Memorandum 80
Submission from the British Antarctic
Survey
1. EUROPEAN SECURITY
1.1 Space weather
Space Weather is a recognised term that refers
to conditions on the Sun and the Earth that adversely affect technological
systems. For example, solar eruptions can emit energetic charged
particles and cause large scale disruptions to the Earth's magnetic
field which cause damage and loss of satellites on orbit, increased
radiation dose to aircrew and malfunctions in aircraft systems,
disruption to navigation signals, radio communications, power
generation and power lines, and other effects (see Figure).
The UK has a considerable financial interest
in the systems affected. For example, a modern telecommunications
satellite costs about $200 million to build, about $100 million
to launch into geostationary orbit and insurance rates are between
3% and 5% each year. There are more than 300 satellites in geostationary
orbit alone. More than half all space insurance is done through
London, and the UK has major satellite construction and service
(operator) industries.
The benefits of a space weather programme are
extremely difficult to quantify since loss estimates from companies
are not available due to the possibility of losing a large contract
in the future. However, other countries consider the problem sufficiently
important to fund their own space weather centres to support commercial
and defence interests. For example, the USA funds a Space Environment
Centre, which conducts research, makes predictions and issues
warnings and advice on space weather events. The US Air Force
also funds it own centre. More widely, Japan, France, Russia,
Canada and even countries such as Poland have a national space
weather centre.
The UK has no national space weather programme
or policies. It has considerable relevant scientific research
expertise, which is mainly funded through the Particle Physics
and Astronomy Research Council (PPARC). The Natural Environment
Research Council (NERC) has decided not to fund space weather,
even as a hazard, within its new strategy. Within the ESA space
weather falls between the science programme and application programmes,
and therefore receives very little funding or support. The EU
does not support space weather.
We ask the committee to:
Consider the UK commercial and
defence interests at stake;
Recognise that considerable
scientific expertise exists in the UK, but future funding is uncertain;
Consider whether a UK national
space weather programme or centre is desirable to provide funding
of research into applications.
1.2 Nuclear detonations in space
New research shows that if a nuclear weapon
were detonated in space today energetic particles from the explosion
would destroy all satellites in low earth orbit within a period
of one to two months. Defence, remote sensing and telecommunications
satellites would be most affected. The harmful particle radiation
would remain trapped in the Earth's magnetic field for years and
reduce the lifetime of GPS and communications satellites in higher
orbits. It is not clear when new satellites could be launched
again into low earth orbit. The growing possibility of a terrorist
nuclear state and local nuclear conflict make evaluation important.
The US Air Force and Navy are funding research
on methods to remove the harmful radiation by transmitting various
types of radio waves. This would protect satellites on orbit after
an event, and enable new satellites to be launched. The UK has
considerable expertises across the Universities, Research Council
Institutes, and Defence industry which could be pulled together
to determine ways of removing the radiation. However, in the UK
the problem has not been clearly identified, nor a need expressed
for research in this area.
We ask the committee to:
Recognise the scale of damage
that could be caused to defence and commercial satellites after
a nuclear explosion in space;
Note that this risk has risen,
as more countries acquire nuclear capability and the growing possibility
of a nuclear terrorist state;
That effective measures to remove
radiation after an explosion in space are possible, but require
research that crosses the both Defence and Research Council remits;
Consider whether the UK should
lead a research programme in this area, and how it may be best
organised, for example, nationally and or as an EU/ESA security
initiative of the GMES programme.
2. UK STRATEGIC
ISSUES
2.1 UK leadership in space
The UK has a tradition of leadership in certain
sectors of the space industry but is facing a growing challenge
from other nations which are investing heavily in space and space
technology. As the development time for major ESA missions becomes
longer and longer, it is difficult to maintain the capacity of
the science and technology base.
We ask the committee to
Consider the visibility and
success of BNSC;
Consider how BNSC or a new space
agency may take a stronger leadership role;
Consider ways of maintaining
the space technology capacity eg through more bilateral missions
and/or UK micro-satellite opportunities.
2.2 Climate change and Research Council funding
There is increasing evidence that the particles
and magnetic fields ejected from the Sun (the solar wind) have
a significant influence on the climate system. This has been identified
as one of the largest unknown causes of climate change in the
most recent Inter Governmental Panel on Climate Change report.
This science transcends the remit of the Natural Environment Research
Council and the Particle Physics and Astronomy Research Council
(soon to be become the Science and Technology Facilities Council)
but cooperation between the Research Councils has been very limited
and has impeded research.
Cross-research council and interdisciplinary
science have been recognised as key issues in the Government's
Next Steps and acknowledgement of the issues but practical steps
to address the problems appear some way off.
We ask the committee to:
Recognise that there are significant
impediments to progress in cross-research council working, space
being an excellent illustration;
Consider using space as an exemplar
to improve cross-council delivery.
November 2006
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