Memorandum 56
Submission from the British Interplanetary
Society
SUMMARY
UK Government space spending as a percentage
of GDP is approximately a quarter of the average for space-faring
nations and is lowest by a considerable margin. This is due to
the UK Government failing to engage in any way in three quarters
of the totality of space activities (the areas where the UK Government
is involved are financed at typical GDP levels). This unique funding
pattern arbitrarily excludes British scientists and industry from
many important fields, to the great detriment of the national
good. We urge the Committee to consider a more balanced and fair
UK programme where the available money and organisation allow
all UK space professionals a chance to make world-class contributions.
1. Introduction
1.1 The British Interplanetary Society (BIS)
has been Britain's premier society concerned with astronautics
and space technology since 1933. It is one of the oldest astronautical
institutions in the world with a worldwide membership (a third
of the fellowship lives abroad). It was a founding member of the
International Astronautical Federation (IAF) and in 2008 the BIS
will host the 59th Congress of the IAF in Glasgow, welcoming up
to 2,000 delegates from the entire international space community.
1.2 These occasions inevitably highlight
the host nation's activities in space. It is therefore timely
that Parliament through a Select Committee has again turned its
attention to the state of UK space activity. Despite previous
Parliamentary Committees' findings, that addressed many problems
requiring attention, we regret there remain significant weaknesses
in UK space policy compared with other nations.
1.3 British space has much to be proud of,
but we also have a uniquely unbalanced programme and it is this
that has created a dominating negative view of UK in space internationally,
overshadowing the many successes we do have. The Glasgow Congress
would be a wonderful opportunity to publicise to the world a new
UK policy that is fairer to UK space professionals, more balanced
in its objectives and more in line with every other space-fairing
nation.
2. The Lack of Balance
2.1 The UK has a honourable and recognized
history of achievement in some areas of space applications, for
example in science, Earth observation and communications. The
Case4Space study conducted by UKSpace (and forming the basis of
their submission to the Committee's inquiry) has shown that these
activities have led to a significant and highly productive space
industry worthy of continued support.
2.2 Despite this, the UK place in space
is widely seen both internally and abroad as being weakillustrated
by the fact that new space achievements are greeted by the media
with the surprised question, "Is Britain still in space?"
The background to this perception includes the following factors.
The UK government investment in space
is absent in areas that other governments consider vitalabout
one quarter in comparison with other European nations. A consequence
is that in many high profile space activities Britain is conspicuous
by its absence.
UK space business (as defined by
Eurospace) consolidated turnover in 2005 was 502 million.
This is significantly lower than France 1,838 million, Italy
733 million, and Germany 614 million, even though
these comparison figures are the most favourable they have ever
been due to a slight rise in the UK and a large drop in other
European countries. (Source: ASD-Eurospace Facts and Figures:
the European Space Industry 2005.)
UK has 2nd largest aerospace industry,
but only 3% of this is related to space (Source: SBAC UK aerospace
industry survey 2006). This compares with 10-15% for other European
nations and 25% for the USA.
2.3 All these factors come down to the lack
of balance in what is supported by the Government. By excluding
three quarters of all space activity, the UK space budget is reduced
to a quarter, but then so is the consequent industry, and detail
of what is excluded has a disproportionate impact on the up-steam
(space engineering) section and therefore aerospace industry particularly
hard.
3. Applications
3.1 The first objective of the "UK
Space Strategy 2003-06 and Beyond" is to "enhance
the UK's standing in astronomy, planetary and environmental sciences."
An objective that excludes all other science
areas with an interest in using space capabilities from UK government
support and hence any chance of pursuing involvement in many important
research opportunities. The Government policy explicitly enshrines
and endorses an unbalanced approach to space research.
3.2 This exclusion is not because the UK
does not have interest and world-class capability in these fields.
Microgravity applications represent an immediate example. The
strength of UK science in space applications to medicine, biology
and materials science was demonstrated by the recent history of
the 50 UK proposals to the ESA ELIPS programmethe European
programme to exploit the research opportunities of the International
Space Station. This was a comparable number of proposals to the
53 from France and the 56 from Germany, and they were judged by
peer review to be of world-class quality. But all are excluded
from the programme because of their UK origins. The consequences
of this will be a loss of capability in many areas of critical
interest to the UK, for example pharmaceuticals.
3.3 The reason so many areas are excluded
is they often use a human space presence to conduct the activity.
There has been a long-standing resistance to UK involvement in
manned spaceflight, an implicit policy that has never been justified
in any way. When pushed the unofficial response reveals an incorrect
preconception regarding the relative costs on manned and robotic
missions. In fact the costs of conducting scientific research
on robotic and human space facilities fall into the same range
and there is no real cost difference between the approaches. Cost
is certainly not a reason to exclude UK science researchers from
programmes such as the International Space Station.
3.4 We believe that the unbalanced policy
has had serious consequences in terms of industrial, commercial
and scientific capabilities of the UK including the ability to
draw the next generation into science, technology, engineering
and mathematics. The Case4Space studies have already uncovered
strong evidence of the unique inspirational role of Space in encouraging
young people in these fields, but it is the areas in which the
UK does not participate (particularly human space flight) that
have the biggest inspirational impact and if the enthusiasm generated
is not to be turn into disillusion the promise must be fulfilled.
