Examination of Witnesses (Questions 1-19)
RT HON
DES BROWNE
MP, DAVID CAIRNS
MP AND DR
JIM WILDGOOSE
17 JULY 2007
Q1 Chairman: Good afternoon. First of
all may I congratulate and welcome the new Secretary of State
for Scotland and his team to our session on the Scotland Office
Annual Report 2007. We have a lot of business to go through this
afternoon. Would you like to make any opening statement very briefly?
Mr Browne: Thank you very much
for your welcome. I am happy to be here this afternoon in my first
appearance before this Committee to answer questions on the Annual
Report of the Scotland Office and the Office of the Advocate General
for Scotland. I am supported by David Cairns who is the Minister
of State at the Scotland Office and by Jim Wildgoose who is the
Head of the Office and I propose appropriately to bring them in
on answers. Otherwise we have nothing else to say by way of introduction.
We have, as you say, a lot of business to get through so perhaps
we should just get on.
Q2 Chairman: The Annual Report says
the first objective of the Scotland Office is to ensure that Scotland's
interests in relation to reserved areas are known and represented
within the UK Government. What value does the Scotland Office
add to bilateral coordination and communication between Whitehall
departments and the Scottish Executive?
Mr Browne: As the Report sets
out in one of three objectives, we have a concentrated function.
The value that we bring is adequately reported over the year that
the Report refers to. We bring an appropriate concentration on
devolution issues by those departments whose affairs affect or
in some way come into contact with Scottish issues, particularly
so that people are sensitive to the issues of devolution. Again
as the Report sets out, we have a small amount of resources but
very concentrated resources in the Scotland Office whose job it
is to do that and keep in touch with, for example, the list of
legislation that is set out in the annex of the Report and ensure
where relevant that ministers and departments know where these
Bills or other activities of those departments may affect Scotland
and come into some sort of contact with devolution issues and,
vice-versa, where matters which are properly the preserve of the
Scottish Parliament and "e Executive of the Scottish Parliament,
the Government effectively there in relation to those powers affect
issues which are reserved. Again as you can see from the Report
and its annex six—and principally this was the responsibility
of my now Minister of State, David Cairns—a significant
number of these Orders reflecting that interaction are to be taken
through Parliament here. That is the value that we bring in terms
of Scotland Act Orders.
Q3 Chairman: If, as the devolution
guidance note three says, the Scotland Office does not act "...
as a conduit for the necessary communication between the Government
and Scottish ministers" then what is its role in encouraging
close working relationships between government departments and
the Scottish Executive and between Westminster and Holyrood? How
can you demonstrate that the taxpayer is getting good value for
money?
Mr Browne: The demonstration that
the taxpayer is getting good value for money is the principal
purpose of the Report actually. We can expand of course where
appropriate on the detail of that but the Report sets out in very
accessible terms what the Scotland Office does and that is to
be contrasted with the view that is sometimes portrayed otherwise
as to the worth of the Scotland Office. You are absolutely right
to suggest that we are not the necessary conduit of communication
between Scottish Executive ministers and ministers or departments
of the UK Government that has grown up over the eight years that
we have had devolution, channels of communication on a bilateral
basis or on a multilateral basis between the Scottish Executive
and those departments. To a large degree that has meant that it
has not been necessary for the joint ministerial committee to
meet formally because those processes have worked on a bilateral
and multilateral basis. The Scotland Office brings a constant
examination of these processes as they go through and I am sure
you will understand that sometimes it takes the Scotland Office
and its officials to point out to ministers and other government
departments that there is a particular Scottish dimension to a
process just to remind them that they have responsibilities that
go beyond and interact with Scotland and in particular the Scottish
Parliament and the Executive there. I refer again to the annex
of measures both of UK Bills that have been examined, considered
and have had some degree of relevance but the other way around
too, the occasions when the Scottish Parliament has legislated
and that has had a consequential effect on legislation which has
a UK or England and Wales perspective and it has been necessary
for the functioning of devolution for that to be reflected. So
we do bring a necessary oiling of the wheels of devolution and
we do it, as you will see from the Report, with a comparatively
small amount of money and a comparatively small staff. We are
a very lean organisation. It may well be that the current Scottish
Executive may challenge us to do more and, if they challenge us
to do more, then we may need to look at the particular capabilities
and capacity that we have but that will be a matter for discussion.
