Select Committee on Trade and Industry Eleventh Report


4  UK Trade and Investment with the A8/A2 Countries

70. UK exports to the A8/A2 have roughly doubled in value from around €5,500 million in 1997 to around €11,000 million in 2005. This figure represents about 2.25% of the UK's total export revenues.[103] UK exports to the A8/A2 have been increasing faster than UK exports to the EU as a whole, but growth in UK exports to the 'big three' of the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary has been slower than the equivalent growth in German, French, Italian, Spanish or American exports to these countries.[104] Indeed, UK exports to the A8/A2 grew at less than half the rate of French and German exports to the same region in the period 1997-2005.[105]

71. UK stocks of foreign direct investment (FDI) in the A8 stood at £5,550 million in 2005, the vast majority in Poland and the Czech Republic. The A8 therefore accounted for just over 1.5% of UK FDI in the EU (a substantial increase on 1.09% the previous year) and 0.8% of UK FDI worldwide. Noticeably the UK was not one of the top three investors in any A8 country in 2004—despite being the largest single investor in the EU15—and its share of FDI in the A8 was the lowest of any EU15 member state.[106] A8 stocks of FDI in the UK totalled just £36 million in 2005, with investments from countries other than the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland too small to be recorded in the ONS figures. To put this in context, Portugal alone invested £128 million in the UK in the same year.[107] Think London, the body responsible for attracting FDI into London, observed that it did not do enough business with the A8 to justify a response to our inquiry.

72. The British Chamber of Commerce in Hungary told us that the British presence was 'hardly noticeable' in terms of FDI flows into the country.[108] In part this is because UK investors had missed out on many of the large-scale privatisations of the 1990s—a message echoed in Lithuania and Slovakia. The Hungarian Investment and Trade Development Agency described UK investment in the Central and Eastern Europe region as 'moderate', accounting for just 1% of FDI stock in Hungary from EU countries in the period 2000-2005, despite the purchase of Budapest Airport in 2005.[109]

Missed Opportunities?

73. The extent to which UK business has missed out in Central and Eastern Europe varies from sector to sector. EEF told us that UK manufacturers had been slower than many of their major European competitors to move into Eastern Europe—not just countries like Germany with long established geographic, economic and cultural ties to the region but also countries like France, Italy and Spain. Nonetheless, they told us that interest in the region was increasing and that, whilst China still tops the list of locations where manufacturers want to invest, Central and Eastern Europe is now second.[110]

74. We were told repeatedly in all three countries that we visited that there were no major UK retail banks trading in the A8/A2—although there are some strategic partnerships between UK banks and banks in these countries. Several reasons were given for this, including the size of the market and fierce competition from other foreign owned banks. Businesses and officials we spoke to told us that a UK banking presence would assist UK companies—especially smaller companies—to enter these markets.

75. The evidence we received from various chambers of commerce suggested that there is a lack of knowledge about the A8/A2 countries among the UK business community. Greater Manchester Chamber of Commerce told us that UK business had been largely oblivious to opportunities in these countries until recently; meanwhile competitors such as Italy, Germany and France were actively involved in the A8/A2 countries long before they joined the EU, putting them several steps ahead of their UK competitors. Despite this, the Chamber identified an increasing interest in Central and Eastern Europe, citing for example a large scale investment by Vodafone in Romania in 2005.[111]

76. The Confederation of West Midlands Chambers of Commerce conducted a survey of their members which showed that 54% of those interviewed thought that the UK was not exploiting the opportunities offered by the accession of the A8/A2; we would be interested to know how many of these companies are involved in the A8/A2 themselves. They cited insufficient resources, time and knowledge as key reasons for this and perceived countries like Germany as having a more aggressive, government-supported trade strategy in the new EU member states.[112]

77. The British Chambers of Commerce accepted that "the UK and UK plc have been a little bit slow and little bit late in recognising the opportunities for exporting as well as other initiatives in Central and Eastern Europe. There is a certain amount of catch-up that has to take place to realise the massive potential which is growing [in these countries]". They cited a focus among UK business on doing business with existing partners and neighbours, a lack of government support for opening new markets compared to countries like Germany and geographical factors as key reasons behind this slow start. They also referred to a lack of confidence among UK businesses leading to a "fear factor" which deters business from investing overseas in new markets.[113] Intellect told us that companies needed access to better information about business conditions in the A8/A2.[114]

78. The importance of being involved in emerging markets early was emphasised by those UK companies which had invested early—that is, during the 1990s—in the Central and Eastern European economies. For example, Tesco—one of the most successful British investors in the region—stressed the importance of the knowledge gained during thirteen years of operations in the A8/A2 countries.[115] We heard that in Lithuania the financial services market is dominated by Scandinavian institutions that entered the market in the period 1995-2000, heavily supported by their respective governments, making it difficult for new entrants to the market. Nonetheless, none of the people we spoke to believed that all the opportunities in these countries had been missed; rather that companies looking to invest or export would have to work harder to find new markets than they would in the 1990s.[116]