3.5 The uniquely negative UK policy on human
spaceflight has been reconsidered from a number of quarters recently
including the Royal Astronomical Society and the Royal Aeronautical
Society. In response to this renewed interest, the BIS held an
open meeting on 27 May 2006 that was attended by many interested
bodies. The meeting unanimously agreed the resolution:
"This meeting recommends UK involvement
in human spaceflight in order to benefit fully from the opportunities
that spaceflight offers, managed by an appropriate national body."
The resolution was later endorsed by the BIS
Council on 9 September 2006 as part of Society policy and we would
commend it to the Committee.
4. Infrastructure
4.1 A feature of UK space policy is that
it solely focuses on applications, as laid out in the three objectives
outlined in "UK Space Strategy 2003-06 and beyond".
This has been interpreted to mean that UK government will primarily
consider involvement in downstream utilisation activities, and
up-steam satellite construction where it has a direct bearing
on a downstream utilisation activity of interest. In particular
this has exclude the UK from any involvement in what is generically
known as the space infrastructure, that is launch systems, human
spaceflight elements, and tracking and data relay systems.
4.2 Because UK space policy supports only
applications, and not the capabilities required to support those
applications, there is a loss to the industry in business providing
those support capabilities. For example, the UK pays non-UK providers
to launch its spacecraft (up to 50% of the total space segment
cost). In addition, since those applications that the UK supports
are incomplete, there is a further loss of total business. In
those areas supported by the UK, investment is similar to other
space-faring nations on a GDP basis, but this double exclusion
from major areas results in a business only about 25% of expectation
(even after the over low spend is accounted for). Since the support
activities represent those areas in which the aerospace industry
has tended to take an interest, this also explains why the space
segment of the UK aerospace industry is so small.
4.3 The consequence is that the fastest
growing sector of the aerospace is largely denied to the UK industry.
Given the aerospace sector is such an important part of the UK
industrial economy is a matter of concern. Despite the lack of
any Government support, UK privately funded initiatives have ensured
there is a considerable amount of world-class technologies and
system expertise that could make the basis of a competitive contribution
in the development of the space infrastructure. However, because
of global market failure, without government support these are
unlikely to be realised and the UK will lose out on the important
benefits that they could provide.
4.4 The House of Commons Select Committee
on Trade and Industry found in its 10th report of the 1999-2000
session, which inquired into UK space policy, reached three recommendations
and conclusions on UK launch systems policy; they were:
"(p) The general perception among all
those involved is that the Government and BNSC are following a
policy of no involvement in launchers. It is our strong impression
that in the BNSC there is a less than open mind on the use of
public funds for launcher research and development. If Ministers
do indeed have an open mind on the use of public funds for launcher
research and development, they should make this explicit.
(q) We recommend that a review is undertaken
of the UK's participation in launcher development programmes.
Since no partner in the BNSC is likely to be fighting for UK involvement
in reusable launch vehicles (RLVs), we also recommend that this
evaluation be undertaken by a body independent of BNSC.
(r) The decision has now been made not
to participate in the Future Launch Technologies Programme (FLTP).
The UK has, however, technical expertise in the area worthy of
maintaining and developing. We recommend that consideration should
be given to ways of maintaining and developing. We recommend that
consideration should be given to ways of fostering existing UK
expertise in technical space infrastructure in the UK outside
the normal avenues of space technology funding."
With some small exceptions that seem to relate
to personal initiatives of individuals rather than any policy
changes, the evidence presented to the Trade and Industry Committee
remains valid and none of these recommendations seem to have been
acted upon. Certainly we are not aware of any public domain review
that has informed policy direction.
5. Conclusions
5.1 The long-standing UK space policy was
been to only get involved with robotic applications when there
is an overwhelming case created by mature operational systems
created by other nations. This is stifling innovation even in
the areas the Government policy will consider. In many other areas
both applications and the development of a space industry in its
own right to support all applications the UK space community is
unable to meaningfully contribute.
5.2 The consequence of this unbalance is
unfairness within both the science and the engineering communities.
This leads to many lost opportunities to exploit British expertise
and is the reason the overall wider space industry is small compared
with other nations. The UK downstream industry should be three
times the size it is and the upstream (space engineering) industry
should be between five and 10 times the size. It is consideration
such as this that have lead every independent review of UK space
policy that we are aware of to conclude the narrow scope it not
in the national interest.
5.3 To redress the unbalance and unfairness
will obviously require new money; making the UK overall spend
more like that of a typical space-fairing nation. However there
also needs to be an organisation and mechanism for spending that
money. The long-standing UK problems are perpetuated because there
is no government institution or even person with the responsibility
for these areas. This institution or institutions (there are many
models that can be considered) would enable the worth and potential
of UK areas of space expertise to be properly and objectively
evaluated, and, where justified, funded as they would be in any
other developed nation. Such a change in the government's organization
and commensurate support would release a new era of benefits of
wider and greater impact than the past successful investment has
provided.
October 2006
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