Q4 Chairman: Devolution guidance
note three identifies a need to "... minimise the scope for
surprises both north and south of the border". What went
wrong when the Government announced the repatriation of the Libyan
national in the Scottish prison? What are you doing to ensure
that we avoid similar surprises in the future?
Mr Browne: We subscribe wholly
to the ambitions set out the in the principles of the Memorandum
of Understanding with the devolved administration, including those
aspects about minimising the scope for surprises. It is not in
anybody's interests that we should generate surprises one way
or the other. It has worked for eight years and there is no reason
to assume that we will not continue to work in that fashion. International
negotiations and agreements are of course the responsibility of
the UK Government. As I recollect it the Government signed a Memorandum
of Understanding[1]
to commence talks with the Libyans on a number of separate matters
including judicial cooperation and prisoner transfer. Bearing
in mind that the UK has such prisoner transfer agreements with
96 other countries, it is entirely appropriate in the interest
of our own citizens that we should have those arrangements because
prisoners transfer both ways and some of our nationals would much
rather be back here serving their prison sentences where they
can be in close contact with their families and their friends.
We arrange that facility regularly through these sorts of agreement.
This MoU was the starting point for such an agreement, it was
an expression by both governments that there was a potential for
such agreement, it was the beginning of a process and in fact
the MoU itself recognised that that process could take up to a
year to be resolved. The MoU with Libya specifically stated that
the UK Government would seek to obtain the agreement of all three
jurisdictions within the UK for any aspects covered by it. There
was no question: a process which would take a year to go through
and which would necessarily have had to engage the Scottish Executive
in its detail was hardly likely to be something that would produce
a surprise at the end of that time and it will not produce any
surprises. The other point I would make is that international
negotiations sometimes move very quickly and those of us who have
been involved in international negotiations sometimes appreciate
that. You yourself who have made quite a significant contribution
to international affairs, particularly relationships between UK
and Pakistan, know that you may be in circumstances where there
is an opportunity to take advantage of a particular route that
is generated and there is a need to respond quickly to the shifting
circumstances. Frankly I do not think there is anybody here or
anybody in Scotland who thinks that beginning those sorts of talks
with Libya about those issues was not a thing that we should have
agreed to do. The MoU itself specifically says that all three
jurisdictions in the United Kingdom would need to agree to any
processes and we were well aware of devolved responsibilities
in this area so I do not accept that there were any surprises.
Given that agreement, I understand why it lent itself to the easy
headline but of course the easy headline did not reflect the nature
of the agreement at all.
Q5 Mr MacNeil: Part of the surprise erupted
on a BBC Newsnight about a week to ten days after the meeting
of the former Prime Minister with Colonel Ghaddafi in Libya and
it seemed to have been an example of surprise indeed. Given your
previous answer where you mentioned Whitehall departments forgetting
the Scottish dimension, was this not an example again of a Whitehall
department forgetting the Scottish dimension? It took about ten
days before the thing actually blew up and was fully realised.
Is it not really making the argument for the joint ministerial
committees to be up and running on a formal basis?
Mr Browne: The first point I make
in response to what you have said is that I never at any stage
used the phrase that any Whitehall department had forgotten the
Scottish dimension. I said that part of our job as the Scotland
Office, and clearly this is a perfectly logical position for us
to be in in the Scotland Office, is to keep an eye on what is
happening and to bring to the attention of other departments that
there is a Scottish dimension. I can think of no example where
they have forgotten a dimension.
Q6 Mr MacNeil: You did need to remind
them.
Mr Browne: I am sure we do not
compartmentalise Government here in Westminster any more than
the Scottish Executive compartmentalise Government. Everybody
works together and there is a collective responsibility. I just
point out that that was not the point that I was making when I
was explaining the relevance of the Scotland Office but I am sure
you agree that the Scotland Office has a relevance in terms of
the devolution settlement. With respect to your recollection of
events, I am not in a position actually to be able to identify
a particular piece of journalism, be it television journalism
or not, but there was no forgetfulness of the Scottish dimension.
There is a very specific reference in the MoU to the very existence
of the Scottish dimension, so there was no forgetfulness of it.
