Memorandum 15
Submission from Professor Rev Robin Gill
and Professor Michael Ramsay, University of Kent
The decision of the Science and Technology Committee
not to look at the ethical and moral issues associated with abortion
time limits has important policy implications. It is my aim in
this invited submission briefly to outline these implications.
The main implication is that the gradualist
ethical position on the status of the embryo, adopted by the Warnock
Committee and reaffirmed by the Donaldson Committee and by the
House of Lords Select Committee on Stem Cell Research, remains
normative.
All three committees recognised that there are
pro-life and pro-choice groups that reject the gradualist position.
For example the House of Lords Select Committee noted:
Positions range from those taken by pro-life
groups and some of the churches that the early embryo is a human
being in the fullest sense from the moment of fertilisation and
should be accorded the same respect as a foetus or baby, to the
position that, because at the earliest stage of its development
the embryo is no more than a collection of undifferentiated cells,
albeit with the potential to develop into a human being, it deserves
little more attention than any other isolated human cell or tissue
[para 4.4].
Like the Warnock Committee, the Select Committee
"adopted a position between these opposing views, concluding
that the early embryo has a special status but not one that justifies
its being accorded absolute protection. That view was enshrined
in the 1990 Act" [para 4.5].
It is not necessary here to rehearse the arguments
given to support the gradualist position since that is not part
of the remit of the Science and Technology Committee. However
all three earlier committees argued that the gradualist position
(articulated initially by Lord Habgood) best represents public
opinion (including many, perhaps a majority, of those who are
religiously active).
The gradualist position—maintaining that
ethical respect for the embryo/foetus should increase in proportion
to his or her physical development—has a number of important
implications for public policy on induced abortions that are directly
relevant to the present remit of the Science and Technology Committee:
— Early abortions are considerably
more preferable than late abortions.
— Late induced abortions need to be
clearly justified.
— Independent viability has crucial
ethical significance.
Only pro-life groups that hold that "the
early embryo is a human being in the fullest sense from the moment
of fertilisation" are likely in practice to reject the first
of these points (although in theory it might be regarded as irrelevant
by more radical pro-choice groups). For the gradualist position
it is axiomatic that if a woman has an abortion (induced or spontaneous)
then it should be as early as possible. So if there is some evidence
(as the BMA suggests) that current procedures are delaying induced
abortions unnecessarily, then that would be a strong reason for
challenging those procedures (as long as this is compatible with
the properly informed consent of the woman). The role played by
the requirement for two doctors' signatures in first trimester
abortions, or not allowing nurses or midwives to carry out such
abortions and/or not allowing them to be carried out at patients'
homes are all procedures that might create unnecessary delay (as
long as this is compatible with the safety of the woman). Questioning
the continuing need for them, having taken careful account of
the two parenthesise, does appear to be compatible with the gradualist
position.
The second point—that late induced abortions
need to be clearly justified—is rejected by some pro-choice
positions but is crucial to a gradualist position. For the latter
the more developed the foetus the greater the ethical respect
required. The nearer the foetus approaches to independent viability
the stronger the justification required for induced abortion (either
in terms of the health of the foetus or that of the mother). In
terms of the gradualist approach I believe that a scientific or
medical definition of serious abnormality would be helpful for
all late abortions including those beyond 24 weeks.
The final point—that independent viability
has crucial ethical significance—is important for the gradualist
position as is clearly demonstrated by the 1990 Act. 24 weeks
was then deemed to be the point of foetal viability. If there
is now clear scientific evidence that (say) 22 weeks (using the
same scientific criteria used in 1990 to establish 24 weeks) is
now the point of foetal viability, then this could well justify
reducing the upper limit.
In terms of the gradualist position it would
be consistent to reduce both the upper limit for abortions and
the procedures that may be delaying first trimester abortions
unnecessarily.
August 2007
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