CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1. The Assets Recovery Agency successfully
established new powers of civil recovery set out in the Proceeds
of Crime Act 2002 to recover assets that are the proceeds of crime,
even where the owner of those assets has not been convicted of
a criminal offence.
It has tested the law through pursuing cases in the Courts, and
laid the foundations for the Serious Organised Crime Agency to
make effective use of these powers in the future.
2. The Agency has recovered only £23
million against expenditure of £65 million, and missed its
target to be self-financing by 2005-06.
Whilst its approach has been to investigate cases and pursue them
through the courts to test the new legislation, the Agency's largest
recovery accounting for half of the £23 million was obtained
through negotiation and settlement. As powers are transferred
to it, the Serious Organised Crime Agency should:
- maintain separate records for expenditure on,
and receipts arising from civil recovery, taxation and criminal
confiscation cases within the records of the Serious Organised
Crime Agency, to enable future assessment of the effectiveness
of the use of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002; and
- actively consider the cost: benefit ratios of
pursuing recovery through the courts compared with arriving at
a negotiated settlement having regard to the net cash benefit
to the Exchequer and the public interest.
3. Management information systems do not include
a comprehensive database of cases referred to and being handled
by the Agency, nor a time recording
system for staff. The cost of pursuing individual cases and
the productivity of staff cannot therefore be easily assessed
by management, hindering effective decision making on, for example,
the prioritisation of cases and the most effective deployment
of staff resources. The Agency and Serious Organised Crime Agency
should implement management information systems to provide reliable
and easily accessible information on total caseload activity,
prioritisation of work, cost of handling cases, productivity of
staff and monitoring of case progression.
4. 90% of the Agency's accredited Financial
Investigators had not completed all the Continuing Professional
Development activities required to maintain accreditation, whilst
almost 30% of those initially trained by the Agency were not actively
working as Financial Investigators. Nearly
70% of Financial Investigators come from police forces where the
Agency funds the training yet has no ability to influence which
staff are put forward for training or how they are deployed subsequently.
The Agency and National Policing Improvement Agency should:
- set up a complete database of the names of Financial
Investigators trained by it and who need to complete Continuing
Professional Development activities to retain their accreditation;
and
- consider charging for all Financial Investigator
training to incentivise bodies putting forward staff to identify
only those who they intend to deploy appropriately in such activities.
5. Work has been hindered by high staff turnover
including the loss of half the Agency's legal staff in a twelve
month period. This situation partly reflects
the decision to locate the Agency's Head Office in central London
and an over reliance on staff seconded temporarily from other
organisations or employed on temporary contracts. The Agency should
consider whether the location of its activities is cost effective.
6. Less than 20% of the approximately 700
bodies which can refer cases for investigation to the Agency have
actually done so. The Agency and Serious
Organised Crime Agency should promote the powers provided by the
Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 with referral parties, and put in place
relationship management arrangements to facilitate referrals and
monitoring of performance.
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