Select Committee on Public Accounts Fifth Report


2  The implementation of the new quality of service regime for Royal Mail

15. In implementing the performance measurement regime, Postcomm is seeking to balance two factors. On the one hand, it needs to impose strong incentives on Royal Mail to improve its performance. On the other hand, it must seek to run a proportionate regulatory regime, which does not overburden Royal Mail in either administrative or in financial terms.

Tackling poor performance

16. This Committee last examined the role of Postcomm in Spring 2002 and reported that Royal Mail's quality of service level was poor.[22] Recent figures indicate that performance has improved since 2002. Postcomm, who design the performance regime and implement the financial incentives, has played some part in that achievement.

17. Nevertheless, Royal Mail has consistently failed to meet several of its targets. The main failures concern targets measuring postcode area performance. Royal Mail should deliver by the next day 91.5% of all first class mail between postcode areas and 92.5% of first class mail within postcode areas. Royal Mail has missed this target every year since the quality of service regime was introduced.[23]

18. There are certain postcode areas within the UK which have consistently received lower levels of service than the rest of the country. Even while experiencing absolute improvements, some mail centres for the same postcode areas have appeared in the bottom 20 performing mail centres year on year. Parts of London, in particular, have suffered relatively poor service in recent years. [24]

19. In April 2006, Postcomm published the results of its investigation into poor performance by Royal Mail in seven postcode areas. Postcomm concluded that in three areas of London - East, South East and West Central - Royal Mail had not used "all reasonable endeavours" to prevent more than 2 million letters arriving late and imposed a fine of £271,000. Although Postcomm investigated individual incidents of absolute failures of performance by Royal Mail, it has not examined why certain postcode areas consistently receive lower levels of service relative to other postcode areas.

20. For Postcomm to set appropriate targets it needs to know what consumers are willing to pay for a higher level of service and the costs to Royal Mail of making changes to service levels.[25] This analysis was not available to Postcomm at the time it designed the new performance regime. So when setting targets, it had to rely on Royal Mail's assessment of what it could achieve.[26]

21. The National Audit Office survey showed that some groups of consumers such as those living in rural or suburban areas believed the value for money offered by Royal Mail to be lower than for other groups such as those living in urban areas.[27] Postcomm has no information on whether certain groups actually experience worse value for money for services than others or why perceptions or experiences of value for money may be different for different groups of consumers.[28] To fulfil its duty of protecting consumers, including vulnerable consumers, Postcomm needs access to more detailed information on the quality of service provided by Royal Mail to different sub-groups of consumers so that it can ensure inequalities of service are being addressed.

Better Regulation

22. A regulatory regime should be consistent, proportionate and transparent. There are elements of Postcomm's investigations into Royal Mail's performance and subsequent fines which are burdensome, both for Royal Mail and for Postcomm itself.

23. Postcomm has a process for its investigations and imposition of financial penalties, including timeframes in which decisions must be made in order for a penalty to be valid.[29] The investigation must assess whether Royal Mail has made "all reasonable endeavours" to meet its targets—a difficult test. Postcomm's investigations can therefore be both administratively burdensome and lengthy.[30] Its investigation into Royal Mail's failure to meet any of its targets in 2003-04 took over a year to complete, which was more than the legal limit, and Postcomm could not have imposed a fine even if it felt that was justified.[31]

24. Postcomm has not yet developed clear, transparent criteria to guide its investigations —for example, when it should launch an investigation. At present there is no link between the array of financial incentives on Royal Mail and investigations[32] making it difficult for Postcomm to balance the need to provide incentives with minimising the burden it imposes.

25. Postcomm's imposition of fines has lacked clarity and consistency. For example, the penalty on Royal Mail for lost mail in 2005-06 was £9.62 million.[33] This level of fine is arrived at through a series of complex calculations which are not accessible to the vast majority of consumers.[34] Postcomm needs to ensure it achieves the correct balance between financial incentives and penalties which are proportionate and meaningful.


22   Q 128 Back

23   C&AG's Report, Figure 2 Back

24   C&AG's Report, Figure 18 Back

25   Q 147 Back

26   Q 174 Back

27   C&AG's Report, Appendix 2 Back

28   Qq 6-7 Back

29   C&AG's Report, Figure 15 Back

30   Q 15 Back

31   C&AG's Report, para 2.27 Back

32   Q 153 Back

33   Reduced from an initial fine of £11.38 million (Postcomm press release: Postcomm confirms penalty on Royal Mail for failing to protect mail, Postcomm website) Back

34   Q17 Back


 
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Prepared 12 December 2006