Select Committee on Treasury Written Evidence

Memorandum submitted by the European Private Equity & Venture Capital (EVCA)


  The UK Private Equity and Venture Capital market is arguably the most developed and mature national market in Europe, and thus has an important role to play in shaping wider transnational discussions. EVCA—the European Private Equity and Venture Capital Association- would therefore like to submit evidence to the Treasury Select Committee to help frame its analysis within the wider European context and support that made by its British colleagues at the British Venture Capital Association, the BVCA.

  EVCA was established in 1983 and based in Brussels. It represents the European private equity and venture capital industry (PE/VC) and promotes the asset class within Europe and throughout the World.

  EVCA's 1,150 members represent over 80% of PE/VC capital under management in Europe[12] . Its members represent all main industry stakeholders, from PE/VC fund management companies to Institutional investors (banks, pension funds, insurance companies, family offices ... ), to professional advisors (lawyers, placement agents, investment bankers ...) and national (European) Trade Associations[13] .

  EVCA's role includes representing the interests of the industry to regulators and standard setters; developing professional standards; providing industry research; professional development and forums, facilitating interaction between its members and key industry participants including institutional investors, entrepreneurs, policymakers and academics.

  PE/VC has a positive economic and social impact. Across the EU, since 2000, the industry has invested over €270 billion of equity capital and has financed over 56,000 companies, and represents employment for some 6.5 million persons[14] . Between 2000-04, EVCA-commissioned academic research found that the industry had created 1 million new jobs across Europe, including 400,000 in the buyout sector, net of any reductions due to business restructurings[15] .

  The tremendous growth of the industry has brought more visibility to the asset class and increased interest by all stakeholders. This has resulted in a number of recent reviews of PE/VC by regulators and authorities, and places an increasing onus on the industry to help stakeholders understand its business model and its implications.

  In response, EVCA is continuing its open dialogue with policymakers and stakeholders to explain the larger role of PE/VC in making the economy more dynamic and competitive, address misconceptions around the industry's business model, and further develop its unique set of professional industry standards[16] as a self-regulatory contribution in the light of principles-based, "better regulation" initiatives.

  Before presenting its responses to the Select Committee's questions, by way of brief summary and to help frame the remarks that follow, the following description of PE/VC is presented as a point of departure[17] :

    "Private equity is the provision of capital and management expertise to companies in order to create value and subsequently, with a clear view to an exit, generate capital gains after a medium to long holding period. In Europe the terms "venture capital" and "private equity" or "risk capital" are often used interchangeably ... Private equity is used as the generic term to encompass all the sub-sets of financing stages. These include three main sub-categories (1) venture capital for start-up businesses and early stage companies; (2) later stage expansion capital; and (3) management buy-outs and management buyins ...

    For investors, the attraction of private equity lies in the potential (risk-adjusted) performance of such investments relative to quoted equity. Such performance is the direct consequence of creating sustainable value through taking more direct and long term influence in investee companies than public equity investments allow. It is the more active entrepreneurial ability to create value in the interim period which is the real core of private equity's attraction".

Typical characteristics of the Private Equity industry

    1.  Investment by a dedicated professional team predominantly in unquoted companies;

    2.  Drawing capital from a defined pool;

    3.  Negotiated contractual relationship with qualified/professional investors;

    4.  Involving active ownership driving value creation;

    5.  Involving stand-alone management of each individual company;

    6.  Investing on the basis of a medium to long term strategy and holding period;

    7.  With a focus on financial gain through exit by sale or flotation.

    8.  Profit-sharing schemes which align interests with investors;

    9.  Strong self-regulation with defined reporting and valuation requirements;

  EVCA would welcome any comments on the enclosed and remains at the disposal of the Select Committee.


The regulatory environment

  The current framework is generally appropriate, even if EVCA also notes the lack of interlinkage between national regimes. However, pan-EU legislation is not always suited to current market practices, or developments.


