Memorandum submitted by the European Private
Equity & Venture Capital (EVCA)
The UK Private Equity and Venture Capital market
is arguably the most developed and mature national market in Europe,
and thus has an important role to play in shaping wider transnational
discussions. EVCAthe European Private Equity and Venture
Capital Association- would therefore like to submit evidence to
the Treasury Select Committee to help frame its analysis within
the wider European context and support that made by its British
colleagues at the British Venture Capital Association, the BVCA.
EVCA was established in 1983 and based in Brussels.
It represents the European private equity and venture capital
industry (PE/VC) and promotes the asset class within Europe and
throughout the World.
EVCA's 1,150 members represent over 80% of PE/VC
capital under management in Europe
. Its members represent all main industry stakeholders, from PE/VC
fund management companies to Institutional investors (banks, pension
funds, insurance companies, family offices ... ), to professional
advisors (lawyers, placement agents, investment bankers ...) and
national (European) Trade Associations
EVCA's role includes representing the interests
of the industry to regulators and standard setters; developing
professional standards; providing industry research; professional
development and forums, facilitating interaction between its members
and key industry participants including institutional investors,
entrepreneurs, policymakers and academics.
PE/VC has a positive economic and social impact.
Across the EU, since 2000, the industry has invested over 270
billion of equity capital and has financed over 56,000 companies,
and represents employment for some 6.5 million persons
. Between 2000-04, EVCA-commissioned academic research found that
the industry had created 1 million new jobs across Europe, including
400,000 in the buyout sector, net of any reductions due to business
The tremendous growth of the industry has brought
more visibility to the asset class and increased interest by all
stakeholders. This has resulted in a number of recent reviews
of PE/VC by regulators and authorities, and places an increasing
onus on the industry to help stakeholders understand its business
model and its implications.
In response, EVCA is continuing its open dialogue
with policymakers and stakeholders to explain the larger role
of PE/VC in making the economy more dynamic and competitive, address
misconceptions around the industry's business model, and further
develop its unique set of professional industry standards
as a self-regulatory contribution in the light of principles-based,
"better regulation" initiatives.
Before presenting its responses to the Select
Committee's questions, by way of brief summary and to help frame
the remarks that follow, the following description of PE/VC is
presented as a point of departure
"Private equity is the provision of capital
and management expertise to companies in order to create value
and subsequently, with a clear view to an exit, generate capital
gains after a medium to long holding period. In Europe the terms
"venture capital" and "private equity" or
"risk capital" are often used interchangeably ... Private
equity is used as the generic term to encompass all the sub-sets
of financing stages. These include three main sub-categories (1)
venture capital for start-up businesses and early stage companies;
(2) later stage expansion capital; and (3) management buy-outs
and management buyins ...
For investors, the attraction of private equity
lies in the potential (risk-adjusted) performance of such investments
relative to quoted equity. Such performance is the direct consequence
of creating sustainable value through taking more direct and long
term influence in investee companies than public equity investments
allow. It is the more active entrepreneurial ability to create
value in the interim period which is the real core of private
Typical characteristics of the Private Equity
1. Investment by a dedicated professional
team predominantly in unquoted companies;
2. Drawing capital from a defined pool;
3. Negotiated contractual relationship with
4. Involving active ownership driving value
5. Involving stand-alone management of each
6. Investing on the basis of a medium to
long term strategy and holding period;
7. With a focus on financial gain through
exit by sale or flotation.
8. Profit-sharing schemes which align interests
9. Strong self-regulation with defined reporting
and valuation requirements;
EVCA would welcome any comments on the enclosed
and remains at the disposal of the Select Committee.
The regulatory environment
The current framework is generally appropriate,
even if EVCA also notes the lack of interlinkage between national
regimes. However, pan-EU legislation is not always suited to current
market practices, or developments.
Transparency is a key factor in the success
and growth of PE/VC. EVCA has developed the highest professional
standards to build stable, long-term relationships with institutional
investors and regulators and increase overall transparency and
trust in the asset class.
