Select Committee on Transport Sixth Report


INTRODUCTION


The Watermen's Revolt

1. Ministers might have been forgiven if they had expected the Regulations introducing the new National Boatmasters' Licence (BML) to sail smoothly through Parliament.[1] They were subject to the negative procedure so there was no necessity for any debate in Parliament; the Regulations had only to be laid before both Houses.[2] The Regulations were fiercely opposed, primarily but not exclusively by the Company of Watermen and Lightermen of the River Thames and other organisations representing masters on the River.[3] They felt that the new licensing system represented a lowering of the previous high standards that they upheld. In an echo of their predecessors' complaint of 1641, that "the River is overburdened with watermen … many of them unskilful, to the danger of many passengers' lives", the Thames Watermen argued that the new licensing standards, which (among other things) reduced the training period for a master to qualify for work on the Thames, were detrimental to safety on the River. [4]

2. The Regulations were attacked first in a debate in Westminster Hall on Thames pleasure craft, then in a committee debate on the Regulations themselves, for which the Government made time in response to objections from the Opposition.[5] Unusually, the Opposition then made further time for a vote in the House on the subject, even though no further debate was possible.[6]

3. During these exchanges, it became clear that the Minister took the view that the Company of Watermen and Lightermen was a "cosy club", which excluded people from different backgrounds from becoming watermen and that prospective watermen needed the support of "close friends and family members" who were watermen themselves.[7] The Watermen were keen to refute this assertion and they provided us with evidence that they are making significant efforts to reach out to people who might not normally be expected to seek out a career on the River. Though some of the Watermen who gave evidence to us told us they were the descendents of several generations of watermen, witnesses pointed out that the fact that prospective watermen tend to be drawn from families with a connection to the River was primarily because the nature of the work and its associated rewards was simply not attractive to many people. Widening participation and access to careers on the River is important, both as a matter of principle and for the long-term viability of the industry. We are pleased to see that the Company of Watermen and Lightermen has recognised this and is reaching out to those for whom a career on the River might not seem to be an obvious choice. Equally, we are concerned that the Government's approach to the Company and to the new licensing arrangements might have been coloured by poorly-founded concerns about nepotism among the Thames Watermen.

4. If the new licence was controversial, it became clear to us that it was also a difficult area where there was significant scope for misunderstanding on all sides. Both the new Licence and the old regimes it replaces are complex. The new licence is a modular one which permits of numerous variations, from a Tier 2 licence for use on canals to a Tier 1 licence with multiple endorsements allowing the holder to carry out a range of operations on tidal estuaries and limited coastal operations. The old system was a 'patchwork' of different qualifications relating to different types of vessel, different parts of the UK's classified waters and different types of operation. Some operations which formerly did not require a licence have been included in the new licensing requirement. Despite the amount of Parliamentary time already devoted to the subject, we felt that this was an area where a select committee inquiry could make a positive contribution, not least by shedding light where previous activity had generated rather more heat. We resolved to investigate the new Licence, in order to establish whether or not it represented a reduction in standards, and announced our intention to do so on the day the Regulations were debated in committee.[8]

5. An explanation of how the new Licence works is at the Annex on page 29 and a complete description is published in Merchant Shipping Notice 1808 (M) and associated documents.[9] The reader who is unfamiliar with the new licence might find it helpful to refer to the Annex before reading the rest of this Report.

6. The question of standards is particularly vexed. In some areas, the new Licence has clearly raised standards by requiring some masters who did not previously need a licence to hold one. Licences to operate on the tidal Thames,[10] which were formerly issued by the Company of Watermen and Lightermen on behalf of the Port of London Authority (PLA), were previously very difficult to obtain, requiring ten weeks' shore-based study and a five-year apprenticeship in most cases.[11] The fact that the old PLA licence represented a particularly high standard of training and competence is reflected by the transitional arrangements, under which Thames boatmasters are entitled to convert their qualification to a higher grade of licence than the holders of other qualifications.[12]

THE TIDAL THAMES: A SPECIAL CASE

7. Although the Thames boatmasters are not alone in their objection to the new Licence, they have been very much at the forefront of the campaign against it. The Thames is the busiest and most complex inland waterway in the UK. Like any estuarial river, navigation can be extremely challenging. The Port of London is the second largest port in the UK, handling more than 50 million tonnes of cargo each year, some of it hazardous. It includes the world's largest sugar cane refinery, an oil refinery with a capacity of 10 million tonnes and the largest sea-dredged aggregates terminal in Europe. It is a major destination for cruise ships, accommodating around 50 each year, and passenger ships on the Thames carry more than two million people annually, including both journeys for pleasure and passenger transport services licensed by Transport for London (TfL).[13] It is also used extensively for leisure and sporting purposes.

8. The new BML is a national licence and we have considered its likely impact throughout the UK's classified waters. However, the Thames is clearly a special case and we have therefore considered it separately from the rest of the inland waterway network in some contexts.

Safety on the inland waterways

9. The comparative safety of the inland waterways should not obscure the fact which was so powerfully put to us by Mr Malcolm Williams of the Marchioness Action Group, that even a single collision or contact can visit the most terrible consequences on many hundreds of people:

Even where passengers' lives are not at risk, every ship carries a crew who have the right to expect the very highest safety standards on waterways which are their places of work. Cargo can also be hazardous, and the spilling of oil, fuel or other contaminating cargoes has the potential to cause significant and widespread environmental damage.

