| 1. | All of the Volunteer Reserve Forces face significant shortfalls in manpower from some 16% in the Territorial Army to some 36% in the Royal Auxiliary Air Force. Recruitment and retention could be improved by increasing the numbers of former Regular Armed Forces' personnel recruited into the Volunteer Reserves (for example through targeted mailshots) and by improving the quality of training and support available for Reservists.
|
| | |
| 2. | People have been joining the Territorial Army despite failing basic fitness tests. The Department is piloting a new system to rectify this situation but does not expect the trial to finish until November 2007. The Department should find an interim measure for enforcing the minimum standard of entry for physical fitness. In addition, it should look more creatively at options to help potential recruits meet the standards required, for example, by introducing a fixed-term probation period prior to full membership allowing applicants time to reach the necessary levels of fitness and negotiating reduced-rate gym membership.
|
| | |
| 3. | The Department does not know if, on operations, Reservists are more likely than Regulars to experience fitness problems which require evacuation back to the United Kingdom. Some commanders in the field in Iraq noted that a number of deployed Reservists were not as fit as they needed to be. The Department should collate and examine statistics on numbers of Reservists evacuated from theatre, and analyse the views of commanders in the field as expressed in post-operational reports. It should use this information to assess whether Reservist levels of fitness are meeting the demands of active service.
|
| | |
| 4. | On routine training and on pre-deployment training, Reservists are not being given the opportunity to train alongside Regulars, nor with the equipment they will use on operations. The Department should use the capacity in the training system more efficiently, making training facilities and equipment available for use by Reserves when not being used by Regulars and by training Regulars and Reserves together. The Department should also build joint pre-deployment training with the Regulars into the mobilisation of all Reservists.
|
| | |
| 5. | The Royal Naval Reservists rarely go to sea, as the Reserve is increasingly confined to force protection duties. A limited and unrepresentative range of duties does little to prepare Reservists for integrating with the regular naval forces if needed, or to promote high morale and the retention of high calibre recruits. The Department should widen the range of tasks available to naval Reservists so as to be more representative of the Royal Navy's work, including training and operational experience at sea.
|
| | |
| 6. | A number of Reservists have valuable civilian skills which are not systematically utilised at present. The Department should complete its database of any civilian skills which Reservists would be willing to use on operations and use it to secure maximum value from the resources which the Reserves provide.
|
| | |
| 7. | Reservist personnel have not been receiving prioritised medical treatment for either physical injury sustained on operations or for mental health problems which develop post-mobilisation. Delays in treatment result in additional costs for the Department since injured Reservists continue to be paid their military salary, and may adversely impact on the morale of Reservists and the support given by their employers. In November 2006, the Department introduced the new Reserves Mental Health Programme to treat mental health problems affecting Reservists post-mobilisation. In addition, the Department should speed up the diagnosis and treatment of physical injuries sustained on operations. It should coordinate resources with the National Health Service so that cases can be referred directly to the appropriate specialists.
|
| | |
| 8. | The welfare support most used by Reservists and their families is provided by their Reserve unit, but not all units have dedicated welfare resources. The Department is providing resources for some additional officers and should target Reservists deployed on their own or in small numbers, families who live a long way from the unit and, in the case of the Regular Reserve, those who no longer have a clear link to any unit. The Department should encourage units to build relationships with families over time, not just once Reservists have been called up, and assist families to form their own support networks.
|
| | |
| 9. | The Department has made some major decisions about the future of the Reserve Forces, yet does not know what they cost. The Department should prepare management accounts which should show the full and marginal costs of the Reserves to inform decisions on deployment and on developments such as the new remuneration package.
|
| | |
| 10. | The Department monitors and collects information on areas of diversity such as race and gender, but not on the socio-economic or educational background of its Reserve personnel whether on recruitment or promotion. Without such information the Department cannot be sure that its Reserve Forces are "drawn from the breadth of society that it defends". The Department should collect information on the socio-economic and educational background of recruits and of those who are promoted, and use it to help draw on the best available talent from across the population.
|
| | |