Excessive leverage and systemic risks
Recent analysis tends to show that the average
ratio of European debt contributions as a percentage of total
buyout transaction value has not varied substantially over recent
years, and debt ratios of PE/VC-backed firms expressed as a percentage
of their total assets do not significantly differ from quoted
blue-chip companies. Moreover, systemic risk from PE/VC to global
financial markets, as part of a risk-adjusted investment portfolio,
The current corporate status of private equity
Within the current underlying tax and legal
environment across Europe, PE/VC funds are structured according
to their specific investors needs and requirements to maximise
the returns on their investments.
The PE/VC industry and its investors are not
asking for or looking for "no tax" but are seeking a
fair tax treatment: tax transparency and tax neutrality.
The economic context
PE/VC firms distinguish themselves from short-term
investors by the way they manage their investments. Specifically,
PE-buyout firms aim to improve the health of existing companies
in order to fully benefit from favourable market developments.
The growth of PE/VC can be attributed to a number
of factors including demographic pressures in Europe and the need
by suitable investors to secure risk-adjusted premium returns
over the longer term through prudent allocations to PE/VC.
Company ownership by private equity funds as opposed
to public listing
EVCA would not draw a distinctive comparison
as both are complementary and support different types of companies
at different stages of their growth and development.
Is the current regulatory regime for private equity
1. Further to EVCA's recent response
to the UK FSA's recent discussion paper "Private equity:
a discussion of risk and regulatory engagement"
, it should be noted from the outset that the PE/VC industry deals
almost exclusively with sophisticated (professional, institutional)
investors on a professional basis, and as such is a contractual
business between parties of equal standing. As a result, PE/VC
regulation has been designed to the appropriateness of its investor
2. PE/VC is regulated at a national level
in almost all EU countries. The question as to whom is subject
to regulation is dependent on the type of legal entity, and either
Management Company and/or the PE/VC Fund vehicle and/or Senior
Management, decided on a national basis.
3. Furthermore, although not regulated on
a harmonised pan-European basis, PE/VC is subject to a number
of EU legislative measures, notably within the field of EU financial
4. By way of brief summary, a non-exhaustive
summary of the situation in a number of European countries is
Examples of current PE/VC regulation across
Europe (non exhaustive summary)
|No specific regulatory framework but specific tax regulation|
|Baltic States:||Estonia and Lithuania may adopt legislation in 2007 |
|Finland:||New legislation in place since early 2006 which treats VC funds similarly to direct investors and introducing new tax treatment for VC investments |
|France:||PE/VC Industry regulated by the AMF: A specific legal framework (FCPR) can be used for VC funds, funds of funds, buyouts. |
|Germany:||Currently two main types of funds: an unlicensed Limited Partnership (LP) structure, and a structure that is licensed at state level|
|Ireland:||A General Partner in a Limited Partnership does not have to be regulated however some funds have voluntarily chosen to be regulated by the Financial Services Regulator |
|Italy:||Fund regulation exists in the form of the "Fondo Chiuso"|
|Portugal:||Fund regulation exists with differences between sophisticated and retail investors |
|Slovenia:||A new law regulating Venture Capital is expected mid-2007.|
|Spain:||Industry regulated by the CNMV: New fund legislation since end of 2005. |
|Sweden:||Regulatory framework for LP (Limited Partnership) and LL (Limited Liability)|
|UK:||Industry regulated by the FSA (both PE/VC fund and managers)
5. Although EVCA believes that the current regulatory
and legislative framework is generally appropriate, EVCA also
notes the lack of interlinkage between national regimes. However,
pan-EU legislation is not always suited to current market practices
or developments. This was recently noted by EU Commissioner Mccreevy
who remarked that; "many Member States and at the EU level
need to understand better the way in which the private equity
industry is organised... We must be sure that cross-cutting financial
and company law does not generate unintended consequences for
the private equity industry".