10. Between 1991 and 2006, a total of 835 accidents—around one a week, on average—were reported to the Chief Inspector of Marine Accidents, who heads the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB).[15] The figure is low, but the statutory meaning of an "accident" in this context is broad enough to include, among other things, any incident in which the ship is disabled, the bursting of a pipeline within the vessel, the failure of a hatch-cover and any contact by a person with loose asbestos fibre.[16] The number of accidents in the sense in which most people would understand the term—collisions between vessels or contact between a vessel and a fixed hazard such as a bridge—is therefore likely to be even lower.

SAFETY ON THE THAMES

11. The PLA collects more detailed information about incidents on the Thames.[17] These are subdivided into two categories: "safety incidents" and the less serious "navigational occurrences". Each incident is also given a severity rating from 0 to 4.[18] This data provides a more detailed picture of safety on the Thames than the MAIB data quoted above. Between 2002 and 2006, there were a total of 139 safety incidents on the Thames, around one a fortnight. Of these, two-thirds (92) had a severity rating of 0 or 1, meaning that they involved, at most, a single, slight injury or minor property damage. There were no incidents of severity rating 4,[19] and only six of severity rating 3, around one each year.[20] Not all these accidents involved holders of a Thames Waterman's licence: 23 involved private leisure craft and 61 involved seagoing vessels whose masters require an STCW licence.[21] Thames Watermen are therefore involved in only a small number of incidents each year, most of them very minor, and in fewer accidents that the seagoing, STCW-licensed masters.

12. The inland shipping industry as a whole has a strong safety record. The Company of Watermen and Lightermen of the River Thames and the Port of London Authority in particular can rightly be proud of their record in maintaining high standards of safety on one of the most challenging inland waterways in Europe, if not the world. Against this background of high standards, it would be foolish to make any alteration to well-proven licensing arrangements except in the absolute confidence that no reduction in safety would result from it.

QUALITY OF ACCIDENT STATISTICS

13. Where there is no requirement for an accident to be reported to the MAIB, it might be reported to one of a variety of authorities, such as the local harbour master, the fire and rescue service, the MCA or the local RNLI station. Data about accidents on classified waters are therefore patchy and collated, to the extent that they are, by a range of agencies. Though the safety record on the inland waterways is generally good, the publication of reliable accident figures would help to emphasise the safety of water transport and boost confidence in the industry. It would also serve to alert those concerned with water safety at an early stage if any negative trends were to emerge. We were therefore pleased to learn of the work being carried out by the National Water Safety Forum, funded by the DfT, in putting together a single database of accident statistics.

14. One of the obstacles to the Forum's work is the fact that data is not collected on a consistent basis by different agencies in different areas. More worryingly, the Department's Head of Shipping Policy suggested to us that some agencies were reluctant to submit their data and that the government had "some persuading to do".[22] We do not think that the Government should have to resort to persuasion in trying to put together a clear picture of accident rates on the UK's classified waters. If the intra-governmental group is unable easily to secure the necessary co-operation of the agencies concerned, we recommend that Ministers intervene directly to make it clear to those public-sector agencies concerned that they must co-operate with the work of the National Water Safety Forum.


1   The Merchant Shipping (Inland Waterway and Limited Coastal Operations) (Boatmasters' Qualifications and Hours of Work) Regulations 2006 (S. I., 2006, No. 3223) (hereafter "the Regulations") Back

2   They were made under the European Communities Act 1972 and the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. For a detailed explanation of the procedure, see House of Commons Library Factsheet L7, Statutory InstrumentsBack

3   We took evidence from the Company of Watermen and Lightermen of the River Thames, the Watermen's and Lightermen's Practitioners' Committee and Transport on Water. For simplicity's sake we refer to this group of witnesses as "the Thames Watermen" throughout. Back

4   O'Riordan C, The Thames Watermen in the Century of Revolution (1992), Chapter 3. The quotation is from the Petition of the eight rulers of the watermen dated 3 May 1641. Back

5   Hansard, 10 January 2007, col 75WH. Sixth Delegated Legislation Committee, 24 January 2007. Back

6   Votes and Proceedings, 7 February 2007. Back

7   Q 383 and Hansard, 10 January 2007, cols 96-99WH. Back

8   Transport Committee Press Notice No. 10/2006-07, dated 24 January 2007. Back

9   The relevant publications are all available on the MCA's online "One Stop BML Shop" via www.mcga.gov.uk Back

10   Throughout this Report, references to "the Thames" are to the tidal River below Teddington Lock, unless otherwise specified. Back

11   Ev 2, paragraphs 3.1-3.8. Back

12   See paragraph 52, below. Back

13   Ev 131 Back

14   Q 180 Back

15   The MAIB in fact received 970 reports of accidents in this time, but some accidents involved more than one vessel and were therefore reported more than once. Back

16   The Merchant Shipping (Accident Reporting and Investigation) Regulations 2005, Regulation 3 (Meaning of "accident"). Back

17   Ev 88-95. Back

18   Ev 95, Annex. The severity rating reflects the scale of personal injury, the value of any property damage, the severity of any environmental impact and any negative impact on the business of the Port. Back

19   More than one death, damage in excess of £2 million. Back

20   One death or multiple major injuries, damage in excess of £0.5 million. Back

21   A seafarer's licence issued in accordance with the international Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping. See Marine Guidance Note 91 (M). Back

22   Qq 436-441 Back


 
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