This is a process that will take up to a year to go through. The
fact of the matter is that the surprise element of it and the
headline element of it was the assertion that this would lead
to a particular prisoner being returned to Libya. We all know
that that presentation of this MoU did not reflect the actual
MoU, so let us get that out of the way first of all because it
is not true. If we actually look at the MoU, there was an agreement
to begin discussions with Libya about an issue which was a UK
responsibility but which could not have been settled without an
engagement in the separate jurisdictions. That is what it comes
to. Why the word "surprise"?
Q7 Mr Davidson: Would you accept,
notwithstanding the points you have made about what was actually
in the MoU, that Government at Westminster in general and the
Scottish Office perhaps in particular were wrong-footed by the
reaction of those who were seeking to take offence, were seeking
offence, were prepared to travel miles to be offended and were
intent upon creating mischief? Can we take it that the Scottish
Office will not be caught napping in that way again?
Mr Browne: One has to be very
careful. I think the phrase is "Beware of Greeks bearing
gifts". It is very easy to say that things will never happen
again but no doubt people may do things in the future which could
be characterised in that fashion. Your presentation of it is far
more accurate than an assertion that somehow a gross error was
made. People did of course travel quite far. They travelled right
to the end of a year's negotiation. Hypothetically they concluded
that negotiation and then they actually arranged in their minds
for a prisoner transfer and got the headline out of it. You cannot
travel any further than that. Would it have been better if the
opportunity had not been created for them to do that? Yes. Should
we guard against that in the future because it was unnecessary
and I have no doubt it generated a lot of quite gratuitous offence
to people who had been directly affected by the circumstances
of the actual incident itself in which some of their relatives
may have been killed? Should we try to avoid people having that
opportunity in the future? Yes, of course we should.
Q8 Mr MacNeil: Given the Memorandum
of Understanding and following up Mr Davidson's point about the
Scottish Office being caught napping, when would the Scottish
Office have stopped napping? When was the point when you were
actually going to tell the Scottish Government of this Memorandum
of Understanding and in future when will the Scottish Government
be informed when Memoranda of Understanding are signed in such
a way? What is the formal process of making sure that this does
not happen again?
Mr Browne: Although there are
96 of these particular agreements, I am not in a position from
here to anticipate any in the future. I am absolutely certain
that the experience and the particular extravagant misrepresentation
of the Memorandum of Understanding that happened in Scotland have
heightened everybody's antennae to this particular issue.
Q9 Mr MacNeil: That is a good thing.
Mr Browne: As those who took advantage
of the opportunity went to extraordinary lengths to make what
was a misrepresentative point, then those of us at Westminster
will now need to go to extravagant lengths to make sure that opportunity
is not generated. The rest of your question is entirely hypothetical
and I cannot answer that.
Q10 Mr Wallace: Just a follow-up
to that. I certainly recognise what you say about the end result
being a lot of froth but the way international negotiations go
this must have been recognised by the Foreign and Commonwealth
Office as being something that would be raised on the Libyan trip,
would be on the table to discuss, to be considered certainly.
At that stage of just the very concept, that that may well have
been up for grabs or for bargaining or whatever went on, would
that not have been a better time perhaps to communicate with the
Scottish Executive that this could come within the remit of those
discussions with the Ghaddafi leader?
Mr Browne: That is very welcome
question because the answer is yes, it would have been a better
time but for the reason that it would have avoided the opportunity
for people to be as extravagant in their response to it as they
turned out to be. We have all learned lessons from it, but the
answer to your question is simply yes.
Q11 Mr Davidson: May I follow on
a point about the role of the Scotland Office in terms of assessing
what is happening in the rest of the UK and what is happening
in Scotland? I sit, as do a number of other members, on the Committee
of Public Accounts and we consistently identify examples of best
and worst practice. Does the Scotland Office have a role in identifying
best and worst practice in Scotland which might have an implication
for services in the UK if we want to pick out the best and avoid
the worst and similarly to disseminate to the Scottish Executive
examples of particularly good practice which might provide better
services for the people of Scotland?
Mr Browne: The answer to that
is no, not because that it is not a good thing to do because it
clearly is a good thing for those who have responsibility for
policy to look well beyond the United Kingdom for examples of
good practice and to learn from them. I know from the departments
that I have been in that there is a process in the Westminster
Government that does that and regularly policy officials and ministers
take evidence from or look at examples right across the world
in areas of delivery of policy to look for good examples. The
role of the Scotland Office vis-a"-vis those areas which
are devolved is very specific and is set out and has to operate
in terms of the Scotland Act. Advising the Scottish Executive
of the Scottish Parliament where there are good areas of policy
that they should follow is not their responsibility. We need to
be entirely differently structured to do that. It would mean replicating
perhaps a lot of the policy and advice structure that should be
there in the Scottish Executive departments rather than down here.