6. EVCA is strongly supportive of the balanced, measured
and pragmatic approach taken by the UK FSA towards the PE/VC industry.
Specifically in respect of the UK regulatory environment, in its
recent paper, EVCA supports the FSA's conclusion that its "current
regulatory architecture is effective, proportionate and adequately
7. The UK has consistently been among the top 3 European
countries in respect of their environment for PE/VC, as seen in
the EVCA benchmark surveys
. The most recent indicators published last December demonstrated
again that the UK is at the forefront of European policy making
with respect to the industry.
8. Within this context and initiatives to advance principles-based
"better regulation", strong industry professional standards
can contribute to and result in more effective industry oversight.
9. European PE/VC has the most advanced self-regulatory
professional standards of any alternative asset class anywhere
in the world. These concern among others the valuation of portfolios,
reporting to investors, and corporate governance. In addition,
all EVCA's 1,150 members have signed and abide by a code of conduct,
a precondition for membership. EVCA also works to develop new
professional standards to cover additional topics such as disclosure
and is extending its code of conduct based on the IOSCO model.
All Guidelines are open to a stakeholder and public consultation
10. EVCA also intends to intensify co-operation with
regulators throughout Europe further to the growth of principles-based
"better regulation" initiatives which seek to provide
"confirmation of industry guidance
" such as that recently launched by the FSA, which will strengthen
oversight of the industry by providing further recognition of
the industry's own self-regulatory standards.
11. Further remarks on EVCA's and the PE/VC industry's
professional standards are provided as evidence below.
Is there sufficient transparency on the activities, objectives
and structure of private equity funds for all relevant interested
12. The PE/VC industry understands transparency as providing
full information to its direct investors and being accountable
to them. Investors in PE/VC funds have access to a lot of information,
and sometimes more than investors in public companies.
13. EVCA believes that transparency is a key factor in
the success and growth of PE/VC. As noted above, EVCA has developed
the highest professional standards build stable, long-term relationships
with institutional investors and regulators and increase overall
transparency and trust in the asset class. These standards are
in addition to statutory requirements
and enable professional investors such as Pension fund trustees
to fulfil their duties.
14. In terms of the transparency of PE/VC activities
and professional industry standards, it should be noted that the
industry provides full transparency and disclosure to its investors,
EVCA Reporting Guidelines, first published in
2000 and updated in 2006 which cover for example:
Fees and carried interest
International PE/VC Valuation Guidelines (Developed
by EVCA/ BVCA /AFIC (the French PE/VC Association), which cover
The concept of fair value
Principles of valuation
Moreover, these standards are consistent with IFRS and US
15. In addition, EVCA's Code of Conduct, which is signed
by all its members as a condition of membership covers among others:
Conduct business in a responsible and ethical
way (ie fair and honest dealing)
Ensure confidentiality on data and information
Disclose fully on syndicated deals
Implementing Anti Money Laundering measures
Ensuring a high standard of the investment portfolio
In light of the above, EVCA would not describe the PE/VC
industry as opaque. However, it would also note that the word
"disclosure" is also relevant to this discussion.
16. The PE/VC industry understands disclosure as the
provision of information to non-direct investors or on a public
17. EVCA is fully aware of the current debate over the
growing role of PE/VC within the European economy and thus a greater
need for public disclosure. This is a valid point and the PE/VC
industry is not against a review of this. EVCA has conducted own
work in this area since 2003
, and welcomes the ongoing work in the UK led by the BVCA and
chaired by Sir David Walker.
18. However it is important to distinguish between disclosure
to Investors, to whom the provision of specific and detailed information
is already covered by the EVCA Reporting Guidelines as noted above,
and disclosure to the General Public who have limited knowledge
of the practical workings of the PE/VC industry, including for
example the complex techniques used to value and measure investment
performance on the specific long-term based return curve ("J-curve").
