Annex 2
FAILURE OF BRITISH SPACE POLICY MAKERS TO
SUPPORT PASSENGER SPACE TRAVEL SINCE JULY 2000
2.1 CRITICISM OF SPACE POLICY IN TRADE AND
INDUSTRY COMMITTEE TENTH REPORT
A2.1 On July 4, 2000, the Parliamentary
Trade and Industry Committee published its Tenth Report [A1].
Among other comments the Committee noted that the BNSC spends
approximately half of its budget on Earth observation activities,
but that these are far from being commercial. It concluded:
"UK space policy appears to have failed
to date in this central objective. Despite more than a decade
trying to stimulate commercial markets for Earth observation data,
provided at public expense . . ."
The Committee also criticised the fact that
the decision to concentrate hundreds of millions of pounds of
investment on this field was based on no more than
". . . an expression of general but unsubstantiated
hope that commercial markets will be generated" [A1].
A2.2 The Select Committee also investigated
the fact that the BNSC has made no investment in assessing the
commercial potential of passenger space travel, despite extensive
evidence that it is the most commercially promising use of space.
The Committee elicited further that the BNSC had argued against
Bristol Spaceplanes Ltd receiving any support from DTI for its
work in this field for nearly a decade, but that this decision
was made without the BNSC having performed any analysis of the
commercial promise of passenger space travel, or of Bristol Spaceplanes'
plans. On the contrary, Bristol Spaceplanes' work had been highly
praisedincluding heading the list of references in Nasa's
very positive 1998 report on space tourism [A2]. The Committee
also interviewed Lord Sainsbury, the Minister responsible for
space, and learned that HMG did not have a policy not to invest
in launch vehicles, as the BNSC had stated incorrectly in arguing
repeatedly against funding for Bristol Spaceplanes.
A2.3 On the basis of these and other findings
the Trade and Industry Committee recommended that
". . . a review is undertaken of the UK's
participation in launcher development programmes . . . Since no
partner in BNSC is likely to be fighting for UK involvement in
reusable launch vehicles (RLVs) we also recommend that this evaluation
be undertaken by a body independent of BNSC" [A1].
In addition, the Committee specifically referred
to the potential of space tourism, which was discussed positively
in 5 separate Memoranda to the Committee [A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6,
A.7], and cited Space Future Consulting, as follows:
"Space Future Consulting are of the opinion
that the government should not participate in any launch vehicle
work that is not specifically aimed at developing a passenger-carrying
vehicle, stating that the UK's lack of involvement in ELVs leaves
the UK uniquely placed to exploit space tourism" [A1].
2.2 HMG RESPONSE TO TRADE AND INDUSTRY COMMITTEE
REPORT
A2.4 On October 27, the British government
published its reply to the Select Committee's report [A8]. Written
by BNSC staff, this showed its strong resistance to the subject
of passenger space travel, which it did not mention at all. This
was despite the fact that this was the most economically important
issue raised by the Select Committee. Instead of an inquiry independent
of the BNSC recommended by the Select Committee, the BNSC commissioned
a report to
". . . reassess the combined effects of
development costs and timescales, revenue streams, market entry
conditions and windows of financial return in the current and
medium term launcher market."
The Launcher Sub-committee of the UK Industrial
Space Committee (UKISC) was paid 30,000 pounds to perform this
study, which the BNSC directed not to consider passenger travel.
A2.5 Despite this, the BNSC claimed that
the conclusion of this study was that:
". . . the evidence shows that a European
reusable launcher. . . would require full development funding
and overall 2/3 of through life costs from the public sector.
The case for investment in this area at this time is therefore
not strategically sound or commercially attractive" [A9].
The truth is that this statement applies only
to cargo launch vehicles, since no analysis was performed of passenger
carrying. However, it gives the impression that it applies to
all launch vehicles, and is therefore untrue by omissionparticularly
in the context in which the Trade and Industry Committee had recommended
a study. It was clearly not commissioned by the BNSC in order
to learn whether the Select Committee's recommendation of passenger
space travel was sound.