  Transparency is a key factor in the success and growth of PE/VC. EVCA has developed the highest professional standards to build stable, long-term relationships with institutional investors and regulators and increase overall transparency and trust in the asset class.

Excessive leverage and systemic risks

  Recent analysis tends to show that the average ratio of European debt contributions as a percentage of total buyout transaction value has not varied substantially over recent years, and debt ratios of PE/VC-backed firms expressed as a percentage of their total assets do not significantly differ from quoted blue-chip companies. Moreover, systemic risk from PE/VC to global financial markets, as part of a risk-adjusted investment portfolio, is low.

The current corporate status of private equity funds

  Within the current underlying tax and legal environment across Europe, PE/VC funds are structured according to their specific investors needs and requirements to maximise the returns on their investments.


  The PE/VC industry and its investors are not asking for or looking for "no tax" but are seeking a fair tax treatment: tax transparency and tax neutrality.

The economic context

  PE/VC firms distinguish themselves from short-term investors by the way they manage their investments. Specifically, PE-buyout firms aim to improve the health of existing companies in order to fully benefit from favourable market developments.

  The growth of PE/VC can be attributed to a number of factors including demographic pressures in Europe and the need by suitable investors to secure risk-adjusted premium returns over the longer term through prudent allocations to PE/VC.

Company ownership by private equity funds as opposed to public listing

  EVCA would not draw a distinctive comparison as both are complementary and support different types of companies at different stages of their growth and development.


Is the current regulatory regime for private equity funds suitable?

  1.  Further to EVCA's recent response[18] to the UK FSA's recent discussion paper "Private equity: a discussion of risk and regulatory engagement"[19] , it should be noted from the outset that the PE/VC industry deals almost exclusively with sophisticated (professional, institutional) investors on a professional basis, and as such is a contractual business between parties of equal standing. As a result, PE/VC regulation has been designed to the appropriateness of its investor base.

  2.  PE/VC is regulated at a national level in almost all EU countries. The question as to whom is subject to regulation is dependent on the type of legal entity, and either Management Company and/or the PE/VC Fund vehicle and/or Senior Management, decided on a national basis.

  3.  Furthermore, although not regulated on a harmonised pan-European basis, PE/VC is subject to a number of EU legislative measures, notably within the field of EU financial services.

  4.  By way of brief summary, a non-exhaustive summary of the situation in a number of European countries is presented below:

  Examples of current PE/VC regulation across Europe (non exhaustive summary)

No specific regulatory framework but specific tax regulation

Baltic States:Estonia and Lithuania may adopt legislation in 2007

Finland:New legislation in place since early 2006 which treats VC funds similarly to direct investors and introducing new tax treatment for VC investments

France:PE/VC Industry regulated by the AMF: A specific legal framework (FCPR) can be used for VC funds, funds of funds, buyouts.

Germany:Currently two main types of funds: an unlicensed Limited Partnership (LP) structure, and a structure that is licensed at state level

Ireland:A General Partner in a Limited Partnership does not have to be regulated however some funds have voluntarily chosen to be regulated by the Financial Services Regulator

Italy:Fund regulation exists in the form of the "Fondo Chiuso"

Portugal:Fund regulation exists with differences between sophisticated and retail investors

Slovenia:A new law regulating Venture Capital is expected mid-2007.

Spain:Industry regulated by the CNMV: New fund legislation since end of 2005.

Sweden:Regulatory framework for LP (Limited Partnership) and LL (Limited Liability)

UK:Industry regulated by the FSA (both PE/VC fund and managers)

  5.  Although EVCA believes that the current regulatory and legislative framework is generally appropriate, EVCA also notes the lack of interlinkage between national regimes. However, pan-EU legislation is not always suited to current market practices or developments. This was recently noted by EU Commissioner Mccreevy who remarked that; "many Member States and at the EU level need to understand better the way in which the private equity industry is organised... We must be sure that cross-cutting financial and company law does not generate unintended consequences for the private equity industry".[20]

  6.  EVCA is strongly supportive of the balanced, measured and pragmatic approach taken by the UK FSA towards the PE/VC industry. Specifically in respect of the UK regulatory environment, in its recent paper, EVCA supports the FSA's conclusion that its "current regulatory architecture is effective, proportionate and adequately resourced".