79. There is a widespread belief among our witnesses both in the UK and overseas that UK businesses were slow to take advantage of the opportunities opened up by the ending of Soviet control of Central and Eastern Europe and the A8/A2's subsequent accession to the European Union. Whilst interest in some sectors—such as manufacturing—is growing and beginning to make an impact, it is clear that investing early in newly opened markets brings significant competitive advantages. This echoes the findings of our predecessor Committee in the 1997-1998 and 1999-2000 sessions. We were therefore particularly disappointed to find that many of the concerns raised in those Reports about UK reluctance to invest in or trade with the Baltic and Central European states were repeated almost word for word by our witnesses in this inquiry. In particular it is regrettable that the UK retail banking sector has failed to establish a presence in these markets.

80. In view of the evidence we received in this inquiry stressing the importance of being well informed and investing early in rapidly developing economies, we propose to conduct an inquiry into the future of trade and investment relations with Turkey.

81. During our inquiry we came to the conclusion that a major reason for the relative lack of UK investment and trade with the A8/A2 was an 'iron curtain in the mind' of UK businesses. We were particularly concerned to hear from the British Chambers of Commerce that many UK businesses lack the confidence to invest in emerging markets. Awareness of developments in Central and Eastern Europe appears to be lagging behind reality. This raises the question as to whether an organisation such as UKTI should entirely follow the priorities of business, or whether it should be more active in promoting areas where UK business may be missing out and educating them about the vibrancy, high skills and ambitions of many of these economies.

82. As with our previous inquiries into trade and investment opportunities in Mercosur, China and India we heard that other countries make more frequent use of Ministerial visits for trade promotion purposes. We believe that British ministers—especially those in trade promotion roles—should follow the example of our competitors and travel abroad more frequently to promote the UK interest. To assist in this, firm agreements should be established between government and opposition to ensure that ministers on trade missions should not have to return to the House to vote, other than in the most exceptional circumstances. In this context we welcome the current Minister for Trade Promotion and Investment's announced intention to spend more time undertaking such overseas visits as a step in the right direction. We note, however, that many of our competitors more regularly use much more senior ministers, including prime ministers and presidents to lead trade missions and assist in the negotiation of major deals than is the tradition for British ministers.

Trade Promotion

83. We heard several times during our inquiry that UKTI resources were being diverted away from the A8/A2 as a result of them not being designated as 'emerging economies'. We are concerned that UKTI has adopted a 'one size fits all' approach to European Union member states—cutting back on resources in the A8/A2 at a similar rate to the resources in the EU15. The A8/2 are in many ways more accessible markets, especially for SMEs, than other rapidly growing economies. Nonetheless the lack of awareness of opportunities in these countries suggests there is still a significant need for advice and assistance over and above that which is required in more established markets. Although 'emerging markets' may not be the most appropriate term for these economies, we think there is a good case for some, or all, of the A8/A2 to receive priority attention from UKTI.

Relocation

84. Since the opening of the Central and Eastern European economies, and particularly since their accession to the European Union, there have been a series of high-profile relocations of production facilities from the UK to the A8/A2 countries. This is particularly true in the manufacturing and automotive sectors. EEF evidence to us shows that 17% of surveyed UK manufacturing companies in 2004 who had located any production overseas had chosen new EU member states in Eastern or Central Europe.[117] The SMMT noted that passenger car production in Central and Eastern Europe had doubled over the period 1997-2005 and expressed the view that production would continue to relocate from the UK eastwards.[118] Our Report into the future of the UK automotive industry agreed with this assessment, concluding "we believe that the closure of car plants in Western Europe and the opening of up-to-date facilities in Eastern Europe, using cheaper labour, will continue."[119] Media reports have claimed a significant negative impact on employment in certain areas of the UK caused by off-shoring production to Central and Eastern Europe. For example, earlier this year BBC Wales ran a documentary 'Going East' which claimed that 4,500 jobs had been lost in Wales due to relocation to Eastern Europe—a claim picked up in the local press.[120]

85. The European Commission report on the impacts of enlargement cites several studies that show a small negative impact (around 1% of all employment) in countries which have closer economic ties with the A8/A2, such as Germany and the Netherlands—an impact concentrated on lower-skilled, manual workers.[121] Studies also suggest that these countries have experienced a counteracting positive impact on employment as a result of increased competitiveness resulting from offshoring. For example, a survey conducted in Germany found that 20% of companies surveyed said they had shifted jobs eastwards as a result of enlargement but 60% of these companies said such investments had preserved jobs in their German operations by making them more competitive.[122]