2.3 DTI "EVALUATION OF FUNDING FOR
UK CIVIL SPACE ACTIVITY"
A2.6 Following the Trade and Industry Committee's
2000 Report another report on the British space industry was commissioned
by the DTI from a consulting company, with advice from several
senior figures from government space agencies, and published in
July 2001 [A10]. Readers of this report could be forgiven for
assuming it to be definitive, being a 400-page review of the previous
25 years of British government space funding, amounting to several
billion pounds. Unfortunately the economic analysis in the report
is very limited, and even important economic facts are not stated
clearly. Above all, it does not discuss the fact that the return
on investment in space activities to date has been extremely poor,
in Britain as elsewhere. For an investment of several billion
pounds there should be a commercial space industry with annual
turnover of billions of pounds. However, apart from government
spending, commercial space activity amounts to barely 10% of that.
If the report had stated this clearly it would have been obliged
to recommend a more energetic search for more commercially valuable
uses of space technology.
A2.7 Instead of this, the report proposed:
"A strategic review of the commercial opportunities
for civil space activity should examine the case for a more balanced
portfolio of complementary space investments within the UK budget
to avoid reliance on a single technological focus. This should
be used to inform the next BNSC review of UK space policy."
The report recommended:
". . . an exhaustive exercise leading to
a comprehensive and actionable Implementation Plan, working systematically
from the high level goals through objectives and on to a budgeted-action
plan spanning the next five years. It ought to be accompanied
by a forward look in terms of strategies and commitments that
has a 10-year and 25-year scenario. The BNSC should look to international
practicesuch as the NASA Strategic Enterprise Plans and
roadmapsfor a lead."
A2.8 From the economic point of view, recommending
that the BNSC should mimic NASA is a very bad idea, because the
economic return on NASA's expenditure has been extremely lowarguably
disastrous for the US economy. Since the end of the "cold
war" alone NASA has spent more than $200 billion of taxpayers'
money, while the US space industry has shrunk substantially. If
invested commercially, there should be a $200 billion/year space
industrybut there is only a small fraction of this. In
addition, NASA has imposed large social costs by continuing to
delay the development of passenger space travel at a time when
the lack of new industries in the USA is so severe that it has
a record trade deficit of $2 billion/day, and the worst unemployment
situation for decades (with 10 million fewer new jobs than in
previous recoveries).
A2.9 Hence, for all the effort that has
gone into the report, it is deeply flawedbecause it nowhere
even refers to the possibility of passenger space travelthe
activity that is now widely recognised as being the most commercially
promising use of space, as described above. By limiting itself
to space agencies' vocabulary of "space transportation"
(ie satellite launch) and "manned space flight" (ie
government staff riding on vehicles like Soyuz and the space shuttle),
the report effectively prevents readers from even thinking about
the possibility of commercial passenger space travel. The assumption
that there is no more economically valuable activity to be done
in space than what space agencies are already doing, is incorrect:
there is ever-growing evidence that passenger space travel can
grow into a popular new consumer service industry of great economic
value.
2.4 GOLDSCHMIDT REPORT
A2.10 In August 2001 a further review of
the BNSC was announced as a response to the Trade and Industry
Committee's 2000 Report. The terms of reference stated that
". . . the study will review the evidence
provided to the Trade and Industry Select Committee investigation
into space policy. . ."
The review was therefore clearly required to
consider the issue of passenger space travel, which was discussed
in at least five submissions to the Select Committee [A3-A7],
as well as in spoken testimony.
A2.11 Dr Pippa Goldschmidt, an astrophysicist
at Imperial College, was invited to write the report. The author
wrote to her on 30 November to ask whether the subject of passenger
space travel, which was the most economically important issue
raised by the Select Committee's Report, would be considered in
her review, and if not, then when and under what auspices this
important matter would be discussed. Dr Goldschmidt replied on
5 December 2001:
"Thank you for your e-mail . . . I will
reply to it more fully in the near future" [A11].
However, she never did reply, despite subsequent
letters on the subject dated 9 January, 13 February and 27 June
2002.
A2.12 Dr Goldschmidt's report made no reference
at all to the subject of passenger travel, nor to the related
evidence on the subject provided to the Trade and Industry Select
Committee [A3-A7]. However, her report included the statement:
"It is beyond the terms of this review to
consider the appropriateness of funding or not funding particular
activities, or the level of such funding" [A12].