  7.  The UK has consistently been among the top 3 European countries in respect of their environment for PE/VC, as seen in the EVCA benchmark surveys[21] . The most recent indicators published last December demonstrated again that the UK is at the forefront of European policy making with respect to the industry.

"Better Regulation"

  8.  Within this context and initiatives to advance principles-based "better regulation", strong industry professional standards can contribute to and result in more effective industry oversight.

  9.  European PE/VC has the most advanced self-regulatory professional standards of any alternative asset class anywhere in the world. These concern among others the valuation of portfolios, reporting to investors, and corporate governance. In addition, all EVCA's 1,150 members have signed and abide by a code of conduct, a precondition for membership. EVCA also works to develop new professional standards to cover additional topics such as disclosure and is extending its code of conduct based on the IOSCO model. All Guidelines are open to a stakeholder and public consultation process[22] .

  10.  EVCA also intends to intensify co-operation with regulators throughout Europe further to the growth of principles-based "better regulation" initiatives which seek to provide "confirmation of industry guidance[23] " such as that recently launched by the FSA, which will strengthen oversight of the industry by providing further recognition of the industry's own self-regulatory standards.

  11.  Further remarks on EVCA's and the PE/VC industry's professional standards are provided as evidence below.

Is there sufficient transparency on the activities, objectives and structure of private equity funds for all relevant interested parties?


  12.  The PE/VC industry understands transparency as providing full information to its direct investors and being accountable to them. Investors in PE/VC funds have access to a lot of information, and sometimes more than investors in public companies.

  13.  EVCA believes that transparency is a key factor in the success and growth of PE/VC. As noted above, EVCA has developed the highest professional standards build stable, long-term relationships with institutional investors and regulators and increase overall transparency and trust in the asset class. These standards are in addition to statutory requirements[24] and enable professional investors such as Pension fund trustees to fulfil their duties.

  14.  In terms of the transparency of PE/VC activities and professional industry standards, it should be noted that the industry provides full transparency and disclosure to its investors, specifically through:

    —  EVCA Reporting Guidelines, first published in 2000 and updated in 2006 which cover for example:

    —  Statutory accounts

    —  Timing

    —  Fund reporting

    —  Portfolio reporting

    —  Fees and carried interest

    —  Performance measurement

    —  International PE/VC Valuation Guidelines (Developed by EVCA/ BVCA /AFIC (the French PE/VC Association), which cover for example:

    —  The concept of fair value

    —  Principles of valuation

    —  Valuation methodologies

    —  Specific considerations

  Moreover, these standards are consistent with IFRS and US GAAP.

  15.  In addition, EVCA's Code of Conduct, which is signed by all its members as a condition of membership covers among others:

    —  Conduct business in a responsible and ethical way (ie fair and honest dealing)

    —  Ensure confidentiality on data and information

    —  Disclose fully on syndicated deals

    —  Implementing Anti Money Laundering measures

    —  Ensuring a high standard of the investment portfolio

  In light of the above, EVCA would not describe the PE/VC industry as opaque. However, it would also note that the word "disclosure" is also relevant to this discussion.


  16.  The PE/VC industry understands disclosure as the provision of information to non-direct investors or on a public basis.

  17.  EVCA is fully aware of the current debate over the growing role of PE/VC within the European economy and thus a greater need for public disclosure. This is a valid point and the PE/VC industry is not against a review of this. EVCA has conducted own work in this area since 2003[25] , and welcomes the ongoing work in the UK led by the BVCA and chaired by Sir David Walker.