19. There is no need to single out PE/VC-backed companies
when listed and non-listed companies (like family business) are
not requested to disclose more than that which is according to
national regulations. Investing in a company, and managing an
investment fund, can often require addressing specificities and
technicalities in respect of a private company's long-tem future;
often this cannot be disclosed to a wider public, taking into
account commercial sensitivities.
20. Furthermore, regulatory bodies issue statutory requirements
including the filling of financial information. These fillings
allow the General Public in most European countries to have access
to information at the level of portfolio companies such as sales,
turnover, debt/equity ratio and earnings. PE/VC-backed companies
are no different from any other private company in this regard.
21. However, there is no harmonised legislation or general
legal framework across Europe relating to the disclosure of PE/VC
information as national PE/VC markets across Europe are at different
stages of development and thus levels of maturity. It is thus
necessary to consider the situation in other, international, PE/VC
22. Therefore EVCA believes that the disclosure of PE/VC
information should not put the underlying investee companies at
a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace or undermine their
economic position. Revealing their underlying strategy would negatively
impact their growth capacity, as well as ultimately the company
workforce. This would lead to a lower acceptance of private equity
investment by private companies, and result in reduced returns
Has there been evidence of excessive leverage in recent transactions
and what systemic risks arise in consequence?
23. Recent FSA
and European Central Bank (ECB)
reports essentially into the "large buyout" category
of the PE/VC industry have addressed these issues from that perspective.
Before continuing, EVCA would firstly draw attention to the great
diversity of PE/VC firms, a very large number of whom do not raise
concerns in those areas, as their transactions often involve little
or no leverage.
24. The concept of overleveraging should be used with
caution, as it is clearly dependent on actual market conditions
and defaults occur not only in the PE/VC sphere.
25. Leveraging a company should be undertaken prudently
and be dependent on market conditions as it may jeopardize the
company's value and would have a negative impact on the value
of its investment. An overleveraged company per se will not produce
enough cash-flow to pay the interests of its debt and reimburse
this debt. All stakeholders are affected: debt providers, employees
and shareholders. Moreover, creditors generally refuse to provide
financing for a company that appears to be overleveraged.
26. Therefore, Private Equity buyout firms try to carefully
assess the level of debt of their investee companies. The decision
to lower the percentage of equity is normally motivated either
because the initial capital structure resulted from a sub-optimal
use of financial resources or because, as active shareholders,
buyout houses initiate strategies aimed to increase margins and
create higher cash-flows.
27. Recent analysis using Standard and Poor's data (S&P
LCD at www.pmdzone.com) tends to show that the average ratio of
European debt contributions as a percentage of total buyout transaction
value (1997Q3 2006) has not varied substantially over recent
years: this figure stood at 67% in 2006, compared to 66% in 2005,
and 64% in 2004. The figure for 2006 is even lower than the figure
for 1997 (70%).
Average European debt contributions as % of total transaction
value 1997Q3 2006
28. Moreover, when looking at companies PE buyout firms
listed on public markets in 2005-2006, their debt ratios expressed
as a percentage of their total assets do not significantly differ
from quoted blue chip companies.
Comparison of debt ratios of listed blue chip companies
with companies recently floated by their buyout houses (as % of
29. Therefore, private equity backed investee companies
do not appear overleveraged when compared to other firms.
30. In fact, a recent study carried out in Belgium involving
53 companies demonstrated that two years after a PE-backed buyout,
their cash flow on average represented 7% of sales compared to
4% before the buyout. This increase was achieved while the average
number of employee grew by more than 13% during the same period
31. To put the recent growth of PE/VC into perspective,
it should also be noted that of the Worldwide total investible
capital markets as of 2005, which amounted to some $93.4 Trillion,
PE/VC accounted for just 0.3%
32. The use of leverage at the level of the PE/VC fund
or fund of funds level, which could provoke systemic risk is very
rare. Indeed, regulation in several jurisdictions and the contractual
agreements between PE/VC investors (Limited Partners) and fund
managers (General Partners) either prevent this from occurring
or authorise it only at very low levels. This should be seen in
comparison with Hedge Funds, where funds can be leveraged several
times over and thus capable of provoking more systemic risk in
the financial system.