This contradicts the statement that the review
would consider the evidence presented to that Committee, and continues
the pattern of space policy makers' refusing either to discuss
the subject of passenger travel, or to justify their refusal to
discuss it.
A2.13 From her statement of 5 December 2001
it seems reasonable to assume that Dr Goldschmidt did initially
intend to answer the author's questionsas she could be
expected to: scientists accept the over-riding importance of open
discussion in order to discover the truth. For example, such a
refusal to answer a key question about her work as an astrophysicist
would be astonishing, and could even be career-threatening. However,
when she subsequently decided, or was told, that her report was
not to tackle the most economically important issue, it seems
that she did not wish to discuss the reason for this; she also
no longer wished to answer the question where this matter would
be considered; and she was also unwilling to state this publicly.
A2.14 From the point of view of policy science,
(that is, the systematic attempt by social scientists to understand
the process of policy-making and to ensure that it works in the
interests of the public), Dr Goldschmidt's refusal to answer these
questions after having said that she would is of extreme interest.
As discussed above, investing in the development of passenger
space travel is the most economically valuable objective for space
policy. Consequently the reason why Dr Goldschmidt's report did
not consider this issue, to which the Select Committee had drawn
particular attention, and her continuing silence concerning this
reason, all remain of exceptional interest for understanding the
fundamental cause of this serious failure of British government
policy-making.
2.5 ROYAL ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY REPORT
A2.15 In 2005, a report by the Royal Astronomical
Society (RAS) recommended that the British government should spend
150 million pounds per year for 20-25 years (ie some 3-4 billion
pounds in total) in order to participate in "manned space
flight" activities, notably for Moon and Mars exploration
[A13]. However, if such huge sums were spent on activities using
expendable launch vehicles, as currently planned by Nasa, it would
have little or no economic benefit for taxpayers, since it would
do nothing to reduce the cost of space activities in future. In
addition the costs of the proposed exploration would be about
100 times higher than achievable using reusable passenger vehicles.
A2.16 It would be sadly ironic if, after
having avoided wasting resources on unprofitable activities using
expendable launch vehicles for 20 years, British policy makers
now joined the wasteful "mainstream" at exactly the
time when it is so clearly a costly failure. By contrast, if the
British government would invest even a moderate fraction of the
3-4 billion pounds requested by the RAS to develop reusable passenger
space vehicles, the result would be of enormous economic value;
it would have wide popular support, particularly among the young;
and it could propel Britain's aerospace industry into a world-leading
position.
A2.17 It may well be that the space scientists
responsible for the RAS report are not aware of the feasibility
of low-cost space travel, which has never been officially discussed
except by the Trade and Industry Select Committee. It is notable
that the negative views on space tourism of another space scientist,
Dr Andre Balogh from Imperial College, have been given considerable
press coverage. However, none of these space scientists have studied
the feasibility of low-cost launch systems, nor published research
on the subject. Moreover, space scientists are not disinterested
parties; their work is dependent on their having good relations
with space agencies, which have long been hostile to passenger
space travel. The unsatisfactoriness of relying on the opinions
of such people on this subject, however eminent they are in their
own fields, can be seen from the fact that the government would
surely not rely on, and the press would surely not give coverage
to the views of an economist on a matter of astrophysics, such
as quasar evolution.
2.6 CURRENT UK SPACE STRATEGY
A2.18 If the BNSC had implemented its stated
objective to
". . . help industry maximise profitable
space based business opportunities" [A8]
it would have both studied the feasibility of
passenger travel and invested in realising it. That it has never
done so, and has also repeatedly advised the Department of Trade
and Industry not to for more than a decade, is a costly error.
In addition, for the past six years this has also been directly
contrary to the advice of the Trade and Industry Select Committee
in July 2000; yet the BNSC has nowhere publicly justified its
behaviour.
A2.19 Interestingly, the BNSC's objectives
have recently been rewritten to be less economically ambitious,
and say no more than to "stimulate increased productivity
through promoting the use of space in commerce" and "develop
innovative space technologies and systems to deliver sustainable
improvement in quality of life". The BNSC has also recently
taken to including sales of satellite television decoders and
broadcasting as "upstream revenues" of the space industry.