  18.  However it is important to distinguish between disclosure to Investors, to whom the provision of specific and detailed information is already covered by the EVCA Reporting Guidelines as noted above, and disclosure to the General Public who have limited knowledge of the practical workings of the PE/VC industry, including for example the complex techniques used to value and measure investment performance on the specific long-term based return curve ("J-curve").

  19.  There is no need to single out PE/VC-backed companies when listed and non-listed companies (like family business) are not requested to disclose more than that which is according to national regulations. Investing in a company, and managing an investment fund, can often require addressing specificities and technicalities in respect of a private company's long-tem future; often this cannot be disclosed to a wider public, taking into account commercial sensitivities.

  20.  Furthermore, regulatory bodies issue statutory requirements including the filling of financial information. These fillings allow the General Public in most European countries to have access to information at the level of portfolio companies such as sales, turnover, debt/equity ratio and earnings. PE/VC-backed companies are no different from any other private company in this regard.

  21.  However, there is no harmonised legislation or general legal framework across Europe relating to the disclosure of PE/VC information as national PE/VC markets across Europe are at different stages of development and thus levels of maturity. It is thus necessary to consider the situation in other, international, PE/VC markets.

  22.  Therefore EVCA believes that the disclosure of PE/VC information should not put the underlying investee companies at a competitive disadvantage in the marketplace or undermine their economic position. Revealing their underlying strategy would negatively impact their growth capacity, as well as ultimately the company workforce. This would lead to a lower acceptance of private equity investment by private companies, and result in reduced returns for investors.

Has there been evidence of excessive leverage in recent transactions and what systemic risks arise in consequence?

  23.  Recent FSA[26] and European Central Bank (ECB)[27] reports essentially into the "large buyout" category of the PE/VC industry have addressed these issues from that perspective. Before continuing, EVCA would firstly draw attention to the great diversity of PE/VC firms, a very large number of whom do not raise concerns in those areas, as their transactions often involve little or no leverage.

Excessive Leverage

  24.  The concept of overleveraging should be used with caution, as it is clearly dependent on actual market conditions and defaults occur not only in the PE/VC sphere.

  25.  Leveraging a company should be undertaken prudently and be dependent on market conditions as it may jeopardize the company's value and would have a negative impact on the value of its investment. An overleveraged company per se will not produce enough cash-flow to pay the interests of its debt and reimburse this debt. All stakeholders are affected: debt providers, employees and shareholders. Moreover, creditors generally refuse to provide financing for a company that appears to be overleveraged.

  26.  Therefore, Private Equity buyout firms try to carefully assess the level of debt of their investee companies. The decision to lower the percentage of equity is normally motivated either because the initial capital structure resulted from a sub-optimal use of financial resources or because, as active shareholders, buyout houses initiate strategies aimed to increase margins and create higher cash-flows.

  27.  Recent analysis using Standard and Poor's data (S&P LCD at tends to show that the average ratio of European debt contributions as a percentage of total buyout transaction value (1997—Q3 2006) has not varied substantially over recent years: this figure stood at 67% in 2006, compared to 66% in 2005, and 64% in 2004. The figure for 2006 is even lower than the figure for 1997 (70%).

Average European debt contributions as % of total transaction value 1997—Q3 2006[28]

  28.  Moreover, when looking at companies PE buyout firms listed on public markets in 2005-2006, their debt ratios expressed as a percentage of their total assets do not significantly differ from quoted blue chip companies.

Comparison of debt ratios of listed blue chip companies with companies recently floated by their buyout houses (as % of total assets)[29]

  29.  Therefore, private equity backed investee companies do not appear overleveraged when compared to other firms.

  30.  In fact, a recent study carried out in Belgium involving 53 companies demonstrated that two years after a PE-backed buyout, their cash flow on average represented 7% of sales compared to 4% before the buyout. This increase was achieved while the average number of employee grew by more than 13% during the same period[30] .

Systemic Risk

  31.  To put the recent growth of PE/VC into perspective, it should also be noted that of the Worldwide total investible capital markets as of 2005, which amounted to some $93.4 Trillion, PE/VC accounted for just 0.3%[31] .