Frankly Scotland is well capable of looking south of the border
to find those examples for itself and the accountability mechanisms
for that lie in the democratic process.
Q12 Mr Walker: Secretary of State,
you are probably bored of answering this question but it is down
here to be asked anyway. You have a hugely complex job at the
moment as Secretary of State for Defence. We have troops committed
in Iraq and Afghanistan and there are some very severe situations
in both of those countries. Given that that is probably a full-time
job, why was it considered to give you even more responsibility
by making you Secretary of State for Scotland? It would strike
me that Scotland may rest much more comfortably under the Secretary
of State for Communities and Local Government. Admittedly it is
not local government but given your responsibilities it might
have rested more comfortably there. Alternatively perhaps we should
even have a Secretary of State for Scotland who only considers
Scotland within their portfolio.
Mr Browne: Frankly I have to disagree
with you that wherever the Scotland Office ought to rest in the
longer term, it would be in a department which has responsibility
for local government. Frankly I can think of nothing more calculated
to offend the people of Scotland.
Q13 Mr Walker: May I ask why that
would offend them?
Mr Browne: Because the people
of Scotland rightfully consider themselves, after years of campaigning
for, arguing for and successfully achieving a parliamentary status
for their devolved Government, to be a nation which has in a broader
union a devolved parliament. To put that into a basket that has
the label "local government" on it would be offensive.
I perfectly respect that you did not intend it to be so, but it
would be offensive and broadly gratuitously offensive. The point
that you make more generally is that the machinery of government
should reflect a collective for the presence of areas which have
devolved government and Westminster. My answer to your question
is really that the machinery of government is a matter for the
Prime Minister and this question has not only been asked of me
but has been asked of the Prime Minister and he has given his
answer to it and I leave his words rather than repeat them. If
what lies behind your question is whether I am able to do this
job while at the same time being the Secretary of State for Defence
then I can only give you the same answer that I always give to
this which is that I thought long and hard about this, I looked
at the level of support that I would have both in the Ministry
of Defence and here in the Scotland Office with an enhanced status
in terms of my deputy but an experienced minister and I took the
view that it would be possible to do both jobs. If the criticism
of it is a criticism of perspective, that people say it does not
look right, I am actually much more interested in getting on with
these jobs. I have been in them now for a couple of weeks or thereabouts.
I have not experienced any sense that either of them has suffered
as a result of my having both of these titles. If my perspective
on that is wrong and people want to point out to me where the
reality lies and the reality is different, then they ought to
do that. All I can say to you and to others is that you can criticise
me for what I do but not for the titles. I think I am capable
of doing these two jobs with the support that I have and that
is why I agreed to do them.
Q14 Mr Walker: I have not criticised
you, I was asking a question. Let me probe a little further. We
have a Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Why could we not
have the Right Honourable Sean Woodward as Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland and Scotland and Wales? Why could we not
double up on that department? Surely that would have made more
sense? I am not criticising you but if you are sitting out there
and every day you are reading the newspapers about British soldiers
under attack and in mortal danger of their life, it is not a question
of what you can do, it is a question of the fact that most people
would think you should be focusing solely on your job at defence.
We have a Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in the Right
Honourable Sean Woodward. Could it not have been possible for
him to have done Scotland as well, bearing in mind that both countries
now have devolved powers?
Mr Browne: It is possible to debate
the merits of all sorts of different administrations, all sorts
of different combinations. In the last form of our Government,
the Secretary of State for Wales was also the Secretary of State
for Northern Ireland and it would appear that worked very well.
Look at the progress that we made in Northern Ireland over that
period in the peace process; certainly Northern Ireland did not
suffer. That just shows that people can do both jobs and of course,
as you will remember, Lord Carrington was both the Secretary of
State for Defence and Chairman of the Conservative Party for a
period of two years in the early 1980s and I am not conscious
that either of these two jobs suffered while he was doing the
two of them. People who know the history of our engagement at
that time will remember that we had in excess of 30,000 troops
deployed, although they were deployed to Northern Ireland and
in the course of one of those years we lost a significant number
of them. It is not unique in a situation where our troops are
at risk that the Secretary of State for Defence should also be
doing another job. It may not be ideal in some people's view but
I actually prefer just to get on with the job. We can exchange
and discuss any number of combinations that you like, but my view
is that it will remain the same. I was asked to do this, I took
the view that I could do both of these jobs with the support that
was being offered to me and I want to get on with the job. Frankly
my views in relation to any combination you may come up with are
irrelevant because the machinery of government is a matter for
the Prime Minister.
