3 The expected benefits of the joint
venture
15. At the outset, the proposals for the joint venture
included a service level agreement that put an obligation on the
Information Centre to procure approximately £600,000 of services
from the joint venture.[44]
The service agreement contained performance indicators and was
one of the ways the joint venture was expected to demonstrate
value for money.[45]
The service agreement was removed from the deal following an Information
Centre review which had highlighted that the joint venture was
providing services to the NHS rather than the Information Centre.[46]
This review was done at the same time that the National Audit
Office questioned the need to comply with EU procurement law and
the legality of the service level agreement.[47]
16. In writing to the Information Centre in November
2005, the National Audit Office stated that whilst the removal
of the service level agreement reduced the risk of procurement
law being breached, it left open the question of what was being
purchased, as no services were to be delivered to the Information
Centre by the joint venture.[48]
In the absence of a clear definition at the outset of what the
Information Centre would receive for its investment, the Information
Centre is restricted to being simply an arm's length partner or
investor. In addition, the Information Centre will need to procure
by tender any services that the joint venture might supply. The
Information Centre therefore does not receive any measurable benefits
from its association with Dr Foster Intelligence, other than a
share in future profits and the potential future value of the
company at the end of the joint venture agreement.[49]
17. The Department believes that the joint venture
will deliver benefits to patients and the NHS through the better
use of information in policy development, service delivery, management
of NHS services and patient choice.[50]
Whilst there were no explicit performance measures included at
the outset, following completion of the deal the Information Centre
and Dr Foster agreed some performance indicators which are reported
on a monthly basis. Whilst these benefits may be measurable over
time, there is no baseline against which they can be measured.[51]
These indicators also do not link effectively to the objectives
of the Information Centre and do not demonstrate the benefits
of the joint venture over and above what the company Dr Foster
Ltd could have delivered without the public sector intervention.
18. The future value of the joint venture company
is largely unpredictable, but the business case for the deal estimated
that sales of the joint venture would grow by over 1000% over
three years.[52] These
projections were subsequently lowered as they were considered
to be ambitious. For example, the projected sales for Dr Foster
Intelligence were lowered by 24% between the valuation carried
out in August 2005 and the business plan produced in early 2006.[53]
In the first year of trading it was predicted that the joint venture
would make a small profit, yet audited figures show that in practice
it has made a £2.8 million loss.[54]
19. By entering into the joint venture the Information
Centre has made a commitment to "generally use its endeavours
to promote business and the interests of Dr Foster Intelligence
and its subsidiary undertaking" and to "use Dr Foster
Intelligence as the principal vehicle and channel for NHS market
research and knowledge".[55]
This commitment does not, however, supersede its obligation to
comply at all times with procurement law. The Information Centre
told us that Dr Foster Intelligence will not have any privileged
access to the information it collects and stated that it has relationships
with a wide range of organisations.[56]
Despite this assurance there remains a real risk that the joint
venture may result in a less competitive health informatics market
by virtue of the fact that Dr Foster Intelligence's close connections
with the Information Centre give it an advantage.[57]
20. Joint venture companies are usually established
because the parties have complementary objectives: each has a
contribution to make to the delivery of a successful business
or venture, which they would be unable to achieve independently.
For a joint venture to work effectively there needs to be some
kind of contribution from both sides; greater than just an investment
of working capital.[58]
The Office of Government Commerce's internal peer review of the
joint venture found that the Information Centre lacked the skills
to be an equal partner with Dr Foster LLP. On the basis of the
findings of the peer review, the Information Centre took more
time over the negotiations and put additional resources into building
the Information Centre's skills.[59]
21. A joint venture normally expects the parties
involved to share the risks in relation to the shareholding whilst
trying to achieve their own organisational objectives.[60]
Under the initial exit arrangements for the joint venture neither
Dr Foster LLP nor the Information Centre can sell their share
within the first three years without mutual consent.[61]
Any time after January 2009, however, Dr Foster LLP has a put
option which requires the Information Centre to buy out its share
at market value if it wishes to exit the deal and a buyer cannot
be found. This option is not reciprocal,[62]
so the risks are greater for the Information Centre.[63]
The Department was content with this arrangement because it wanted
to retain control in the longer term, and the joint venture represents
a substantial part of Dr Foster's business but is only a fractional
risk on its side.[64]
44 C&AG's Report, para 1.37 Back
45
Q 112 Back
46
Q 113 Back
47
C&AG's Report, para 1.40 Back
48
C&AG's Report, appendix two Back
49
Q 114; C&AG's Report, para 1.47 Back
50
Qq 16, 115 Back
51
Q 116; C&AG's Report, summary para 24 Back
52
Q 65 Back
53
Q 150 and note to Q 78 Back
54
Note to Q 94 Back
55
Qq 127-132 Back
56
Qq 124-125 Back
57
C&AG's Report, para 1.59 Back
58
A Guidance Note for Public Sector Bodies forming Joint Venture
Companies with the Private Sector, HM Treasury Guidance prepared
by Partnerships UK, December 2001 Back
59
Q 111 Back
60
C&AG's Report, para 1.12 Back
61
Q 35 Back
62
Qq 165-167 Back
63
Q 71 Back
64
Q 36 Back
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