  32.  The use of leverage at the level of the PE/VC fund or fund of funds level, which could provoke systemic risk is very rare. Indeed, regulation in several jurisdictions and the contractual agreements between PE/VC investors (Limited Partners) and fund managers (General Partners) either prevent this from occurring or authorise it only at very low levels. This should be seen in comparison with Hedge Funds, where funds can be leveraged several times over and thus capable of provoking more systemic risk in the financial system.

  33.  Therefore, as compared to other alternative asset classes, EVCA would argue that systemic risk from PE/VC to global financial markets when the asset class is deployed as part of a risk-adjusted investment portfolio is low.

What are the effects of the current corporate status of private equity funds, including both their domicile and ownership structure?

  34.  In the majority of EU countries, establishing and operating a PE/VC fund as well as establishing and operating the management company of the fund is a regulated activity[32] .

  35.  Within the current underlying tax and legal environment across Europe, PE/VC funds are structured according to their specific investors needs and requirements, who themselves must take into account their own liabilities (for example to pensioners or insurance policy holders) to maximise the returns on their investments.

  36.  Furthermore, the precise composition of the capital structures used by PE/VC fund managers for the investee companies they acquire is evolving over time and it is evident that large, complex, cross-border transactions may involve the use of complex structures. Notwithstanding, it does not seem to be within the regulators domain to determine the preferable forms of ownership in private companies.

  37.  The UK Limited Partnership Structure is not only one of the most used PE/VC fund vehicles in Europe, it has also ranked highly in EVCA benchmark[33] surveys of the PE/VC environment in Europe and many other European countries have taken the UK Limited Partnership as their basis.


Is the current taxation regime for private equity funds and investee firms appropriate?

  38.  Each European country has a single fiscal framework that applies to all companies in a country, for example for the treatment of debt interest.

  39.  It is important that political decision makers understand that changes to the above not only affect the whole PE/VC industry but also the whole corporate world. This is also important within the context of achieving the European single market and facilitating cross-border activities.

  40.  The PE/VC industry and its investors are not asking for or looking for "no tax" but are seeking a fair tax treatment: tax transparency and tax neutrality. Tax transparency means investors should be treated as if they had directly invested in the underlying investee company. Tax neutrality means avoiding discrimination of PE/VC tax treatment as opposed to investments in public equity.

  41.  On a pan-European level, EVCA has been advocating for some time for a pan-European harmonised PE/VC fund structure to address these and related issues.

  42.  Within the context of the Select Committee enquiry, EVCA would like to draw attention to the following points which are also specific to PE/VC and are currently under discussion by a number of EU countries.

Debt Interest Tax Deductibility

  43.  Across Europe, debt interest tax deductibility is available to all companies, within nationally defined limits which govern among others debt/equity ratios.

  44.  PE/VC's business model is highly efficient and the use of debt is a discipline that maximises the efficient use of working capital.

  45.  If taxation is imposed on the interest on debt, this will not only damage PE/VC but the financial sector and the economies of European Member states: it would equate to a tightening of monetary policy.

Carried Interest

  46.  The management team of a PE/VC fund is requested by fund investors to make a significant personal contribution to the capital of the fund, and the profit sharing scheme ("carried interest") align managers' interests with those of the fund's investors. Carried interest is received in acknowledgement of and financial compensation for the personal risk taken by fund managers as individuals, and is not distributed before investors have received their original capital, a special hurdle rate interest, and own share of profit. Furthermore, any distribution of capital gain to investors and managers is not possible before exiting an investment: therefore based only on the actual performance of the investment.

  47.  This reward structure is an important differentiator for PE/VC as compared to the hedge fund model, where shared profits to Hedge Fund managers are calculated and distributed regularly, at a fixed date, on the actual market value of the investment, even if it has not been exited: therefore based on the potential performance of the investment.

  48.  Carried interest is thus a capital gain, and attracts managers to the industry, who generate returns for their investors. Therefore tax treatment of carried interest should be appropriate to supporting this.


