. Ethnic nationality civil society networks also undertake some important, low-profile protection activities - although they are unable to take part in public advocacy. Humanitarian Principles 36. Those delivering aid to IDPs in Burma face the need to strike a compromise between the need to provide emergency humanitarian support with respect for the principles of humanitarian assistance: independence, impartiality and neutrality. 37. Independence: international NGOs working inside Burma face pressure to confirm to a set of Guidelines for UN Agencies, International Organisations and NGO/international NGOs, produced by the Burmese Authorities in February 2006. Some of the guidelines are not being applied - for example, the Burmese Authorities are not attempting to restrict the UN and international NGOs to choosing new Burmese staff from the Authorities' list of approved candidates. But other guidelines are being implemented in a piece-meal manner - for example, State-Divisional and Township Coordinating Committees are sometimes pushing for a supervisory role over development projects - and these have the potential to compromise the independence of NGOs in Burma. The International Committee of the Red Cross has a very clear mandate which demands its independence. They currently face difficulties in obtaining access because, consistent with this mandate, they refuse to travel with a Government or Government-Organised NGO escort. Community-based groups inside Burma, because they operate through widely distributed faith-based networks are also able to maintain an independence. Cross-border groups are much less so - there is a mutual reliance with the armed groups who escort them into conflict areas. 38. Impartiality: there is no evidence to suggest that in-country or cross-border groups are anything other than impartial in the targeting and provision of aid according to need in the areas that they can access. The great majority of assistance seems to reach its intended beneficiaries. 39. Neutrality: Cross-border groups are closely associated with the armed opposition on which they rely for security and logistical arrangements. Indeed, most cross-border personnel are members (or affiliates) of insurgent organisations. As a result, cross-border groups are not neutral in the conflict (they adopt various positions of solidarity with oppressed villagers, and support for opposition forces). The community-based groups operating inside the country utilise religious networks which are neutral. Limited Capacity 40. Of the mechanisms for delivering support, International organisations have the greatest capacity - highly skilled staff with experience of conflict and displacement internationally from which to draw. Groups working cross-border have been able to draw on international support and experience for capacity-building support over the past few years - for example to strengthen their planning and monitoring systems. The groups working inside the country have had much less opportunity for capacity-building and because of the sensitivity of their work often maintain a low profile and so have limited access to international interlocutors. So whist they have strong networks and some organisational capacity, these groups often have limited experience of working on humanitarian/development issues and limited financial management and reporting mechanisms. Coordination 41. There is currently no systematic means to analyse the humanitarian situation and set out a comprehensive statement of needs. The other challenges described above make reliable data collection extremely difficult, and no single organisation has the comprehensive access which would facilitate it. The Burmese Authorities are not in a position to lead or coordinate interventions or donor funding as other governments would; and no other organization has been filling that role. 42. This situation is made worse by the fact that local NGOs inside Burma, even through they want to increase coordination, are very careful about to whom they will describe their activities - for fear that the Burmese Authorities will learn of the projects and close them down. This also means that organisations working 'inside' Burma cannot afford to be as bold in their advocacy roles as those in Thailand and overseas - as a result, a lack of funding is a major problem for groups supporting IDPs from inside Burma. Humanitarian/protection/development balance 43. In a constrained working environment such as Burma, it is easier for international organisations to focus on service delivery and relief activities, than on more politically challenging issues, such as protection. Therefore, one of the greatest challenges facing international organisations in Burma is how to achieve a balance between emergency relief, more sustainable assistance, whilst also maintaining pressure on protection issues - the organisations providing assistance to IDPs each tend to be more effective at different aspects of this balance. How donors can assist IDPs in Burma and refugees in Thailand most effectively.
44. The aim of the international community must be to ensure that i) emergency assistance reaches all those who are in the greatest need; ii) that protection is provided from human rights abuses; and iii) that longer-term development assistance is provided to all those who live in unsustainable situations as a result of conflict. 45. To those ends donors have a choice of mechanisms to support. They could look to support refugees in Thailand through the international organisations working on the Thai-Burma border - including the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, the International Rescue Committee and the Thailand Burma Border Consortium.
46. Donors can support the provision of emergency assistance to a sub-set of the most vulnerable IDPs in hiding in the areas of on-going armed conflict from across the border.
47. Donors can fund protection work by international organisations inside Burma, such as that by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC).
48. Or donors can use in-country community-based groups to deliver emergency relief, as well as some health and education programmes, and a limited protection role.
