Examination of Witnesses (Questions 80-99)
MINISTRY OF
DEFENCE
13 MARCH 2006
Q80 Chairman: Mr Davidson mentioned
civilian casualties. There was a PAC recommendation, which is
mentioned on page 17 of this Report "The Department needs
to provide a clearer account than it has done so far of the steps
it is taking to reduce the risk of civilian casualties and when
these measures will be in place". What have you done since
we have had our report?
Mr Jeffrey: We have certainly
published the statement of policy which is described in box six
in the report itself.
Q81 Chairman: Statements of policy
are good as far as they go, but what have you done to reduce the
risk of civilian casualties in a future war?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: There
is now a better focus than ever before on the issue of engagement
criteria, rules of engagement which clearly stipulate when individuals
may use their weapons. There is greater focus in the training
on the circumstances around that, there is greater focus on providing
them with a clearer situational awareness so that they know what
is around and a huge amount of effort has gone into making sure
that in all cases we are attacking the right targets and minimising
any form of collateral damage, particularly to people.
Q82 Chairman: Is there any difference
in our approach to that of the Americans?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: We each
operate by a set of Rules of Engagement. Those Rules of Engagement
are nationally decided upon, but the training is certainly harmonised
so each other knows what training goes on with each side to make
sure that we are getting the best out of it. That is why we do
joint exercises all the time.
Q83 Chairman: Would it be unfair
to say that Americans are more casual than we are about civilian
casualties or collateral damage, as you put it?
Mr Jeffrey: I believe our sense
is that it would be unfair in the sense that—
Q84 Chairman: It would be unfair?
Mr Jeffrey: That is my belief.
Q85 Chairman: So the report of the
retired trooper from the Special Air Service, who was all over
the Sunday Telegraph this week, that he was not prepared
to stay in the army because of the way that the Americans treated
civilians in Iraq, was wrong, was it?
Mr Jeffrey: What I was about to
say was that everything I have heard would suggest that the Americans
take this issue very seriously, as we do.
Q86 Chairman: As seriously as we
do?
Mr Jeffrey: Yes.
Q87 Chairman: So all this Report
about us being much more careful and all this stuff about wearing
the berets rather than helmets and all that is nonsense, is it?
Mr Jeffrey: I repeat that our
contacts with the Americans lead us to conclude that they take
these matters seriously, just as we do.
Q88 Mr Davidson: May I just ask the
National Audit Office whether they could have a look at the paper
that we are going to get from our visitors about the Boards of
Inquiry and particularly have a look at the question of whether
or not there are either undue delays in the process of producing
the report or in then making the report public and whether or
not the reports that are produced are unnecessarily restricted
in some way? I accept that it will be necessary in some circumstances
not to reveal various things, but I just want to clarify whether
or not they are being as open as they might in all circumstances.
May I just ask the Air Vice Marshal, in terms of working with
our allies, whether there is a league table of allies to be avoided,
as it were? Do we rate our allies in some way in terms of those
which are quite reliable and are up to the same standards in terms
of blue-on-blue incidents and those of whom we ought to be much
more wary? Presumably the Armed Forces of the various allies we
have are at different levels. How does the training which is provided
to our own forces, which you accurately indicated put restraints
upon them, train them to protect themselves perhaps against less
restrained allies we might find ourselves with?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: There
is certainly no question of having any sort of league table in
that way. We make sure that before any operations those allies
who are involved are aware of each other's tactics and each other's
rules as pertain to making sure that they minimise the chances
of any form of blue-on-blue engagement. As I have indicated, that
almost becomes an issue at the boundaries and I do not suppose
that there is any way I could sit here and say we shall never
get problems at those boundaries. They are the difficult area,
but we try, by agreeing procedures and agreeing the minimum RoE,
to ensure that is minimised.
Q89 Mr Mitchell: As far as I remember,
this was also a problem in the first Gulf War in the sense that
there were at least two highly publicised incidents where British
troops were gunned down by American planes. What statistics do
you have on that and the relative rate of injuries the Americans
inflicted on British or British inflicted on Americans?
Mr Jeffrey: There were some casualties
and indeed fatalities in the first Gulf War. I do not have the
figures immediately to hand. Do you?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: We had
nine British servicemen killed by fratricide engagements during
the first Gulf War and six in Operation TELIC. There were incidents
of course; they were not the same, although they were in similar
circumstances. Given the incredible number of people involved
and the actions which were going on and the lack of any real technology
to address it in the first Gulf War, the ones which happened in
TELIC were of a nature that would be fundamentally down to human
nature and not necessarily down to pure technology.
Q90 Mr Mitchell: Some of them were
due to failure to recognise, were they not, electronic recognition?
What steps were taken after the first Gulf War to improve the
situation?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Take
the example of the Tornado and the Patriot, which is maybe the
one you are referring to there, certainly the technology was there
and is there to try to limit the chances of that. If that technology
does not work or if someone is not satisfied that the answer they
get is right, there has to be a range of other measures in place
such as airspace control, such as profile, such as speed and so
forth, to try to limit the possibility, if the technology does
not work, of someone jumping to the conclusion that that is the
enemy. Despite those procedures being in place, on this particular
occasion, mainly because of the difference in technologies which
exist, the individual concerned was persuaded that this presented
a threat to him where he was and therefore he engaged it.