Q15 Mr Walker: A cynic might suggest
that Scotland requires a Secretary of State for Scotland to be
Scottish, so perhaps that limits where the Prime Minister can
look when he needs a Scottish Secretary of State for Scotland.
Mr Browne: We are in a situation
where we in Government—and indeed when your party was in
Government the same applied—where it would have been a very
unusual set of circumstances that would have, for example, produced
a Secretary of State for Northern Ireland that was Irish. You
put candidates up in Northern Ireland but they do not get elected
and we do not even contest the elections. In terms of the United
Kingdom and representation of parts of it, neither of us has any
doctrine about that. However, if you want my view in relation
to whether it is better that the Secretary of State for Scotland
is a Scot, yes. Is it better that the Secretary of State for Wales
is Welsh? Yes. It would be better if the Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland were able to be Northern Irish but it is not
likely to happen.
Q16 Mr Walker: It would perhaps be
better if the Prime Minister of this country were English. Bearing
in mind that we have a huge number of powers devolved to Scotland
and we have Scottish MPs voting on English matters, that same
courtesy is not extended to English MPs and we get lumbered with
a Scottish Prime Minister. Thank you, that is an interesting response
to the question.
Mr Browne: I am quite happy if
this session is going to develop into a situation where you give
the evidence; that absolutely suits me. It seems a remarkable
observation for a Unionist, to be honest.
Q17 Mr Wallace: Well perhaps as someone
who is a Scot and now represents an English constituency, worked
in the Armed Forces and was a soldier and is now in the defence
industry, I might bring it slightly back to the defence issue.
It clearly states at the beginning and in the memorandum that
your job as Secretary of State is to represent Scotland within
the machinery of government. The defence contracts that come out
of the Ministry of Defence are very large defence contracts and
with a consolidated defence industry there are very few options;
there are only so many yards, there are only so many production
lines effectively or defence contractors which can be in receipt
of those contracts. In one sense the competition, because of our
open defence market, is much harsher—a good thing—than
it is in other countries. I do not question your integrity Secretary
of State, I never have done and the answer you have given before
when I asked how you can avoid a conflict of interest when giving
out defence contracts with your other role of representing Scotland,
and I am not questioning your integrity, often was that you can
do your job to the fullest. There are no contractual jobs like
that either in the private or public sector where it is just assumed,
based on the personality of the person or the integrity, that
people are removed or separated from certain decisions. What actual
mechanism is there in place to ensure that when these defence
contracts come up you are not in conflict with that role of representing
Scotland, you can do your best for Scotland at that time without
being in conflict? I represent a seat in the north of England,
in Lancashire, so I have Barrow-in-Furness round the corner, I
have defence contractors in England and I should be grateful to
know what mechanism is in place to ensure that you do your job
of representing Scotland without undermining conflicting interests.
Mr Browne: I understand why you
ask the question and I am grateful to you for the way in which
you have asked it. You have already heard my answer to this question
which is, and I do pride myself in this, that I make the decisions
that I have made as a minister in the best interests of the responsibilities
that I have at the time and any decisions that I make in relation
to defence I will make on the basis of advice in the best interests
of defence. I have not, as a Member of Parliament for a Scottish
constituency, found any conflict of interests between my responsibilities
to my constituents, some of whom work in defence industries, and
my responsibilities as a minister. The mechanism that is in place
that ensures that I continue to do that is the ministerial code
which I observe punctiliously. Everything that I do is open to
the nature of the audit that is there and fairly open and transparent
and above board. Whether it be decisions in relation to the defence
training review, whether it be decisions that I will need to make
in relation to the naval base review, there will be a proper audit
trail in the department in relation to those decisions. I am very
conscious of that. I make sure that it is there. I make sure that
these decisions are capable of being audited to make sure that
they are decisions that are in the best interests of defence and
proper value for money for the taxpayer. I rely upon those systems,
those systems have served me well in a number of departments and
they will continue to serve me well.