33. Therefore, as compared to other alternative asset
classes, EVCA would argue that systemic risk from PE/VC to global
financial markets when the asset class is deployed as part of
a risk-adjusted investment portfolio is low.
What are the effects of the current corporate status of private
equity funds, including both their domicile and ownership structure?
34. In the majority of EU countries, establishing and
operating a PE/VC fund as well as establishing and operating the
management company of the fund is a regulated activity
35. Within the current underlying tax and legal environment
across Europe, PE/VC funds are structured according to their specific
investors needs and requirements, who themselves must take into
account their own liabilities (for example to pensioners or insurance
policy holders) to maximise the returns on their investments.
36. Furthermore, the precise composition of the capital
structures used by PE/VC fund managers for the investee companies
they acquire is evolving over time and it is evident that large,
complex, cross-border transactions may involve the use of complex
structures. Notwithstanding, it does not seem to be within the
regulators domain to determine the preferable forms of ownership
in private companies.
37. The UK Limited Partnership Structure is not only
one of the most used PE/VC fund vehicles in Europe, it has also
ranked highly in EVCA benchmark
surveys of the PE/VC environment in Europe and many other European
countries have taken the UK Limited Partnership as their basis.
Is the current taxation regime for private equity funds and
investee firms appropriate?
38. Each European country has a single fiscal framework
that applies to all companies in a country, for example for the
treatment of debt interest.
39. It is important that political decision makers understand
that changes to the above not only affect the whole PE/VC industry
but also the whole corporate world. This is also important within
the context of achieving the European single market and facilitating
40. The PE/VC industry and its investors are not asking
for or looking for "no tax" but are seeking a fair tax
treatment: tax transparency and tax neutrality. Tax transparency
means investors should be treated as if they had directly invested
in the underlying investee company. Tax neutrality means avoiding
discrimination of PE/VC tax treatment as opposed to investments
in public equity.
41. On a pan-European level, EVCA has been advocating
for some time for a pan-European harmonised PE/VC fund structure
to address these and related issues.
42. Within the context of the Select Committee enquiry,
EVCA would like to draw attention to the following points which
are also specific to PE/VC and are currently under discussion
by a number of EU countries.
Debt Interest Tax Deductibility
43. Across Europe, debt interest tax deductibility is
available to all companies, within nationally defined limits which
govern among others debt/equity ratios.
44. PE/VC's business model is highly efficient and the
use of debt is a discipline that maximises the efficient use of
45. If taxation is imposed on the interest on debt, this
will not only damage PE/VC but the financial sector and the economies
of European Member states: it would equate to a tightening of
46. The management team of a PE/VC fund is requested
by fund investors to make a significant personal contribution
to the capital of the fund, and the profit sharing scheme ("carried
interest") align managers' interests with those of the fund's
investors. Carried interest is received in acknowledgement of
and financial compensation for the personal risk taken by fund
managers as individuals, and is not distributed before investors
have received their original capital, a special hurdle rate interest,
and own share of profit. Furthermore, any distribution of capital
gain to investors and managers is not possible before exiting
an investment: therefore based only on the actual performance
of the investment.
47. This reward structure is an important differentiator
for PE/VC as compared to the hedge fund model, where shared profits
to Hedge Fund managers are calculated and distributed regularly,
at a fixed date, on the actual market value of the investment,
even if it has not been exited: therefore based on the potential
performance of the investment.
48. Carried interest is thus a capital gain, and attracts
managers to the industry, who generate returns for their investors.
Therefore tax treatment of carried interest should be appropriate
to supporting this.
Are developments in the environment and structure of private
equity affecting investments in the long-term?
49. PE/VC fund investors have a long-term commitment
horizon of generally ten years, which stems from contractual agreements
which bind PE/VC funds to their investors (such as pension funds,
insurance companies and banks).