Are developments in the environment and structure of private equity affecting investments in the long-term?

  49.  PE/VC fund investors have a long-term commitment horizon of generally ten years, which stems from contractual agreements which bind PE/VC funds to their investors (such as pension funds, insurance companies and banks).

  50.  On this basis, PE/VC funds should not be considered as short-term investors, which implies holding periods of less than one year, as their average holding periods in investee companies is 4 years.

  51.  More concretely, PE/VC firms also distinguish themselves from short-term investors by the way they manage their investments. Short-term investors take advantage of market trends but do not influence the way the underlying companies operate. In particular, PE Buyout firms have an opposite strategy, which first aims to improve the health of underlying companies in order to fully benefit from favourable market developments.

  52.  Regarding PE Buyout firms, they increase the value of their investments through a combination of three elements:

    1.  Better use of financial resources, notably through an appropriate use of debt

    2.  Improved company operations

    3.  Redesign and refocus of the corporate strategy

  53.  By acting on these three elements, PE Buyout firms enhance the growth potential of companies until their value is fully recognised by other investors, who then want to become shareholders in the company themselves:

    —  Better use of financial resources is implemented relatively quickly and the results show rapidly.

    —  Improving the operational quality of a company takes longer and therefore more time is needed before the related benefits start to surface.

    —  Redesigning a company's corporate strategy is a long-term endeavour, the outcome of which often takes years to materialise.

  54.  Long holding periods apply to both SMEs and large companies. A recent study conducted in 2006 revealed that PE Buyout houses remained shareholders in their biggest companies for an average of 3.5 years[34] .

  55.  Furthermore, the underlying economic strength of PE/VC-backed companies is also demonstrated by their performance after PE Buyout firms have decided to sell them. A recent study showed that the share price of companies that were originally supported by buyout houses outperformed other floated companies by 11 percentage points three years after their IPO on a stock market[35].

  56.  Therefore, within this context and the important job-creating role of PE/VC across Europe, with the PE/VC industry as a whole investing some €50 billion into European companies in 2006 and at least the same amount to be invested this year (including some €16 billion raised/invested for VC investments alone), and with 93% of all companies financed by PE/VC firms by number having less than 500 employees[36] , it is arguable that PE/VC investments will have and are having a long-term positive effect on the economy.

To what factors, including the current macroeconomic context and position in the economic cycle, is the current rise of private equity attributable?

  57.  The growth of PE/VC can be attributed to a number of factors:

    —  Demographic pressures such as ageing populations in Europe and the need to secure risk-adjusted premium returns over the longer term by suitable investors such as Pension Funds and Insurance companies to meet their liabilities to their policyholders through prudent allocations to PE/VC;

    —  Generational change within European companies as ownership patterns change means that particularity within a number of countries within continental Europe there are a range of existing companies that require new leadership to continue;

    —  A benign economic environment with a period of low interest rates has facilitated PE/VC investment; and

    —  The superior alignment of interests between PE/VC fund managers and company owners and effective oversight of the investee company by active, strategic investors who focus on value creation over longer time horizons have helped to continue to generate superior returns, and which have continued to attract investors.

What are the economic advantages and disadvantages of a firm being owned by private equity funds as opposed to being publicly listed?

  58.  EVCA would not draw such a distinctive comparison between the public and private markets, as both are complementary and serve to support different types of companies at different stages of their growth and development. Moreover, specific legislation and PE/VC industry professional standards place reporting and internal control processes requirements on a company, listed or otherwise.

  59.  When a PE/VC fund de-lists a company, it is part of a strategy to be able to strengthen it through reorganisation, often difficult to do under the quarterly earnings pressure of stock markets, and then to re-list it once it is back in better shape.