Q18 Mr Wallace: If I am not mistaken,
and you may correct me, when it comes to your constituency work
there are mechanisms in place within Whitehall to ensure that
ministers are not unduly using their power to favour their constituency
work. Certainly the Prime Minister has that in place and—I
am sure Whitehall will correct me—there is a safety barrier.
It is not about how well you do each job, it is that one job is
to champion and represent Scotland and sell their yards and the
excellent facilities in Govan to produce submarines and the other
job is to make a decision to build submarines or a super carrier
or whatever and they just cannot be done by the same person. A
mechanism is needed such as removing yourself from the room, which
even people in planning committees do, or a mechanism of saying
today you are Scotland and your excellent Lord Drayson, who I
have to say is a very, very good defence procurement minister,
takes that decision without recourse or redress to you or anything
else. Something has to give if it is the same person making that
decision.
Mr Browne: I recognise in passing
your perfectly appropriate recognition of Lord Drayson's abilities.
Everybody who has had to deal with him either here in Parliament
or beyond recognises those abilities and what he has brought to
procurement and procurement processes and he is a substantial
part of my ability to have confidence in the decisions that we
make in the Ministry of Defence, the way in which he drives that
part of the department. I do not accept the characterisation of
my responsibilities in the way in which you set them out and I
do not accept that this is an issue of a conflict of interest.
I do not accept there is a conflict of interest in the first place.
If you set about seeking to make decisions in the best sense of
your responsibilities and on the basis of the evidence and if
you are prepared to have those examined objectively, then there
does not necessarily need to be a conflict of interest and there
is not necessarily, in any event, the level of competition that
you describe in relation to the limited opportunities that there
are in the UK to build ships. The example that you give is of
submarine building and there is a monopoly on submarine building
in the United Kingdom which fortunately happens to be near your
constituency and I have no doubt that some of your constituents
work in those yards. There are limited opportunities. The challenge
that we face is in sustaining that capacity, using the spending
power that we have in a way which maintains the workforce and
sustains that capacity and there are at least two people in this
room who have devoted a substantial part of their political life
to try to achieve that, very successfully I have to say. What
I do not want is for people to judge me against a false prospectus.
The measures that I will take and the decisions that I will take
in the future will be made in the best interests of defence and
the Ministry of Defence. Many people will put forward and articulate
arguments and I may help them marshal them for different parts
of the country, not just limited to Scotland, and give people
the opportunities to put forward their arguments and I will punctiliously
observe the ministerial code and all the steps that need to be
taken case by case in each of these to make sure that there can
be no suggestion that I have been doing anything which favours
any particular part of the country unfairly over another part.
Q19 Mr MacNeil: Last year, much to
my amazement at the time, the then Secretary of State resisted
the temptation to place on record his disbelief at the prospect
of an SNP First Minister in Scotland. Then on 1 May, much to my
fury, the then Chancellor, the current Prime Minister, said it
would be impossible to work as Prime Minister with a Scottish-National-Party-led
Government in Edinburgh. The SNP have always adopted a cooperative
approach. Which do you think is the best approach and which approach
do you think you will be adopting in your department: the cooperative
approach of the SNP or the approach as deemed impossible by the
current Prime Minister?
Mr Browne: Again I do not necessarily
accept these edited characterisations of predecessors. They may
be examples of things that people have said but, that aside, I
have made it clear in the short time that I have been doing the
job what my approach to this will be and that is that I see my
job as working in the best interests of the people of Scotland.
I am instinctively an inclusive and cooperative person. I like
to work with other people. I find in the other job that I do,
which we have been discussing for some time now, as Secretary
of State for Defence that I have to work increasingly internationally
with governments of all hues, shapes and sizes in very demanding
circumstances and sometimes I have in my political past worked
with people whom I never thought I would find in the political
environment. If I cannot work with other Scottish politicians
after that experience, then it does not say very much about me.
I am able to work with anybody who wants to work in a cooperative
fashion with me in the best sense of the people of Scotland. It
does not mean we will not disagree, it does not mean there will
not be times when we may be saying things that are conflicting,
but we should be able to work together.
1 Memorandum of Understanding and Supplementary
Agreements between the United Kingdom Government Scottish
Ministers, the Cabinet of the National Assembly of Wales and the
Northern Ireland Executive Committee SE/2002/54. Back
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