86. Similarly, a research paper by two economists from the OECD concluded that the productivity gains and resulting job creation generated by offshoring were sufficient to offset the jobs originally lost in the 'home' country and, in some cases, result in a net increase in 'home' employment. This does not imply that the process is without cost to the domestic labour force; the authors concede that the additional jobs generated are likely to have higher skill requirements than those lost—increasing the value of the business and therefore the economy, but potentially excluding those who were affected by the original relocation.[123]

87. Intellect told us that, in their sectors, offshoring business functions to the A8/A2 countries is driven by the need to remain competitive by accessing a wider talent pool and reducing costs.[124] A report by the consultancy Ovum into the impact of offshoring in the software and IT industries found that onshore labour costs were increasing faster than market growth—a situation that they concluded was unsustainable. Ovum estimated that to remain competitive, the percentage of the workforce employed by UK-owned software and IT companies based overseas had to increase from 13% in 2005 to 26% in 2008—a total reduction in UK headcount of 21,000. Increased competitiveness would result in employment gains in the UK, but importantly—and contrary to the findings of the Hijzen and Swaim paper cited above—only 5,500 jobs would be created in this way, leading to a net loss of 15,500 jobs over the three year period.[125]

88. It was stressed in evidence to us that the accession of the A8/A2 into the European Union occurred over a similar timescale to the integration of China, India and other emerging economies into the world market.[126] The European Commission in its report on enlargement noted that the impacts of A8/A2 accession "mirror closely" those of globalisation more generally.[127] The House of Lords European Union Committee in its report on the possible further enlargement of the EU noted that the sectors which had come under most pressure from the addition of the A8/A2 were those which had also come under most pressure from global competition, including automotive, pharmaceuticals and ICT. They argued that "for the investing companies, the choice was not between producing in their home companies or in a cheaper location. The choice was between cutting costs or losing market shares—and thus reducing employment at home anyway."[128] The British Chambers of Commerce agreed with this assessment; they told us that the key to ensuring that the UK did not begin to lose economically through offshoring was to maintain a competitive environment in the UK for the high-value-added aspects of production, design, research and development.[129]

89. The accession of the A8/A2 has led some companies to move production and other business activities from the UK to these countries. This has led to concern that UK jobs are being 'exported' overseas. The evidence we received suggests that a degree of relocation has been necessary to maintain UK companies' competitiveness in the face of global competition and can be compensated for to some extent by resulting gains in employment in higher value-added areas of the same industry. Nonetheless, it is clear that some sectors—such as IT and automotive—are experiencing net reductions in their UK based workforce. We would welcome a comprehensive study into the net effects on UK business and employment of relocation overseas to inform public policy responses more accurately.

90. Although the A8/A2 have proved attractive locations for UK companies looking to offshore some of their business activities, the evidence we received suggests that the phenomenon itself was not a direct consequence of these countries' accession to the European Union. Rather, relocation overseas has been driven by global competition from a variety of locations—including the A8/A2 but also Asia and more widely.


103   Ev60 (DTI) Back

104   Ev99 (EEF) Back

105   Ev62 (DTI) Back

106   Enlargement Two Years after, p. 71; Ev 60 (DTI) Back

107   Office for National Statistics, Foreign Direct Investment 2005, http://www.statistics.gov.uk/pdfdir/fd1206.pdf Back

108   Ev74 Back

109   Ev77 'Hungarian Investment and Trade Development Agency' Back

110   Ev100-1(EEF); Q14 (EEF) Back

111   Ev105 (Greater Manchester Chamber of Commerce) Back

112   Ev85('Confederation of West Midlands Chambers of Commerce) Back

113   Qq184, 191 and 201; Ev72-73  Back

114   Q154 (Intellect) Back

115   Ev130 ('Tesco) Back

116   Q11 (EEF) Back

117   Ev98 (EEF) Back

118   Ev128 (SMMT) Back

119   Trade and Industry Committee, Fourth Report of Session 2006-2007, Success and Failure in the UK Car Manufacturing Industry, HC399, para. 12 Back

120   South Wales Echo, 22 May 2007,'Jobs go east' Back

121   Enlargement Two Years after, p. 74 Back

122   Katinka Barysch (2006) Enlargement Two Years On, p. 14; Q 259 'Katinka Barysch' Back

123   Alexander Hijzen and Paul Swaim (2007) Does Offshoring Reduce Industry Employment?, pp. 19-20 Back

124   Ev113 (Intellect); Q148 (Intellect) Back

125   Ovum (2006) The Impact of Global Sourcing on the UK Software and IT Sector, pp. 11-14 Note this does not take into account estimates of potential employment losses due to falling competitiveness.  Back

126   Q259 (Katinka Barysch) Back

127   European Commission European Enlargement Two Years On, p. 57 Back

128   European Union Committee of the House of Lords, 53rd Report of Session 2005-2006, The Further Enlargement of the European Union: Threat or Opportunity?, HL 273, para. 81  Back

129   Q187 (British Chambers of Commerce) Back


 
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Prepared 18 October 2007