  60.  The key reason for delisting a company is its undervaluation by stock markets, consequently, limiting its potential for development and growth and going private becomes a preferred solution when:

    —  Shareholders do not get the reward for their investment and are likely to accept an offer from outside investors (PE/VC or other). In return, shareholders receive liquidity and a premium on the share price, which is why they support delisting, and;

    —  The management of the undervalued company is limited in trying to develop the company. It is difficult to raise equity by issuing more shares given that interest from new investors is low and that current shareholdings would be diluted. Additionally, the company cannot increase its debt levels, as financial support from banks is unlikely.

  61.  Each year, PE/VC identifies a small number of undervalued companies for delisting. This should not be seen as a way to deny existing shareholders value. Studies on UK and US pubic to private transactions show that shareholders receive on average 45% more for their investment than what the market would have given them before the buyout deal was announced[37] . In the first 6 months of 2006, 10 companies were de-listed by buyout houses, with €23 billion paid to their existing shareholders.

Public to Private Management Buyouts/Buyins (CE), 2000-2006 [38]
YearNumber Number
(% of all deals)
(EUR m)
(% of all deals)
2000204.0 6,203.717.2
2001152.9 7,772.422.8
2002132.3 6,676.115.6
2003183.1 3,787.59.0
2004111.8 8,124.916.1
2005212.9 20,883.422.7
H1 2006102.9 22,935.840.6

  62.  Finally, there are regulatory requirements that must be fulfilled to delist a company, namely a large majority of shareholders are required to accept the sale of their shares at the offer price. For the UK, 75% of a company's shares are required to re-register the target as a private company and 90% to "squeeze out" minority shareholders[39]. Shareholders can also subsequently ask an independent investment bank to analyze the offer.

May 2007

Open Hearing on Investment Fund Expert Groups Reports, Brussels, 19 July 2006.

The data refers to the leverage loan market and covers loans that are syndicated to borrowers in Europe. It only takes account of LBO transactions, including all sponsored activity such as refinancing and recapitalisations.

Note: (*) denotes a company that has been recently floated by a buyout firm in 2005/2006.

12   Source: EVCA. Back

13   Further information on EVCA is available online at Back

14   Source: EVCA. Back

15   "Employment Contribution of Private Equity and Venture Capital in Europe": Back

16   EVCA Professional Standards: Back

17   Text and characteristics drawn from the recent European Commission Expert Group Report on Private Equity, June 2006: Back

18   For more information, please see: Back

19 Back

20   Charlie McCreevy, European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services Back

21   EVCA Benchmarking of European tax and legal environments: Back

22   EVCA Professional Standards: Back

23   FSA's Discussion paper 06/5 "FSA confirmation of Industry Guidance", November 2006: Back

24   EVCA's Professional Standards can be found online at: Back

25   EVCA Barometer May 2003: "Disclosure-a snapshot on EVCA members' opinion": Back

26 Back

27   Large Banks And Private Equity-Sponsored Leveraged Buyouts in the EU, April 2007: Back

28   Source: S&P LCD at Back

29   Source: EVCA-Latest company annual report (2005 or 2006) Back

30   Solvay Business School, Brussels (2006) "Private Equity in Belgium-Value Creators or Locusts?" by Valentin Toubeau. Back

31   Source: UBS Global Asset Management / Adams Street Partners NVCA Annual Meeting 2006. Back

32   EVCA Private Equity Fund Structures in Europe-January 2006: Back

33   EVCA Benchmarking Tax and Legal Environments 2006: Back

34   Ernst & Young (2006), "How do European Private Equity Investors Create Value?":$file/How%20do%20Private%20Equity%20investors%20create%20value.pdf Back

35   Ritter R. J. (2006): "Some factoids about the 2005 IPO Market": Back

36   Source: EVCA. Back

37   Wright M., Renneborg L., Simons T. and Scholes L. (2006): "Leveraged buyouts in the U.K. and continental Europe: Retrospect and Prospect", European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI): Back

38   CMBOR/ Barclays Private Equity/ Deloitte (2006): "European Management Buyouts": Back

39   SJ Berwin (2007): "Public-to-private: An overview": Back

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