Q91 Mr Mitchell: I wonder too about
the role of statistics. The proper collection of statistics would
bring home the scale of the problem. Yet I see that in terms of
exercises as opposed to real battle each Service collects its
own and they are not all lumped together. Nobody will take me
on paintball exercises because I just blast out at everybody and
the death rate—not mine—is atrocious. You would get
a better idea of the problems if there were statistics from exercises
on all British interventions, such as in Sierra Leone against
the Westside Boys or whatever they were called. Why are all these
statistics not added in and collected in?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: We do
collect the statistics from exercises and in fact the Army publishes
its figures from places like BATHUS[5]
each year after the training season is finished. This is to try
to get the information fed into future training and future awareness.
You have to remember that training is often designed to create
situations and people are training; by definition they are not
necessarily combat ready. Therefore what they do does not necessarily
relate to the way people react in operations.
Mr Jeffrey: As the earlier discussion
revealed, we may not be collecting or have available to us immediately
as much on the practices of other countries as Mr Davidson was
asking for earlier, for example, but if you look at the NAO Report
the collection of data on fratricide is one area where the NAO
acknowledges we have made quite significant progress. Paragraph
44 says "The Department has developed its analysis and collation
of data on fratricide incidents ... Improvements are being made
to the collection and analysis of data from training and simulations".
They are not both the same thing. We need to keep the hard data
from the real engaged situation separate from the data from training
and exercises. I do believe that we are better placed on data
collection than we were before.
Q92 Mr Mitchell: What about an actual
operation like Sierra Leone? Were there any deaths like that in
Sierra Leone? I see a nod behind you.
Mr Jeffrey: You have the benefit
of seeing behind me. I do not know off hand whether there were.
Q93 Mr Mitchell: The nod was saying
no, not yes.
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: As far
as I am aware there have not been any from the other operations
like Sierra Leone in which we have been involved.
Q94 Mr Mitchell: What is the joint
recognition trainer to help military personnel identify friend
from foe which is not going to be available for some years? Is
it just an aircraft type thing or signal type thing? What is a
joint recognition trainer?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: The joint
recognition trainer is designed to create the environment where
any military object or civilian vehicle can be seen from a variety
of angles, through a variety of sensors, so that the troops and
the airmen and all the sailors can all be trained to recognise
these things in all those guises. To create that database is something
we are working on and that is what takes the time. What we do
have is series of equipments which exist throughout all three
Services which provide the basics of visual recognition, some
thermal recognition, which is going on now, and increasingly radar
recognition. It takes time to build up that database of all the
various vehicles we might need to recognise in the future. There
is a lot more going on and certainly has been over the last five
years and before that.
Q95 Mr Mitchell: So it is the creation
of situations from which people can learn?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Yes.
Q96 Mr Bacon: The Report says that
the Senior Responsible Owner "... works by leading, co-ordinating
and focusing the relevant activities in the Department and acting
as an advocate for the capability within the Department".
Can you give me a concrete example of how the Senior Responsible
Owner has instigated real improvements in combat identification?
Mr Jeffrey: He can speak for himself,
but I think he is the architect of a good deal of the progress
which is reported in the NAO Report. Would you like to give a
specific case?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: If I
may, I shall give two. The first one is that we were looking earlier
last year at one of the technologies which might provide the BTID
capability, Battlefield Target Identification Device, particularly
in the ground-to-ground environment and we were keen to try to
make sure the same technology might work in the aviation-to-ground
attack helicopters and air-to-ground fast jets. What I was able
to do was to get money assigned to take that equipment and get
it put into an aircraft so that in the test we did in September
we could demonstrate that it was practical, feasible and did do
the job. That level gives the evidence which I hope later this
year will allow me to persuade everyone that it is worthwhile
going down that road because the technology exists. In terms of
the database it is through persuading people that the intention
of having a database which differentiates between operations and
training that nevertheless exists is practical to achieve even
though it is a lot of effort to try to pull all the figures together
at the time. People were reluctant to do that, but they have now
agreed to do it.
Q97 Mr Bacon: Essentially your achievements
are in the area of producing more evidence for what you are saying
is the case or what you are saying is possible.
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: At the
moment, absolutely.
Q98 Mr Bacon: So in terms of actually
delivering real improvements in combat identification which are
of use to our forces now, so far there has not been a delivery,
has there?
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: Yes,
there has, because there is improved—
Q99 Mr Bacon: There is an improved
understanding of what might be possible, but it is not the same
thing as actually delivering it and it being used by forces. They
are separate things. As you said yourself, it is a process.
Air Vice Marshal Dalton: But programmes
of equipment are being delivered all the time and the issue is
to look across the programmes of equipment being delivered which
encompass the idea of how we improve Combat ID. For instance,
we are about to coordinate the information which comes for the
airspace, to make sure it is collected once and delivered to everybody.
That is another programme which is en route to deliver.
5 Note by witness: BATHUS is the British Army
Training Unit Suffield, in Canada, where large scale training
exercises are conducted. Back
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