Memorandum submitted by Bridget Rosewell,
It is hard to discern the purpose of this report,
beyond a list of achievements and of lengthy descriptions of minor
Thinking back to a decade ago, the Pre-Budget
Report was billed to increase the transparency of the Budget process
by adding to the interim review of the state of the economy and
the old process of setting out spending plans a more balanced
view of government finances which also signalled new tax initiatives.
If only this was the outcome. It is impossible
in this report to easily separate the new from old announcements.
Some tables do thishere we discover that the Chancellor
is proposing to raise another £2 billion in taxes, half of
which comes from airline passengers and the other half from various
changes to corporation tax and other business tax arrangements.
However, this is not a "Pre-Budget" announcement but
a "Budget" one. No consultation required.
And on the state of government finances, and
how they are projected to perform, there is little until after
p140. The previous pages are a paean of praise for the government's
record in everything that you could possibly imagine and proposals
on everything from children's reading to women's enterprise and
why the business formation rate by women is lower in the UK than
in the US. For example, we find described a scheme called "Every
Child a Reader", which aims to help 30,000 children with
their reading. This is not to say the scheme is not worthyit
may or may not bebut can hardly be judged or evaluated
as part of a report such as this.
The report is therefore full of waffle and twiddle
and commissions and reports and investigations. It is probably
also full of twaddle but it is very hard to tell. When you contemplate
the cost of preparing this magnum opus and the time also spent
trying to read it and work out what it means by all of the commentators
and economists, it is hard to see whether the benefits outweigh
the costs. And it is hard not to be suspicious that the purpose
of all the flowery phrases is to disguise reality. Discomfort
might not be so acute if some of the pronouncementsaround
efficiency in the public services and cost savings for examplewere
not so reminiscent of the pronouncements of achievements under
Soviet five year plans.
So here are some reality checks.
The golden rule will be met because the economic
cycle is about to come to an end. This is planned for early 2007
and will therefore mean that the public finances have been just
in surplus over this cycle. But "the cycle" is not a
simple concept. The start and end of a cycle are meant to be identified
as points where the economy is in balance and on trend. The chart
on p 33 of the PBR illustrates this. The output gap apparently
closed but then opened again in 2004, and so the cycle was not
held to be complete.
Chart 2.6: Fiscal policy supporting monetary policy
Note: The fiscal stance equals the annual change in the cyclally=adjusted PSNB. The effect of the automatic stabilisers equals the change in the cyclical component of PSNB, i.e. the difference between PSNB and the cyclically-adjusted PSNB.
Source: HM Treasury
Indeed if the chart's projections are correct
the cycle will never be complete, as the economy does not pass
into a position in which it is above trend.
There are several issues here. One is what the
trend position might be and the other is how it is in any case
dependent on the actions of government itself. The rhetoric suggests
that the economy operates in one place while the government manages
the fiscal position. But since the government itself takes such
a large share of resources and uses them directly as well as in
redistribution, there is no independence of management.
Further, there are still no well established
and empirically verified theories of the cycle which could be
used to anchor points at which a cycle begins or ends. Each cycle
is unique. In these circumstances, policy has been locked onto
a base which can only be created by the application of considerable
amounts of judgement and all the arcane discussions cannot disguise
this. Appropriate choice of dates will always produce some kind
of answer, and since data is so often revised, backward looking
analysis will then always produce a different answer, so no position
can ever be falsified subsequently.
However, what is beyond dispute is that the
public finances are in considerable disarray if we are so close
to the end of the cycle. In both last year and this, borrowing
has been bigger than planned. £15 billion last year, and
£8 billion this. If it is indeed the case that the cycle
is ending then finances should also be close to balance. They
Plans for continued spending growth are also
extensive, and again there is no clear presentation of why until
you reach the appendices. The tax take is expected to rise by
6.6% in 2007-08 and will then be over 40% of GDP. At the same
time, investment is set to rise by 13%, and then by hardly anything.
The report speaks extensively of taking forward
the Eddington recommendations and the Barker review of planning
and of making it possible for greater public and private investment.
At the same time, it faces overruns on investments which are being
made, such as the Olympics, and is failing to guarantee that the
important investments in urban transport to keep London moving,
such as Crossrail, can be made.
In the section on investment, the report discusses
the incentives to make long term investment when costs of finance
are low and how this creates an upside for business. Surely it
should create an upside opportunity for the government as well.
A simple person might think this is a simple
question. In a developed economy, operating under market conditions,
there is not much variation in long term growth. If we simply
take the available statistics and an average, then this should
be the answer. The usual answer is the same as the Treasury's
previous view of the matter, that is 2.5%. However, in this Pre-Budget
report, the rate has been raised to 2.75%.
It is important to realise that this is not
what is meant by the trend growth concept as used by the Treasury.
They want to ask what the potential growth rate is over the cycle.
Such growth depends on two key factors, the number of people likely
to be working and the productivity that they have. Employment
multiplied by productivity equals total output. Thus the prospective
growth over the next cycle, which is what the Treasury are trying
to measure, depends on the assumptions made about these two elements.
It is unfortunate that they are both uncertain.
Population growth is provided by demographers,
immigration is guessed at by the same people. From this can be
derived the number of people who might work, depending both on
the ability to forecast the numbers of working age and the proportion
who will work. All of this is difficult. The Chart shows how estimates
and forecasts of migration have previously been wrong, and there
may be considerable measurement error in the statistics themselves.
They are based on 3,000 interviews held at a limited numbers of
ports and airports. They rely on individuals giving truthful answers
to a question on their likely length of stay. If, as many suspect,
there are indeed more people already here and working, then measured
productivity will be too high and the government's view on its
acceleration too rosy.
Chart 5: Net migration outturns and GAD projections
Source: ONS and GAD
Output growth then depends on the estimate of
productivity growth. The measurement of productivity is much more
fraught than is usually thought. Industries in which the UK is
a world leader such as retailing and financial services, apparently
have poor productivity records. Equally, there are considerable
revisions on a continuous basis to this series.
So this upward revision rests on some very uncertain
areas of analysis. The Treasury buttress their conclusion by comparing
their view with that of other forecasters. These are however also
not looking at trend growth as the simple person understands it.
These figures are the average growth numbers for future years
published by the forecasters in question. They mostly use cyclical
models which are driven by some underlying assumptions taken from
the same kinds of sources as the Treasury models. So it is not
surprising that the same results. In addition, most of the analysis
in the most recent report on long term growth looks at only two
cycles and concentrates on the most recent.
This is not of course to say that the conclusions
are definitively wrong, but the caution that they say they are
showing is likely still to be insufficient.
Moreover, there are distinct signs that pressures
may be rising in the opposite direction which would reduce growth
potential. Businesses and self-employed increasingly report that
regulation and nannying is stifling enterprise and innovation.
The cost of form filling and the greatly increased numbers of
persons employed to inspect, regulate and interfere produce a
disincentive to take risks in the hope of reward. This is now
too often described as greedy speculation.
11 December 2006