50. On this basis, PE/VC funds should not be considered
as short-term investors, which implies holding periods of less
than one year, as their average holding periods in investee companies
is 4 years.
51. More concretely, PE/VC firms also distinguish themselves
from short-term investors by the way they manage their investments.
Short-term investors take advantage of market trends but do not
influence the way the underlying companies operate. In particular,
PE Buyout firms have an opposite strategy, which first aims to
improve the health of underlying companies in order to fully benefit
from favourable market developments.
52. Regarding PE Buyout firms, they increase the value
of their investments through a combination of three elements:
1. Better use of financial resources, notably through
an appropriate use of debt
2. Improved company operations
3. Redesign and refocus of the corporate strategy
53. By acting on these three elements, PE Buyout firms
enhance the growth potential of companies until their value is
fully recognised by other investors, who then want to become shareholders
in the company themselves:
Better use of financial resources is implemented
relatively quickly and the results show rapidly.
Improving the operational quality of a company
takes longer and therefore more time is needed before the related
benefits start to surface.
Redesigning a company's corporate strategy is
a long-term endeavour, the outcome of which often takes years
54. Long holding periods apply to both SMEs and large
companies. A recent study conducted in 2006 revealed that PE Buyout
houses remained shareholders in their biggest companies for an
average of 3.5 years
55. Furthermore, the underlying economic strength of
PE/VC-backed companies is also demonstrated by their performance
after PE Buyout firms have decided to sell them. A recent study
showed that the share price of companies that were originally
supported by buyout houses outperformed other floated companies
by 11 percentage points three years after their IPO on a stock
56. Therefore, within this context and the important
job-creating role of PE/VC across Europe, with the PE/VC industry
as a whole investing some 50 billion into European companies
in 2006 and at least the same amount to be invested this year
(including some 16 billion raised/invested for VC investments
alone), and with 93% of all companies financed by PE/VC firms
by number having less than 500 employees
, it is arguable that PE/VC investments will have and are having
a long-term positive effect on the economy.
To what factors, including the current macroeconomic context
and position in the economic cycle, is the current rise of private
57. The growth of PE/VC can be attributed to a number
Demographic pressures such as ageing populations
in Europe and the need to secure risk-adjusted premium returns
over the longer term by suitable investors such as Pension Funds
and Insurance companies to meet their liabilities to their policyholders
through prudent allocations to PE/VC;
Generational change within European companies
as ownership patterns change means that particularity within a
number of countries within continental Europe there are a range
of existing companies that require new leadership to continue;
A benign economic environment with a period of
low interest rates has facilitated PE/VC investment; and
The superior alignment of interests between PE/VC
fund managers and company owners and effective oversight of the
investee company by active, strategic investors who focus on value
creation over longer time horizons have helped to continue to
generate superior returns, and which have continued to attract
What are the economic advantages and disadvantages of a firm
being owned by private equity funds as opposed to being publicly
58. EVCA would not draw such a distinctive comparison
between the public and private markets, as both are complementary
and serve to support different types of companies at different
stages of their growth and development. Moreover, specific legislation
and PE/VC industry professional standards place reporting and
internal control processes requirements on a company, listed or
59. When a PE/VC fund de-lists a company, it is part
of a strategy to be able to strengthen it through reorganisation,
often difficult to do under the quarterly earnings pressure of
stock markets, and then to re-list it once it is back in better
60. The key reason for delisting a company is its undervaluation
by stock markets, consequently, limiting its potential for development
and growth and going private becomes a preferred solution when:
Shareholders do not get the reward for their investment
and are likely to accept an offer from outside investors (PE/VC
or other). In return, shareholders receive liquidity and a premium
on the share price, which is why they support delisting, and;
The management of the undervalued company is limited
in trying to develop the company. It is difficult to raise equity
by issuing more shares given that interest from new investors
is low and that current shareholdings would be diluted. Additionally,
the company cannot increase its debt levels, as financial support
from banks is unlikely.