However, the fact that British consumers like to buy imported
electronic devices for viewing largely imported television programming
is hardly evidence of successful space development.
A2.20 It is also of interest that the BNSC
web-site includes a list of "Reviews & reports on UK
civil space" but does not mention the Trade & Industry
Select Committee's 2000 report. The BNSC has thereby hidden the
fact that the only independent review of space policy, carried
out by a Parliamentary Select Committee, found the case for investigation
of space travel convincing, and urged the BNSC to do so. The reports
which it has itself commissioned do not mention the subject.
2.7 EUROPEAN SPACE AGENCY AND EUROPEAN UNION
SUPPORT FOR SPACE TOURISM
A2.21 In September 2006 it was reported
that an Esa staff-member stated:
"I think the conclusions are shared by all
the space community that space tourism has a great potential to
become a very successful business and a major driver for space
technology development. If this materialises, the future of human
space flight might even be exclusively commercial, potentially
having a great impact on the scope of the activities carried out
by space agencies" [A14].
and:
"The flight of SpaceShipOne resolved all
doubts regarding whether small private companies could perform
human suborbital space flight safely and inexpensively. It also
showed that there is a worldwide interest in space tourism. It
certainly opened the door to human suborbital space flight to
become a commercial business soon" [A14].
The same report also stated that the European
Commission is paying the two large non-British aerospace companies
EADS and Dassault to study
". . . potential road-blocks to European
space tourism operations" [A14].
Although these statements do not represent a
change in policy as yet, they are strong additional evidence of
the error of the BNSC's stance in preventing research on passenger
space travel. They are also strongly supportive of the unique
work of Bristol Spaceplanes and Space Future Consulting over the
past 20 years.
2.8 SUMMARY COMMENTS
A2.22 In summary, for more than six years the
British government's space policy makers have continued as though
the Trade and Industry Select Committee had not criticised its
"failed" commercialisation efforts and recommended studying
passenger space travel. The BNSC's decision to spend a further
400 million pounds since 2000 on Earth surveillance satellite
systems, with no commensurate improvement in commercial return,
while continuing to ignore passenger travel is clearly not a sincere
effort at commercialisation, and constitutes a continuing policy
failure.
A2.23 The question why the BNSC is so strongly
resistant to passenger travel remains unanswered. The only substantive
comment which the author has elicited was the following:
"We believe that space tourism is not likely
to be a mass market for the foreseeable future" [A9].
However, as an opinion, this statement is not
based on any published research, and it is contradicted by Nasa's
published market estimate [A15] (as discussed in Paragraph 3 of
the main Submission). Moreover, it is contrary to the publicly
stated policy to
". . . help industry maximise profitable
space based business opportunities" [A8].
It is also not consistent with spending some
1,000 million pounds on Earth surveillance activities over 20
years, which have no prospect of becoming a mass marketwhile
spending nothing at all to even investigate passenger travel,
of which the promise has been recognised by Nasa, the AIAA, the
FAA, NASDA, ESA, the EU and other organisations. While the non-profit-earning
use of Earth surveillance data can be valuable for environmental
research and for military purposes, these activities are not a
substitute for earning a commercial return from investment in
space.
A2.24 The process whereby changes in space
spending are decided has been described as follows:
"Spending proposals in the DTI have to be
supported on the basis of ROAME statements . . . These are considered
by internal programme committees before being submitted to the
person with the authority to commit the level of expenditure involved.
No ROAME statement has been prepared on passenger space travel
as there have not been expenditure proposals. This is because
we have not at any stage been convinced that there is sufficient
argument to commit public funds to the study of this area. . .ministers
have encouraged BNSC to focus priorities on...developing markets
which have short-term promise of commercial returns" [A16].
While this arrangement may sound reasonable,
there are a number of serious problems with it. First, it has
not been applied consistently: while being used to allow further
expenditure of 400 million pounds since 2000 on Earth surveillance
systems which show no promise of commercial returns, as the Trade
and Industry Select Committee specifically criticised, nothing
at all has been spent on even a feasibility study of passenger
traveldespite the rapid growth in recognition of its potential
world-wide.