49. Very few international organisations operating inside Burma have programmes specifically targeted at IDPs. In part, this is due to the sensitivity of the issue, especially in the current political and humanitarian environment; in part, it reflects the fact that a very large number of conflict-affected people in Burma have been displaced at some point, so it is often very difficult to distinguish IDPs from other vulnerable people. Donors can therefore also try to ensure that their development programmes are responsive to the needs of IDPs and other conflict-affected people. For example, International Development Enterprise's sale of foot-pumps to poor farmers and the United Nations Development Programme's Human Development Initiative,
50. None of these means alone can deliver sufficient support to displaced people. They are complementary in the types and locations of the IDPs or refugees they support. As a result, the international community needs to ensure that the full range of mechanisms is supported. No individual donor is likely to be able to engage sufficiently effectively to support them all, so it will be important for donors to take account of the programmes of other donors in order to ensure greatest overall coverage. It is likely also that donors will have a comparative advantage in supporting one mechanism over another - and this should also be taken into account within the context of overall international effort. A mechanism for systematic comprehensive donor coordination does not exist, so a key responsibility of donors will be to contribute to the sharing of information between donors and implementers working inside Burma and cross-border - on levels of need, access, funding and projects. The impact of DFID's policies towards Burma's IDPs and refugees 51. DFID has very recently changed its policy towards IDPs and refugees. In response to criticism that serious consideration was not being given to the legitimacy of cross-border support, we carried out a review to look again at both cross-border and in-country means of supporting IDPs. As a result of our policy we have a balanced allocation of our resources which reflects the placement of other donors' funds and our own comparative advantage in building relationships inside Burma. 52. DFID has increased the ability of community-based groups inside Burma to deliver emergency relief, health and education programmes and a limited protection role for IDPs. Governments tend not to support these organisations because few donors have a presence inside Burma, and therefore lack the necessary capacity for the regular and detailed engagement inside Burma. Over the last three years DFID has developed relationships with community based networks inside Burma and last year provided support to IDPs through them, at the same time providing training to increase their ability to deliver aid. As a result, this year the networks will be better placed to provide support to a greater number of IDPs. 53. DFID has increased the breadth of the support we provide to IDPs and other conflict-affected people. We have increased the amount of aid available to community-based groups inside Burma (£400,000 in 2007/08) to deliver their emergency relief, health and education programmes and a limited protection role for IDPs in eastern Burma. We have also removed a restriction on the use of our funds provided for assistance to refugees (£1.8m over three years) so that they can be used for either cross-border or refugee assistance, as their relative needs and funding dictates. This will mean the continued provision of food, shelter and a range of other necessities to refugee camps on the Thai-Burma border and of emergency relief to a sub-set of the most vulnerable IDPs in hiding in the areas of on-going armed conflict across the border.The protection work carried out by the International Committee of the Red Cross is a further important component to this coverage, and we will continue to lobby the Burmese Authorities hard fully to reopen access for them in eastern Burma. Finally, we continue to ensure that the development programmes DFID funds are responsive to the needs of IDPs - this includes not just International Development Enterprises' foot-pumps and the UN Development Programme's Human Development Project (described in earlier case-studies) but also Save the Children's provision of early childhood education, WHO's vaccine-preventable disease surveillance and other projects. As Three Diseases Funded projects are developed, DFID and our partner donors will work hard to ensure that IDPs suffering from tuberculosis, malaria or HIV/AIDS are able to benefit from international assistance. 54. DFID is helping to ensure greater coordination of international assistance to IDPs. We have been a strong advocate for a process led by the United Nations, including funding a position with explicit aid-coordination objectives in the UN Humanitarian Coordinator's Office in Rangoon. We have tried to ensure that the organisations we fund contribute to the coordination process organised by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. And we have, with the European Commission, led an ongoing process to increase the information-sharing, coordination and complementarity amongst donors. As a result of these initiatives we intend that donors and NGOs will be better able to assess displaced people's needs, and to coordinate their interventions and donor funding to ensure that assistance reaches as many of those needs as possible.
[1] The Chin National Front insurgent group estimates that, since 1988, 40-50,000 people have been displaced by armed conflict in Chin State, many of whom have since fled to Mizoram State, India. There are small numbers of Type 1 IDPs in thinly-populated areas of Chin State, near the borders with India and Bangladesh, where Rohingya, Arakanese and Chin armed groups are active. [2] Naga armed groups operate on both sides of the India-Burma border. Increased counter-insurgent cooperation between the Burma and India armies since 2003 has displaced unknown numbers of people. [3] Unverifiable local sources estimate that approximately 80,000 IDPs are living in temporary settlements in the jungles and mountainous areas of Arakan State, as a result of low-level armed conflict between Arakanese insurgents and the Burma Army, with associated human rights abuses (including rape and murder). Also, relocated Burman and Rakhine communities live in 49 'new villages' in Northern Rakine State, to which they were forcibly relocated by the Government, as part of a scheme to re-model the demographics of northern Arakan. Relocated families were provided with 'start-up kits', including small parcels of land, shelter and farming tools, and some means of livelihood support (e.g. trishaws or tractors). In many instances, the initial capital investments never materialized, or were insufficient to allow families to engage in productive activities. |