61. Each year, PE/VC identifies a small number of undervalued
companies for delisting. This should not be seen as a way to deny
existing shareholders value. Studies on UK and US pubic to private
transactions show that shareholders receive on average 45% more
for their investment than what the market would have given them
before the buyout deal was announced
. In the first 6 months of 2006, 10 companies were de-listed by
buyout houses, with 23 billion paid to their existing shareholders.
Public to Private Management Buyouts/Buyins (CE), 2000-2006
(% of all deals)
(% of all deals)
62. Finally, there are regulatory requirements that must
be fulfilled to delist a company, namely a large majority of shareholders
are required to accept the sale of their shares at the offer price.
For the UK, 75% of a company's shares are required to re-register
the target as a private company and 90% to "squeeze out"
Shareholders can also subsequently ask an independent investment
bank to analyze the offer.
Open Hearing on Investment Fund Expert Groups Reports, Brussels,
19 July 2006.
The data refers to the leverage loan market and covers loans that
are syndicated to borrowers in Europe. It only takes account of
LBO transactions, including all sponsored activity such as refinancing
Note: (*) denotes a company that has been recently floated by
a buyout firm in 2005/2006.
Source: EVCA. Back
Further information on EVCA is available online at www.evca.com Back
Source: EVCA. Back
"Employment Contribution of Private Equity and Venture Capital
in Europe": http://www.evca.com/images/attachments/tmpl_9_art_123_att_900.pdf Back
EVCA Professional Standards: http://www.evca.com/html/PE_industry/IS.asp Back
Text and characteristics drawn from the recent European Commission
Expert Group Report on Private Equity, June 2006: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/ucits/reports/equity_en.pdf Back
For more information, please see: http://www.evca.com/images/attachments/tmpl_8_art_225_att_1091.pdf Back
Charlie McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal Market and
EVCA Benchmarking of European tax and legal environments: http://www.evca.com/html/public_affairs/benchmark.asp Back
EVCA Professional Standards: http://www.evca.com/html/PE_industry/IS.asp Back
FSA's Discussion paper 06/5 "FSA confirmation of Industry
Guidance", November 2006: http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/library/policy/dp/2006/06_05.shtml Back
EVCA's Professional Standards can be found online at: http://www.evca.com/html/PE_industry/IS.asp Back
EVCA Barometer May 2003: "Disclosure-a snapshot on EVCA
members' opinion": http://www.evca.com/images/attachments/tmpl_27_art_8_att_373.pdf Back
Large Banks And Private Equity-Sponsored Leveraged Buyouts in
the EU, April 2007: http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/largebanksandprivateequity200704en.pdf Back
Source: S&P LCD at www.pmdzone.com Back
Source: EVCA-Latest company annual report (2005 or 2006) Back
Solvay Business School, Brussels (2006) "Private Equity
in Belgium-Value Creators or Locusts?" by Valentin Toubeau. Back
Source: UBS Global Asset Management / Adams Street Partners NVCA
Annual Meeting 2006. Back
EVCA Private Equity Fund Structures in Europe-January 2006: http://www.evca.com/html/publications/bookshop.asp Back
EVCA Benchmarking Tax and Legal Environments 2006: Back
Ernst & Young (2006), "How do European Private Equity
Investors Create Value?": http://www.ey.com/global/download.nsf/Finland/Private_Equity_tutkimus/$file/How%20do%20Private%20Equity%20investors%20create%20value.pdf Back
Ritter R. J. (2006): "Some factoids about the 2005 IPO Market":
Source: EVCA. Back
Wright M., Renneborg L., Simons T. and Scholes L. (2006): "Leveraged
buyouts in the U.K. and continental Europe: Retrospect and Prospect",
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI): http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=934939 Back
CMBOR/ Barclays Private Equity/ Deloitte (2006): "European
Management Buyouts": http://www.cmbor.org/ Back
SJ Berwin (2007): "Public-to-private: An overview":