A2.25 Second, such a purely internal decision-making
process, with no objective measures of performance, no need to
defend positions publicly, and no costs for failure, is a recipe
for stagnationwhich has indeed been the result. Third,
the process described is a particularly inappropriate way of making
decisions about innovative projects, which are well known to involve
uncertainty, and to be inherently "disruptive", leading
to "creative destruction" of obsolete activities. It
is inevitable that such an administrative structure will be poor
at recognising valuable new possibilities and committing resources
to aid their growth even in the early stages with relatively high
uncertainty. This is especially likely for a major innovation
which poses a threat to existing activities.
A2.26 Moreover, the record is clear: the only
report on British space policy which was clearly independent of
the BNSC and space policy-makers is the only one with substantial
criticism and a proposal for major change. This proposal has been
entirely ignored, and the report buried under a flurry of commissioned
reports which all ignore the main issue. These reports are listed
on the BNSC's web-site, while the critical report is not, so unsuspecting
readers have no means of discovering that a fundamental criticism
of British space policy remains unanswered after six years, and
that world-leading British research has been starved for 15 years.
A2.27 HMG's failure to provide any support for
passenger space travel research over this time has been a serious
failure of policy. It appears to have been partly due to the excessive
influence of a long-standing monopoly without adequate oversight.
The refusal of British space policy makers to consider the subject
for 15 years has already lost a great deal of potential competitive
advantage, representing a major loss to British taxpayers. Rapid
actions to make up for lost time, under the right auspices, would
have great economic value.
REFERENCES
A1. | House of Commons, 2000, Trade and IndustryTenth Report, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmtrdind/335/33502.htm
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A2. | D O'Neil, I Bekey, J C Mankins, T F Rogers, E W Stallmer & O'Neil, 1998, "General Public Space Travel and Tourism Volume 1Executive Summary", NASA/STA, NP-1998-03-11-MSFC; also at www.spacefuture.com/archive/general_public_space_travel_and_tourism.shtml
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A3. | D Ashford, 2000, Memorandum submitted by Bristol Spaceplanes Ltd, Minutes of Evidence, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/ cmtrdind/335/0041114.htm
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A4. | T Rogers et al, 2000, Memorandum submitted by the US Space Transportation Association, Appendix17, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/ cmtrdind/335/335ap21.htm
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A5. | M Hempsell, 2000, Memorandum submitted by Mr Mark Hempsell, Minutes of Evidence, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/ cmtrdind/335/0041113.htm
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A6. | J Brodie-Good, 2000, Memorandum submitted by Wildwings Worldwide Travel, Appendix 8, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/ cmtrdind/335/335ap09.htm
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A7. | P Collins et al, 2000, Memorandum Submitted by Space Future Consulting, Appendix 12, www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/ cmtrdind/335/335ap13.htm
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A8. | Anon, 2000, Government Reply to Trade and Industry Committee Tenth Report, Appendix to Trade and Industry Committee Twelfth Special Report, www.parliament.the-stationery-office.co.uk/pa/cm199900/cmselect/cmtrdind/ 908/90804.htm
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A9. | A Cooper, BNSC, 6 February 2002, Personal Communication.
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A10. | Technopolis Group, 2001, "Evaluation of Funding for UK Civil Space Activity", DTI Assessment Paper No 42, (URN 01/1032), www.bnsc.gov.uk/ index.cfm?nid=11912
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A11. | P Goldschmidt, 5 December 2001, Personal Communication.
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A12. | P Goldschmidt, 2001, "BNSC Review: Report of Findings by Dr Pippa Goldschmidt", www.bnsc.gov.uk/assets/channels/about/bnsc%20review.pdf
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A13. | F Close, J Dudeney & K Pounds, "The Scientific Case for Human Space Flight", Royal Astronomical Society Commission, RAS PN05/45, 2005.
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A14. | L David, 2006, "Esa to Sponsor Space Tourism Work", September 19, www.space.com/news/060919_esa_tourism.html
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A15. | Nasa-MSFC, 2003, "NASA ASCENT Study Final Report", Marshall Space Flight Center.
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A16. | A Cooper, BNSC, 5 August 2002, Personal Communication.
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